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Armija BiH  The Army of the Republic of Bosnia Herzegovina. (The largely Muslim 
army of Bosnia-Herzegovina).
CPY The Communist Party of Yugoslavia.
HDZ    Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica. The Croatian Democratic Union. (The 
Croat nationalist party. Though this is a Croat party, my informants al-
ways referred to HDZ and not to HDZ-BiH, when talking about Croat 
nationalist policy).
HDZ-BiH  Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica – Bosna i Hercegovina. The Croatian 
Democratic Union – Bosnia-Herzegovina. (The Bosnian Croat national-
ist party). 
HOS   Hrvatska Odbrambene Snage. The Croatian Defence Force.
HV   Hrvatska Vojska. The Croatian Army.
HVO  Hrvatsko Vijeće Odbrane. The Croatian Defence Council. (The army of 
the Bosnian Croats).
IPTF  The International Police Task Force. 
JNA  Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija. The Yugoslav People’s Army.
LCY  The League of Communists of Yugoslavia.
NDH  Nezavisna Država Hrvatska; the Independent State of Croatia. The war-
time fascist state run by a Nazi-installed regime led by Ante Pavelić.
OHR  The Office of High Representative. (Created under the General Frame-
work Agreement for Peace in BiH (the Dayton Peace Agreement of De-
cember 1995) to oversee implementation of the civilian aspects of the 
Peace Agreement). 
OSCE  The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.
SDA  Stranka Demokratske Akcije. The Party for Democratic Action. (The Mus-
lim nationalist party). 
SDS  Srpska Demokratska Stranka. The Serb Democratic Party in Bosnia 
Herzegovina. (The Serb nationalist party).
SDP  Socijaldemokratska Stranka. The Social Democratic Party. (Non-national-
ist party, mainly supported by Muslims). 
SFOR  The Stabilisation Force. (A NATO-led multinational force overseeing the 
implementation of the Dayton agreement).
SBiH  Stranka za Bosnu i Hercegovinu. The Party for Bosnia Herzegovina.      
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Part I
Framing the question
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Prologue: Chronology of the war
Stolac, the town of departure for this book and the site where I conducted field-
work, is located in the south-western corner of Bosnia Herzegovina. Before the 
war, according to the population census from 1991, the municipality of Stolac 
had 1,1 inhabitants (Muslims: 43 %; Croats: 33 %; Serbs: 21 %; others: 3 %), 
and the town itself had 5,530 inhabitants (Muslims: 2 %; Serbs: 20 %; Croats: 
12 %; others:  %). A large proportion of the Croats lived in the minor villages 
in Stolac municipality. When I did fieldwork among the Muslims of Stolac no 
census figures were available, but judging from the number of schoolchildren 
attending the school in Stolac, the town had a majority of Croats, the rest be-
ing Muslims. Only a few Serb families had returned. According to the daily 
newspaper Dnevni Avaz ( December 2001), between 199 and 2001 about 3,00 
Muslim refugees had returned to the municipality of Stolac, and 1,00 to the 
town itself. Most of the Muslim returnees were confined to a few neighbour-
hoods in the eastern and southern part of the town, which were largely de-
stroyed during the war. 
Before the war Stolac was a beautiful and historical town, as can be seen 
from pre-war pictures. The town contained many buildings from the Ottoman 
period, including mosques, houses, housing complexes and bridges. Post World 
War Two architecture was finely adjusted to the cultural traditions of the town. 
Stolac also had a lot of light industry, with several of the factories employing be-
tween 200 and 1,000 people. In addition, there were banks, a shopping centre, a 
museum, a cinema, many cafés, a new hotel, a big market, a hospital and a high 
school. Today a large proportion of these buildings have been destroyed, the 
industry has fallen apart, and the Croat population runs nearly all the public 
institutions.
The war in Herzegovina
Bosnia Herzegovina experienced a fierce war from 1992 to 1995, a war which 
divided the country ethnically. The Dayton peace agreement of December 1995 
retained Bosnia Herzegovina’s international boundaries and created a joint 
multi-ethnic and democratic government. Also recognised was a second tier of 
government comprised of two entities roughly equal in size: the Bosniak/Croat 
Federation of Bosnia Herzegovina, and the Bosnian Serb-led Republika Srpska 
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1	 post-war identification
(RS) (see map). The Federation and RS governments were charged with over-
seeing internal functions. 
The war in Bosnia Herzegovina was initially an act of aggression and ter-
ritorial conquest instigated by Serbian political leaders. However, as the war 
progressed, it increasingly came to consist of several minor wars, one of them 
fought in Western Bosnia Herzegovina between Croatian and Muslim forces. 
This was the one that affected the inhabitants of Stolac the most. At the be-
ginning of the war, Bosnian Croats and Muslims had joined forces, primarily 
because they faced the same enemy, the Serbs, who had already conquered 
large parts of Bosnia Herzegovina in the first month of the war. Croatia had 
already suffered from Serbian attacks, so in Croatia people felt sympathy for 
their neighbours. However, the alliance was a marriage of convenience, made 
up of rather different strategies. 
The Bosnian Croats were divided between those living in central Bosnia, 
who considered themselves as much Bosnian as Croat, and the Croats living 
in areas dominated largely by Croats, mainly Western Herzegovina, who were 
eager to forge closer ties with Croatia proper, rather than with the other eth-
nic groups of Bosnia Herzegovina. The Herzegovinian Croats only constituted 
around a third of the total Croat population of Bosnia Herzegovina, but when 
the war started they were the most influential. This influence was primarily 
due to the existence of what some have called ‘the Herzegovinian lobby’ (Do-
nia and Fine 1994: 249; Grandits 200: 10-9), a hard-core nationalist group 
of mainly émigré Croats. The Herzegovinian lobby had contributed greatly to 
the Croatian President Tuđman’s presidential campaign in 1990 (Woodward 
2000). Tuđman – himself strongly nationalistic, with his dream of annexing 
substantial parts of Bosnia Herzegovina1 – rewarded his backers by supporting 
their desire to divide up Bosnia and make Herzegovina a part of Croatia. In July 
1992, the Herzegovinian Croats, led by Mate Boban, leader of the HDZ-BiH 
(Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica – Bosna i Hercegovina; the Croatian Demo-
cratic Union – Bosnia Herzegovina, a strongly nationalist Croat political party) 
convened a self-proclaimed Presidency of the Croatian Community of Herceg-
Bosna and declared a self-governing community (Donia and Fine 1994: 24-51; 
Glenny 199: 192-9; Bennet 1995: 19-202).
1  By March 1991 Tuđman and Milošović had already met to discuss the partition of Bosnia 
Herzegovina between them, and on  May 1992 Tuđman sponsored talks between Mate Boban, 
the leader of the Bosnian Croats’ strongly nationalistic and heavily influential political party 
HDZ, and Radovan Karadžić, leader of the Bosnian Serbs, at which time they considered a 
potential division of Bosnian territory (Bennet 1995: 200, Glenny 199: 193-4).
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The Herzegovinian Croats, despite the declaration of the self-governing 
community, lacked the strength to pursue the annexationist design and felt 
that in the long term an alliance with the Bosnian government was still the 
best way to realise their nationalist dreams. But it was clear from the start of 
the takeover of the HDZ-BiH by Mate Boban that the Muslim-Croat alliance 
was fragile: fighting broke out between Muslims and Croats at several places 
in Bosnia Herzegovina, and Croats started driving out Muslim inhabitants of 
villages under Croat control (Donia and Fine 1994: 250, Glenny 199: 194, Ci-
gar 1995: 125). For their part, the Muslims, who were desperately pursuing the 
goal of an autonomous unitary Bosnia Herzegovina, had no alternative but to 
form an alliance with the Bosnian Croats and uphold the best possible relation 
with Croatia. The Bosnian forces (of which the majority was Muslims) were ill-
equipped and would have stood no chance if they were to face both the Serbs 
and the Croats. Furthermore, they depended on good relations with the HVO 
(Hrvatsko Vijeće Odbrane, the Croatian Defence Council, the army of the Bos-
nian Croats) in order to receive the illegal weapons supplies (illegal because of 
the international weapons embargo) coming through Croat-held territory, as 
well as food supplies to major Bosnian cities (Glenny 199: 195, 22). 
Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina, then, were officially war allies during 
1992 and the beginning of 1993, and in Herzegovina Muslims fought in the 
ranks of the HVO against the Serbs. But in spring 1993, the latent Muslim-Croat 
conflict escalated into full-scale war. A prime reason was probably the interna-
tional community’s Vance-Owen peace proposal, which, in addition to ratify-
ing the carving up of Bosnia Herzegovina along ethnic lines, also allotted a 
proportionally large amount of territory to the Bosnian Croats. For the Bosnian 
Croats the Vance-Owen peace proposal was an incentive to consolidate their 
respective positions and assume full control of the area assigned to them under 
the plan, as well as to seize additional areas from the Bosnian government, in-
cluding areas where Croatians were in a distinct minority (as in Stolac).
In many areas of Western Herzegovina the Bosnian Croats’ policy result-
ed in open fighting between Muslims and Croats. The Croats wanted to cleanse 
the territories ethnically and unite them with Croatia, while the Muslims want-
ed to keep the areas under the control of a multi-ethnic Bosnian state. Some of 
the fiercest fighting of the entire war broke out between Muslims and Croats 
in Mostar. And in areas south and south-west of Mostar (among them Stolac) 
the entire Muslim population, including former Muslim co-combatants, was 
disarmed and arrested, then placed in horrendous prison camps (logori) or ex-
pelled to territory held by the Bosnian army. At the same time the Croats and 
Muslims were still fighting together against the Serbs, in Sarajevo for instance.
001_316_post-war.indd   19 14/04/08   22:04:14
Denne side er købt på www.ebog.dk og er omfattet af lov om ophavsret. Uanset evt. aftale med Copy-Dan er det ikke tilladt at kopiere eller
indscanne siden til undervisningsbrug eller erhvervsmæssig brug.
20	 post-war identification
A year later the fighting between the Muslims and Croats was stopped 
by the signing of the Washington agreement by both parties on 1 March 1994. 
It was a federation agreement, and though not respected as such – the Croats 
did not dismantle their newly created republic of Herceg-Bosna, and joint com-
mand of the two armies remained a fiction – it was a step towards stopping 
the war in Bosnia Herzegovina. The Dayton agreement, which officially put 
an end to almost four years of total destruction and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia 
Herzegovina, was signed on 21 November 1995. The agreement was not a formal 
division of Bosnia Herzegovina (see however Mertus 2000), but in reality the 
country has been ethnically divided ever since. The Serb Republic is control-
led and mainly inhabited by Serbs, and the Federation (between Muslims and 
Croats) is itself divided in Croat and Muslim areas and jurisdictions. As a case 
in point, today the country has in reality three different armies. 
Today Bosnia Herzegovina faces huge problems. One of the hardest to 
solve has to do with the repatriation of displaced people. Between 100,000	and	
200.000 people died during the war, and more than 2 million out of a total 
pre-war population of 4.3 million were internal or external refugees after the 
war. So besides facing a completely ruined economy, a destroyed production 
apparatus, enormous unemployment, war traumas en masse, corruption and a 
general mood of despondency, the Bosnian people and Bosnian political sys-
tem in cooperation with the Office of High Representatives (OHR) also have to 
solve the impossible puzzle of relocating people to their houses, houses which 
have in many cases been ruined or occupied. When the war was brought to an 
end, a pilot project facilitating inter-Federation returns in four towns was initi-
ated. One of these was Stolac, where the Muslim and Serb populations were 
to be supported in returning. The return of the Muslim population to Stolac 
was met with resistance by the Croats, many of whom had fled to Stolac from 
central Bosnia during the war. These Croats feared for ‘their’ (the Muslims’) 
property as well as their newly won political power in town. And on the ideo-
logical level, the Croats worried about the decreasing prospects for realising the 
independent state of Herceg-Bosna. Of the four pilot projects, the Stolac project 
has been the most difficult one to realise, due to the immense obstruction from 
the Croats living in town. With this background in mind, I will now focus more 
closely on Stolac and offer some details. 
  The figure 200,000 is from UN sources, the figure 100,000 is from a recent research project at 
  See OHR’s HumanRights report 2, May 199.
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The war in Stolac
The war started officially in April 1992, when Serbian forces occupied Stolac. 
But many people sadly recall an incident six months earlier, when a war me-
morial from World War Two commemorating fallen Partisans was blown up.4 
The monument was located in front of the school. Today on the same spot the 
Croats have placed a bust of Ivan Musić, who was a leading Croat resister in the 
Herzegovinian revolt (15-1). The Serbian occupation of Stolac town did 
not meet any resistance. The Serbs set up their military camp outside town, but 
there was no fighting, and there was hardly any looting or killing as was the case 
in areas occupied by Serbs in eastern Bosnia during the same period. The occu-
pation of Stolac had severe consequences though. Most of the Croatian popula-
tion fled overnight, fearing the Serbian forces. The whole Serbian population 
of Stolac joined the Serbian army either compulsorily or voluntarily, and the 
Muslims secretly arranged a number of local defence units in order to protect 
their families if necessary. Some Stolac Croats have subsequently accused the 
Muslims of not having resisted the Serbian occupational force, but according 
to my informants resistance would have been suicidal, as the Muslims were too 
badly equipped to face what was the fourth largest army in Europe.
Two months after the Serbian occupation, Croatian forces (the HVO and 
the HOS) conquered Stolac almost without a fight, and the Serbs withdrew 
to the mountains and hills east and southeast of Stolac. Many of the Mus-
lims regarded the Croatian takeover as a relief. They hoped and thought things 
would improve, and many believed the Croats’ explicit statements about their 
desire for Muslim and Croatian coexistence, although on the other hand they 
also regarded the massive Croatian presence as a new occupation (vlast). Many 
Muslims from Stolac joined the forces of the Bosnian Croats (the HVO) be-
cause there were no units of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia Herzegovina 
(Armija BiH) in town: the closest was around Mostar, and service here would 
have meant separation from one’s family. Soon after the Serbian withdrawal, 
4  I do not know the reason for the sabotage, but see Bax (199) for similar actions elsewhere in 
Herzegovina, where Partisan memorials were interpreted by local Croats as symbols of Serbian 
oppression. 
  Serbian forces in Bosnia Herzegovina consisted of Bosnian Serbs as well as part of the former 
JNA.
  Several Muslims I spoke to saw the Croatian conquest of Stolac as part of a deal between the 
Serbian and Croatian forces about sharing the territory of Bosnia Herzegovina between them. 
As an example of such a deal people recall how in this period of Croatian/Muslim control of 
Stolac, Croatian refugees from Central Bosnia were driven to Croatian territory south of Stolac 
through Serb-controlled territory, that is, with the approval of the Serbs (see Glenny 199: 19-	
for further elements of the political games influencing life in Stolac).
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the Serbs started shelling Stolac, which caused several casualties, and fighting 
between HVO and the Serbs resumed. 
The Muslims and Croats joined forces from June/July 1992 and for almost 
a year, though as mentioned above it was a marriage of convenience. There 
was sporadic fighting between Croat and Bosnian forces several places in Bos-
nia Herzegovina, though not in the Stolac area. Then in April 1993, the Croats 
started arresting leading Muslim intellectuals and local Muslim politicians in 
and around Stolac, as well as the few Muslims who held more responsible posi-
tions in the HVO. The arrests continued, and on the 1 July all adult Muslim men 
from Stolac were arrested, interrogated, beaten and driven to prison camps 
(logori). According to my sources the oldest person arrested was 90 years old, 
and the youngest 13. A few managed to escape through the mountains, and a 
few hid in the hills. According to my informants, the whole operation was car-
ried out systematically by troops from the HVO and the HV (Hrvatska Vojska, 
the Croatian army). To the Stolac Muslims the mass arrest came as a surprise. 
Although they had had a feeling that something was going to happen, my in-
formants had generally been ‘naïve’ enough to hope that ethnic cleansing was 
not going to happen to them. Nevertheless, the Muslim men were forced into 
prison camps known as Dretelj and Gabela after the villages of the same name 
outside Čapljina, not far from Stolac. The camps were former JNA (Jugoslov-
enska Narodna Armija; the Yugoslav People’s Army) hangars and ammunition 
warehouses, totally unfit for human habitation. The Muslims were crammed 
together in these extremely hot and totally dark buildings. They were beaten, 
threatened, starved and offered extremely low rations of water. And they were 
forced to listen to and also sing Croatian nationalist songs. 
Women and children continued to stay in Stolac for about one month 
after the men had been expelled. It was a month of fear and uncertainty. Croats 
looted and burned down old Muslim houses, and terrorised the Muslim civil-
ians. And the women and children had no information about their husbands, 
fathers and brothers. Then on 3 and 4 August, the women and children (and 
the men who had hidden themselves) were picked up in their homes, escorted 
to the school or a local factory where they were robbed, and then transported 
to the borders of Croat-held territory, from where they were forced to walk to 
the Bosnian-held territory of Blagaj. In Blagaj people searched for places to stay, 
  Though it is important to account for the many local strategies and motives in the war (see 
e.g. Bax 2000a, 2000b) when outlining episodes in the war in Southern Herzegovina, one also 
has to acknowledge that the expulsion of the Muslims from Stolac and other towns was or-
chestrated from above and formed part of a general Croatian attempt to annex and ethnically 
cleanse parts of Bosnia Herzegovina, see for instance Cigar (1995) and Glenny (199).
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in private homes, or abandoned houses: many families lived together in a few 
square metres. 
Throughout the following year (1993-94) the women, children and eld-
erly lived under miserable conditions. Both Croatian and Serbian forces shelled 
them, there was hardly any food to be obtained, and many contracted infec-
tious diseases. Some managed to smuggle money or some basic food supplies 
past the Croatian search in Stolac, but these resources only lasted a short time. 
Following the expulsion of the Muslims, Croatian forces started looting 
Muslim property in Stolac and destroying all signs of the town’s Muslim herit-
age: the town’s four mosques were blown up and the remnants were removed. 
Old houses, the town market, the town café, which had been built in traditional 
Ottoman style in 19, and an office complex from 1990 were burned. Libraries, 
private as well as public, were burned, collections of carpets and rugs and other 
old irreplaceable antiques were destroyed. The destruction of Stolac formed 
part of what can be seen as a general ‘urbicide’ (destruction of urbanity) in 
Bosnia Herzegovina (Coward 2002).
For the first three months after the internment, the prison camps were 
kept secret, but their existence was brought to public attention after the visit of 
the journalist Ed Vulliamy to the camps on  September 1993 (Vulliamy 1995: 
2-) and the visit of the Red Cross the day before. After the visit of the Red 
Cross, around 500 of the prisoners in the poorest condition were released, but 
only on condition that they were to be transported to territory outside Bos-
nia Herzegovina – that is, mainly European countries and the US. The rest re-
mained in the camps. In the following month more were released, but many 
remained imprisoned until March 1994, when the Washington deal was signed. 
They could then rejoin their families in Blagaj and other areas; for a period of 
one year, they had not had any information about one another. 
The return
As mentioned above, Stolac participated in a UN-sponsored pilot project to 
facilitate the inter-federation return of displaced persons. But such returns 
were difficult to realise, and many local politicians obstructed them. And the 
situation was particularly grave in Stolac. One must remember that the expul-
sion of the Muslims from villages in Herzegovina had formed part of a gen-
eral Croatian war aim of creating ethnically clean territories, whereas return 
  See document Crimes in Stolac Municipality for a thorough statement of the destruction of 
historic monuments in Stolac. The document is also on the Internet: http://www.haverford.
edu/relg/sells/stolac/CrimesSt.pdf
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projects such as the one in Stolac attempted to remix these territories. In the 
eyes of many nationalist-minded Herzegovinian Croats, towns like Stolac had 
been conquered in war – so they and their contents were to be seen as booty. 
In 199, groups of Muslims began visiting Stolac for the first time since 
the war. They drove from Mostar by bus escorted by SFOR (Stabilisation Force; 
a NATO-led multinational force overseeing the implementation of the Dayton 
agreement). On their arrival in Stolac they were often met by angry Croats 
throwing stones, eggs and bread at the buses. According to my informants, the 
throwing of bread was an attempt to insult the Muslims, which alluded to the 
period during the war when the Muslims were starving to death. The Muslims 
could not walk the streets or visit their properties, and only some were able 
to visit relatives’ graves. The visit was a shock for the Muslims. They had not 
seen the town after the destruction of all Muslim architecture; furthermore, 
the Croats had not cleaned up the town, and so rubble and garbage marred the 
face of the town. After the first visits many Muslims were disillusioned. Though 
they had initially looked forward to returning, many now had second thoughts. 
Nevertheless, workers protected by SFOR started rebuilding damaged and 
looted houses, preparing for the first Muslims to return. When the Croats re-
alised that the Muslims were actually going to return, a wave of post-war vio-
lence started. Around 200 Muslim houses in the municipality were blown up 
or burned within a short time, and the work of the pilot project was sabotaged. 
Though the mayor of the town had instructions from the UN to support the 
return, and though the police force was officially neutral, not one of the Croats 
guilty of these crimes was ever caught. The Croats kept intimidating the Mus-
lims hoping that they would not return and reclaim their property, and several 
episodes of physical violence were recorded.
Despite the difficulties and with a great deal of delay, the first sixteen Mus-
lim families returned to live in Stolac in June 199. The initial period was very 
difficult and horrifying. The Muslims did not dare walk the streets in the centre 
of town, as they were met with threats, comments and sometimes even direct 
assaults. The social network did not work; mostly people stayed indoors by 
themselves watching TV. There were no Muslim shops or cafés and nearly all 
the facilities (institutional as well as others) were controlled by and more or less 
reserved for Croats only. Many of the returning Muslims felt that Stolac was as 
a totally new town. The street names were new, the physical shape of the town 
was new, and there were new and unfamiliar neighbours. The situation was 
not unequivocally depressing. Croat shops soon started selling the products 
desired by the Muslims, and one of the Croat-run cafés welcomed the Muslims. 
People felt that some Croats (mainly old friends) were pleased with their re-
turn to Stolac. Slowly things started to improve: more Muslims returned, some 
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Muslims opened shops, and people began to feel safer – though the violent 
episodes and mining of property did continue and the police’s detection rate 
was almost zero.
At the beginning of 2000, things improved further. Following the death 
of the Croatian president Franjo Tuđman in December 1999, the financial sup-
port from Croatia to the Herzegovinian Croats and their self-proclaimed inde-
pendent state Herceg-Bosna dried up (Grandits 200). This made them much 
more dependent on funding from the international community, funding that 
the OHR and UN could use as a political means of exerting pressure. And be-
cause Mostar was much more important for the leading Croat politicians in the 
HDZ than Stolac – which on the other hand held a high symbolic significance 
for the OHR – deals about such issues as the school and the return of Muslim 
property could be made. Furthermore, in April 199, the Croat mayor of Stolac, 
Pero Raguz, became the first Bosnian politician to be sacked by the UN’s High 
Representative Carlos Westendorp. And in November 1999 his successor Pero 
Pazin was also sacked, due to his own obstruction of the return of the Muslim 
refugees. Furthermore, the local police were placed under the close scrutiny of 
the international Police Task Force (IPTF). When I started fieldwork in Sep-
tember 2000, the situation for the Muslims in Stolac was thus markedly better 
than it had been only one or two years before. Despite the improvement of the 
situation and despite the feeling of the Muslims that the Croats had accepted 
their presence, at least on a pragmatic level, changes were slow. Stolac was still a 
more or less totally ethnically divided town, with the Muslims being discrimi-
nated against on all levels of society. Many of my informants compared the 
situation to a kind of apartheid. 
The public sphere in Stolac 
Institutionally
According to several employees in the OHR, IPTF (International Police Task 
Force) and OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) I 
talked to, it was very difficult to make progress in Stolac municipality, as every 
attempt at establishing or facilitating inter-ethnic cooperation was obstructed 
by hardliners in the HDZ. Furthermore, according to the same sources, there 
was reason to believe that heavy and well-organised criminal activity emanated 
from institutions, companies and groups of persons around Stolac with con-
nections to the HDZ. Upholding the nationalist policy of ethnic separation 
could therefore be a way for such corrupt Croats to profit financially. I will not 
evaluate these presumptions; but it does make sense that a rather influential 
and inflexible group of Croats was trying as hard as possible to uphold ethnic 
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division in Stolac in as many areas as possible. When I did fieldwork, Stolac 
was ethnically divided on all institutional levels, and intense symbolic demon-
strations constantly reinforced nationalist thinking and promoted ethnic stere-
otypes. In short, antagonistic Croats dominated the public sphere, where they 
clearly communicated the message: “Croats and Muslims cannot live together.” 
I shall give some examples of how thorough the ethnic division and discrimina-
tion was on the institutional level at the time of my fieldwork.
All local public enterprises in Stolac had Croat directors, and they only 
employed Croat workers (only three Muslim men had been re-employed in 
their former jobs due to their much specialised skills). Croats ran the post of-
fice, the banks, the telephone company, the power supply, and the water com-
pany. As a result, Muslims used banks and post-offices in Mostar, and only a 
few Muslims had telephones in their homes. Furthermore, the post office only 
used Croatian stamps and Croatian currency (as well as DM: Deutschmarks). 
The municipal assembly elected in April 2000 was dominated by the HDZ and, 
despite the sharing of power principles laid down by the OSCE, Muslim town 
council members had been completely excluded from the local administration. 
Since the reunification of the cantonal police in the Herzegovina-Neretva can-
ton in June 2000, the local police station had officially been multiethnic. In-
terethnic cooperation had in reality been very rare. Furthermore, according to 
the local representative of the IPTF Croats still dictated the majority of police 
activities and protected criminals from prosecution. He himself had to conceal 
his written documents on a floppy disc, as they would not be safe on his com-
puter in his office at the police station. Since May 2000, Muslim school children 
had been permitted to make use of a small part of the local primary school, 
but classes for Muslims and Croat children were still held separately, and the 
secondary school as well as the school gym was for Croats only. Muslims were 
excluded from local public health care; the hospital built and financed with 
public funds before the war only treated Croats. The nearest TV antenna was 
turned so that it was only possible for the residents of Stolac to watch Croatian 
television unless they bought a satellite dish. A small town had been built on a 
field on the western side of Stolac, which was inhabited only by Croats. Croats 
occupied many Muslim houses, though the situation has improved since I left 
Stolac.  In short, the self-proclaimed state of Herceg-Bosna was a de facto reality. 
In fact, in November 2000, the HDZ took the initiative to hold a referendum 
among Croats, in order to establish an independent state Herceg-Bosna. This 
referendum, which was invalid under the terms set by the OHR, was regarded 
by the Muslims in town as pure provocation.
001_316_post-war.indd   26 14/04/08   22:04:15
Denne side er købt på www.ebog.dk og er omfattet af lov om ophavsret. Uanset evt. aftale med Copy-Dan er det ikke tilladt at kopiere eller
indscanne siden til undervisningsbrug eller erhvervsmæssig brug.
	 prologue: chronology of the war 2
Symbolically
The public sphere in Stolac was dominated by nationalist-minded Croats sym-
bolically as well as institutionally. The public sphere was filled with national-
ist symbols of all sorts. Again, let me offer some examples. Today the central 
mosque in town (Čaršija mosque) has been rebuilt; but when I did fieldwork, 
the whole area – where the mosque and all the old buildings connected to the 
marketplace area surrounding the mosque had been before – was laid out as 
a parking lot, and on one side there were three flags: the flag of Herceg-Bosna, 
and two flags with the Herzegovinian Croats’ newly designed version of the 
coat of arms of Stolac. A big wooden cross had been erected outside the mu-
nicipal office. Crosses were used by the Croats as territorial markers in various 
places in Herzegovina. On the outskirts of villages or areas ruled by Croats, 
one often saw two/three-meter-tall concrete crosses painted white. Inside the 
medical centre, there was a huge poster with a picture of the former Croatian 
president Franjo Tuđman, who supported the struggle of the Herzegovinian 
Croats. Inside all the public buildings I entered, I saw the Šahovnica (a framed 
checkerboard emblem composed of white and red squares, the Croatian coat 
of arms with strongly nationalist and at times fascist undertones) the size of a 
normal sheet, and several places also a poster of Franjo Tuđman. On the top of 
Stari Grad (Pasha Rizvanbegovic fortress, an old fortress and a cultural monu-
ment), there was a big Croatian flag that could be seen from almost any part 
of town. Nationalist Croat graffiti was abundant, though a lot of it originated 
from the time of the war. For instance, on entering Stolac one sees the sen-
tence Dobro došli U Stolac (Welcome to Stolac) painted on a house, with the 
‘U’ painted in a way that symbolises Ustashe. However, the graffiti is rather 
faded. Streets and town sites have been given new names, which are all part of 
a Croatian nationalist discourse. Many Bosnian Croat cars had a BiH (Bosnia 
Herzegovina) sticker on the back of the car, but the letters were printed on a 
red and white checked background, the Croatian national symbol. Leading up 
to the general election in November 2000, many of the election posters of the 
Herzegovinian Croats featured fierce nationalist rhetoric. In short, Stolac was 
ruled by nationalist-minded Herzegovinian Croats. On the institutional level 
and on the public symbolic level, the Muslims have no influence. In all these 
arenas ethnic discrimination and nationalist symbolism prevails.
I have found it necessary to begin with this short prologue summarising the war 
in Herzegovina and Stolac in particular, outlining the return of the Muslims to 
 Ustashe is closely connected to violent Croat nationalist and fascist policy. 
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Stolac, and describing the incessant dominance of nationalist ideology in the 
public sphere. These matters are rather complicated, and I refer to episodes and 
periods throughout the book. The other main function of the prologue is to de-
scribe a town where nationalist thinking had come to be totally dominant be-
cause of both war aims and post-war policy. My informants’ counterdiscourse, 
which is the focus of the book, has to be understood on the background of this 
dominance.
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Introduction
The war in former Yugoslavia – mainly Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina – and 
the fierceness with which it was carried out is probably still remembered by 
most Europeans. For many, this war inside Europe destroyed the feeling of liv-
ing in a peaceful region, a feeling built upon a common European commitment 
to not letting the Second World War repeat itself: Never again! Some, though, 
succeeded in upholding the idea of everlasting European peace by ascribing 
the war and violence in former Yugoslavia to an endemic Balkan mentality: the 
Other within. 
The war is now over, at least it officially ended with the Dayton agreement 
on 14 December 1995, and the people of the region are now trying to piece to-
gether a life – pieces consisting of war-related traumas, nationalist propaganda, 
ruined economies, disappointment, memories of pre-war life and so on. This 
book focuses on this puzzle of post-war life among the Muslim population of 
Stolac, a small town in Bosnia Herzegovina. More specifically, I will concen-
trate on how in everyday practices and narratives the Muslims of Stolac resist 
the ethnonationalist discourse that has invaded so many aspects of both public 
and private life throughout the last two decades. Their resistance is seldom out-
spoken, consciously articulated or organised; rather it consists of a steady in-
sistence on not using ethnic or national categories and stereotypes when iden-
tifying themselves and others. And it exists in a hope for future inter-ethnic 
coexistence. I term this resistance counterdiscourse.
Many books and articles dealing with the war and pre-war period in 
former Yugoslavia have been published in the last fifteen years, and nearly all 
of these have analysed the role of nationalism. Some maintain that national-
ist or ethnic tensions in former Yugoslavia ignited the war; others have dem-
onstrated how such tensions were produced throughout the war and pre-war 
period to legitimise a fight for power. Hardly any, however, have focused on 
how ordinary people trying to hold on to everyday life have related to the dis-
courses of nationalism outside the public sphere.1 In this book I maintain this 
ethnographic focus; and, as my results illustrate, nationalist policy and ethnic 
identity and stereotypes in the light of the everyday life of the Muslims of Stolac 
1  Bougarel et al. (200), Jansen (2000a), Maček (2000a), Povrzanovic (199) and Feldman et al. 
(1993) are important in this respect.
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come to mean something else and also something less, as they have to live with 
the consequences of ethnic hatred in a much more direct way. My analysis thus 
partly contradicts structuralist theories of violence, claiming that violence re-
sults in the creation of unambiguous and clear-cut identities. By relating such 
an argument to the way in which actual victims of violence react to the creation 
of unambiguous identities, one sees that complexity, flexibility and inconsistent 
categories are what mark post-war/post-violence society.
Because the complex question of ethnicity and nationality in former Yu-
goslavian republics is so central for understanding both war and post-war life, 
I shall provide a short explanation:
1) In the former Yugoslavia, everyone had a Yugoslav citizenship.
2) In the former Yugoslavia, one could choose a national identity from the op-
tions given by the state, for example on census forms. However, the English 
term ‘national identity’ or ‘nation’ does not fully cover the term used in former 
Yugoslavia: narod. In Danish, my own language, there is a more or less equiva-
lent term: folk (or in German volk). The national identities most relevant for 
this study are: Croat, Serb, Muslim and Yugoslav.
3) In former Yugoslavia, one had an ethnic or ethnoreligious identity (nacija). I 
use the terms interchangeably. This identity was more or less ‘inherited’ from 
one’s parents. Though religious terms are used to designate ethnic identity, one 
cannot translate nacija as religious identity. In my study, I will be referring to 
the following ethnic or ethnoreligious identities: Catholic, Orthodox Christian 
and Muslim. And in general (but not always) Croats are Catholics, Serbs are 
Orthodox Christians, and Muslims are Muslims.
However, things are and were not as clear-cut as the above divisions indicate. In 
the book, I do not use the terms ‘national identity’ (narod) and ‘ethnic identity’ 
(nacija), and nationalism and ethnicisation in an entirely consistent and clear-
cut manner. In the first place, my informants did not do this either, and in the 
second place the major aim of nationalist policy was to conjoin the two identi-
ties, so that the emotionally deep ethnoreligious identity could strengthen the 
more arbitrary national identity. This nationalist project did succeed up to a 
point: when my informants – who are Muslims – referred to a Muslim identity, 
it was not always obvious whether they were referring to ethnic (nacija) or 
national identity (narod); and often, it was my sense that they were not cer-
tain either. It is necessary to add a further remark on terminology. A ‘Bosnian’ 
(bosanac) is someone coming from Bosnia Herzegovina no matter what his 
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ethnic affiliation. ‘Bosniak’ (bošnjak) means Bosnian Muslim. However, the 
terms however have a disputed history, see Chapter 10.
The structure of the book
Part I, Framing the question, consists of the Prologue, with factual information 
about war and post-war episodes in the Stolac area. Chapter 1	presents a thor-
ough reading of contemporary anthropological perspectives on war and war-
related violence, and my own research is placed in relation to this. In Chapter 
2, I depict the way in which my informants’ world has been unmade: prima-
rily through ontological insecurity, the breakdown of mental categories, moral 
decay, and an all-pervading feeling of loss. Chapter 3 outlines the theoretical 
tools for analysing identification, discourse and counterdiscourse; the delicate 
balance is to establish the concept of counterdiscourse solidly enough for it to 
function as an analytical tool, and porously enough to avoid doing violence to 
the ambiguities of real life. 
Part II, Who are they, the ones who did this to us? is about how the Muslims 
of Stolac identify possible Others when accounting for the war as well as for 
their present hopeless situation. My main argument is that their identifications 
of the Others resist the ethnicisation that came to dominate public life in former 
Yugoslavia and in the seceding nations. Chapter 4, therefore, outlines the emer-
gence of this national thinking in former Yugoslavia, showing how it is rooted 
in the post-Second-World-War politics of Tito, but exploded throughout the 
190s as a way to gain power. Chapters 5, ,  and  present the most important 
categories of identity which my informants employ when identifying the guilty 
party: immoral politics; decent and indecent people; un-cultured persons, and, 
lastly, a complex range of different ways of categorising Croats (my informants’ 
main ethnic Other). All identifications avoid ethnifying the war and are part of 
the Muslims’ counterdiscourse.
Part III, Who are we, since this was done to us? deals with my informants’ 
identification of themselves as Muslims, an identity that has become increas-
ingly important. Pre-war embedded practices of identification no longer suf-
fice, so new and more conscious values have to be attached to their ethnore-
ligious identity. When identifying Muslimness, my informants avoid drawing 
upon the national and religious values promoted especially by Bosnian Muslim 
political elite throughout the war. Chapter 9, which should be read in continu-
ation of Chapter 4, accounts for the emergence of this specific Bosnian Muslim 
national religious identity; and I argue that it came late, was contradictory, and 
can to some extent be seen as an elite project. In Chapter 10, I outline the fea-
tures of pre-war processes of everyday Bosnian Muslim ethnoreligious identifi-
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cation. I find it reasonable to conclude that this identification was very impor-
tant, but also embedded in everyday life and characterised by respectful means 
of inter-ethnic interaction. This insight is important later when I demonstrate 
how my informants have objectified elements of such pre-war habitual patterns 
of inter-ethnic interaction today, and when I estimate the changes that the war 
has created in matters of identification. Chapter 11 illustrates how national and 
religious identification is only of minor importance to the Muslims of Stolac. 
Chapters 12, 13, 14 and 15 present the most important categories of identities 
which my informants employ when identifying themselves: a strong local pa-
triotic attachment that includes all respectable citizens of Stolac; an ideal of 
tolerance and inter-ethnic coexistence; shifting attachments to the discursive 
construct of Europe-Balkan; and the ‘role of the victim.’ The first three resist 
the nationalist thinking to various degrees. For my informants, their Muslim 
identity is of utmost importance; however, the content of this identity relates 
not to nationalist or religious elements, but to values stressing interethnic re-
spect and coexistence. Only in the ‘role of the victim’ have I found elements of 
an antagonist, essentialist ethnic identity.
The field
In a tragic but also important way, Bosnia Herzegovina serves as a contempo-
rary example of how war and war-related violence is connected to processes 
of identification. The war in Bosnia Herzegovina consisted of several conflicts. 
One of them took place between the Croats and the Muslims in Herzegovina, 
and it is this somewhat neglected war I look into. I choose Stolac as a field site 
as the UN and OHR (Office of High Representatives) had a pilot project here 
encouraging Muslims and Serbs to return. A local employee in the DRC (Dan-
ish Refugee Centre) helped set me up in Stolac with some of his friends; here 
I rented a separate room on the lower floor of their house. In the beginning, 
I ate alone and did not interfere very much in my landlords’ lives. I did not 
want to trouble them too much, and they left me alone so I could concentrate 
on my research. Soon, however, our formal ways of interacting changed. I had 
my meals in their house, we interacted a great deal, and I came to have a very 
relaxed relationship with the family (children, brothers and parent), several of 
their friends, and their home in general. I listened to their tragic stories and 
their present problems, and they comforted me when I missed my wife and 
children in Denmark. I conducted fieldwork from the middle of September 
2000 to the middle of April 2001, taking a two-week break around Christmas to 
recuperate (the sad and depressing life and fate of my informants having taxed 
my energy) and for preliminary reflections on my data. My relatively short pe-
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riod of fieldwork could not fully dissolve my role as an outsider, but in the end 
I did not think of myself as a total stranger. My fieldwork in Stolac was in a way 
rather traditional, but conducted in an untraditional situation. I participated 
in as many different situations as possible and interacted with as many people 
as I could. Some I only met or talked to once or twice, others I interacted with 
on a regular basis. As Stolac is in some respects a small town, I soon became 
acquainted with a lot of people, old and young, and heard stories about even 
more. Naturally, my data is marked by my role as an interested, educated, male, 
white Westerner. However, I never found that such roles excluded me from 
participating in any situations. And though much of my data is affected by, 
and some even came about as a result of, these roles, I also feel that I engaged 
in various situations where I could observe and listen or interact in a relatively 
relaxed manner without playing the lead: listening to people educate their chil-
dren, watching television with informants, sitting in the café, drinking with 
some of my informants, walking around town talking with informants, partici-
pating in funerals, visiting people informally and so on.
I had five key informants with whom I interacted on daily basis: 
– A schoolteacher in the mid-thirties. He lived with his wife, their small 
children and his parents. Like many of my informants, he was traumatised by 
his stay in a prison camp. He often told me how episodes from that stay trou-
bled his sleep at night. Despite these tough memories, he spent a lot of energy 
trying to focus on positive aspects of the present, and he felt a heavy responsi-
bility, due to his role as teacher and father, to refrain from instilling hate in the 
younger generation. This educational function, however, sometimes collided 
with the bitterness and anger which he also bore. 
– A couple in their fifties. They lived with their grown-up sons. The hus-
band was lucky to have work, which he conscientiously carried out. They had 
a nice house. All their furniture however had been stolen, and the house had 
been vandalised during the war. The couple was only slowly putting the house 
in order. As they sometimes said, they simply lacked the energy. The couple was 
bitter and often depressed, and they loved to talk about the past when they had 
experienced prosperity and happiness. They worried a lot about their children’s 
future, as they feared there were only very few opportunities for them. 
– A young man in his mid-twenties. He studied at the faculty in Mostar 
– a hard-working student. He lived with his parents and was an indispensable 
workforce in the home. He was very determined about asserting the future in 
a positive way. After four months of imprisonment in a Croatian-run prison 
camp he had been living abroad for four years, where he had been building up 
a life, and had a job and friends. Then voluntarily he had returned to Stolac. 
Living in Stolac, therefore, was for him a conscious choice and he wanted it to 
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be successful. In contrast to his friends of the same age, he was interested in 
politics. And he believed, at least to a point, that a change on the political level 
away from nationalist politics was possible and could even improve ordinary 
people’s situation and inter-ethnic relations in general.
– An old lady around seventy years old. She was living with her daughter. 
Although I regarded her as generally positive, she was also often very sad. She 
lamented her own situation: Stolac, the once so beautiful city where she had 
grown up, was now nothing but ruins. Most of all, though, she missed her son 
and her grandchildren. They were now living abroad and contact was rare. All 
her life she had been living with ethnic differences as a natural part of life, 
and she simply could not comprehend the present ethnic animosity in Bosnia 
Herzegovina, let alone Stolac.
An important part of my data stems from interviews. Some of the inter-
views only had one interviewee, but most of them were conducted in people’s 
homes with much of the family and often also some friends present. The in-
terviews were loosely structured. Normally, I introduced topics which I had 
found to be relevant when doing participant observation, and which helped 
steer the conversation toward subject matters I found important; but just as 
often the discussion took unanticipated detours, some of which became sub-
jects for further conversations and interviews with other informants. In sum, 
I conducted twenty-eight taped interviews lasting on average one and a half to 
three hours. Often after I had turned off the tape recorder, people kept talking 
for an additional thirty minutes to two hours. I conducted the majority of the 
interviews with the same assistant, who vouched for me since I did not know 
all of the interviewees beforehand. In Denmark, I had taught myself Serbo-
Croatian, or Bosnian, as Muslims in Bosnia Herzegovina call it today. And dur-
ing at least the last three and a half months (the period when I also conducted 
the interviews), I felt I had an adequate command of the language. However, 
when I talked to people or overheard conversations, several shades of meaning 
got lost that were doubtless important. I therefore translated and transcribed all 
my interviews in Stolac into Danish with the help of an informant who spoke 
Danish almost fluently (he had spent four years in Denmark as a refugee). My 
interviews and participant observation therefore contributed to each other in 
various ways. Throughout the book I quote from both taped interviews and 
conversations written down post factum. I do not always point out whether I 
am dealing with the one or the other, only mentioning it when I feel it is signifi-
cant. All the names of my informants are pseudonyms; however, the same pseu-
donyms are used consistently for the same persons, allowing the reader (at least 
to some degree) to get to know the different informants. On a few occasions, 
however, I have used two different pseudonyms for the same person, simply 
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in order to prevent a potential identification. Only rarely do I offer individual 
characterisations of or personal information about my informants. I know it 
is detrimental to my presentation; however, the anonymity of my informants 
takes first priority. 
My study has one great bias. Only on a few occasions did I talk to or oth-
erwise interact with Croat citizens of Stolac. Some of my informants encour-
aged me to do so; however, I did not feel I could entertain credibility among 
either the Muslims or the Croats by pursuing such a strategy, and I did not have 
sufficient time to divide up my fieldwork. As a result, my analysis deals with the 
point of view of the Muslims of Stolac alone.
In addition to my fieldwork in Stolac, I also did research among Bosnians 
living in Denmark. I carried out ten unstructured interviews with Bosnians who 
had been granted residence permits. And for three months I visited Bosnians 
living in a camp for asylum applicants on a regular basis. I have not worked 
systematically with the data collected through my research in Denmark. But 
the research did function as important background knowledge for my later 
fieldwork in Stolac. It meant that I was already familiar with relevant cultural 
categories, personal stories about loss, strategies of resistance, repression and 
acceptance of ethnic thinking. And perhaps most importantly, the research in 
Denmark put my Stolac data into perspective, enabling me to see how fierce 
and unambiguous ethnic denunciation thrives best in exile, probably because 
people then do not have to live with the consequences of their own actions in 
quite the same way. In addition, socialising with Bosnian asylum applicants 
gave me a chance to practise my Serbo-Croatian.
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Chapter 1 
Anthropological perspectives on war and 
war-related violence
In this chapter, I identify important perspectives in contemporary studies of 
war and war-related violence, and place my own research in relation to these. 
The perspectives used, which I have labelled instrumentality/structure, expres-
sion and experience/narrative, have developed in relation to and at times as cri-
tiques of each other; they are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but reflect 
focuses on different phases of war and war-related violence. The first perspec-
tive attempts to explain the outbreak of war and violent acts; the second centres 
on the cultural meaning of violent events; and the last represents experiences 
with and narratives of violence, focusing on the effects of violence. The per-
spectives also reflect different analytical levels, falling from a macro to a micro 
level, which, some would claim, relates to the possibility of empirical compari-
son (Schröder and Schmidt 2001), an argument reminiscent of the ‘verstehen’ 
– ‘erklären’ contrast.
Instrumentality/structure 
The anthropological literature on war and violence reflects broader develop-
ments in anthropological theory, in which the critique of evolutionistic and 
functionalistic theories has given way to theories focusing on the relation be-
tween structure and strategy. Functional explanations of war (Gluckman 1955; 
Turner 195; Ferguson 194; Vayda and Rappaport 19) have been abandoned, 
and though evolutionary theories of violence are still present in contemporary 
anthropology (Keegan 1994; Carneiro 199; Reyna 1994; Abbink 2001), many 
explanations favour at least some degree of agency/structure.
Instrumentality
In relation to the first part of the instrumentality/structure pair, the central ar-
gument is that violence does not occur randomly but is intended. Competition 
over scarce resources or competition for power does not automatically result 
in violence; rather violence is conceived as a deliberate outcome of conscious 
actors’ strategic considerations. Violence is an instrument or a source of social 
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power; it is action taken in order to reach certain goals (Hardin 1995; Turton 
199; Schmidt and Schröder 2001; Jabri 199) – a thought echoing Carl von 
Clausewitz’s famous dictum that war is politics by other means. When explain-
ing the break up of Yugoslavia, for instance, such analyses have often high-
lighted the erosions of political power centres (both national and global) and 
explained violence as strategic action intended to cement or defend economic 
and political positions (Schierup 1991; Cohen 1993; Simić 1993; Malcom 1994; 
Nagengast 1994; Bennett 1995; Shoup 1995; Sofus 199; Glenny 199; Gallagher 
199; Gow 199; Turton 199; Brubaker 199; Sunic 199; Oberschall 2000).1
When discussing violence as a source of power, legitimacy becomes a cen-
tral issue. Riches (19) has argued that one reason why violence is a universal 
social and cultural resource is that “performance of violence is inherently li-
able to be contested on the question of legitimacy” (ibid. 11). Violent clashes in 
modern states – defined by their ‘legitimate’ monopolisation of violence (Gid-
dens 195) – could therefore be theorised as fights for or contestations of this 
legitimacy, as seen by the fact that often the very definition of the status of a 
conflict is strategically contested. For example, are we dealing with war, civil 
war, terror, defence or humanitarian intervention? The use of violence to con-
test legitimacy is usually accompanied by propaganda. In modern conflicts, the 
mass media have increasingly helped to create the demonic Other, on whom 
violence then turns (Allen 1999; Naughton 1994; Malešič 1993; Sofus 1999). Such 
propaganda often tends to produce a strictly polarised structure of ‘us-them’ 
that no-one can escape, that leaves no room for ambiguity, and where ‘our’ 
side is understood as morally superior (Löfving and Maček 2000; Schmidt and 
Schröder 2001). Discussing such propaganda, advocates of the instrumentalist 
perspective have often invoked it as an explicit critique of the so-called pri-
mordial perspective, though the primordial perspective is seldom clear-cut (in 
relation to the Balkans, however, see Mojzes 1994; Kaplan 1993). 
The instrumentalist approach to violence sometimes fails to notice that 
even though violence is a possible power strategy for local elites, strategic ac-
tion is affected by broader global systemic processes. Mass communication and 
1  Although, as argued by Sluka (2000), state violence should not (only) be seen as an instru-
ment with which potential elites can seize power in periods of eroding state power. Rather, 
state violence tends to increase when the power of the state increases, as strong states do not 
have to take into consideration their ways of defending established inequalities, and violence 
is often the most economical means of protecting privileges. Therefore, according to Sluka, it 
is not disintegration of the Weberian state that explains contemporary excesses in state-related 
violence (as argued, for instance, by Desjarlais 1994; Brubaker 199), but rather the opposite.
  The argument is that violent conflicts are outbursts of latent ethnic, religious, cultural or other 
essential differences.
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mass immigration have made local identification problematic; and along with 
growth in the global weapons industry and the rise in long-distance national-
ism, this has increased the very potential for conflict (Anderson 1992; Turton 
199). Another dimension that fits into the instrumentalist perspective but 
which is also often neglected is that wars, even if they are the outcome of stra-
tegic considerations, often create their own complex dynamic, inasmuch as war 
tends to develop into a kind of mental framework in which physical violence 
occurs. Bax (2000a; 2000b), for instance, describes how in Herzegovina already 
existing local conflicts escalate, change, and form their own dynamic in a war 
situation, because local leaders perceive the war as a framework for solving 
existing conflict by new means. War then comes to serve the different purposes 
of many actors, which may in turn account for the difficulties of putting an end 
to wars. 
Structure
The instrumentalist approach, which focuses on the strategic use of violence, 
conflicts with structural theories; however, I have grouped them together be-
cause they both attempt to explain the origin of war and violence. Structurally 
inspired anthropological analyses of war and war-related violence have prima-
rily focused on the inherent potential of violence and war to create identities. 
In a condensed form, the line of reasoning goes like this: Identity is built on dif-
ference, and when differences become too small, identity becomes threatened 
and violence then recreates or reinforces differences. This is Blok’s (2000) argu-
ment, for instance: following Freud, he calls violent practices aimed at destroy-
ing similarities and thereby creating the Other, the: “narcissism of minor differ-
ences.” As he writes in respect to the eruption of war in former Yugoslavia:
Once more we see the working of the narcissism of minor differences: the ero-
sion and loss of distinctions and differences result in violence. (ibid. 41).
Violence as a technique to create the Other is also present in Malkki’s (199) 
study of Hutu narratives of Tutsi violence: 
Through violence, bodies of individual persons become metamorphosed into 
specimens of the ethnic category for which they are supposed to stand. (ibid. 
; original italics).
Violence, it is argued, creates the structural division on which identity is built: 
we are us because we fight against them, and vica versa. Consider also Har-
rison’s (1993) claim that violence in Melanesia has a structural function − that 
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is, groups do not create war, war creates groups. As he sees it, both gift giving 
and violence create social relations, which are contrary to the view of Mauss, 
who saw violence as the failure of the gift (Corbey 2000, 200). Sorabji (1995) 
has argued that the logic of the violence in many parts of Bosnia Herzegovina 
was to de-personalise social relations and annihilate existing cultural values of 
neighbourliness in order to install an ideology of nationalism. The violence was 
therefore often rather extreme and furthermore performed in local settings, so 
as to destroy the memory of ethnic coexistence. In a study of ethnic cleansing in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Hayden (199) follows a different, but still structural ap-
proach. Inspired by Mary Douglas, he claims that in the nationalist ideologies 
of the new Yugoslav states reigned a vision of ethnic homogeneity that did not 
correspond to reality. The ethnic cleansing and the removal of populations that 
occurred during the war constituted an attempt to recreate the world to corre-
spond to this vision. Finally, in his re-reading of Clastres, Bowman (2001) sug-
gests that violence does not even have to be carried out physically to construct 
identity. Violence is a force that creates boundaries and may operate concep-
tually prior to manifesting itself in action. It is the imagining of violence that 
“…serves to create the integrities and identities which are in turn subjected to 
those forms of violence which seek victims” (ibid. 2), and it is the imagining 
of violence against the Other that is the medium through which (embedded) 
societies are represented to themselves.
So far we have two different explanations of war and war-related violence. 
In the first, violence is purely instrumental and contextual, which means that 
violence is never studied in its own right. Often such analyses inspired by po-
litical science explain war but do not account for what happens when violence 
breaks out. In doing so, they overlook the cultural framework in which vio-
lence is constructed and interpreted (see next paragraph); miss the possibility 
of operating with innate structural properties of violence; and often reproduce 
a Hobbesian view of human nature, which views violence as latent and erupting 
when the centralisation of power erodes. In the structural approach violence is 
perceived not as a source of social power, but as a source (either acted or im-
agined) of identity. Furthermore, the inherent logic of violence creates subject 
positions without the help of any concrete subjects. This perspective ignores 
the fact that the use of and reaction to violence can change the course of violent 
events. Claiming that violence creates unambiguous identities, therefore, only 
accounts for part of the process relevant for understanding the relationship be-
tween violence and identification. Violence plays a part in constructing a gen-
eral polarised atmosphere of ‘us and them’, but this does not say anything about 
how people react or relate to such a dichotomised space of identity. Further-
more, even if we accept the idea that violence creates unambiguous identities, 
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such consequences should not be confused with explanations of why violence 
occurs in the first place.
Expression
The next perspective to be found in contemporary anthropology of war and 
war-related violence focuses on the violent acts themselves, on the meaning 
they carry and the cultural landscape in which they are shaped and serve as 
communication. The perspective is based on the implicit assumption that the 
way in which one dies or is injured is significant and seldom coincidental. The 
studies grouped together in this second category therefore try to explicate 
(Geertz 193) rather than explain violent events; one could say that they make a 
‘thick description’ of the violent events.
Van de Port (199) conducted fieldwork in a Serbian town in Vojvodina. 
His research was meant to be a study of gypsies, but then the war broke out 
and left him and seemingly everybody else in a condition of mental and ex-
istential chaos. But only seemingly. He discovered the existence of a cultural 
logic that he, following Taussig, calls implicit social knowledge, which was used 
to make sense of the madness of the war. This knowledge, which was neither 
conscious nor verbalised, was for instance manifested in the Serbs’ ambivalent 
relationship to the gypsies. On the surface, the Serbs condemned the gypsies 
as uncivilised primitives, but below the surface the Serbs embraced the primi-
tive, uncivilised, emotional craziness that they felt the gypsies represented. So 
in everyday life the ‘civilised’ Serbian citizens of Vojvodina showed distaste for 
the war-related barbaric and insane violence; but at night in the gypsy bars 
they embraced it because of the connection they felt with the implicit social 
knowledge which the gypsies embodied. Other studies have focused more on 
the violent acts themselves and shown how they can be loaded with cultural 
meaning (Feldman 1991; Krohn-Hansen 199b). Malkki (199), for instance, 
analyses the Tutsis’ bestial, violent acts against the Hutus as attempts to dehu-
manise the Hutus, to associate them with nature and disassociate them from 
culture. And Olujic (199) argues that war rapes in former Yugoslavia were not 
only physical assaults on the women, but also attacks on the male members of 
their family, whose honour was related to the female members’ chastity. The 
individual body becomes in this way a metaphorical representative of the social 
body, and the killing or maiming of that body symbolically kills and maims the 
individual’s family and ethnic group. The war rapes also reinforced the cultural 
notions of cleanliness and dirtiness associated with sexuality and ethnic affili-
ation. Through forced pregnancy resulting from rape, aggressors could ‘purify 
the blood’ of the attacked group by creating ‘ethnically cleansed’ babies belong-
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ing to the group of the invading fathers. On quite a different scale, Appadurai 
(1999) tries to understand contemporary ethnic atrocities worldwide in relation 
to a culture of modernity. Modernity and globalisation, he claims, have disem-
bedded social relations and created uncertain and alienated identities. Violence 
thus uses the body to recreate certainty and intimacy in a grotesque way. 
Anthropological studies of violence that focus on expression and mean-
ing try to understand the cultural anchoring of violent acts and how violence 
functions as communication. And sometimes such insight is used to explain 
the potential instrumentality of violence. A major challenge confronting an-
thropological studies of the expressive character of violence is to consider the 
ethical dimension thoroughly (see, for instance, Richard Jenkins’ (1992) cri-
tique of Allen Feldman). In short, it is essential not to let the act of interpreta-
tion overshadow the experience of violence. 
Experience/narrative
The third and most recent perspective in contemporary anthropology of war 
and war-related violence is mainly an ethnographic one. The centre of interest 
is not on macro-actors’ strategic use of violence, the built-in potential of vio-
lence to produce identities, or the communicative aspect of violence. The focus 
is on actual victims’ subjective experiences of war, violence and torture, and on 
the narratives people construct in their attempts to (re)create meaning, identi-
ties and social relations in a shattered world.4 Concurrently with such analyses, 
the very possibility of the academic representation of such fundamental and 
groundbreaking experiences has been discussed. Analyses of actors’ experi-
ences of violence can, it is argued, be seen as a contradiction in terms, since the 
“experience of war implies a loss of the conceptual and epistemological frame-
work that previously provided means to interpret the events of life and death 
of others” (Löfving and Maček 2000: 5, see also van de Port 199: 2-). At the 
same time, though, anthropologists have also insisted on the academic respon-
  Analyses on such analytical levels are often rather speculative. One could argue otherwise and 
claim that violence itself has become a disembedded practice. As Bauman’s (1994) study of the 
Holocaust shows, violence in modern bureaucratic systems has in fact been lifted out of con-
crete social relations and developed into a rational bureaucratic tool. Violence thus becomes 
devoid of meaning and purely instrumental –an instrument not of an actor, but of a bureau-
cratic system. In a similar vein, Pick (1993) argues that the acts of violence and slaughtering 
(both of animals and men) in Western Europe in the past 150 years have followed the overall 
pattern of systematic industrial rationality.
4  Studies of the experience of perpetrators of violence are very rare (Schmidt and Schröder 
2001).
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sibility to ‘write against terror’, and speak out against injustice (Scheper-Huges 
1992; Taussig 19).
Experience
Elaine Scarry’s (195) argument regarding the relation between torture and pain 
has served as an explicit or implicit theoretical inspiration in many of the eth-
nographic studies of people’s experiences of war and violence and loss of epis-
temological framework (Feldman et al. 1993; Green 1995; Jackson 2002; Maček 
2000a, 2000b; Nordstrom 199; Povrzanović 1993, 199; Scheper-Huges 1992; 
Van de Port 199). Her basic contention is that the feeling of physical pain is an 
irreducible bodily experience that cannot be objectified by anything outside the 
body including language. This is why torture is such an effective instrument of 
power, because the inexpressible and non-communicative feeling of pain, the 
‘unmaking of the world’, as she calls it, that takes control of the victim can only 
be alleviated through a new version of the world − another version of the Truth 
(see also Löfving and Maček 2000: 5; Frykman 2002). Based on ethnographic 
fieldwork in war-torn Mozambique, Nordstrom (199) expands Scarry’s idea of 
torture’s ‘unmaking of the world’ to the general wartime situation experienced 
by civilians. Nordstrom sees the structure of this experience as bearing clear 
parallels to Bakhtin’s idea of the grotesque:
When the familiar and everyday are turned into implements of torture and 
murder, the familiar everyday world is rendered grotesque – not merely by 
the fact of the present terror and repression, but by the enduring nature of 
association. (p. 1).
She offers an example of a man who had his throat cut in the family’s mortar 
by intruding soldiers, the whole village being forced to watch, and she asks if 
the onlookers will ever be able to use a mortar without having the drama run at 
the back of their minds. The strength of terror, she argues, exists in its ability to 
break down the everyday world and destroy the webs of significance into which 
people’s self-identities are woven. In this way terror was used intentionally by 
all parties in the war in Mozambique to eliminate political will and military 
resistance among civilians. But besides unmaking the world, terror also incites 
different kinds of resistance: retelling the grotesque practices and linking them 
with the perpetrators, rebuilding broken social relations and institutions of the 
community, and imagining a world beyond that could function as a source of 
creativity in everyday life. When listening to the horrible atrocities to which 
people had been subjected, Nordstrom was furthermore impressed by the con-
current life-generating creativity of her informants. In sum this made her see 
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how in Mozambique peace and solid social relations were built from the bottom 
up. In a related but less optimistic study of the siege of Sarajevo, Ivana Maček 
(2000a, 2000b) invents the concept ‘the deserter’s mode of perception’ in an at-
tempt to communicate people’s war experiences. The deserter’s mode is a proc-
ess “… in which all individuals, faced with unexplainable violent disruptions of 
their lives, constantly engage in making sense of their situation” (Maček 2000a: 
240). It is a sense-making process whereby people, in their attempt to categorise 
and understand the situation, easily fell victim to the nationalistic discourse 
that swept the country.
A problem with some of the ethnographies focusing on experiences of 
war and violence is that bare survival becomes labelled as resistance. This either 
romanticises people’s coping strategies or expands and thereby weakens the 
concept of resistance. However, it does focus on a crucial discussion: whether 
the creative component is violence (as the structural perspective has it) or peo-
ple’s strategies and reactions toward violence. Does violence create identity, or 
is it people’s reactions to violence that create or destroy positions of identity? 
The focus on the disintegration of everyday life furthermore questions the con-
cept of violence. Many scholars have asked: Is violence only physical? (See for 
instance Riches 19; Nordstrom and Martin 1992; Nordstrom and Robben 
1995; Simons 1999). I only want to add that violence does not need to physically 
attack the body to produce an ‘unmaking of the world.’ A constant threat of 
violence can disrupt the fabric of everyday life (see, for instance, Gilliland 1995; 
Ross 2001).
Narratives
It is difficult to uphold a division between, on the one hand, the experience 
of loss of meaning and, on the other, the narratives people use to explain and 
make sense of this loss, especially if both matters are only revealed to the eth-
nographer in communication. That is to say, what part of communication 
expresses the pure and unmediated experience of violence and what part is a 
narrative representation of it? In medical anthropology, the idea of pure exis-
tential experience has flourished (Kleinman and Kleinman 1995, Good 1994); 
the same can be considered true in experientially oriented war anthropology. 
The critical philosophical problem, however, is that experience must always 
pass through language to be visible/audible (Mead 19). Some studies have 
nevertheless focused more on the narratives used to make sense of the violence 
experienced and the destroyed everyday world than on the ‘pure experience’ 
  A point raised by Ivana Maček (personal correspondence).
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that the unmaking of the world can be said to represent − which may be due 
to the ethnographer’s arrival after the violence has stopped (Zur 199; Warren 
1993; Malkki 199; Mehta 2001; Jansen 2000a, 2000b; Das 1990, 2001; Perera 
2001; Kolind 200, 200; Jackson 2002). In these studies, the concept of narra-
tive (or similar concepts) is often used to systematise informants’ more or less 
ordered and identifiable versions of events and relate them to the overarch-
ing discourses in which they are cast. In a study of Hutu refugees’ memory of 
violence, Malkki (199), for instance, found what she calls a ‘mythico-history’, 
or cosmological ordering of the past, a ‘world-making.’ The Hutus construct 
themselves in their attempt to seize history, condemn the Tutsis’ atrocities, and 
legitimise their own position in Rwandan society. Malkki (199) does not try to 
sort out true facts from invented ones in these mythico-histories:
Different regimes of truth exist for different historical actors, and particularly 
historical events support any number of different narrative elaborations. (p. 
104).
What her analysis misses, though, is a consideration of other possible ‘regimes 
of truth’ or discourses that affect the Hutus’ narratives. In a more phenomeno-
logically inspired narrative approach, Jackson (2002) focuses on what he calls 
‘the politics of storytelling.’ In the face of violent events and other disempower-
ing circumstances, storytelling (narratives) – understood as “a result of ongo-
ing dialogue and redaction within fields of intersubjectivity” (ibid. 22) – can 
be seen as a way to transform private meanings into public ones and to sustain 
a sense of agency, both vital aspects for human existence. In other words, the 
very act of putting experience into words (and thereby sharing it, making it 
part of the social) is theorised as a necessary human capacity to overcome the 
‘unmaking of the world’ and recreate a meaningful life.
However, it is also possible to think about narratives and people’s catego-
risations as less consistent and static than the prevalent use of narratives seems 
to indicate. When primarily focusing on the ability of narratives to order the 
world cosmologically and morally, one may overlook the more chaotic, frag-
mented and contradictory aspect of social life and its strategic uses, especially 
in post-war societies. The branch of anthropology inspired by Mary Douglas, 
which basically sees human activity as cosmological ordering of the world, may 
  By the term narrative I mean clusters of speech and action that are moral and cosmological 
and which have an internal structure that organises the past and gives directions for the fu-
ture; these clusters draw on external sources (discourses) for their constructions (see Mattingly 
2001).
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overlook another feature of social interaction: the persistent situational and 
strategic mixing of categories. In a study of post-war Croatia, Jansen (2000b, 
200), for instance, shows how on the surface people reproduce the national-
istic rhetoric that has poisoned the whole area, but on closer inspection what 
looks like conformism is rather a manifestation of agents’ situational and con-
crete strategies. For instance, a Croat family (from Bosnia) living in a Serbian 
house in Croatia evoked the authoritative nationalist discourse of ‘language 
right’ (even though the languages are nearly identical and even though before 
the war the family lived peacefully with their Bosnian Serb and Muslim neigh-
bours), which allowed them “to resist subjection to another, possible threaten-
ing discourse, that of rights of property and return” (Jansen 2000b: 14). This 
example shows the intricate relationship between discourse and agency, or the 
way in which people’s narratives of the war are both situational and strategic. 
For some scholars the recent shift in the anthropology of war and violence 
focusing on experience and narratives is perceived as a blind alley. Schmidt 
and Schröder (2001) argue, for instance, that this “postmodernist shift in an-
thropological research on violence” (ibid. ), as they call it, is a hindrance to 
comparative anthropology. Violence, they claim, can easily be compared to its 
causes, events and results, but not to its subjective experience of these things. I 
do not agree. I think that one can actually distinguish some core themes in this 
‘postmodernist’ ethnography of war and violence: violence that ‘works’ via its 
erosion of the everyday, taken-for-granted world; ways of rebuilding meaning 
when people’s worlds are shattered (a comparison that could be expanded to 
other areas of research; see, for instance, Cohen and Taylor 192); and a theoret-
ical discussion of resistance and the ways in which discourses interrelate with 
processes of recreating meaning through narratives.
Relevance to my study
I have outlined three different focuses of research in contemporary anthropol-
ogy of war and war-related violence: instrumentality/structure, expression and 
experience/narratives. By focusing on processes of post-war identification (and 
its counterdiscursive aspect) among the Muslims of Stolac, I primarily adopt 
the last perspective. However, the other perspectives have also influenced my 
study. 
In my historical account of the emergence of nationalism in Yugoslavia 
(Chapter 4) and more specifically in Bosnia Herzegovina (Chapter 9), I follow 
the instrumental perspective. While my aim is not to explain the war, I show 
how and why nationalist ideologies became so dominant. And one of the con-
clusions is that nationalist ideologies served to legitimise a rise to power. I use 
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the structural argument only partly. In short, it is important to acknowledge 
that the war and war-related violence created a dichotomised space of identity. 
Ethnicity, which was only one identity among others before the war, came to 
the forefront throughout the war, increasingly determining everybody’s lives, 
and the actual violence and threats of violence contributed massively towards 
this change. The ethnic identity of some of the Muslims of Stolac became a 
matter of life or death; for most it was the reason they were expelled, and for 
the returnees it was the cause of their discrimination in post-war Stolac. The 
total destruction of everything reminiscent of the Ottoman influence (see Pro-
logue) in Stolac also contributed in a violent way to create the ethnic Other. 
However, this is ‘only’ the framework; in my analysis I focus on how my in-
formants fill up this framework in their everyday life, that is, how they relate 
to the ethnic identities promoted by the war. The focus on expression is only 
of indirect importance to my study. I primarily use it as an ethical reminder. 
First, violence can have an exotic entertainment value, as seen, for instance, in 
entertainment films. I have therefore been careful to restrict my presentation 
of examples to those necessary to present my argument. Second, I try to refrain 
from only depicting my informants as ‘victims of violence’ and thereby ‘other-
ing’ them. Instead I analytically approach my informants’ use of the ‘role of the 
victim’ (Chapter 15). In Chapter 2, I follow the experience-oriented approach, 
demonstrating how the concept of ‘unmaking of the world’ is apt when gener-
ally describing my informants’ experiences of the war and post-war violence. 
The focus on the unmaking of the world is important for two reasons. First, 
inspired by the epistemological discussion ascribed to this research approach, 
the validity of my own as well as my informants’ representations can be ques-
tioned. If it is true that the unmaking of the world also implies destroying the 
categories normally used to communicate experience, then both my analysis 
and my informants’ accounts are somewhat blurred. This does not make my 
analysis of my informants’ post-war identifications irrelevant or invalid, but 
it has helped me to persistently focus on the very act of category building. My 
representation of Muslims’ ways of identifying themselves and the Other there-
fore goes into detail with this process of reconstructing categories and looks 
into how they eventually build upon pre-war classifications. Second, my book 
is based on the analytical division of unmaking – remaking, with emphasis 
on the latter. By looking into the unmade world of my informants it becomes 
clear how profound the devastations of the war have been, and consequently 
how profoundly my informants have had to question, reconsider and remake 
their social relations, friendships, religious beliefs, moral values, conception of 
the nature of society, ethnic identities and so on. Cultural construction takes 
place everywhere, all the time; in Stolac, however, such cultural construction 
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is so profound and extensive that it is apposite to term it remaking. And it is 
this process of remaking with emphasis on the question of identification that is 
my major focus. The theoretical background for my analysis of this process of 
remaking and identification, and especially for considering this as a counter-
discursive practice, is presented in Chapter 3.
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Chapter 2 
The unmaking of the world
In order to fully understand the remaking of the world that my informants 
engage in – and especially the elements of resistance and counterdiscourse in-
volved in this remaking – it is important to realise how profound and severe the 
unmaking of their world has been. As I will argue, the unmaking of my inform-
ants’ world has forced them to re-question previously taken-for-granted social 
relations, values and moral categories: in other words, to re-identify themselves 
and the ethnic other. Both during and after the war, an ethnonationalist para-
digm was the dominant explanatory device available for explaining people’s 
misfortunes, as well as a central element in the remaking of people’s shattered 
lives. An element of counterdiscursive resistance is therefore legible when peo-
ple refuse to give ethnonationalist discourse the upper hand in the remaking of 
the unmade world.
In this chapter, I outline some of the central events and experiences in the 
unmaking of my informants’ lives. First, however, some terminological clarifi-
cation is necessary, for, as touched upon in the previous chapter, the distinction 
between the world’s unmaking and its remaking is a necessary theoretical fic-
tion. In the first place, attempts at holding on to mundane everyday practices 
– however much of a caricature this may seem – are characteristic of wartime 
life. Povrzanović tellingly calls this practice/strategy of attempting to stick to 
‘minimal normality’ (Maček 2000a) ‘imitations of life’ (Povrzanović 199: 15). 
The unmaking of the world and the remaking therefore take place simultane-
ously. However, the object of my study is a post-war society, not a war-time 
society. Though my informants’ lives were still darkened by the shadow of the 
war, they no longer feared for their own lives. And despite their difficult so-
cial situation my informants still felt that in general things had improved since 
the end of the war. So, whereas in a situation of war it would be accurate to 
describe unmaking and remaking as simultaneous, in Stolac today people are 
more occupied with attempts at understanding, forgetting and forgiving. These 
forms of remaking are qualitatively different from the wartime ‘imitation of life’ 
which they superficially resemble. On the other hand, it is still important to 
acknowledge how destructive the tough post-war situation has been to people’s 
hopes and dreams, as well as their meaning-creating narratives, which are still 
severely damaged. In one sense, then, a process of unmaking is still going on. 
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Analysing the unmaking of my informants’ lives centres on two core as-
pects: the everyday world and epistemology. Firstly, by ‘everyday world’ I mean 
the non-conscious routine practices and categories one employs to make sense 
of events, including other people’s actions. Moreover, such non-conscious acts 
and categories can often easily become the object of conscious reflection. It is 
this domain that much phenomenologically inspired anthropology has tried to 
analyse and conceptualise. For instance, the non-conscious constitutes a central 
component in Bourdieu’s concept of habitus (1995) as well as Arthur Kleinman’s 
‘local moral worlds’ (1992). For an overview see Jackson (199). The everyday 
routine world has also been a focus of ethnomethodology. For example, Gar-
finkel’s studies (193, 19) have revealed the existence of an implicit everyday 
morality, a largely hidden taken-for-granted world with unwritten assumptions 
about the dos and don’ts of social life, which is the basis for people’s situational 
strategies. But Garfinkel’s work also reveals how seemingly minor and in a way 
imperceptible changes in people’s behaviour can radically disrupt the neat flow 
of social interaction, creating feelings of confusion. In a similar way, Goffman’s 
extensive studies of face-to-face interaction have shown that the individual’s use 
of social identities as well as the social expectations attached to such use (in sum 
impression management) is dependent on predictability in social interaction 
(the interaction order) (191, 194, 193). In sum, the everyday world possesses 
a taken-for-granted-ness that is fundamental to processes of identification of 
oneself and the Other, and to avoid feeling bewilderment and confusion. And it 
is the damage to such everyday worlds with their predictable social routines and 
identities that constitutes a core element in many people’s war experiences. 
The second aspect of the unmaking of the everyday world relates to the 
loss or failure of epistemological frameworks. As mentioned, Scarry’s work 
(195) describes how the experience of torture is often non-communicative, 
because the categories and concepts its victims would normally use to com-
municate experience no longer suffice.1 This is why the victims of terror and 
war-related violence often state that they cannot describe what happened, that 
they do not have the words, or that strangers will not understand (Maček 2001, 
Mertus 199, Povrzanović 1993, Perera 2001). The ability to communicate expe-
riences of violence is restricted because the mental categories normally used 
1  Whereas in Scarry’s theorising the experience of violence is a matter of the relationship be-
tween the individual and his/her body, in anthropological theorising the experience of vio-
lence is primarily a matter of the relationship between the individual and his/her society, for 
society constitutes the foundation of the life-worlds of individuals. Therefore, the unmaking of 
the world relates to more than the inability to express individual experiences. This term also 
encompasses the experience of what one might call ‘social pain’, the breakdown of social rela-
tions and categories (see for instance Ross 2001).
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for making sense of the world are themselves shattered by the unprecedented 
events of war and violence (Zur 199: 159-91; Nordstrom 199: 153-5). In sum 
the world’s unmaking forces its victims to redefine their social worlds from 
minor mundane practices to more overall values and ideals. 
In the rest of the chapter, I will describe my informants’ experiences dur-
ing and after the war in terms of four aspects of the unmaking of the world. The 
destruction of the everyday world, stories and communication, and finally the 
all-pervasive feeling of loss.
The destruction of the everyday world
In pre-war Bosnian life, a normal day did not start with the question whether 
you and your family would survive or have anything to eat and drink. But dur-
ing the war basic subsistence suddenly became problematic. A central theme 
in my informants’ accounts from the war is how such fundamental aspects of 
everyday life became a question of life and death. Suddenly life was reduced to 
bare subsistence, and fear and desperation followed. I will present some of the 
recurrent themes in people’s accounts of wartime life. 
Leaving everything behind
The imprisonment of the Muslim men of Stolac happened more or less over-
night. But before the women and children were arrested they had had six weeks 
to prepare themselves, knowing all this time that they were at great risk of be-
ing driven out like their men. Valuables were therefore hidden, for instance 
buried in the garden, and when the soldiers came to fetch the women many had 
packed clothes, photos and food in rucksacks, and they had hidden money and 
jewellery on their persons. Even after all this preparation, many women recall 
the experience of having to leave everything behind as really horrible. Mate-
rial possessions gathered over a lifetime, along with the dreams, happiness and 
expectations connected symbolically to these objects, were left behind. Repeat-
edly I heard expressions such as “We were forced to leave carrying only a plastic 
bag”. As one woman lamented “What can you put in a plastic bag?” To make 
matters worse Croat soldiers stole bags, jewellery and money from the women 
when they were searched before their actual expulsion from Stolac.
Violence
Both men and women experienced physical violence, including murder. They 
also experienced a constant threat of violence. These terrible experiences are 
central themes in their accounts of the war. For the men violence relates to the 
brutal interrogations before the internment as well as to the routine beatings of 
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prisoners in the camps. Both the interrogations and the beatings killed several 
people. As a consequence of the visit of the Red Cross to some of the prison 
camps about three months after their creation, some of the most exhausted 
prisoners were allowed to leave – those who had lost the most weight. They 
were not allowed to return to Bosnia Herzegovina, but had to travel to third 
countries instead. Emir was one of these prisoners. When he was released, the 
Red Cross sent him to the small island of Korcula in Croatia. After about two 
months, Emir had recovered somewhat. As he concisely summed up: “There 
we were well, we were given food three times a day, we were not beaten, we had 
a bed to sleep in.” Aspects of life that had been natural and unproblematic a 
couple of month previously had suddenly become issues of conscious concern. 
The women experienced the physical violence when they were searched and 
robbed by Croat soldiers. Violence also marks their ten-kilometre march from 
the place where the Croat soldiers set them off to Blagaj, a Muslim-controlled 
area. It was hot, people were scared, and they had to carry heavy burdens – bag-
gage, as well as children or disabled parents in some cases – while the Croat 
soldiers fired into the air. About nine old women lost their lives on this march, 
probably from exhaustion. The experience of violence also relates to the time 
the women spent in Blagaj. One woman, Anvere, occupied a basement. The 
area was shelled all day, so she and her children had to stay indoors, and they 
only dared to tend the small vegetable patch they had for cultivating some let-
tuce or cabbage at night, and then very hastily. 
Hunger
A third experiential theme relates to the hunger and thirst people felt, the dis-
eases they contracted, and the lack of treatment available. In the prison camps 
the prisoners were given one loaf of bread every two weeks, as well as some 
soup, and almost nothing to drink. The camps were extremely hot, and the 
constant thirst was unbearable. Some people urinated in a tin can, filtered it 
through a sock, and drank it. Aziz told me:
I was thirsty and nobody would give us water. They brought one milk-can 
of water to 500 people so everybody pushed and fought for the water. You 
opened your mouth, but there was no water. It was worse not to have water 
than not to have food. After the Red Cross had been in the prison-camp (log-
or) the Croats began to give us a little more water. But it was not clean water, 
it was dirty. The water was reddish. But we drank it, because we were thirsty. 
When you had to pee or go to the toilet, you did it where we slept, and we did 
it in buckets and some days you did not know if you should use those buckets 
to pee in or drink water from.
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The women and children also starved after being driven to the Muslim-control-
led areas. At first some could live on the food they had brought with them, but 
it did not last long. Some food could be bought, but it was extremely expensive. 
So the money some people had managed to bring with them was soon spent. 
Here are the words of Nusreta:
It was a hard life, when we stayed there. So hard that we did not have any-
thing to eat. Once we only had 350 grams of food for fifteen days. You were so 
hungry. And some of the old people, they starved to death. We ate grass. We 
soon learned to recognise every sort of grass, and that was one of the things 
that saved people, and then you ate fruit, grapes. Some got dysentery. A lot 
of people got that disease, because you drank too much water and hardly ate. 
The shells were falling all the time, and the shells killed people.
TK: Didn’t you receive humanitarian aid? 
Nusreta: We didn’t receive much humanitarian aid, because the Croats would not 
permit it to pass through to us. They stopped the convoys […] and plundered 
them. It was very difficult […]. And the old people who could not search 
for food, they starved to death. There was this woman, one of the richest in 
Stolac, she lived alone in Stolac. When we were expelled she came to the same 
village as me and she also starved to death. Nobody could help her, or give her 
grass or grapes or other kind of fruit. It was terrible. I hope God will not give 
such a thing again (the saying spomenulo se ne ponovilo se: you can talk about 
it, but you do not hope it will happen again). Never again, it would be better to 
be dead than experience it again […]. I had a good friend, she took care of my 
daughter, she brought her some milk. Every night her son brought her some 
milk […]. One of her sons was at the front facing the Serbs, a Chetnik killed 
him. She and her family were very kind, and she saved my little daughter. We 
all had a hard time when her son was killed. It was like he was one of ours [one 
of the family]. I’ll never forget how well they treated us. 
Anxiety about one’s family members
The last theme I will touch on here is the insecurity and anxiety people felt not 
knowing anything about the fate of family members. A related theme is the feel-
ing of desperation caused by not being able to provide for one’s children, because 
it was not possible to fed or protect them. It was not just in Stolac that men and 
boys were imprisoned. It also happened elsewhere in Herzegovina, and formed 
part of a Croatian strategy of ethnic cleansing. The women knew that similar 
things were going on in other places, but nobody knew exactly what was hap-
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pening to their men, whether they were dead or alive, until the men were allowed 
to send letters through the Red Cross. In these letters, the men always wrote that 
they were well; they did not dare to write the truth as they feared the Croats 
would read the letters. Emir was one of the first to be released from prison camp. 
He was then 1. He was sent to Germany, where he sent a message using a radio 
telephone reporting that he was all right. But he did not see his family for the 
next five years. The men who were captives in the prison camps were also filled 
with worry and anxiety: they had no news about their families for anywhere 
from five to ten months, depending on how long they were detained. 
Osman: I was in prison camp for six months and it was terrible for me because I 
was sick. During the whole time in prison camp I did not get two litres of wa-
ter. And we did not have food enough, and everybody just wanted water and 
food. But I escaped it without any injuries, and I was not beaten. All the time 
I thought that they were going to kill me, all the time, even though I was not 
guilty of anything. The worst thing was not to know where my family was, if 
they were alive or not, and when I got out of the camp, I had to start looking 
for them.
It was terrible for parents not to be able to take proper care of their children. 
The children were hungry and frightened. They could not understand their 
situation and were exposed to great danger, and the parents could do very lit-
tle to help. A woman called Fata recalls how providing for her children made 
everything else less important:
They shot at us from two different sides. During the war between Muslims 
and Croats I lived in Mostar and we did not have water in the houses and 
you had to go to Neretva [the river] to fetch water. And we passed the Harem 
[Muslim graveyard] on our way to Neretva, and we saw them burying the 
dead soldiers and civilians. You did not think at all that tomorrow or the day 
after tomorrow you might be buried the same way yourself. You did not fear. 
You knew you had to go to the river to get water, because the kids needed wa-
ter, and you just had to make it to the river. It was like you did not care about 
being killed. We just walked without fear.
The themes in this section all focus on aspects of an everyday world that sud-
denly became problematic: food, shelter, security, and basic social relations. 
Together, they constitute a fundamental aspect of the unmaking of my inform-
ants’ world. 
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The destruction of stories
Another aspect of the unmaking of the world relates to the destruction or ques-
tioning of the values and principles governing normal social life: what van de 
Port calls “the damage war can cause to stories” (199: 109). The stories dam-
aged by my informants’ wartime experiences were not epic, but rather the sim-
ple tales that make everyday social interaction meaningful, understandable and 
predictable: You can trust your friends. Children are the most valuable thing in 
life. Criminals go to jail. In hospitals sick people are cured. War happens some-
where else. The family is a safe haven. Jackson (2002) has argued that the funda-
mental function of stories and narratives is to enable the individual to integrate 
his personal world and the wider world of others, in his words “transforming 
private into public meanings” (ibid. 15). He describes how narratives meet an 
existential human need for “sustaining a sense of agency in the face of dis-
empowering circumstances” (ibid.). The unmaking or questioning of peoples’ 
stories thus destroys the very foundation of self-identification and this sense 
of agency. However, unmaking relates not only to how such stories suddenly 
break down or slowly crumble away, but also to how one starts questioning the 
very foundation of (such) stories, that is, starts seeing them as only an illusion. 
It is interesting that questions of identity often arise […] in the face of terror 
(warfare) and cruelty. It is perhaps here that people meet the most significant 
challenges to their sense of self and humanity. ”Violence”, as Allen Feldman 
has noted, “itself both reflects and accelerates the experience of society as an 
incomplete project, as something to be made” (Nordstrom 199: 19).
The following examples from my informants’ discourse will illustrate how their 
experiences affected the stories they lived by before the war. All of these people 
experienced the disintegration of stories which had formerly bestowed mean-
ing on their lives. For the first time, they were led to reflect on values and nar-
ratives that they had always taken for granted. 
Am I me?
Nusret is a sculptor, that is, he was a sculptor; he is not able to make art any 
more. Instead he makes tombstones – such is the irony of fate. Once he showed 
me some of the creations he had made at the academy before the war, and he 
was especially proud of a small, beautiful Virgin Mary sculpture. The first time 
I met him he was standing outside his house working. I started talking about 
my research, but he interrupted me before long. This is how I remembered part 
of the conversation afterwards:
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Nusret: This country is not normal, nobody here is normal, but when nobody is 
normal you feel normal! People are crazy, insane. […] 
TK:  Do you make sculptures now?
Nusret: No! How could I? I can’t any more. Everything seems so unreal. It’s abnor-
mal, as I’m living in a fake world. I’m standing here watching the huge pile 
of garbage [a pile of rubble and garbage approximately two metres high and 
thirty metres long running along the road] and I don’t care. It’s as if it’s not my 
concern, or as if it’s completely normal, but it isn’t. The destroyed, mined and 
burned-out houses, everything seems unreal or normal at the same time.
The first time I saw a dead man it was terrible, it made me feel sick, but 
later I could see ten dead people, it didn’t affect me, I didn’t care. When you 
have seen dead women and children and experienced all this madness, how 
can you make sculptures? I cannot. Nothing matters. How can I laugh? Well I 
can laugh, a lot, but it is not I who do it…it feels unreal. I’m destroyed inside. 
It’s as though there’s a distance between me and the world, it’s as if it’s not I 
who stand here talking or laughing.
What do children play?
Lamira told me that watching children’s games during the war sometimes hurt 
her the most:
The boys gathered some old tyres, which should do duty as a bundle. The girls 
played women, they cried and kept asking: “Where are our men or brothers?” 
At one point in the game the boys would come out of hiding, dragging the 
tyres, they were pretending to be the men coming home from prison camps, 
and the women [girls] thrilled to see them. And then they would start all over 
again.
What is a school?
Normally it is a place where children are educated and socialise, but during the 
expulsion of the Muslim men and women, a school (as well as a hospital and a 
factory) was turned into a place for torture, robbery, humiliation and killing. 
Moreover, for many adults it was the very school they themselves had attended 
as children; the children had been students there only months before.
What is an enemy?
Normally friends and enemies are clearly distinguishable, but during war this 
changes. Mensur told me how in Blagaj the Serbs and the Muslims traded 
with each other. The Serbs sold coffee for DM 25 per kilo, which they may had 
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bought for DM - per kilo, and the Muslim traders would then resell it for DM 
50 to other Muslims, and after that the Muslims and the Serbs would shoot at 
each other again.
What is an ally?
Aziz told me that people were driven to eat grass during the war when there 
was nothing to eat. One day his mother was picking some grass in a garden 
when the owner (who was also a Muslim) came and kicked her out. He needed 
the grass for his cow. And another time when she went to a place where a little 
food could be bought, the owner told her that she did not have enough money 
to buy anything, but then he saw her ring and said she could have one kilo of 
food in exchange for it.
You don’t kill children, do you?
Several people expressed feelings like Nijaz: “I cannot understand how one can 
kill children; one thing is if a soldier meets another soldier and it’s a matter of 
life or death, but to kill a child, or like in Visegrad to throw them out from the 
bridge…old and children.”
You teach your children to be good, don’t you?
Senad’s mother’s experiences made her question the moral education of the 
Croats. On the day she and her family were driven from their home:
…one of the Croat soldiers had a knife in the one hand and a hammer in the 
other, then another came and opened the door, it was a young guy the same 
age as my Senad [her son], and I thought about what I had taught my children 
and how they [the Croats] raise their children. And I thought, how could they 
hurt an elderly woman? I was forty-eight at that time. Then a couple of them 
came in and beat me and my maternal uncle’s wife. My mother-in-law stayed 
in the house, and she begged for somebody to stay with her in the house, but 
they said that everybody had to go away from the house and then they burned 
the house with her in it. The worst is that we do not know where her bones 
are.
Normal people react to injustice, don’t they?
Anvere: I lived with the children here in Stolac. Nihad was in prison camp. One 
day one of the kids found a little piece of paper, something from the UN. It told 
us things I did not even know. And when you watched TV there was nothing 
[no information about what was happening to the Muslims in Herzegovina]. 
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They knew out in the world what was going on, but they didn’t do anything and 
they didn’t inform us either. We were an experiment, a political experiment.
You trust friends and neighbours, don’t you?
The last example relates to the central value of inter-ethnic coexistence, con-
densed in the idea of neighbourliness (komšiluk). For many their betrayal by 
friends, neighbours and fellow citizens, with whom they had lived peacefully 
for many years (often their whole lives), was the most incomprehensible of 
many disillusionments. Here I will describe three examples, showing how such 
feelings of betrayal were expressed to me.
I
Nermin: I should never have thought that my friend, who lived together with me, 
would take the rifle and shoot at me. My best friend sang and drank together 
with the other Ustashes [term of abuse for violent Croat extremists], while I 
was locked up on the lower floor. He was my best friend from Stolac. 
II
Ljubica: The people we had been drinking coffee and loza [grape brandy] with, it 
was they who picked up Nihad [her husband], and stole my jewellery. It was 
they who came and stole our things, they knew where they were.
III
Senad’s father: The worst is that up until yesterday we were neighbours and we lived 
well together, but suddenly they looked upon us as wild animals who should be 
slaughtered. It is totally inexplicable that some people can behave like that.
Lamira’s story
I will end this section with an excerpt from an interview with Lamira, a woman 
in her late 20s. The first time I met her was at her work. I introduced myself and 
told her about my study. We then went down to the canteen, where she started 
talking. We had coffee, but she did not touch hers for a whole hour, she just 
talked. She said that it had been a long time since she had last talked about the 
war, and that there was so much to tell. Sometimes, she said, she really wanted 
to talk and other times she did not even want to think about it. The excerpt 
consists of several small anecdotes about deceit and evil, which reveal how the 
world has been unmade. But there are also elements of pride and hope. Like 
Nusret at the beginning of this section, she said: “Often I feel like a bystander 
to it all. As if it is not I who have experienced it. It’s like I’m standing outside 
looking in at myself.” 
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I don’t know where to begin. There is so much to tell. There are so many sto-
ries. In Stolac there is a hospital for skin diseases. We have such good air here. 
So before the war a lot of people came to Stolac to get treatment, and there 
were a lot of disabled staying there permanently. When the Croats expelled 
us they turned this hospital into a barrack and all patients were removed. The 
Croat patients were driven to Čapljina, the Serbians to the Serb Republic and 
the Muslims were put in cars, and several of them could not walk, they used 
wheelchairs. They drove them to a place at Buna, near Blagaj. They abandoned 
them there, so that they were outside Croat territory, some of them died. We 
had to transport them in sheets or pieces of cloth and put them up in houses 
in Blagaj, but there were no wheelchairs, and none of the treatment they had 
been getting, so a lot of them died.
One day we were told to leave our house and leave the key in the door. 
It was the third of August, and all the women and children were expelled 
(proteran). My father, my cousins, and all the other men in town had been 
driven to concentration camps a month earlier. We women and children were 
taken to Željezara [a factory in Stolac], There we were locked up in a room 
and robbed of everything, money and gold. […] 
I remember those women who came dragging big bags. Not real bag-
gage, but for instance the kind of sacks you store potatoes in, they were drag-
ging all these things, and they begged the soldiers to be allowed to bring them 
with them, they were weak women. And then there were the women who only 
carried a handbag with family photos. They were very aristocratic, and they 
didn’t deign to look at the soldiers. They were proud, and ‘If you want the bag, 
so take it.’ They didn’t want to beg for anything. 
Afterwards we were put on trucks. Many of the trucks were stolen from 
Bosniaks, and many of them had previously been used for transporting ani-
mals. We were then driven to Buna, where we had to walk to Blagaj. It was 
terrible. It was a no-mans-land.
TK: Many people tell me that this walk of eight or nine kilometres was very ter-
rible, why was it like that?
Lamira: There were dead bodies along the road, people died on that walk. I always 
thought that when you die, then you turn cold and stiff. But we were expelled 
in August, and it was very hot, and the dead bodies were totally swollen. And 
when we walked, the soldiers constantly told us to keep walking. And the peo-
ple living in Blagaj said they didn’t have room, so we had to keep on walking, 
walking…and we didn’t have water or food. The disabled and sick we carried 
in blankets, and we kept thinking ‘Is there room here for us?’ At last we found 
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an abandoned house, or what was left of it. Four families were staying in one 
room. There were thirty-five people in the house. There was one outdoor toi-
let, where you should see to everything. There was only very little water, water 
from the gutters saved in tanks. We had to live in the basement because they 
were shelling us. Next morning….We lived here for eighteen months. We had 
no food. We were starving and lost a lot of weight. It is hard to imagine, but 
try not eating for seven days, then you can imagine a little. And then there was 
the constant shelling.
In December 1993 – or was it January 1994? – We received aid from the 
air for the first time. It was American planes that were dropping relief sup-
plies. I remember the night when they dumped those relief supplies; it was 
one of the worst nights in my life. We ran to the field. It was at night, but there 
were snipers. We ran to the packets that had landed in no-man’s-land. You 
have to imagine the Croats one the one side and the Serbs on the other, and 
then we were in the middle in a hole [Blagaj is situated in a kind of valley], 
and they shot at us and shelled us. But the packets weighed about 500 kilos 
each, so we couldn’t carry them back, we could just try to wrench something 
loose from the packets and then hurry back. People were scared, and some got 
wounded. I lost a friend that night. Snipers hit her. But the day after, it was ab-
surd, because at night we hadn’t been able to see what we had grabbed/taken 
back with us, and some had only got hold of chewing gum, so all the kids were 
walking around blowing big chewing gum bubbles, but there was no food.
When we arrived [at Blagaj] we had to describe our skills, and my moth-
er and sister told the soldiers they could cook, so they were stationed in the 
kitchen. I said I could type, so I typed some documents on an old typewriter. 
Then I started to teach the kids. We didn’t have any schools, but we tried to ar-
range some teaching, and I taught English. I had 130 pupils. We didn’t receive 
any pay. It was voluntary. We only got some candles as payment, so we could 
sit at night and prepare the lessons, write down some exercises. My friend 
and I got a candle each, we shared it, so we had a spare one. Then there was a 
woman who had a baby, and she had some instant milk, but she breastfed her 
child, so we traded our candles for some instant milk.
There are many stories from that time, a lot of sad and a lot of beautiful 
stories. There was a woman who had one of her hands so badly injured that 
she couldn’t use it, and she had to take care of her two children, she had to 
chop firewood and take care of everything with one hand. On one occasion 
my friend was wounded, and there was a man who had a wheelbarrow, we 
wanted to borrow it to drive her to a place where she could get some treat-
ment, but he didn’t want to lend it to us, he had to take care of his family. We 
lived like animals.
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What else? In my class there was a very nice girl. She was so lovely and 
kind towards the other kids, she was so full of life. But one day she locked her-
self into a room and didn’t want to speak to anybody, she withdrew into her-
self, into her own traumas. It was sad to see. There was an eleven-year-old boy 
without parents, he managed himself. Planted potatoes and harvested them.
Once we had a lot of glue, I don’t know from where, probably Germa-
ny, then we made a lot of collages, on paper. We picked a lot of flowers and 
used them to make a tree, a hand or other beautiful things with this glue. We 
also made a two-metre-long letter to a school class in Bremen with drawings 
where we wrote who we were. There were a lot of beautiful things then. 
When we buried our dead, we didn’t have coffins, as there was no wood. 
The last one we buried in wood, was one we laid on a door, but after that it was 
decided that we should only use fabric, sheets and such, because we barely 
had enough firewood. 
My father returned from prison camp in 1994, but he hasn’t ever been 
the same since. He turned silent, introverted and sad. […] 
In 1994 I started on the faculty in Mostar. It was a long way to walk, eight 
kilometres each way. I was a teacher at that time, but I didn’t have time and 
had to stop. I remember the day the radio reported: ‘Today there are no dead.’ 
It was unbelievable. They had been reporting who had died every day. That 
day it was as if the whole world opened itself to me. There was a German jour-
nalist who interviewed me and asked how I could be so happy when the whole 
town was destroyed and everything was in ruins, but I said he should try to 
imagine finally being able to walk the streets without being afraid of getting 
shot. He wanted to give me some money. He felt pity for me, but I said: ‘Keep 
your money and write the truth about what has happened here instead.’
Sometimes I think it is all like an experiment. Like if you take two frogs 
and you put one of them into boiling water and put the other into cold water, 
which you then bring to a boil slowly. I felt like the last one.
Lamira’s story, as well as the other examples I have presented, on a general level 
reveal that nothing is sacred: social relations and matters formerly taken for 
granted reveal their illusory character; meaning becomes problematic; agency 
vanishes; and institutions, practices and values change character. All in all this 
leads to a general need for reformulating moral behaviour, and re-identifying 
social belonging (e.g. ethnic identity).
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The destruction of communication
Lamira’s story is somewhat extraordinary, not in content, but in form. It has 
a chronological order and is coherent. Most Muslim women in Stolac would 
probably recognise the feelings and situations she depicts, but few would be 
able to express them so clearly. This brings me to the methodological problem 
of how to represent the violent memories and experiences of my informants, 
how to “write about the ‘unmaking’ and ‘creating’ of the world in a ‘made’ world 
of academic prose?” (Nordstrom 1995: 13). Theory and academic writing style 
have a structure and order which is removed from lived experience (Hastrup 
19), an order which is imposed on the world, “the academic will to order” as 
van de Port names it (199: 25), an order which is especially intolerant of the 
chaotic experiences related to war, violence and the unmaking of the world. It is 
therefore unlikely that experience of war and violence can ever be documented 
in any real sense. Representations of human suffering will always have gaps 
in terms of experience, perception and the nature of pain itself (Perera 2001: 
15-0). 
Furthermore, the problem confronts not only anthropologists: it is also 
central for the victims of war and violence themselves. In essence, the problem 
is this: how can one communicate experiences when existing categories do not 
suffice, and when the categories themselves have been distorted by the unprec-
edented events of war and violence. In addition, victims of violence and terror 
are also often caught in a dilemma between wanting to forget and wanting to 
remember at one and the same time. For example, Warren (1993) has described 
how people in Guatemala did not want to talk about la violencia (a period of 
intense state violence) because they feared reprisals. At the same time, however, 
that period came up in all routine conversations, in part because it functioned 
as a temporal marker in people’s conceptual world. My informants showed the 
same ambivalence: on the one hand they wanted to speak out, and to put their 
violent experiences into word to tell the world about them (thereby experienc-
ing the imperfection of words); on the other hand, and at the same time, they 
wanted to forget, to be able to get on with life and achieve peace of mind. 
Problems with forgetting
The evocative power of words was one reason why my informants wanted to 
forget. Telling someone about horrible events can make them come alive (see 
also Jackson 2002: 5; Perera 2001: 159). If people did choose to talk about ex-
periences like internment in a prison camp, the horrible time in Blagaj, or the 
expulsion, they would often only say a little and then stop. They did not want 
to talk about it because it was like reliving the experience. We see this clearly 
in the following excerpt from my notebook about a man called Emir, who had 
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been interned in a prison camp with three thousand prisoners and only thirty-
three plates and spoons:
Emir:  So nearly 100 of us had to share each spoon and plate. When the Red Cross 
arrived, we washed the spoons for the first time. We had very little time to eat, 
15 seconds.
TK: Was it hot food?
Emir: Yes it was soup. We slept on the floor on the concrete. 500 in one hangar. 
There were no blankets, and if you had to pee, you just had to do it where you 
were.
He suddenly stops talking, I can feel that he is moving towards the limit 
of where he still can talk and keep things at a distance. I say that it is impos-
sible to understand how people can do such things to others. He answers that 
if you could, you would be like them.
According to Anvere, people’s and especially men’s attempts at forgetting are 
rather general, as she straightforwardly ascertained about her husband.
Nihad he has not told me about the prison camp, he can’t manage. No men 
tell about their experiences from there, well yes a little when they drink loza 
[grape brandy].
Like speech, television is a strongly evocative medium. Once the film Welcome 
to Sarajevo, which depicts the horrendous time during the siege of Sarajevo, 
was shown on television. Seeing the film with my hosts was a tough emotional 
experience. We all sat watching: nobody said a word except my landlady, who 
kept sighing. Her husband, who normally likes to eat the hot popcorn his wife 
makes, did not touch it. After the film nobody spoke, and we all went to bed. 
The day after several people asked if I had seen the film. Safet said that when 
he saw it everything came back to him. He told me how he had relived a lot of 
episodes from the war, and had not fallen asleep until 4 am. Nusret’s father, on 
the other hand, said that he only saw the first ten minutes. He had seen it all in 
real life, he explained, and did not need to see it again.
My informants’ intentions to forget were often sabotaged by the way the 
subject of the war would surface in many everyday conversations. Anything 
could function as a trigger of episodes from the war, as the following examples 
show. My father visited me for four days while I was doing fieldwork, and I 
remember how it struck me that on the first evening he was with me in my 
host family’s company, we only talked for about half an hour about the things 
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one normally converses with foreign guests about, such as climate, buildings, 
family relations, food and so on. At this point the conversation changed topic 
and we concentrated on the war and the present problems. It was impossible 
to carry on a ‘normal’ (non-war-related) conversation. Once Osman offered 
me a cigarette, a Bosnian cigarette labelled Drina. He asked if I knew the River 
Drina, and I said yes, it is located at Visegrad, which then led him to talk about 
the war, starting with the atrocities committed by Serbs in that town. And at a 
child’s birthday party, my comments about the lovely food we were served led 
to a discussion about the lack of food during the war. Often people did not even 
need a cue. Experiences from the war often erupted spontaneously. 
Problems with remembering: incomprehensibility
I will now turn to the other side of the dilemma in which my informants are 
caught: wanting to remember and put their terrible experiences into words. 
Remembering is blocked by the fact that people often cannot understand what 
has happened. It does not make sense to them. As I was told several times, “how 
should you be able to understand it, when we can’t?” Many people explained 
that their memories were all like a dream: one is just waiting to open one’s eyes 
and wake up. Some of the examples offered above already express this feeling of 
incomprehensibility. I shall here limit myself to two examples. During an inter-
view, in which Fahrudin had been talking about problems related to rebuilding 
the ruined houses in Stolac, he suddenly said:
There is one thing I don’t understand. I was born here and I lived here until 
I was caught and put in prison camp, and then I returned and continued to 
live here, and I intend to die here. But I cannot understand what was going on 
in their heads. The people who expelled the Bosniaks from here. Those who 
committed this urbicide [I come back to this term], genocide. You should talk 
to them instead if you are interested in this social pathology.
When I asked Amela, a young schoolteacher, what she thought about the situ-
ation, she turned my question back on me:
What do you as an anthropologist think about this situation? We live together 
in an area, Serbs, Croats and Muslims. We were raised in the same system and 
in the same social environment. Why do they have this will to kill? How can 
they have the will to kill a human being?
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Problems with remembering: epistemology
A more fundamental problem confronting people’s attempts to remember and 
communicate their experiences in a meaningful form relates to epistemology: 
how to communicate experiences when existing categories do not suffice. In 
addition, the difficulty of communicating traumatic events arises from the 
victim’s experience of feeling disconnected from the life s/he lived before and 
his/her experience of being out of time. For this reason, “refugee stories are not 
like the stories we ordinarily tell. They do not carry us forward to any consoling 
denouement. They do not require others to listen to them or respond. There is 
no prospect of closure. There are victims, but few free agents. They may bear 
witness to an event, describe a journey, or recount a tragedy, but they suspend 
all consideration of salvation or justice” (Jackson (2002: 92). Furthermore, trau-
matic events are often remembered as bare facts disconnected from the world, 
as “an unbearable sequence of sheer happenings” (Arendt in Jackson 2002: 92). 
These events are therefore without meaning. This characterisation of refugee 
stories has parallels to some of the stories I was told. When people told me 
about, or rather tried to tell me about, such topics as prison camp, expulsion, 
separation from family and Blagaj, they lacked the right words and categories, 
and their stories sometimes sounded disconnected from time and were occa-
sionally held in a prosaic, record-keeping style. However, there are also differ-
ences. My informants were telling about events that had happened at least eight 
years earlier, and some of these stories had been given some kind of structure 
since then, they urged the listener to respond, and they included considera-
tions of ‘salvation or justice.’ Even though (pace Jackson) people were unable to 
express the whole of their experience, and were frustrated because they lacked 
the right words, nevertheless they did develop ways of communicating (about) 
their experiences which gave them coherence, set them in a moral framework. 
A central strategy is what I will call ‘amputation.’ By ‘amputation’ I mean that 
when mental categories do not suffice and/or are invalidated, new categories 
are invented. While they cannot fully express war-related experiences, they 
function as a kind of symbolic shorthand.
Amputation: we ate grass
Often people said that they had to eat grass when living as refugees in Blagaj 
during the war. In 1993 and 1994 hardly any relief reached the area: the Muslim-
  Factuality could be used as a way for the speaker to distance himself from the spoken. The only 
time I heard Emir’s father talk about his stay in the prison camp, he mentioned that the first 41 
days were the worst, then came the Red Cross, that he was in the camp for 1 days, that he lost 
35 kilos, that they had one loaf of bread for 15 men and so on.
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controlled area around Blagaj was like a tongue of land, with only one unsafe 
entrance. People were hungry or even starving. But how does one communi-
cate the feeling and experience of starvation? It does not suffice to say ‘we were 
starving’ or ‘starving to death’, or ‘we were extremely hungry’, though I have 
heard all these expressions. Then people summed up the experience in the sen-
tence ‘we ate grass’. The expression ‘eating grass’ functioned as a symbol cover-
ing some of the feelings people had in relation to extreme starvation and fear. 
This symbolic expression could stand alone, without needing to be commented 
or elaborated on. Let me give two examples: One evening Nihad was jokingly 
talking about how they had made moonshine during the war, and we were all 
laughing at his story. Suddenly his wife said: “we had to eat grass.” Then the 
laughter stopped, and we were all silent for a couple of minutes. Then we started 
talking about something else. 
Amer told a story he had probably heard from his wife:
The women went to the field to pick some grass, and they ate it. While they 
did this, the snipers were shooting at them. This was while we [the men] were 
in prison camp. Near the house where my mother lived, an old woman was 
out in the field, two times the snipers shot at her, they missed two times, but 
she did not hear, she was nearly dead. And then they shot her the third time. 
The women in the house were shouting at her to hide herself, but she did not 
hear, and then the third time they hit her. And all she did was to pick some 
grass from the field.
Amputation: losing weight
Another way of condensing and expressing the feeling of starvation and misery 
was to say how many kilos one had lost. “I lost thirty-five kilos in the first three 
months!” “Aziz lost thirty kilos in prison camp!” Again there is no reason to 
disbelieve this. The point, however, is the sentiment such a statement is able 
to carry. The accurate enumeration of the number of kilos lost is not a mere 
factual calculation, but rather a symbolic visualisation of hunger.
Amputation: film analogies
When they told me about the shelling, people sometimes made an analogy to 
film, saying for instance that when the Serbs starting shelling Stolac in 1992 it 
was like a movie, or it was like the things one had only seen in movies. Again, 
here, the analogy compensates for the inadequacy of the existing vocabulary. 
The merging of fiction and reality is a way to express such dramatic occurrenc-
es: the sound of a bomb hitting the ground, the sensation of immense tremors 
in the earth, the sight of people running.
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Amputation: rather die than go through it again
People sometimes condensed their overwhelming, unwieldy and intangible 
feelings from the war by saying that they would rather die than go through it 
again. This might be considered as no more than a saying. However, the way 
people said it convinced me that at the moment of speaking they meant it seri-
ously. 
Amputation: this war was the worst
Another condensation: comparing this war to previous wars and then saying 
this war was the worst:
TK: You have survived two wars?
Džanana: Yes one in childhood and one in old age…But that war [World War II] 
was nothing compared to this war. Božija milost! [Meaning something like 
God’s joy that God gives in abundance, which is the way Džanana compares 
World War II to the present war].
People would also make comparisons to Hitler, saying that he had not been as 
destructive as the Croats had been during this war. And not only old people 
who had actually experienced World War II made such comparisons. Even for 
younger people, evoking Hitler, the symbol of modern evil, and stating that this 
war was worse than what he did, was a powerful expression of the strength of 
their feelings.
Amputation: hero-tales
The last example relates to how remembering experiences can function as a 
way of recovering agency. I call the agency-generating stories told in Stolac 
hero-tales. The point is that when telling these rather tragic stories, the speaker 
introduces a little twist, so that he becomes an acting subject and not just an 
object acted upon by others. Hero-tales can be stories about escapes, hiding 
food in prison camp, dressing up like a woman and thereby tricking the Croat 
soldiers when they came to fetch the Muslim men, and so on. 
A transcription of an interview can never convey the atmosphere in which 
it was conducted. This is a great disadvantage in this excerpt from an interview 
with Muhamed, as the atmosphere was full of humour and liveliness, and Mu-
hamed’s story was accompanied by vibrant gestures.
Muhamed: Did you arrive from Denmark by plane?
001_316_post-war.indd   67 14/04/08   22:04:24
Denne side er købt på www.ebog.dk og er omfattet af lov om ophavsret. Uanset evt. aftale med Copy-Dan er det ikke tilladt at kopiere eller
indscanne siden til undervisningsbrug eller erhvervsmæssig brug.
	 post-war identification
TK: Yes.
Muhamed: From Mostar to Sarajevo, Mostar to Sarajevo over the mountains on 
foot! Yes on foot…And we had noting to eat, no water, there was nothing.
Muhamed’s wife: It was war.
Muhamed: Over the mountains. I had boots. My wife had only shoes. And there 
were a lot of stones, and they hurt your feet.
TK: How many days?
Muhamed: Four days and four nights. Halfway through Bosnia on foot, and we 
returned to Konjic on foot. And we returned to the house in the evening, 
washed a little … [and then he uses body language to show how they then 
made love]. We were not tired [laughing}, but after making love, we were tired 
[laughing]. […] 
TK: When was that?
Muhamed: In 1994.
Wife: Tell him about when we were married.
Muhamed: The wedding was at ten o’clock in the morning … No wedding out-
fit … [only] uniform…we washed ourselves…My wife had smartened her-
self up you know, and all the time shelling, snipers; take cover. I said to my 
wife…it is normal at a wedding that you shoot in the air. I said ‘Here is a gun 
so we can shoot, for real.’ [Laughs]. But the shells were falling so we could 
not shoot [What he means was that they did not need to shoot, because all 
the shells were a salute in themselves]. Then we were in the basement, only 
the four of us. Me, my wife and the best men (kum i kuma). Nobody else. 10 
o’clock in the morning. We signed the papers and then we were ready to go 
to another house and…you know [laughs.] And we had no wedding ring. My 
wife made pita [traditional dish] out of tinned food, then we had half a litre 
of sliva [plum brandy], and at 4 o’clock in the afternoon I had to go…to the 
front…yes…that’s how it was…love.
The unmaking of the world is not ‘only’ about how the everyday world is de-
stroyed and values and social relations damaged. It is also about how commu-
nication of the violent experiences is itself problematic. People want to forget 
but cannot do so because the memories keep surfacing. And people want to 
remember and talk about it all, but cannot do so because they are not able to 
understand what happened, and when they try words and categories do not 
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suffice, so new but still insufficient ones have to be invented: the amputated tell-
ing from the world’s unmaking.
The all-pervasive feeling of loss
The final element in my informants’ experiences of the world’s unmaking re-
lates to a seemingly trivial, but nevertheless central point: the unmaking of my 
informants’ world is not restricted to either a discrete period in time (the war) 
or to a bounded set of core experiences. Rather, it must be seen against the 
background of a total and all-pervasive feeling of loss:
•  Loss of future or belief in a future (dreams, plans, wishes). 
• Loss of nation state (Yugoslavia, and the identity: Yugoslav). 
•  Loss of a functional society (school, doctors, pension, law and order, 
industry, education). 
•  Loss of a safe society (ethnic violence, Croat intimidation and discrim-
ination of Muslims).
•  Loss of material goods and material status (house, clothes, not being 
able to buy birthday presents for one’s children, money).
•  Loss of status and dignity (an old ethnology professor from Mostar 
now walks about the streets in ragged clothes trying to earn some 
money by guiding the few tourists).
• Loss of family members (refugees in other countries, killed).
• Loss of the sense of psychological security (war-related traumas).
•  Loss of a native soil (for everybody Stolac is a new town, virtually noth-
ing is as it was, personal contacts are gone, and the town has become 
ugly). 
• Loss of the past.
Even though this list covers many aspects of people’s sense of loss, it still can-
not capture the pervasiveness of people’s feelings of bereavement. Stolac is a 
sad and depressing town, with a gloomy atmosphere. And though people are 
friendly, hospitable and refreshingly humorous (albeit blackly), the place drains 
their energy. I felt this myself. Sometimes I felt that Stolac was nothing but a 
sump of sadness and despair, despite the optimism, creativity and courage that 
sometimes also existed almost schizophrenically. 
One example of the persistent attack on the everyday world is the way 
people seldom distinguished clearly between peace and war. People for instance 
said ‘after Dayton’ instead of peace, or they said ‘the present situation.’ They sel-
dom remember the date of the Dayton agreement, but they remember the exact 
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date they were released from prison camp and the day they returned to their 
home in Stolac. Sometimes people say they wish for peace to come (implying 
that the present situation is not peace), or they simply say outright that the war 
is not over. This is from an interview with Suljeman:
Suljeman: It is impossible to live here. When was it the peace came, 1995?
TK: Yes, in 1995.
Suljeman: Then six years have passed and there is no progress. Things have not 
become better, no industry, nothing.
One day while I was talking to Nusret’s father outside a small shop, a man about 
my age stopped by. He lived in a village one kilometre away, where the power sup-
ply had not yet been fixed. I asked him if they were going to get electricity soon, 
as a US-funded project was fixing the electricity lines around town. He said:
Yes, but they say that about everything: ‘Just wait a little, just wait.’ For my 
part the war has now been going on for eight years, and they are just wasted 
years. I’ve not accomplished anything, it has only been waiting time, and I’m 
still waiting, but for what? They say things will be better, but a lot of my years 
have been wasted. To you this is maybe interesting, but to us it is tragic. I 
have no job, nothing to do, and we’ve been living without electricity since we 
returned.
It is difficult to describe the sad atmosphere I often found in Stolac, An atmos-
phere that contributed to people’s general feeling of loss. Nevertheless, I will 
here quote a few excerpts from my notebook to give an impression of how the 
town appeared to me.
I
I am just returning from Nota [a small café]. I don’t know what it is, but some-
thing has happened to the way I see things today. From being exciting and 
interesting – and myself having positive energy – things have changed. People 
are strange. The town is strange, a dump. Down at Nota, for instance, five to 
six people sit. There is a only little light. Two individuals are talking. Some 
drink coffee and half-sentimental Bosnian music fills the room. The room is 
no more than twenty-five square metres. The cables in the bar are hanging 
down. An old 1-inch TV stands on the bar, it is dirty. One of the ‘waiters’ sits 
in a corner kissing his girlfriend. Jamezdin is sitting in the dark, alone, like he 
has totally given up. 
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TK: What did you do today? 
Jamezdin: Nothing!
He has no coffee, nista [nothing]. Osman sits on one of the four plastic chairs, 
which, placed around a plastic table, make up the regular table for those who 
play cards in the evening. The room is like a bunker someone has tried to 
fix up a little. On the way out we talk a little about football, and about good 
and bad Danish football clubs. They know them better than I do. The worn 
football programme in the bar, showing dates for matches and the odds, is the 
only thing livening the place up. One of the young men turns on the TV, but 
there is nothing, only static.
II
Stolac is a hole. There is nothing in the town. The tired unshaven man sitting 
in the post-office, staring and saying sutra [tomorrow] when I ask if I have 
mail. Cafés with room for one hundred but with only ten guests. I met the guy 
without teeth on my way back, we talked a little…about nothing.  
III
It is as though everything, in one way or another, has been ravaged by the war. 
Houses are shattered and collapsed and just standing as empty gaping ruins: 
bushes and grass grow in many of them. Goats are grazing there. Other hous-
es, inhabited, are filled with holes after shell splinters, they lack windows, and 
plastic or planks cover the window openings. Houses about to be built – but 
the money has run out – are left half-finished, but inhabited anyway. Laundry 
is hanging outside, and a satellite dish hangs on the rough wall. Outside in the 
garden there is an old lady, dressed in black. Her child or grandchild gets into 
the old ramshackle and rusted Opel Cadet in the driveway, starts it and drives 
away, the noise from the leaky exhaust pipe filling the air. I pass a small bridge, 
the metal railing is torn by shell splinters, and it is rather rusty. Below is an old 
factory, all the windows are broken, the drainpipes are gone, so the walls on 
the north side are mossy as the rainwater just runs down the building’s sides. 
The roads are filled with potholes, but people still drive extremely fast. I meet 
a young girl, about twenty-five, in a pink pullover, I say hello and smile, she 
smiles back showing all her missing teeth. The Muslim graveyard [Harem] 
is overgrown by twining plants, the Croats haven’t touched it, but time has. 
Nobody has tended it for the last five to seven years. All this decay is in glaring 
contrast to the few new and very stunning three-storey houses and a totally 
new Alfa-Romeo or Mercedes driving by. 
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IV
At the café I noticed many have bitten-down nails. Coffee, cigarettes and bit-
ten-down nails.
And finally, two quotations that communicate the feeling that the unmaking is 
still on-going. One day Anvere said to me:
Nicolas [my second name], you can’t understand what the war has done to us. 
At first sight everything may look normal, but it’s not. Nothing is normal. The 
war has changed everything.
Another day she talked about the time in Blagaj. This is how I recalled the con-
versation afterwards.
Anvere: In Blagaj I lost thirty kilos in the first three months. Imagine! Fear and 
there was no food. All the time I had to think about how to get food. Alen 
[son] did not come out of the basement where we lived for half a year, he 
would not, he was scared. I had to go out to get food. But there was nothing 
to buy. There were no shops. Sometimes you could buy a little from those who 
had something, some of their homemade stuff, a little meat or some hon-
ey. But it was expensive. If not, I had to pick grass, we had nothing else. We 
cooked it and ate it. And we were scared all the time…And the things Nihad 
experienced in the prison camp, he has not told me. He can’t bring himself to 
tell me, and I can’t stand to hear it.
Nihad: It was terrible; you can’t understand how it was. One day or one week you 
could maybe endure, but when it continued week after week, month after 
month…I saw people dying in front of me, we were scared, it was…
He stops. Nihad is not a man who talks a lot, but at this moment I simply do 
not think he can manage to say more, and I do not ask. His face is ash-grey, 
and his whole body is somewhat fallen apart. When he stops talking he lowers 
his glance, and it stays there. His wife then said:
Anvere: And the fear we had hasn’t left us. When I gave birth to Amer in 199, I 
think I passed on that fear to him; he was like…wild and restless [she cries].
TK: Yes, but he is a good boy now, he has a good life now.
Anvere: Yes, but I passed on that fear to him, and now what does he have to grow 
up for? There is no future, no work, nothing.
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This last section has showed how – owing to the unhealed traumas of my in-
formants and the present depressing situation – the unmaking of the world 
is still going on. I have termed it the existence of an omnipresent feeling of 
loss. Let me stress again that my depiction of Stolac and people’s mood is just 
one side of the coin. The other side is hope, successfully forgetting the past, 
optimism, laughter, humour, determination and energy. But when the coin is 
flipped, this side often lands face down.
The aim of this chapter has been to give an account of central themes in my 
informants’ experiences related to the unmaking of their world. The very foun-
dations of existence (property, security, food and family relations) have been 
affected. The stories and values governing normal social life were also damaged, 
which led people to question not only ontology, but also moral principles and 
social relations, especially ethnic relations. Furthermore, the unmaking of the 
world means a loss of epistemological frameworks, making both the remem-
bering and communication – as well as forgetting and repression – of traumatic 
events equally problematic. Lastly, I have tried to capture my informants’ gen-
eral and all-pervasive feeling of loss. 
The chapter is a necessary introduction to the rest of the book, in which I 
concentrate on my informants’ remaking of their world. I intend to analyse the 
contours of the mental landscape (what I see as their counterdiscourse) they 
have created in order to explain and give meaning to the devastating experi-
ences of recent years. It has been necessary to show how profoundly people’s 
world has been unmade in order to make it possible to contextualise how fun-
damental the question of identity is in this process of remaking for the Muslims 
of present-day Stolac. It is my argument that the unmaking of people’s world 
forces them to first question and then recreate a number of the central catego-
ries of human experience: social relations, moral values, the everyday world, 
and group identity (especially ethnic). I will be treating many of my informants’ 
questions and uncertainties concerning these fundamental issues under two 
primary headings, touched upon in each part of the rest of the book. Firstly: 
Who are they, the ones who did this to us? And secondly: Who are we, since 
this was done to us? The question of the identity of the Other will be the theme 
of Part II, and the question of my informants’ own post-war identity will be 
the theme of Part III. However, before looking at some of the answers people 
have come up with in detail, I will outline the central aspects of the analytical 
framework for my discussion of the remaking of the world.
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Chapter 3 
Remaking, identification, and 
counterdiscourse
Remaking
As an introductory remark one could argue that the concept of remaking is 
not theoretically solid enough to demand specific focus. After all, what we are 
dealing with is an aspect of cultural construction. Remove the re- and one has 
a commonplace anthropological focus upon how people make their world. I 
more or less agree. In her study of war and the consequences of war, Nordstrom 
(199) argues differently. Her informants’ world was totally destroyed, and as she 
analyses it they had to rebuild it from scratch: “[normally] people do not create 
worlds anew but fine-tune the ones they are born into. Very few empirical data 
exist to show how people’s worlds are newly crafted” (ibid. 13). Though it is ana-
lytically tempting to envisage war-torn societies as areas of cultural tabula rasa, 
cultural construction can never be studied from scratch (Connerton 199); and 
as my study demonstrates, people draw upon already existing cultural catego-
ries and habitual practices when remaking a world. Nevertheless, I still find 
the concept of remaking illuminating, as we can use it to direct attention to the 
intensified need that people who are victims of war and violence have to adjust 
experience to larger narratives (and vice versa). As I showed in the previous 
chapter, many aspects of my informants’ everyday world were unmade during 
the war and post-war period, and the unmaking is still taking place. Therefore, 
the material and mental remaking of this shattered world is necessary in order 
for the Muslims to live on. The difference in relation to ‘ordinary’ studies of 
cultural construction is then quantitative and not qualitative. 
I will introduce four themes central to the study of practices of remaking 
in post-war societies. These themes are: a) officially sanctioned public spheres for 
narrating experience; b) creation of a predictable everyday life; c) agency; and d) 
identification of oneself and the Other. My study mainly focuses on one of these 
themes – identification – though the strength of the analysis consists in letting 
the different themes interact. 
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The first thread relates to the general human need for connecting individual 
stories to larger collective or supra-individual ones in order to express and 
order experience (Jackson 2002: 11-3). More specifically, the focus relates to 
experiences with officially sanctioned public spheres, which give explicit rec-
ognition to one’s suffering. That is, which enable one to express grief, recount 
experiences, facilitate a sort of intellectual grasp on events and obtain some 
kind of satisfaction for the injustices experienced. In post-traumatic societies, 
such a requirement is of special importance, as many of the existing narratives 
are often destroyed or no longer valid, and because people’s experiences often 
exceed the explanatory potential of remaining narratives. In some countries hit 
by war or conflict, official attempts at creating such organised arenas for com-
municating loss and injustice have been made. Consider for instance the work 
done by the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Buhr 2000; 
Fiona 2001). Or take the example of Nigeria, where the deliberate and widely 
accepted displacement of the process of reconciliation from the national to the 
community level has occurred (Last 2000). When we look at Stolac and Bos-
nia Herzegovina, though, such officially sanctioned space is already colonized 
from the perspective of my informants. 
As already shown, the official public space in Stolac is totally dominated 
by nationalist-minded Croats, and the message communicated is clear: We won 
the war! Stolac is Croatian and has never been otherwise! Ethnicity is a hin-
drance to interaction! The Muslims’ perspective is unimportant!1 Since I left 
Stolac, the central mosque in town has been rebuilt. I imagine this is a great 
blow for the nationalist-minded Croats. On the other hand, I do not think it 
is seen as a great victory by many of the ordinary Muslims. As I demonstrate 
throughout the study, the counterdiscourse that the Muslims produce, though 
it is about identifying the culprits and gaining recognition for their own suffer-
ing, is not a fight over national symbols. Rather it is about resisting the nation-
alist discourse altogether, which in Stolac is almost impossible. Furthermore, 
this counterdiscourse does not exist in the publicy sphere. It exists rather as an 
implicit, loose and often non-conscious practice.
One might expect that the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia in the Hague would function as an official criminal justice system, 
redressing the Muslim’s grievances. However, it is not regarded as such. In gen-
1  The term space should also be taken literally. I had an informant with whom I often walked 
about Stolac discussing various matters, and it was always very obvious when we passed 
Croat cafés or houses, or walked in areas mainly inhabited by Croats. He lowered his voice, or 
stopped talking, sometimes in the middle of a sentence, and I could sense his uneasiness. 
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eral people feel that the work of the tribunal is all too late and too slow. Further-
more, they feel that the tribunal fails to indict the right people. Several of the 
war criminals from the war and post-war period are still walking the streets, 
and some are even employed in the public sector.
One could also imagine that the West or the international community 
in some way could work to officially recognise the grievances of the Muslims. 
Many Muslims, however, have an ambivalent relationship towards the West, 
for instance reflected in their attitudes towards the Dayton agreement, which 
ended the war. Naturally they are relieved that the war ended, but on the other 
hand they are also resentful over the neutrality of the agreement. All groups 
are treated equally, which means that no groups are treated as having suffered 
more than others, which is directly contrary to the experience of the Muslims 
of Stolac. In general, people accept or appreciate the international presence in 
Bosnia Herzegovina, but they do not find that this presence guarantees or con-
stitutes a public sphere communicating their experiences.
Everyday life
Attempts at creating or relating experience to officially sanctioned collective 
memories often run counter to another characteristic of post-war remaking: 
the need for rebuilding an everyday life. This is the case because forgetting is 
often a central element in this process. In order to live on, restore a belief in a 
future and create an everyday life not permeated by hate and implacability, a 
strategy of active forgetting is often pursued in post-war/terror communities 
(Das and Kleinman 2001; Jackson 2002). The tension between creating spheres 
for articulating experience (remembering) and on the other hand consciously 
setting the past aside in order to live on (forgetting) was very clear in Stolac. 
Sometimes it was a generational matter. For instance when the older people 
persistently talked about the war, and the younger people deliberately tried to 
avoid any focus on it. But the dilemma was felt by all and manifested itself 
through often outright contradictory statements. In a study of post-war life in 
Bombay, Mehta and Chatterji (2001) observed the same relationship between 
forgetting and the resumption of an everyday life:
The altered everyday is marked by a new knowledge and memory of loss, but 
also a practical wisdom of negotiating this loss. It tells one that reparation 
cannot take the form of justice, coexistence is possible only if the past is delib-
erately set aside. (ibid. 23).
It seems that condemnation, hate and a feeling that justice is all or nothing is 
characteristic for people living ‘outside’, either abroad or outside the relevant 
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community. The reason is, I believe, that they do not have to live with the con-
sequences of their own condemnations. In post-war communities the different 
parties have to develop some kind of ‘working consensus’ or unspoken agree-
ment about social interaction. In this light we can understand the technique of 
a Muslim woman who told me that she never discussed politics with her Croat 
colleagues. The only things they deliberately talked about were cooking and 
children. The rationale behind such a strategy seems to be related to the integ-
rity of the situation – upholding the ‘order of the interaction’ – that is, a mutual 
protection and confirmation of the identities presented (Goffman 193; see also 
Kolind 2002a). But naturally the creation of a working consensus is not easy: 
for example, if one has lost everything, including family members, and then has 
to co-exist with the guilty party or members of the ‘guilty’ ethnic group. Often, 
though, people have no alternatives. On several occasions I heard people in 
Stolac say that they could not yet live together with the Croats, but they could 
live alongside them. The implicit assumption was that as time passes the ethnic 
groups would learn to live together again. Last (2000), in his work on reconcili-
ation, the restoration of sociality, and the establishment of the trust necessary 
for cooperation in post-war society, has isolated four main areas necessary for 
the recreation of an everyday life: 
1. The establishment of a framework of security.
2. Reopening the pathways of exchange, social as well as economic.
3. Symbolic cleansing of the land.
4. Offering of credible grounds for hope.
Looking at Stolac I would say that people are beginning to feel safe, as incidents 
of ethnically related violence diminish, and as inter-ethnic economic exchange 
in the town grows. However, social interaction is still rare and difficult, and as 
three and four have only been partially realised. 
The rebuilding of an everyday world, one can see, is not about ideology. It 
is about establishing predictability, creating a ‘working consensus’, and burying 
memories. It is about being able to send the children off to school, to get per-
sonal finances to hang together, feel safe, (re)build friendships, buy a car, have a 
cosy café where one can socialise, cultivate the garden, keep the sadness at bay, 
fall in love, take care of the parents, dream. As Das and Kleinman (2001: 15-1) 
have put it when writing about similar matters:
We are looking not necessarily for a grand narrative of forgiveness and re-
demption but for the small local stories in which such communities are ex-
perimenting with ways of inhabiting the world together. 
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Agency
A third element relevant for analysing post-war practices of remaking relates to 
agency. Above I mentioned the importance for victims of warfare to be able to 
connect their experiences to larger collective narratives in order to gain recog-
nition for injustice and in order to grasp the violent interruption of their lives. 
The implication is that experience only exists when narrated. However, the rep-
resentation of experience does not account for the whole picture. According to 
existentialist-inspired writers, people also generate strategies aimed at sustain-
ing a sense of agency, especially in the face of disempowering circumstances. 
Jackson (2002) analyses storytelling not solely as an attempt to understand the 
world conceptually. Rather: “Storytelling reworks and remodels subject-object 
relations in ways that subtly alter the balance between actor and acted upon, 
thus allowing us to feel that we actively participate in a world that for a moment 
seemed to discount, demean, and disempower us” (ibid. 1). Jackson relates this 
to a general existential imperative, understood as the need “to be more than a 
bit player in the stories of our own lives” (ibid. 15). It should go without saying 
that this existential imperative is intensified for victims of violence and war. 
Returning to Nordstrom’s (199) study of civilians’ reactions to the ter-
ror and warfare in Mozambique, she found that the creation or sustaining of 
agency constituted a central element in her informants’ counter-practices. She 
furthermore noticed how this agency-creating activity was closely linked to a 
strong code of human ethics. The result of this combination was, she argues, to 
disprove the Hobbesian dictum that life is reduced to a free-for-all; a mentality 
of unstructured survival in situations of destruction of institutional structures 
and governmental support. Instead, people’s ‘worldbuildings’ (ibid. 13) were 
characterised by the making of durable social relations and by mitigating the 
onslaught on the self and one’s status as a political subject, which the terror had 
aimed at (see also Howel 199).
In the previous chapter, I introduced a number of ‘hero-tales.’ These can 
be seen as examples of agency-creating activity. Though the existential impera-
tive will not be my central focus, it can be used to put the data I present into 
perspective. The counterdiscourse I analyse is probably not only about resist-
ing nationalist discourse and creating meaning in a shattered world. It is also 
about restoring a sense of control over relevant elements in one’s life. The focus 
upon counterdiscursive elements will tend to make people’s practices a little too 
conscious and ideological and treat them as a little more coherent than they 
are in reality, whereas a focus upon existence and agency will make them look 
individual and idiosyncratic. Furthermore, such idiosyncrasies – when taken 
together and related to a code of human ethics or a will for coexistence, which 
I found in Stolac – can be seen as part of a human ability to create sociality. We 
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must not automatically depict the sociality in post-war societies as a Hobbesian 
nightmare. Fulfilling the existential imperative (by not giving up, but resisting 
the destructive force of violence) coupled with a will for coexistence can – as in 
Stolac – very well be the force or potential in local everyday interaction that can 
help rebuild society from below. 
Identification
The last, and for this book most central theme relevant for studying processes of 
remaking relates to everyday identification. Everyday identifications are distin-
guished from the officially sanctioned public sphere by being more undefined, 
non-conscious and implicit. Officially sanctioned public spheres can function 
as a means of connecting individual stories with supra-individual collective 
stories, but as I pointed out above such official spheres are not present for the 
Muslims of Stolac. The question is what happens when relevant officially sanc-
tioned public spheres for representing experience do not exist.
Various anthropological studies of ordinary people’s reactions to violence 
and war have focused on precisely this relation between individual and collec-
tive memory. They have analysed various strategies for transforming private 
into public meanings. That is, creating integration and balance between one’s 
personal world and the wider world of others, which seems to be especially 
problematic when justice in a legal sense has not (yet) been achieved; as is also 
the situation for the Muslims of Stolac. Such alternative or dissident collective 
memories and cultural representations (alternative or dissident in relation to 
the officially sanctioned public sphere) do not need to be coherent, ideologi-
cal, fixed or totally conscious in order to work. In fact, they do not even need 
to be new. Often already existing cultural categories and narratives are used or 
remoulded in order to grasp experience and explain people’s changed reality. 
Alternative collective memory can take the form of culturally sanctioned ghost 
stories, which are used as instruments for remembering the past terror in an 
otherwise politically dangerous milieu (Perera 2001). It can also consist of tra-
ditional narratives or tales commenting on a local social situation of distrust, 
which mitigate the consequences of the internalisation of violence in local so-
ciety (Warren 1993). Alternative narratives can also function as a critique of an 
officially sanctioned nationalism by indirectly operating with a different period 
of time (Jansen 2000b). Or they can be explicit and conscious political expres-
sions such as painting murals and graffiti (Sluka 1992b). 
In Stolac, I found people to be primarily occupied with two kinds of iden-
tification. First, they persistently tried to answer the question: who are they, the 
ones who did this to us? This was about being able to hold someone responsible 
for it all, and though ethnic identity was officially presented as the most im-
001_316_post-war.indd   80 14/04/08   22:04:27
Denne side er købt på www.ebog.dk og er omfattet af lov om ophavsret. Uanset evt. aftale med Copy-Dan er det ikke tilladt at kopiere eller
indscanne siden til undervisningsbrug eller erhvervsmæssig brug.
	 remaking, identification, and counterdiscourse 1
portant identity overall by all sides throughout the war, ethnic identity did not 
suffice for my informants in answering the question. The second question was: 
who are we, since this was done to us? Again, one might presume that ethnic 
affiliation would be central in answering the question, and in a way it was. But 
when ethnicity was used as identification, it was often not the public national-
ist discourse’s version of ethnicity, which focuses on territory, blood, language, 
history etc. Rather, it was one characterised by a local ethic stressing inter-
ethnic respect; and what is more, non-ethnic identification existed as well, in 
narratives that stressed coexistence and local solidarity. Identification among 
the Muslims of Stolac should be seen as part of a counterdiscourse that partly 
rejects the nationalist discourses and partly offers alternative interpretations of 
relevant aspects of those discourses. Identification and counterdiscourse will 
be the theoretical focus of the remainder of this chapter. The discussion will be 
conducted in light of the two central aspects: discourse and resistance.
Discourse 
Discourse has become a more or less catch-all concept in the social and cultural 
theorising of recent years. However, I find the concept illuminating, and the 
definition offered by Hajer (1995: 44) is helpful. Discourse is:
… a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categories that are produced, re-
produced, and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which 
meaning is given to physical and social realities.
This definition is probably a little too broad and in the following I will try to 
narrow it down somewhat.
Constraining qualities of discourse
Foucault has contributed extensively to the popularity of the concept of dis-
course. When writing explicitly about discourse, he emphasised both enabling 
and constraining qualities, but his historical analysis has mainly highlighted the 
constraining power of discourse at the expense of the reflective powers of indi-
viduals (Hajer 1995: 42-52; Dreyfus and Rabinow 192). According to Foucault, 
his overall intention was to produce “… a history of the different modes by 
which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects” (Foucault 192), sub-
ject positions which are the results of objectifying practices. His analysis of the 
construction of the delinquent (Foucault 1991) – which simultaneously was a 
study of the working of the disciplining power of modernity – is an example of 
this. That is, a symbol of how identities are manufactured and internalised. In 
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Panopticon people are not related directly to each other, but produced as sub-
jects in front of the gaze. Furthermore, not only are subject positions the results 
of the working of the formative power of modern discourses. Our very notion 
of the individual, the subject itself, is also regarded by Foucault as a modern 
construction produced through various practices (Foucault 1994). As Nikolas 
Rose has termed it, we have ‘invented ourselves’ (199). The constraining effects 
of discourse are summed up by Hajer (1995: 49):
Discourses imply prohibitions since they make it impossible to raise certain 
questions or argue certain cases; they imply exclusionary systems because they 
only authorize certain people to participate in a discourse; they come with dis-
course forms of internal discipline through which a discourse order is main-
tained; and finally there are also certain rules regarding the conditions under 
which a discourse can be drawn upon. (My italics).
When looking at the nationalist discourses in former Yugoslavia such con-
straining features are relevant, as will be shown in Chapters 4 and 9. Ques-
tions about the possibility of interethnic coexistence have become increasingly 
impossible to raise. Politicians, religious persons, military personnel, national-
ist-minded journalists, and others, were the voices making up the discourse; 
whereas ordinary people’s more ambiguous everyday voices, as well as criticism 
of the nationalist programmes, were silenced. New elements were increasingly 
incorporated into the discourse, and were all related to the same agenda: na-
tional identity. As regards the last element of the quotation above, one could say 
that during the war there were hardly any conditions under which the national-
ist discourse could not be made relevant.
There are, however, also problems involved in viewing discourses as only 
being constraining and producing subjectpositions. Even though the national-
ist discourse of former Yugoslavia became almost hegemonic, it is also essen-
tial, especially when doing ethnographic research among the receivers of such 
massive ideological impact, to focus upon the ways ordinary people receive, 
resist, reject and also reproduce, in sum reflect on ‘constraining’ discourses. 
Reflection
Inspired by Foucault, Hacking has studied how modern science has been en-
gaged in ‘making up people’, that is, producing knowledge in relation to groups 
of people. Unlike Foucault, though, Hacking sees such subject positions or ‘hu-
man kinds’ (Hacking 1995: 354) as real. Real in the sense that people who are 
classified can react to these classifications, and real in the sense that intentional 
action is action under description. When people respond to the classifications 
001_316_post-war.indd   82 14/04/08   22:04:27
Denne side er købt på www.ebog.dk og er omfattet af lov om ophavsret. Uanset evt. aftale med Copy-Dan er det ikke tilladt at kopiere eller
indscanne siden til undervisningsbrug eller erhvervsmæssig brug.
	 remaking, identification, and counterdiscourse 3
that have entrapped them, the classifications have to be readjusted: “…our clas-
sifications and our classes conspire to emerge hand-in-hand, each egging the 
other on” (Hacking 19: 22). Hacking calls this process of feedback ‘dynamic 
nominalism’ (ibid.; see also Pedersen 199). Contrary to Foucault’s analysis, 
power is dynamically linked to its outcome; power does not operate as an ex-
ternal principle saturating everything but not itself explained (Foucault 1994: 
9-109; Dreyfus and Rabinow 19: 20). Although modernity has probably ac-
celerated the production of identities (subject positions), and though Hacking 
only considers modern scientific discourses, I think we can expand his insight 
into a general characterisation of human identification. The very relation be-
tween objectified identities and reflection can be seen as part of a general hu-
man social adjustment. 
Mead (19, 192) theorised human reflection or self-consciousness as an 
ability man has developed throughout evolution in order to sustain interac-
tion, a capability realised through verbal socialisation. The metaphysical im-
material subject existing in Descartes’ cogito – the impossibility of which Lacan 
(195:0) has described as: “I see myself seeing myself ” – is replaced by Mead 
by a social self, for whom:
Thinking [or reflection] is the same as talking to other people, except that 
it is done inwardly, with one self rather than with others. (Mead quoted in 
Baldwin 19: 31).
Consciousness and reflection originate from the human ability to use symbols 
or language and let them stand in for interaction-experience. Humans are – 
contrary to animals – capable of reacting to symbols. We are able to envisage 
the result of a given action before it has been realised. Thinking is internalised 
experiences with interactions put into language/symbols. Reflection is thereby 
built into sociality, as we can only see the consequences of our actions through 
the eyes of ‘the other.’ As Mead stated:
The individual experiences himself as such, not directly, but only indirectly, 
from the particular standpoints of other individual members of the same so-
cial group as a whole to which he belongs. For he enters his own experience 
as a self or individual, not directly or immediately, not by becoming a subject 
to himself, but only in so far as he becomes an object to himself just as other 
individuals are objects to him or in his experience; and he becomes an object 
to himself only by taking the attitudes of other individuals towards himself 
within a social environment or context of experience and behaviour in which 
both he and they are involved. (19: 13).
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Mead operated with two sides of this social self. The ‘Me’, which is the organi-
sation of other’s attitudes in the self, and the ‘I’, the subjective attitude of re-
flection itself gazing on the objective image of the self and its own responses 
(Mead 19; see also Burkitt 1991: 2-55). These two phases of “self-reproducing 
activity” (Shotter 199: 139) are in constant dialogue, and the one cannot exist 
without the other. Furthermore, the ‘Me’ is not only internalised experiences 
with concrete others, but also relative structured accumulations of experiences 
with what Mead called generalised others. That is, general attitudes, values and 
morals, or one could say discourses. Contrary to Foucault, though, Mead does 
not perceive such discourses or generalised others as being purely restrictive; 
rather they are seen as conditions for actions. Only through action (the ‘I’), 
do these structures come alive – get reproduced or transformed. And the ‘I’ 
on the other hand can only act on the background of experiences with such 
generalised others. Discourses then are without a doubt constraining; they pro-
duce subject positions and they offer and even prescribe a vision of reality. On 
the other hand – though some macro-actors are more capable than others of 
constructing the discourses others have to relate to – discourses or generalised 
others enter the individual’s social self as interaction-experience and are used 
in social interaction. I do not argue that ordinary individuals are capable of 
transforming discourses at will, but rather that they can relate themselves and 
their actions to them, thereby resisting, rejecting, reproducing or surrendering 
to them.
Mead’s theory is important when investigating my informants’ relations 
to the massive nationalist discourse penetrating so many aspects of their life. 
No doubt this discourse produced subject positions, that is, it produced ‘na-
tionalists’ out of neighbours, colleagues, and friends. But this did not occur 
automatically. People reflected upon the new identities, a reflection based upon 
former experience with social interaction, and, as I will show throughout my 
study, this reflection altered, modified and even resisted the subject positions 
created by the nationalist discourse.
The impossibility of discursive closure 
Mead’s theory operates with two forms of consciousness: ‘consciousness qua 
experience’ and ‘consciousness qua awareness’ (see Natsoulas 195). The former 
refers to unreflective everyday acts. That is, dispositions, knowledge and ex-
perience not immediately accessible to us in language. This is similar to what 
Giddens has termed ‘practical consciousness’ (19: 52-3). Only when such 
habits and routines are consciously put into language do they enter a self-re-
flective process, the ‘conscious qua awareness’, which only happens when daily 
interaction becomes problematic. When social adjustment is unproblematic, 
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one is not forced into the subjective attitude that demands objective reflection 
upon oneself and one’s actions. However, when the everyday is questioned, the 
taken-for-granted part of social life becomes conscious and at the same time 
changeable. As Giddens (19:3) writes: “These latter forms of cognition can-
not be translated into discourse without the influence of some kind of distort-
ing mechanism.”
In ex-Yugoslavia this translation into discourse of non-reflected elements 
was astoundingly massive and fast. In only a couple of years, nearly all aspects 
of not only political life but also people’s everyday life had become articulated 
in the context of a nationalist discourse. Music, food, history, territory, tradi-
tions, family relations, literature, language, greetings and so on all became in-
corporated into the discourse and interpreted through its nationalist lenses. In 
only a couple of years nationalist thinking became almost hegemonic. Vukovic 
(1993) recounts how he was rejected by close friends at the beginning of the war 
in Sarajevo, not because of his ethnic background, but because he refused to 
enter the nationalistic discourse and define national loyalty. 
One question remains: are discourses – no matter how massive they appear 
– capable of becoming completely hegemonic? Following Laclau and Mouffe, 
discursive closure is logically impossible, as this would imply a world of fixed 
meanings and an unchangeable status quo (Jansen 2000a: 11-14). Guha (199) 
displays the same kind of logical reasoning. Though his analysis is developed in 
relation to the colonial situation in India, I think we can generalise some of his 
insights. According to Guha, power is a logical relation of entailment between 
dominance and subordination, as it is not possible to think of the one without 
the other. Each of these positions is in turn constituted by a pair of interact-
ing elements: domination by coercion and persuasion, and subordination by 
collaboration and resistance. Domination and subordination imply each other 
logically, as do coercion and persuasion on the one hand and collaboration and 
resistance on the other; whereas the relation between the two pairs is organic, 
that is, a contingent empirical relation. Therefore, the power relation domi-
nation: subordination differs from one society to the other according to the 
organic composition of that power relation. As Guha writes (199: 22): “There 
can be no ideal structure of power that is not subject to and modified by the 
contingencies of history: no Nazi fantasy of total force that is not disturbed by 
nightmares of dissent, no populist utopia of total consent that is not traversed 
by a constable’s beat, if not trodden by army jackboots.” He takes hegemony as 
  This line of reasoning is inspired by Jansen (2000a).
  Or as Foucault (1990: 101-2) has it: “Where we have power there is resistance.” Power relations 
simply need a multiplicity of points of resistance to be articulated against.
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an example. Hegemony is a condition of dominance in which persuasion out-
weighs coercion, but is still organically related and open to resistance (through 
the logical relation of domination and subordination). It also follows that there 
can be no hegemonic system under which persuasion totally supersedes coer-
cion. Were that to happen, there would be no domination, hence no hegemony 
(Guha 199: 20-23). 
Discourses then often strive to become hegemonic, to define everything 
in their own image, but they will never succeed. There will always be an el-
ement of instability, contingency, and potential dissident alternatives. This is 
similar to the point made by Scott (1990: 4-5) that the dominant part never 
controls the stage absolutely, but their wishes normally prevail. What may look 
like hegemony or dominant discourses is more a result of both parties – both 
the dominant and the subordinate – on the public scene tacitly conspiring in 
misrepresentation (ibid. 2); but behind the public scene resistance or hidden 
scripts always exist. Possible alternatives will always exist. In Stolac I found 
people submitting to the nationalistic discourse, but they also resisted it. Resist-
ance, the second central element of the identifications I found in Stolac, is the 
theme I will focus on next.
Resistance
Rigorous scientific discourse claims that our categories and analytical concepts 
should have precise and definable edges, and be strict, recognisable and invari-
able from one situation to another. This is not the way Keesing sees it. In his 
discussion of resistance as an analytical metaphor, he concludes that while it 
is useful in characterising a range of phenomena it will never be able to fit all 
situations equally aptly, as well as not being precisely definable (1992: 21-25). 
According to Keesing, the force that resistance resists can be a concrete physical 
force, as well as an abstract, general and unclear one. Resistance itself can be 
the attempt to push back, but also the passive slowing down of the impinging 
force, or even partial compliance with it. Individuals as well as a collective can 
be the ones who resist (slow down, partially comply), and finally resistance can 
be overt and conscious as well as indirect and involuntary. He concludes:
Images and metaphors may be more or less apt, more or less useful; they can 
scarcely be incorrect. If we expect our technical terms to be precise, resist-
ance will not serve us well in theoretical analyses. If we see our theoretical 
discourse as inevitably cast in everyday language, then we will abandon false 
hopes for precision and prescriptive definitions. (ibid. 224).
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Bearing this dilemma in mind, I shall now clarify the way the term resistance is 
used in this study. Let me start by noting that I tend to use the concept counter-
discourse instead of resistance. That is, I see the counterdiscourse of the Mus-
lims of Stolac as a resistance to the dominating nationalistic discourse. 
Counter
I shall start by discussing the first part of the concept counterdiscourse: ‘coun-
ter’. The counterdiscourse I analyse only exists in relation to the nationalist 
discourse. Even though the counterdiscourse reflects and is based upon deep-
seated cultural and moral values (see below), it is only when such ‘traditions’ 
are viewed in relation to more macro-political changes, such as the rise of na-
tionalism in Yugoslav public life, that they take the for of resistance (Nordstrom 
and Martin 1992). As such, counterdiscourse can be compared to Scott’s (1990) 
use of the concept hidden transcript to analyse resistance. The hidden transcript 
is, as he sees it, derivative, in the sense that it consists of those practices which 
mainly contradict what dominates the public scene (ibid. 4-5). Labelling the 
Muslims’ resistance as being counter is a way of giving it form analytically. It 
follows, therefore, that my informants, simply by not using ethnic or nationalist 
categories to explain the war, violence, and people’s misfortunes, are resisting 
the nationalist discourse. Such ‘non-ethnic condemnations’ (Kolind 2002a) re-
sist the nationalist rhetoric, not by speaking against it, but by avoiding it. I did 
find in Stolac articulate and conscious resistance to nationalist thinking, and 
such ‘anti-nationalism’ (Jansen 2002a) is part of the picture. But the major part 
of the counterdiscourse I analyse is more intricate, implicit and subtle, and exists 
precisely in avoiding the worldview offered by the nationalist discourse, and by 
suggesting alternative interpretations and alternative contexts for understand-
ing social life. Instead of blaming the ethnic Other, people use and construct 
other categories of blame: politicians, not-decent people, the uncultivated, the 
rural population. And instead of identifying Muslim identity by reference to na-
tion, blood, territory, history and so on, as the nationalist discourse has it, my 
informants evoke localism, ideals of tolerance and coexistence, and Balkan men-
tality. The counterdiscourse I encountered in Stolac is not a winning or well-de-
fined analytical discourse. Sometimes it became articulate and ideological, but 
mostly it was not open and direct. It is not even possible to locate persons who 
can act as pure representatives. The force of the counterdiscourse exists rather 
in being able to recontextualise the narratives of destruction, loss and violence 
(see also Das and Kleinman 2001: ) - thus offering alternative non-nationalist 
contexts for explaining and identifying.
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Culture
However, the counterdiscourse of the Muslims of Stolac is not just defined by 
being ‘counter-.’ The non-nationalist identifications – the recontextualisations 
– that the Muslims make rest upon already existing cultural categories and so-
cial identities, as well as drawing upon experiences from pre-war habitual in-
ter-ethnic interaction. In other words, the recontextualisations characterising a 
large part of the Muslims’ counterdiscourse are not arbitrary. The counterdis-
course, though defined by being counter-, also has its own internal dynamic, 
coherence and constraints. There is no incompatibility between defining the 
Muslims’ counterdiscourse in its ‘counter-ness’ to the nationalist discourse, 
and concurrently analysing how counterdiscursive practices are anchored in 
cultural values and patterns of habitual pre-war inter-ethnic interaction. In 
fact, the interesting point is to see how embedded cultural practices and values 
become metamorphosed into more or less conscious resistance to a national-
ist paradigm. Though I agree with Martin (1992: 1-) that when, as is often 
the case, resistance is “encoded in cultural forms rather than expressed in con-
sciously organized social movements […] the anthropologist is left to discern 
the element of resistance in a culture of domination.”
Working out where to position oneself in this field of tension is a chal-
lenge. One finds oneself caught between analysing resistance only as sets of 
ideas called into being by the situation of domination itself, and on the other 
hand only looking at cultural traditions and practices and neglecting the mean-
ing and actions that the domination is able to call forth. Ortner (1995) may well 
be right in stating that ‘resistance studies’ of recent years are characterised by a 
certain degree of ‘cultural thinning’. Consider for instance Fox’s (195) study of 
Sikh identity formation during colonialism. Here political strategies of resist-
ance are only analysed in relation to the actual logic of the situation in which 
they are unfolded. 
In short then, the nationalist discourse which has been striving for he-
gemony in pre- and post-Yugoslavia has called forth novel practices of resist-
ance and defiance. On the other hand, pre-war cultural categories and social 
practices have been elevated from a non-conscious level to a much more con-
scious and focused field of battle, in which they have changed character as well 
as becoming practices of resistance against the nationalist discourse. For exam-
ple, I show how the Muslims of Stolac explain violent and warlike behaviour as 
stemming from people being uncultivated, a categorisation not just originating 
in the present situation, but deeply rooted in a Yugoslav cultural dichotomy 
between the urban and the rural. 
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Authenticity 
Operating with culture in relation to categories and practices of resistance 
makes it possible to clarify a related discussion: the question of authenticity of 
resistance. According to Scott (1990), the hidden transcript in which practices 
of resistance are located is not just a space (physically as well as mentally) where 
dissident thoughts and actions can be conducted. It is also an authentic space 
where “a natural impulse to rage, insult, anger, and the violence that such feel-
ings prompt” can be articulated (ibid. 3). In the public transcript the subordi-
nate has to act and also suppress true feelings, whereas in the hidden transcript 
he can display his real self and genuine emotions (ibid. 2-44). Scott’s concepts 
have clear associations to Goffman’s (191) distinctions between frontstage and 
backstage behaviour, where frontstage is the place one consciously plays differ-
ent roles and is observant about other people’s reactions. Backstage, however, 
one can tear off the mask and act naturally: “Here the performer can relax” and 
“reliably expect that no member of the audience will intrude” (ibid. 115, 11). 
Though appealing, Scott and Goffman’s differentiations between real and pre-
tended actions, real and pretended selves, are analytically problematic. First, an-
thropological studies have shown how the (Western) notion of authentic selves 
is a cultural construct (Geertz 193; Shweder and Bourne 194; Selby 194), and 
furthermore how emotions are not universal, but constituted through discourse 
(Rosaldo 194; Lutz and Abu-Lughod 1990). Operating, then, with true selves 
showing true and natural emotions, seems to reflect rather than analyse power 
relations, that is, the primarily Western construction of the individual (Rose 
199; Taylor 1992; Hacking 1994; Foucault 1994). It is probably wise to oper-
ate with two different spheres of action, as Scott and Goffman do; but rather 
than differentiating between degrees of authenticity, one should realise that 
both spheres are socially constructed. In both public and private spheres social 
expectations about proper behaviour exist. Such a thing as a ‘natural response’ 
does not exist analytically. 
In Stolac I found that people communicated dissimilar and occasionally 
opposing views depending on the situation. Sometimes people could even ut-
ter rather contradictory views in one and the same sentence. For instance, a 
person could say that he felt that the three ethnic groups of Stolac belonged 
together, that they had always existed together and that were they still able to 
do so. In the next sentence he could then say that one should never forget what 
happened during the war, and that during the war the Croats showed their 
true nature. Now, which is true? I think both statements are. Neither of them 
is a more transparent reflection of true emotions and feelings than the other. 
Instead of operating with different spheres, reflecting different degrees of au-
thenticity, I work with different discourses: the nationalist discourse and its 
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counterdiscourse. In fact a chief characteristic of post-war life in Stolac is ambi-
guity, existing due to this persistent struggle between two opposing discourses, 
taking place in people as well as in different situations. People, therefore, are 
not schizophrenic: but social situations are. 
Operating with discourses instead of poses and real actions is inspired by 
such work as: Gal’s (1995) thorough review of Scott’s study, and her own study 
of bilingual communities in Hungary (1993); Jansen’s (2000b) analysis from Za-
greb and Belgrade of nationalism opposed to anti-nationalism, both seen as 
discursive practices; Mehta and Chatterji’s (2001) research on the time after 
communal riots in Bombay; and Abu-Lughod’s (19) study of two contrasting 
discourses among Bedouins of Egypt. Common to all of these scholars is that 
they analyse seemingly contrasting and ambivalent practices and their relations 
to power, but without resorting to essentialist explanatory models such as ‘hu-
man nature’ or ‘authentic impulses.’ Instead, practices showing conflicting val-
ues and contrasting stances, such as my example above, are “… evidence of the 
coexistence of deeply felt yet contested discourses” (Gal 1995: 413) – one being 
no more real than the other. As Abu-Lughod (19: 23) wrote about one of the 
discourses she analysed, a discourse of honour: “…the cultural ideals set by that 
code for the individual are not empty acts of impression management but the 
stuff of morality.” There is no real individual lurking behind the scenes, as is 
the case in Goffman’s work, and no natural impulse coming out in the hidden 
transcript as Scott sees it.
Consciousness
Lastly, I shall discuss consciousness in relation to resistance. The question is, 
in what way and to what extent were my informants aware that their actions 
and thoughts constituted a collective, more or less coherent alternative oppos-
ing the nationalist discourse of the war and post-war period? To what extent 
does the counterdiscourse gets its substance, coherence and form through my 
analysis? 
In Stolac I found that people occasionally criticised the nationalist think-
ing very consciously, and they intentionally tried to communicate alternative 
ways of interpreting the conflict, as well as trying to envisage an alternative fu-
ture that included inter-ethnic coexistence. A counterdiscursive consciousness 
existed. Sometimes, though, such consciousness turned into a servant of the 
very nationalism it tried to resist, as when ideals of coexistence, tolerance and 
forgiveness were seen as constituting the core elements of Muslim mentality. 
Ideals which the other ethnic groups, due to their ethnicity, did not adhere to.
However, conscious resistance to the nationalist discourse in Stolac is 
only part of the picture, and I would say a minor part. Another way, then, of 
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addressing the questions posed above is to ask whether people resist without 
knowing it. According to Keesing (1992), it is important that one does not re-
strict the study of resistance to only focusing upon conscious political acts. 
Such a view is contrary to for instance Lagos (1993), who criticises a tendency 
in anthropological studies of hegemony to define almost every form of cultural 
alterity as resistance. The point which Lagos tends to miss, however, is not to 
confuse form and function, since it is not what people do, but how actions are 
interpreted by others that matters (see e.g. Abu-Lughod 1990). Furthermore, as 
Keesing (1992: 21) writes:
On the one hand, if we define resistance so flexibly and broadly that subal-
terns are resisting when they are not aware of it, or when outwardly they are 
passively accepting the terms of their domination, we have taken a term that 
– in its common use at least – implies conscious agency and intentionality and 
so bleached it that these qualities disappear. On the other hand, if we insist 
on a more strict definition, and observe a subordinated population through 
time, we find overt resistance bursting forth at historical moments when cir-
cumstances allow […]. Resistance seemingly then emerges out of apparent 
quiescent acceptance, consciousness burst out of unconsciousness.
Whether the counterdiscourse I analyse has the potential to become a more 
political ideological resistance, only time can tell. Nevertheless, I think it is im-
portant to focus upon the many minor actions, thoughts and practices people 
perform without clearly knowing why, though still having a feeling of express-
ing alternatives, indignation, bitterness, and even despair. Though I do not ac-
cept Scott’s (1990) idea of ‘human nature’, his establishment of a field of every-
day resistance open for anthropological research inspires me. People in every-
day life are not ideologues, and especially not in war and post-war situations, 
where they are more involved in strategies of survival and remaking. However, 
such necessary strategies can constitute patterns and visions that transgress 
their local anchoring. This is a vital element in hidden transcripts as well as the 
counterdiscourse I analyse. Even apparent conformity to dominant nationalist 
ideologies can entail elements of or potential for resisting the self-same ideolo-
gies, as shown by Jansen (200) in his study of a small Croatian village.
I would like to state that one should be careful not to romanticise resist-
ance. The image of people collectively uniting for one just cause against oppres-
sion is probably only an image, seldom a reality. Interwoven in the counterdis-
course of Stolac are a lot of personal strategies and ambitions, personal hurts 
and fantasies. According to Ortner (1995) it is important to integrate such per-
sonal projects and strategies into the analysis of resistance. I have chosen not to 
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do so. I do not think six months of fieldwork enables me to see through people’s 
acts and say what they are really up to. Naturally, I did encounter examples of 
inconsistencies between what people said and what they did, between what they 
said they did and what they did, and between what they said they would do and 
what I thought they would do. However, I do not feel I have the knowledge 
necessary to distinguish practice from ideology (or one could say the real from 
the posed) in order to reconstruct individual(s’) (real) strategies and motives. 
In fact I do not think anybody has, and perhaps not even the individual himself. 
I therefore find it more apposite to operate with discourses and inconsistencies 
between them (recall the discussion above about human nature). 
I shall give an example that illustrates the problem. Mustafa was a man 
who often talked about interethnic tolerance. He was very conscious about rais-
ing his children in a non-antagonistic way, and he stressed the importance of 
financial interaction between the different ethnic groups as being an important 
step towards reintegration. Now, Mustafa also has a small family business also 
serving Croat customers. Should I then analyse his statements about inter-eth-
nic coexistence as (only) being a result of his financial enterprise? In a way 
this would make sense, but then how many of his utterances and practices are 
formed by his financial interests? Does he at all believe in inter-ethnic coexist-
ence? Instead of engaging in such guesswork, I analyse and outline the counter-
discourse. I do not try to discern how people use it. Furthermore, it is my belief 
that this counterdiscourse is ‘the stuff of morality’ as stated above, not empty 
impression management. The counterdiscourse is about values and social rec-
ognition. One cannot step outside the moral values of the counterdiscourse. 
One can step over into – and alternate between – the nationalist discourse, 
but there is no ‘real’ position from which the Muslims (or I) can judge their 
behaviour. 
My attempt to outline the contours of the counterdiscourse of the Mus-
lims of Stolac, or one might say my focus upon the counterdiscursive elements 
of the mental landscape of my informants, is furthermore a personal choice. 
The vast majority of the literature produced on the break-up of former Yugosla-
via deals with nationalism in the political sphere. Many learned studies explain, 
analyse, describe and criticise the emergence and articulation of nationalism in 
Yugoslavia; but hardly any have examined everyday resistance to nationalism in 
any detail. Outlining and representing the contours of my informants’ counter-
discourse, therefore, is also an attempt to counterbalance this dominant focus. 
This, though, is not the same as accepting all the statements of my informants 
at face value. In order for the counterdiscourse to be taken seriously, I persist-
ently point out any ideals and values that seemingly communicate tolerance 
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and coexistence but in fact only underline the nationalist discourse they are 
supposed to resist.
My general analytical tool in this book is remaking, and identification is the ele-
ment of remaking that I focus on in particular. I have theorised identification 
as being part of a counterdiscourse, and the counterdiscourse I have isolated by 
discussing discourse and resistance. I have discussed four themes relevant for 
understanding the element of resistance in the counterdiscourse. Firstly, more 
than an explicit articulation of opposition to nationalism, a substantial part 
of the resistance exists in persistent recontextualisations of the narratives of 
destruction, that is, by introducing alternative agendas for explaining and un-
derstanding. Secondly, the recontextualisations – though obtaining analytical 
status as resistance only by being counter – are often routed in existing cultural 
categories and social identities and draw upon experience from pre-war ha-
bitual inter-ethnic interaction. Taken together it is interesting to see how ‘neu-
tral’/non-conscious cultural categories and practices change character, not so 
much because their content changes, as because the context changes. Thirdly, 
instead of analysing resistance as being more authentic and real than subjec-
tion, I operate with various discourses. Conflicting statements and practices are 
therefore not evaluated in relation to their authenticity, but analysed as indica-
tions of the coexistence of deeply felt yet contested discourses. Fourthly, acts 
and statements need not consciously resist the nationalist discourse in order to 
be analysed as part of the counterdiscourse. 
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Part II 
Who are they, the ones who did this to us?
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Introduction to Part II
I have now given an account of my informants’ experience of how the world has 
been unmade, and I have outlined the theoretical assumptions necessary for 
analysing my informants’ remaking of their world, most crucially the concepts 
of discourse and counterdiscourse. These subjects will be in focus in the re-
mainder of the book, with a principal focus on the counterdiscursive practises 
of my informants. In Part II I shall start by outlining the rise of the dominant 
discourse: the nationalist ideologies that swept through most of former Yugo-
slavia prior to the war. I shall also describe the major characteristics of these 
ideologies, which have attempted to – and to a certain degree succeeded in – 
making ethnic identity the most salient issue in all aspects of social and cultural 
life. On the basis of these ideologies, the nationalist politicians of the region 
have pursued a policy of ethnic separation. Despite ‘successes’, the Muslims of 
Stolac exhibit resistance to the nationalist ideologies and the separatist policies 
based on them. Though resistance is sometimes expressed explicitly, mostly it 
is implicit and unspoken, existing as a counterdiscourse. The hallmark of this 
counterdiscourse is an insistence on not using ethnic categories when explain-
ing and holding Others responsible for the tragic events of the war. Instead of 
relying on the dominant antagonist national ideology, people try to facilitate 
interethnic coexistence by for instance remoulding and reusing already exist-
ing cultural categories that indirectly communicate interethnic tolerance. So 
although ethnic thinking has pervaded everything, at the same time a myriad 
of small practices and ways of thinking and explaining try to reject the ethnic 
categories, or at least make them less important. One of the most central issues 
in this struggle is to answer the questions: Who are they; the ones did this to us? 
What kind of people could commit such terrible acts? In Chapters 5 through 
, I introduce four different categorisations, which are all part of my inform-
ants’ attempts at answering these questions. The categories refer to: unmoral 
political action, non-decent people, uncultured people, and finally a complex-
ity attached to ethnic labelling. People’s attempts at resisting ethnic thinking, 
however, are not always successful. There exists a persistent struggle between 
the nationalist discourses and counterdiscursive practices, a struggle played out 
in the everyday life of the Muslims of Stolac. This ambivalence is at the heart of 
post-war life in Stolac.
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Chapter 4
Yugoslav nationalism
In this chapter, I identify and discuss the most important discursive framework 
in which my informants have been caught: the discourse of nationalism in the 
former Yugoslavia. The chapter focuses upon the historical emergence as well 
as the contours of the nationalist discourse that swept through the former Yu-
goslavia prior to the war, conquering the political, cultural and public scene.1 
Nationalist movements and ideologies existed even before the creation of the 
First Yugoslavia in 191, but starting in the period immediately preceding the 
latest war and lasting throughout and after the war, nationalism has been the 
language through which nearly all disagreements and discontents have been 
expressed, especially so in the political arena. Outlining the discourse of na-
tionalism is necessary to fully appreciate the element of resistance in my in-
formants’ counterdiscourse. The nationalist discourse has been so amazingly 
all-encompassing, and has penetrated nearly all aspects of people’s lives with its 
focus on such ideologically charged themes as blood, territory, language, and 
origin. My informants resist the discourse of nationalism not by consciously 
and openly rejecting it, but by continuously avoiding it as a context of reference 
for explaining their present situation as well as the terrible events they have 
endured.
A rather confusing and tangled picture emerges when we look at the his-
tory of Yugoslavia. Borders have shifted and been easily penetrable. Popula-
tions, political and religious ideas, merchants, commodities and armies have 
been in constant movement and provoked the redefinition of borders and have 
challenged the different states. Conquests, wars, displacements, spontaneous 
drifts and urbanisation are some of the grounds for the huge movements of 
populations throughout the history of the Balkans (Malcom 1994; Sofus 199; 
Allcock 2000: 145-0). The linear, uncontested and progressive evolution and 
realisation of national identities belonging to a people and a territory which the 
politicians and intellectuals of the former Yugoslavian states refer to does not 
have a solid foundation in historical fact as revealed by historical research. The 
different historical myths on which current national constructions rest are pre-
1  In the first chapter of part III, I will examine the emergence of nationalist discourse among the 
Muslims of Bosnia Herzegovina in more detail.
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cisely that – mythical and not historical. Indeed, it is often difficult to establish 
the objective historical link between a given people and a given territory, as the 
history of the Balkans as a whole indicates that their forefathers probably lived 
somewhere else.
The First Yugoslavia
The emergence of national consciousness in the Balkans was inspired by the 
general nineteenth-century European search for the authenticity of ‘The Peo-
ple’, an authenticity which was variously defined in terms of such abstractions as 
language, territory, blood, mentality and history (Knudsen 199). The cultural 
and ethnic movements in the Balkans sought to carve discrete national cultures 
and languages out of the linguistic and cultural continuum characteristic of 
the region’s peoples (Sofus 199: 253). The establishment of national centres of 
education, increased schooling, the establishment of print media in most of the 
major cities, the standardisation of national literary languages and the codifica-
tion of national folklores were all important components of the development of 
national consciousnesses (Cohen 1993: 1-45).
The Serbian national movement was probably the most successful of 
these early Balkan national movements. The creation of an independent Ser-
bian Principality in the 130s, together with the intellectual national Romantic 
Movement, really boosted Serbian nationalism. Though still formally subjects 
of Turkey, the Serbs could see that full independence was only a matter of time, 
a goal they reached in 1. For this reason, the unification of all Serbian people 
in a strong, independent state was the chief goal of the Serbian elite of the mid-
dle decades of the 19th century (Cohen 1993: ). Support for a Yugoslav state first 
arose in the twentieth century, but the idea that the people of the region shared 
a common ethnic background emerged during the nineteenth century, at the 
same time as the Serbian nationalist movement flourished. It was primarily 
Croatian intellectuals who promoted the view that Serbs and Croats had more 
things in common than dividing them – for instance their language – and that 
the distinct Serbian, Croatian and Slovenian identities were merely the results 
of tribal divisions. The ‘Yugoslavism’ that the Croats advocated was moreover 
presented as an alternative to dependence on the Austro-Hungarian and Turk-
ish empires (Cohen 1993: 1-45; Lampe 2000: 39-194). The Serbs however, were 
for their part ambivalent about the issue of a common South-Slavic state called 
Yugo-slavia (Yugo means south). On the one hand, the proposed unification of 
the south-Slavic peoples had an aura of romanticism. The union was also seen 
by some as a shortcut for reaching the goal of Serbian independence from Tur-
key. On the other hand, many of the more nationalist-minded Serbs believed 
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that such a union would weaken the sovereignty and strength of the Serbian 
people.
Then with the First World War came the disintegration of the old empires. 
The result was, if not a literal vacuum of power, then at least a real possibility for 
the emergence of a sovereign Yugoslav state. The Croats were still the primary 
advocates of the idea, now because their territorial possessions and sovereignty 
were threatened by a possible Italian invasion. For their part, the Serbs were 
more reluctant, but the formation of the ‘Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes’ in December 191 was realised to a certain extent on the premises of 
the Serbs. In addition, This Kingdom was an elite project with very little popu-
lar support, and it consisted of some rather disjointed territories, populated by 
rather different peoples, with different religions, histories and political aspira-
tions (Lampe 2000: 39-194).
The union of the South-Slavic peoples was a rather unstable undertaking. 
The greatest disagreements existed between the Slovenes and the Croats on the 
one side and the Serbs on the other. The Slovenes and the Croats considered 
the Serbian influence in the coalition to be too dominant: they wanted a federal 
state with greater independence given to the different republics. The Serbs, on 
the other hand, wanted a centralised Serbian-dominated state and did not want 
to divide the Serbian population, which would have been the result if greater in-
dependence were given to the different republics because 30 percent of the Serbs 
lived outside Serbia. The Serbs succeeded in imposing a unitary state model in 
1921, but the Croats and Slovenes did not accept it and declared it invalid. 
The greatest resistance to the Serbian-dominated centralisation project 
was lead by Stjepan Radic and his Croatian Peasant Party, who sought Croatian 
autonomy through mainly peaceful means. But the Serbian political domina-
tion also produced more violent forms of organised resistance, such as the ter-
rorist Croatian independence movement Ustashe (meaning uprising). In 192 
Radic was murdered, an incident that created turmoil and violence. In 1929, in 
general frustration with the conflicting parties’ inability to find any agreement 
and as an attempt to keep the country together, King Alexander dissolved the 
parliament and instituted a strongly authoritarian regime, while focusing on 
promoting pan-Yugoslav ideas and sentiments. But his nation-building project 
failed, and in 1934 he was killed. The conflicts between the different parties were 
still deep, but after decades of struggles and ineffective rulers, in 1939 the Croats 
and the Serbs finally signed a treaty which recognised Croatia as a partially 
independent nation inside Yugoslavia with extensive rights. And for the first 
time sporadic feelings of ‘Yugoslavism’ began to evolve (Cohen 1993: 1-45; Mal-
com 1994: 13-5; Bennett 1995: 1-42; Sofus 199). Then came the Second World 
War, and political extremism revived.
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The Second World War
The history of the Second World War in Yugoslavia is so complicated that I will 
not even try to do justice to it. I will only offer a very general picture, in order to 
illuminate the post-war politics of Tito, as well as the historical basis for some 
of the current explanations for recurrent Balkan violence.
In 1941, the South Slav Kingdom surrendered to the Axis forces, and on 10 
April of that year the Germans proclaimed a new independent Croatian State 
(NDH: Nezavisna Država Hrvatska; the Independent State of Croatia. The war-
time fascist state run by a Nazi-installed regime led by Ante Pavelić), includ-
ing the whole of Bosnia Herzegovina. In reality this ‘independent’ state was 
nothing more than a German puppet state. The extremist terrorist movement 
Ustashe was given control of the state, and this organisation’s pre-war national-
ist dream of a strong and independent Croatia was partly fulfilled. The issue of 
the Jews was of only secondary concern to the new rulers, who rather saw the 
‘Serbian minority’ in Croatia (the territory of NDH) as their main problem. 
This ‘minority’ actually constituted almost a third of the population: 1.9 million 
out a total population of .3 million (Malcom 1994: 1). Ustashe started a re-
gime of terror, attempting to eradicate the ethnic Serbs through such measures 
as forced conversion to the majority religion, Catholicism, expulsion to Serbia, 
and literal slaughter (Denich 1994: 34). 
The Serbian inhabitants of Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina (the territory 
of NDH) were taken by surprise when Ustashe members started their deporta-
tions and massacres of civilians. The Serbs, though, soon organised themselves 
in two resistance movements, which however were at war with each other as 
well as the Croats. The so-called Chetniks formed a unit based on the remnants 
of the pre-war Yugoslav army. The Chetniks were led by Draža Mihajlović, who 
supported the restoration of the monarchy. The other resistance movement was 
the communist Partisans led by Tito.4 
The Chetniks engaged in massacres and deportations of both Croat and 
Muslim civilians, and massacres were also carried out by non-Chetnik Serbs in 
Bosnian villages. However, none of these massacres were a part of the imple-
mentation of an official policy of genocide like the Ustashe’s attempted ‘cleans-
  Though secondary, the anti-semitism of the NDH state was catastrophic for the Jewish popula-
tion of Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina. Only 4,000 of the original 3,000 Jews survived the 
regime’s persecution and extermination (Lampe 2000: 212).
  For the Vatican’s rather controversial role in supporting the Nazi puppet state NDH, see Dedi-
jer (1992).
4  Tito’s real name was Josip Broz. He was born in 192 in northern Croatia, which was at that 
time part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. His father was a Croatian peasant, and his mother 
a Slovene (Bringa 2004).
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ing’ of the territory of NDH (Malcom 1994: 15-; Lampe 2000: 201-33; Denich 
1994: 35). 
Generally speaking, the Bosnian Muslims’ position during the war was 
very complex. Before the war they supported the Croatian political programme 
of decentralisation, which would have granted the Bosnian Muslims some kind 
of independent state. The Muslims were against the national aspirations of the 
Serbs, which also entailed anti-Muslim rhetoric before the war. But the behav-
iour throughout the war of Croats and Serbs alike did much to encourage Mus-
lim distrust and hatred. During the war the Ustashes killed Muslims, Chetniks 
made raids on Muslim villages, and even the communist Partisans had dead 
Muslims on their conscience. At the beginning of the war some of the Muslims 
supported the Croatian state and the Germans, and a volunteer Muslim SS divi-
sion was created with an eventual full strength of 21,000 men. Many Muslims 
thought that supporting the Germans could protect their villages from attack. 
When this strategy failed, many of them switched sides and joined the Parti-
sans. Tito, the leader of the Partisans, stopped the attacks on the Muslims see-
ing the advantages of enlistment Muslim in the Partisan ranks. 
For a long time Tito was prepared to cooperate with the Germans, as he 
knew that the liberation of Yugoslavia by the Allies would entail the restoration 
of the monarchy. But the situation changed after a number of heroic battles in 
the summer of 1943 in Montenegro, after which some of the British officers who 
had witnessed the strength and fighting spirit of the Partisans sent admiring 
reports home. This led the Allies to shift their support from Mihailović and his 
Chetniks to Tito’s Partisans, and on  April 1945, the Partisans liberated Sara-
jevo. Many Muslims were relieved, for they had neither been absorbed into a 
greater Croatia (the Ustashes’ plan) nor a greater Serbia (the Chetniks’ plan), 
and they were now promised a solution in which Bosnia could continue to exist 
(Malcom 1994: 13-94).
The Second World War was nothing less than a human disaster in Yu-
goslavia. A huge number of people died, of all nationalities and ethnic groups 
– over a million by the end of the war. Whole villages were wiped out. Ethnic 
cleansing, either by deportation or extermination, had been carried out – .1 
% of the Bosnian Muslims were killed during the war. Military or paramili-
tary associations crossed ethnic lines to set Serbs against Serbs, Muslims up 
against Muslims. An estimated 250,000 people (anti-Partisan forces and associ-
ated civilians) were killed by the Partisans, either in mass executions or in the 
Partisan-run concentration camps in 1945-4, Slovene ‘home guards’, Ustashe 
  The principle of recruiting volunteer SS divisions was well established in other occupied coun-
tries like France, Belgium, Holland and Denmark.
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soldiers, Serb and Muslim Chetniks, Bosnian Croats, Serbs and Muslims were 
among the victims (Malcom 1994: 13-94). More than half of the over one mil-
lion people who died during the war had been killed by their fellow Yugoslavs. 
Nobody came through the war untouched. Fear and distrust were rampant, and 
ethnic and religious dividing lines were sharpened. On the foundations of hate, 
loss, confusion and political and ethnic divisions, Tito hoped to rebuild and 
modernise a unified Yugoslavia. The task was not easy, to say the least.
The Tito era 
After winning the war three main problems faced Tito and his Partisans (or-
ganised in the CPY, Communist Party of Yugoslavia). One was to deal with the 
‘ethnic question’: the politicisation of ethnicity that had emerged in the period 
between the wars, and which had intensified during the Second World War. A 
second task, obviously related, was to invent some kind of overarching national 
identity, a new version of Yugoslavism, which could suppress the traumatic 
memories from the war. The third challenge was to modernise the country and 
rebuild it economically, as post-war Yugoslavia was totally devastated and un-
derdeveloped. I think it is fair to say that Tito and the CPY never managed to 
either separate or solve these problems (Sofus 199: 25). 
Tito and the CPY’s solution to the first problem was the creation of a fed-
eration with six republics and two autonomous units. The leading principle of 
the federation was to be so-called Yugoslavism, which was a fusion of social-
ism, a belief in Yugoslavia as a common project, and respect for the cultures of 
the different ethnic groups. This solution imposed by the communist regime 
to deal with national tensions was not the outcome of any deep respect for 
the complexity of the country’s ethnic composition. It was rather a pragmatic 
strategy for keeping the country together and avoiding conflicts. In short, na-
tionality was a tactical question for Tito. As he saw it, the Second World War 
had not been about nationality. It was not Croats against Serbs or Muslims, but 
communists against anti-communists. In this view, the Second World War had 
been an anti-fascist struggle and a proletarian revolution. And in fact the com-
munists succeeded in drawing followers from all Yugoslavia’s Slav people. The 
Communist party was for everyone, irrespective of national origins (Bennett 
1995: 51-3).
As Milovan Djilas, one of Tito’s closest allies in the wartime communist 
struggle later said about the communists’ pragmatic relationship to the issue of 
nationality:
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We looked on the national question as a very important question, but a tacti-
cal question, a question of stirring up a revolution, a question of mobilizing 
the national masses. We proceeded from the view that national minorities 
and national ambitions would weaken with the development of socialism, and 
that they are chiefly a product of capitalist development […] consequently the 
borders inside our country didn’t play a big role. […] We felt that Yugoslavia 
would be unified, solid, that one needed to respect languages, cultural differ-
ences, and all specificities which exist, but that they are not essential, and that 
they cannot undermine the whole and the vitality of the country, inasmuch 
as we understood that the communists themselves would be unified. (Quoted 
in: Cohen 1993: 24).
As a consequence of this ideology, the territorial borders inside Yugoslavia 
were drawn rather randomly – which, as we have seen, would later make them 
highly disputed. One of the reasons for splitting up Yugoslavia into republics 
and autonomous provinces was to divide the power among the different ethnic 
groups and thereby limit dominance by any one ethnic group, especially Ser-
bian, and thus avoid internal rivalry. The geographical and political divisions 
made by Tito were meant to both reflect and defuse the reality of Yugoslavian 
ethnic diversity.
The regime institutionalised two categories of populations in Yugoslavia: 
national groups (narod) and nationalities (narodnost). The first group consisted 
of those recognised as having their homeland inside Yugoslavia, whereas the 
other group was made up of those assumed to have homelands outside Yugo-
slavia. But as always, categories were one thing, reality was another. The ethnic 
map of Yugoslavia did not lend itself to a neat division of republican borders. 
Serbs also lived in the republic of Croatia, three ethnic groups lived in Bos-
nia Herzegovina, Serbia’s Sandžak region had a Slav-Muslim majority, and so 
on. Nevertheless the six republics were constituted: Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, 
Macedonia and Montenegro, and finally Bosnia Herzegovina with its hetero-
geneous population of Croats, Serbs and Muslims, where no narod was in the 
absolute majority. The second grouping, the nationalities (narodnost), consisted 
of Albanians, Bulgarians, gypsies, Romanians and others. It was never entirely 
clear exactly why some groups were recognised as nations and others as na-
tionalities. The Muslims, for instance, were only recognised a national group in 
194 (see Chapter 9); and Kosovo, with its Albanian majority, was only granted 
status as an autonomous province, as was also the case for Vojvodina with its 
large Hungarian population. 
It is hard to say whether Tito’s ambitious project of creating a Yugoslav 
communist state uniting all citizens in an atmosphere of ‘brotherhood and uni-
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ty’ (the official post-war Yugoslavian motto) was a success: it depends on who 
you ask. The ones who achieved the most benefits from Tito’s organisation of 
Yugoslavia were the country’s smaller peoples, for example the Muslim Slavs, 
who were shielded from the potential aggression of Croatian and, in particular, 
Serbian nationalism. Tito’s system allowed these people to thrive culturally and 
evolve confident national identities. As a result, sympathy with Titoism sur-
vived longest in these areas (for instance Bosnia Herzegovina). On the other 
hand, the Serbs and the Croats – at least from the 190s onwards – saw Tito’s 
policies as a hindrance to their national ambitions (Bennet 1995). Furthermore, 
the degree of identification with Yugoslavism was much lower in the coun-
tryside than in the cities. In fact, several authors have gone so far as to argue 
that local identification, communitarism and personal alliances were far more 
important than federal or even republican and/or national identifications; es-
pecially in the countryside. Yugoslavism was a rather peripheral phenomenon 
(Allcock 2000; Bougarel 199; Sunic 199).
From 14 to 10
The time from 1945 to Tito’s death in 190 can, according to the political scien-
tist Lenard Cohen (1993), be divided into five periods (see also Shoup 1992).
The first period lasts from 1945 to 1952. During this time, Tito was inspired 
by Soviet communism and its strong centralisation of power. Despite Yugo-
slavia’s federal structure, the country soon became highly centralised – Tito’s 
power was immense (Bennet 1995: 54). Tito also thought that high levels of 
industrial growth and a fair economic distribution among the republics would 
create a common feeling of Yugoslavism. He initiated a Soviet-inspired five-
year plan, which promoted the development of heavy industry at the expense 
of agriculture and other primary-sector economic activities (Sofus 199: 25). 
Expressions of religiously based ethnic affirmation were harshly suppressed in 
this period as part of an attempt to prevent any ethnic and/or religious ten-
sions. The Catholic Church was treated with special harshness, as some of its 
clergy had cooperated with the Ustashes. But Islam was also heavily repressed, 
primarily because it was seen as backwards and ‘Asiatic’: Islamic courts were 
suppressed, elementary schools teaching the Koran were shut down, and teach-
ing children in mosques was made a criminal offence (Malcom 1994: 195).
In 194 Stalin expelled Yugoslavia from Cominform, and the period that 
followed, from 1953 to 192, was characterised by more humane socialism and 
greater liberalisation of the political system. After the break with the USSR and 
the power it represented, Tito could no longer afford to ignore the deeply es-
tablished group sensibilities in Yugoslavia, and the period witnessed a growth 
in local authority. The regime also began to realise that the creation of a com-
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mon feeling of ‘Socialist Yugoslavism’ would be a long-term enterprise that was 
dependent on education and political socialisation as well as rapid economic 
growth. However, inter-ethnic conflicts were still most often suppressed and 
swept under the carpet.
Then from 193 to 191 came a period of what can be called ‘pluralist so-
cialism.’ Yugoslavia was experiencing rapid economic growth, a continuous in-
crease in living standards, and a growing international recognition due to its 
non-alignment policy. However, the progress was partly financed by loans from 
the West, and Yugoslavia’s constantly fragile economy was partly shored up by 
these loans. One must remember that by virtue of being a socialist country not 
dependent on the USSR, Yugoslavia was an important ally for the West in the 
Cold War period. Nonetheless, in the 190s the economic imbalance began to 
have visible effects: an inflexible economy due to the one-sided investment in 
heavy industry, high inflation, and increasing economic inequality between the 
republics. The rich republics like Slovenia and Croatia were in the north, and the 
underdeveloped areas like Bosnia Herzegovina and Kosovo were in the south 
(Cohen 1993; Ramet 1992b: 13-). At the same time, Tito’s state-sponsored 
Yugoslavism, the idea of a transcendent ideological consciousness, began to be 
regarded as reactionary by leading communists. Inter-group conflicts were no 
longer taboo, in fact different and conflicting interests were seen as a normal 
phenomenon during a socialist revolution, and decentralisation and regionali-
sation were seen as more viable political solutions to such conflicts than cen-
tralisation and uniformity. In effect, by the end of the 190s, the republics and 
provinces of Yugoslavia had begun to emerge as important centres of political 
authority and power. The mix of increased economic problems, dissatisfaction 
with marked regional imbalances, and greater scope for expressing national 
aspiration enabled a shift from a focus on economic problems into a focus on 
national identities. Yugoslavian politicians increasingly used the ‘national ques-
tion’ in order to gain support for economic programmes (Ramet 1992b). 
Then from 192 to 193, Yugoslavia experienced a short period of gov-
ernmental re-centralisation, an attempt to handle the growing inter-ethnic 
disputes. But this direct attack on nationalist movements – jailing of leading 
figures, banning of nationalist propaganda, purging of official ranks and so 
on – was followed by the 194 constitution, which in some ways moved in the 
opposite direction. It invested the Yugoslav republics and provinces with au-
tonomous statehood. In this way Tito attempted to neutralise the nationalists’ 
appeal by delegating even more authority from the federal to the republican 
level. Unfortunately the consequence of this reform, which also allowed inter-
ethnic conflicts to be articulated publicly as long as they were not politically 
subversive, was a politically ineffective society. Furthermore, the federal gov-
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ernment was on a rotation basis between the different republics, resulting in an 
inconsistent federal policy, as regional politicians used their short periods of 
power to cultivate regional and personal interests. The period witnessed grow-
ing corruption, regional chauvinism, and conflicts among the different repub-
lics. Tito’s policy of regionalisation was intended to legitimise the power of the 
federal government, but the consequence was the opposite. The new constitu-
tion combined with a growing economic crisis produced a society fragmented 
along regional and ethnic lines. 
In the last years up until Tito’s death the republics, rather than the fed-
eration, had became the real loci of power. And national identities served as a 
means of expressing regional economic conflicts, which could not be expressed 
in the rhetoric of a unified communist federation (Bowman 1994: 152). To some 
extent Tito managed to suppress ethnic conflict and deal with the so-called ‘na-
tional question’, which primarily concerned the conflict between Serbian and 
Croatian nationalist and territorial aspirations. After all, his regime managed 
to keep the peace in the country for forty-five years. The ideological project 
of Yugoslavism did succeed to some extent, though this is hard to evaluate. 
However, his policy of decentralising power along republican lines (later to be-
come national lines) would have devastating consequences in the years after his 
death. Though domestic political relations in the 190s were generally calm – at 
least compared to what was to come – due to high rates of economic growth, 
it was apparent to many that national tensions would re-appear at some point, 
either following the death of Tito or provoked by an assertive leadership in 
Serbia (Shoup 1992).
After Tito: nationalism explodes
On the 4 May 190, Tito died in a hospital bed in Ljubljana (Slovenia), leaving 
the majority of the country in grief (Bringa 2004). The huge economic and po-
litical problems and the nationalist power struggles that would haunt the coun-
try for the next eleven years had been developing for a while. Paradoxically, it 
  Some observers see this continued decentralisation and regionalisation of power as a poor sub-
stitute for the kind of genuine democratisation which might have facilitated the evolution of 
non-nationalistic opposition politics, thereby preventing the war (Denitch 1994; Dimitrijević 
1995).
  Although ‘Yugoslavs’ only accounted for 5.4 % in the 191 census – Yugoslavs mainly lived in 
the cities, where local/religious/ethnic identifications mattered less, and in Bosnia Herzegovi-
na (.9 %) with its very mixed population – the Yugoslav identity was never meant to replace 
national identities or compete with them. Rather it was part of Tito’s general attempt to create 
an all-embracing Yugoslavism under which national identities could exist. 
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was Tito himself who laid the foundations for nationalist strife by regionalising 
power along republican lines: while intended to solve the ‘national question’, 
this solution meant that divisions and tensions would come out into the open 
after Tito’s death. 
Throughout the 190s, Yugoslavia experienced high unemployment, a 
huge foreign debt ($20 billion in 19), high inflation and serious food short-
ages. Salaries dropped, and the standard of living plunged. This growing eco-
nomic crisis destabilised the country so much as to threaten its very existence. 
Inefficiencies in economic production and failure to adjust to a changing world 
economy led to slow economic growth rates, undermining the country’s abil-
ity to respond properly to the crisis. The average annual GDP growth rate fell 
from .1 % in the period 193-199 to 0.4 % in 190-194, and the real personal 
income growth rate fell from .1 % in the period 195-192 to 2. % in 193-9, 
and -2.0 % in 190-194 (Cohen 1992: 31). Looking at the economies of the in-
dividual republics comparatively, deep inequalities also became apparent, with 
Croatia and Slovenia having the lowest unemployment rate, the largest GDP, 
and generally speaking the healthiest economies. Despite this relative prosper-
ity, these republics also expressed great dissatisfaction with Yugoslavia’s policy 
of income redistribution, which benefited the poorest republics and autono-
mous provinces such as Bosnia Herzegovina and Kosovo (Ramet 1992b: 13-; 
Allcock 2000: 9-100). The burden of subsidies to the ‘underdeveloped south’ 
made it easy to blame the backward parts of Yugoslavia for the economic dif-
ficulties that these more prosperous republics faced. Slovenia and Croatia were 
not alone in blaming other republics for their own republics’ economic difficul-
ties. The political elites of all the republics and autonomous provinces began 
blaming other republics for their difficulties, together creating a ‘culture of par-
anoia.’ The enemies ‘without’ of the Cold War period were replaced by enemies 
‘within’ of other Yugoslavian nations and nationalities (Allcock 2000: 9).
Under Tito’s rule strikes had only occurred on rare occasions, but after his 
death they became more common. In 199 for example, 1,900 strikes involving 
40,000 workers were reported (Donia 1995: 199). Though these strikes were 
not all economically motivated – several were staged by the nationalist regime 
in Serbia – they did reveal a growing popular dissatisfaction with the economic 
developments in Yugoslavia. In addition, a series of financial scandals involving 
party members and major Yugoslavian companies revealed an economically 
  The economic crisis and decline in salaries and living standard greatly revitalised the country-
city network, as owning a piece of land could alleviate the worst consequences of the crisis (see 
for instance Simic 193: 10-2; Allcock 2002: 140-4).
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and politically corrupt Yugoslavia controlled by economic strongmen who 
could do whatever they pleased without any interference by the state.
The increasing economic crisis was thus paralleled by a political crisis. 
Party members and citizens in general lost confidence in the capacity of the rul-
ing communist party to solve the country’s difficulties and maintain Yugosla-
via’s territorial cohesion. This loss of legitimacy is illustrated by the communist 
party’s declining membership, especially among younger people. This crisis of 
confidence grew in intensity as each of the eight republics and provinces be-
came more autonomous and unwilling to implement the decisions made at the 
federal level. And though the mid-190s saw a relatively high degree of turno-
ver in the party elite, with younger ambitious leaders replacing the older Tito-
era communists, this new generation – even though it was preoccupied with 
solving the country’s economic problems and renewing the socialist regime’s 
legitimacy – nevertheless still sought to acquire political support by appealing 
to the regional concerns of local communities (Cohen 1992: 45-51; Janić 1995). 
The League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) increasingly lost legitimacy 
and cohesion. Republican interests had gradually undermined the federal in-
stitutions of the ruling Communist Party, to the extent that the LCY was little 
more than a loose association of republic-based organizations by the end of the 
190s.
Milošović 
The Serbian leader Slobodan Milošović arose out of this economic and political 
crisis. I shall briefly sketch his rise to power and the nationalism he promul-
gated. Milošović did not single-handedly invent Serbian nationalism as such. 
Rather he both exploited and catalysed the smouldering nationalism which the 
economic and political crisis had intensified. Milošović was born in Serbia in 
1941. He became a member of the Communist Party at the age of twenty-eight, 
but only entered politics in 194 at the request of his friend Ivan Stambolić, 
chairman of the Central Committee of the Serbian Communist Party. Though 
Milošović soon gained a reputation as a strong advocate of Serbian interests, it 
was not until Milošović’s famous speech in April 19 in Kosovo Poljo, where 
he told the Serbian minority that “Nobody, either now or in the future, has the 
  Bosnia Herzegovina, for instance, witnessed an immense and rather symptomatic economic 
scandal in 19. By accident it was revealed that Agrokomerc, one of the largest enterpris-
es in Bosnia Herzegovina, was built on unsecured promissory notes valued at $5 million, 
and from one day to the next 50,000 workers’ paychecks were invalid. The unsecured debt of 
Agrokomerc was part of a greater fraud involving 200 party members in Bosnia Herzegovina 
and Croatia, and it was argued that the practice of Agrokomerc was widespread throughout 
Yugoslavia’s industry (Donia 1995: 195-).
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right to beat you,” that he really discovered the political power of nationalistic 
rhetoric (Ramet 1992b: 22). After this Milošović managed to oust Stambolić 
from the Serbian presidency and began his own climb to power. 
His first step was to establish full control in Serbia. As a way to achieve 
this goal he sought to gain control of the media. Among other things, he fired 
journalists and editors at the renowned publishing house Politika and replaced 
them with supporters of his own political views. Before long other leading pub-
lishing houses were following the nationalist editorial line set by Politika. By 
so doing the media soon began to play a central role, both articulating and 
also creating nationalist tensions and antagonisms. Increasingly the media 
played on a fear of the ethnic Other, as well as attacking the Yugoslav ideology 
of ‘brotherhood and unity’ (Malešič 1993; Sommelius 1993; Naughton 1994). At 
the end of the 190s a moral panic was created by the Serbian media, a panic 
mainly based on fear of the Kosovo Albanians and their presumed attempted 
genocide on the Serbian minority population in Kosovo. The official Serbian 
press printed stories of Kosovo Albanians raping Serbian women and destroy-
ing Orthodox Christian monasteries. Milošović also created a close alliance 
with the Serbian Orthodox Christian Church, thus adding further weight to the 
authenticity of Serbian nationalism. Furthermore, the media encouraged devo-
tion to a mythical version of Serbian history, heroising the Serbs’ fight against 
the Turks 00 years before in particular (especially highlighted was the defeat 
of Prince Lazar in 139). In short, an image of the suffering and glory of the 
Serbian nation was constructed (Bowman 1994; Sofus 1999; see also Čolović 
2002a). A cult arose around Milošović, making him the first really strong man 
after Tito, and it became increasingly difficult to criticise Milošović and retain 
a job of importance (Ramet 1992b: 22).
Milošović’s next step, after having established full control in Serbia, was 
to gain control of the two autonomous provinces Kosovo and Vojvodina. Right 
from the beginning of his rise to power, Milošović had maintained that Ser-
bia was discriminated against in Yugoslavia. An example of this injustice was 
the two autonomous provinces, which Milošović claimed ought to have been 
Serbian by rights. These arguments were added to the old Serbian nationalist 
claim that Montenegro was in reality the coastal part of Serbia. Through the 
extensive use of orchestrated mass demonstrations as well as by putting im-
mense pressure on local leaders, Milošović managed to gain control of Kosovo 
and Vojvodina in addition to Serbia itself by mid-199. He had also installed his 
men in Montenegro, and made Macedonia his ally. Furthermore, he sent agents 
to Bosnia Herzegovina to attempt to subvert the republic from within (Ramet 
1992b: 231-233).
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As a result of these manoeuvres, at the end of the 190s Serbia found itself 
with four out of eight votes in the collective presidency which had replaced Tito 
after his death, which gave a right of veto over all federal decisions. The collec-
tive presidency, which was meant to mediate differences between the republics, 
was thus increasingly reduced to an instrument of Serbian nationalist leader-
ship and became increasingly delegitimised in the eyes of the republics who 
had not supported the Serbian line (Denitch 1994: 1).
Milošović’s takeover of the Serbian Communist Party and the collective 
presidency was closely linked to another central step in his rise to power: the 
rebuilding of a strong Yugoslavia through a strong Serbia. Milošović himself 
called this project an anti-bureaucratic revolution, a campaign intended to 
cleanse the state apparatus of inefficient bureaucrats. More to the point, his 
project was directed against the decentralisation of power along republican 
lines laid out in the 194 constitution. Many Serbs flocked to Milošović, the 
strong man who, rebuilding a powerful and proud Serbia, would also restore 
the decentralised, disintegrating and corrupt Yugoslavia. His fervent national-
istic rhetoric gained him immense support for the claim that the disintegration 
of Yugoslavia was an attack on legitimate Serbian interests: as the largest ethnic 
group in Yugoslavia, Serbia should not be reduced to just one republic among 
others. 
Milošović’s rise to power in Serbia and Yugoslavia in general represented 
a break with previous post-war politics in Yugoslavia. His use of mass rallies 
and the threats of the crowd was a new weapon that radicalised the political 
climate.10 In combination with his anti-bureaucratic revolution, Milošović’s in-
timidating Serbian nationalism and the project of the ‘Serbianisation’ of Yugo-
slavia were increasingly regarded as a threat by the other republics. 
Slovenia
I shall now examine Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina’s response to 
Milošović’s nationalist policy individually.
While Milošović worked for the centralisation of Yugoslavia, Slovenia 
went in the opposite direction. Their goal was to achieve independence from 
Yugoslavia gradually. However, nationalistic rhetoric was also part of their 
strategy. The Slovenian goals of decentralisation and eventual independence 
10  In a Belgrade rally in 19 in support of Milošović an estimated 00,000 to 1.3 million Serbs 
were present (Cohen 1992: 52), and also in 19 100,000 Milošović supporters marched to Novi 
Sad (the capital of the autonomous province of Vojvodina) to ‘convince’ the communist offi-
cials to resign in favour of Milošović supporters. The same strategy also paved the way for the 
resignation of the anti-Milošović government in Montenegro (Sofus 1995: 24).
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were partially motivated by Yugoslavia’s economic subsidies to the poorest re-
publics and autonomous provinces. The Slovenes wanted to keep ‘their’ eco-
nomic surplus for themselves. 
Slovenia had been advocating pluralism since the mid-190s. Slovenian 
society, in particular, had witnessed a growing liberalisation as exemplified by 
the emergence of non-governmental alternative movements, especially youth 
movements. Many Slovenes, therefore, saw Milošović’s centralisation of Yu-
goslavia as a threat to Slovenia’s sovereignty. ‘One republic, one vote’ was the 
slogan for the federal power structure they advocated, instead of the majority 
vote in terms of population Milošović campaigned for – which favoured the 
Serbs, as they were the largest group in Yugoslavia. The disagreement between 
Slovenia and Serbia about the degree of centralisation of Yugoslavia intensified 
in the late 190s: the political debate was laden with nationalistic and republi-
can rhetoric. 
The situation reached a crisis when, in November 199, the Slovenes de-
nied Serbian demonstrators entry into the republic of Slovenia. The Serbian 
communist leadership responded by threatening to terminate governmental 
and business relations with Slovenia. Slovenian discourse was becoming in-
creasingly not only anti-Serbian, but also anti-southern. Though they theo-
retically supported the Kosovo Albanians’ right to autonomy, the Slovenes also 
feared an influx of poor migrants from the south, and the Slovenes therefore 
tried to set themselves apart culturally by connecting to Europe and dissociat-
ing themselves from the Balkans.
After the Slovenes walked out of the Yugoslav Communist League’s Ex-
traordinary Congress in January 1990 together with their Croatian colleagues, 
Yugoslavia in reality ceased to exist. The first genuinely free governmental elec-
tion in Yugoslavia since 193 was held in Slovenia soon afterwards, in April 
1990. The communists lost, while the winners were former communists who 
had become nationalists more or less overnight. Soon elections followed in the 
other republics. Some commentators have described the atmosphere of elec-
tions as virtually millenarian: “People felt that if they took the magical draught 
of democracy proffered them by the West, they would instantly move into a 
new, and far better, world” (Bowman 1994: 145). The elections were all based 
on the assumption that legitimacy came from ‘the people’ rather than the self-
ordained communist leadership, but the central question arose: who are the 
people? The answer given by the winners of the elections was that ‘the people’ 
were the dominant ethnic groupings of the respective republics (Bowman 1994: 
145-).
Slovenia prepared for sovereignty, and in July 1991 the republic proclaimed 
its independence. The Yugoslav army, which had supported Milošović’s central-
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ising line and was by this stage Serb-dominated, was sent in to regain control. 
But after a mere ten-day long relatively bloodless confrontation, the army was 
withdrawn. The first period of independence was not easy, and the country was 
hit hard by the Slovenian economy’s isolation from its traditional markets in 
Yugoslavia. Xenophobia and nationalism grew, and as a consequence, so did 
the nationalist right-wing party (Cohen 1992: 59-94; Sofus 199: 25-).
Croatia
Whereas the route to independence was relatively easy for Slovenia, Croatia’s 
road was harder and nationalistic rhetoric and political goals had much more 
influence. While Slovenian protest had been directed against the communists 
and the policy of centralisation, the rhetoric of the Croatian opposition was 
markedly anti-Serbian and outright nationalist. Croatia’s first multiple elec-
tion took place just a week after the election in Slovenia. One of the best-fi-
nanced political alternatives to the communist ruling party was the Croatian 
Democratic Union (HDZ), led by the historian and former communist Franjo 
Tuđman, who had also fought with Tito’s Partisans.11 The HDZ had already ex-
isted illegally for a year, with branches all over Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina. 
Tuđman and the HDZ won the election. Despite only getting a little over 40 % 
of the votes, the HDZ received nearly 0 % of the seats in the Croatian legisla-
ture (Cohen 1992: 95, 100).
Tuđman had spent several years in jail in the 190s and 190s because 
of his nationalist activities. His version of Croatian nationalism was based to 
a large extent on an attempt to rehabilitate aspects of the Ustashe-led Inde-
pendent State of Croatia (NDH) from the Second World War. For instance, he 
understated the scope of the genocide of the Ustashe regime, and he encour-
aged the public use of many of the symbols of the controversial NDH State, in 
particularly the checkerboard emblem composed of white and red squares, the 
Šahovnica. This symbol, which replaced the communist red star after independ-
ence, had also figured on the flag of the fascist Ustashe state, and even though 
it dated back to the Middle Ages it was hated by many Serbs as a reminder of 
the Ustashe regime’s atrocities and oppression. Tuđman also initiated a revival 
of the wartime linguistic innovations of the NDH, stressing the dissimilarities 
between the Serbian and Croatian dialects. 
Tuđman advocated an independent Croatia, claiming that the Croatian 
people had the right to self-determination and sovereignty. However, he speci-
fied that the Croatian state ought to reclaim Croatia’s ‘historical borders’ – that 
11  $ million was raised in support of Tuđman’s victorious campaign for presidency; a good pro-
portion of these funds came from returning émigrés (Woodward 2000).
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is, the borders drawn by the NDH state. These borders annexed the territory 
of Bosnia Herzegovina. Tuđman had revitalised the old claim that the Mus-
lims of Yugoslavia had originally been Croats, and that Bosnia Herzegovina 
and Croatia therefore formed an indivisible geographical and economic entity 
(Malcom 199: 21; Denich 1994: 3-0; Bowman 1994: 155-; Sofus 199: 2-
9). 
In several ways Tuđman can be seen as the Croatian Milošović. Like 
Milošović, Tuđman and his regime used the media to deliberately create or 
exaggerate ethnic hatred (Bennett 1995: 14; Malešič 1993). Like Milošović, 
who had succeeded in stirring up the Serbian masses with a nationalistic pro-
gramme advocating a strong Yugoslavia under Serbian dominance, Tuđman 
employed a fierce and antagonistic ethnic rhetoric to offer his people a vision 
of the restoration of the Croatian-led fascist state of World War II. And finally, 
Tuđman served as a unifying symbol for the many Croats who had come to fear 
the growing Serbian nationalism. 
One of the dangerous aspects of Tuđman’s nationalism was that it both 
rhetorically and legally reduced the huge Serbian minority of the republic to 
second-class citizens.1 Tito had cautiously defined the republic of Croatia as 
‘the nation-state of the Croatian people and the Serbs in Croatia’, giving the two 
peoples the same rights. By contrast the new constitution (from 1990) reduced 
the status of the Serbs to that of a minority. On several occasions Tuđman stat-
ed that the Serbs of Croatia had the right to live there, but also had to accept 
that they were a minority. In Yugoslavia there had existed a distinction between 
‘state’ and ‘nation’ (‘nation’ being ethnically defined), which secured the equal 
right of all the citizens of the state, no matter what their nation. But in the 
nationalist constitutions of Slovenia and Croatia this distinction was erased, 
and the state was legitimised on the basis of the sovereignty of the ethnically 
defined nation. Other national groups could be citizens, but could not expect 
the same right to participate in the control of the state (Hayden 199).
The conflict between the new Croatian regime and the country’s Serbian 
minority, who understandably feared the anti-Serbian policy of the state, was 
essential in leading Croatia and Serbia into war (Grandits and Leutloff 1999). 
When Croatia voted for independence, the Croatian Serbs of the historical-
ly important Krajina area claimed independence, maintaining that they had 
the right to belong to Serbia proper. Milošović and his propaganda machine 
supported the uprising of the Krajina Serbs, telling people in Serbia that their 
brothers in Krajina were in danger of losing their lives to the Croats (Bow-
1  One tangible sign of this was the purging of Serbs in Croatia from administrative positions.
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man 1994: 15). Whether Milošović’s consideration for the Krajina Serbs was 
genuine, or whether he had ambitions of creating a ‘Greater Serbia’ now that 
Yugoslavia was disintegrating, we can only guess. However, it is beyond doubt 
that conflict regarding the Serbian minority population in Croatia was also a 
fight for power and influence. 
Milošović and Tuđman were officially enemies, but they both pursued 
the same strategy: nationalism as a way to power. One of the few non-nation-
alist politicians of this period was the federal president of Yugoslavia, Ante 
Marković, who persistently emphasised the need for economic reforms. Both 
Milošović and Tuđman had an interest in de-legitimising his influence. Togeth-
er they managed to transform the moral discourse of Tito’s Yugoslavia, epito-
mised by ‘brotherhood and unity’, into a violent discourse of ethnic, religious 
and nationalist antagonism. Visions of a ‘Greater Serbia’ or ‘Greater Croatia’ 
built upon ethnic homogeneity and to be realised through the annihilation of 
the ethnic Other became ruling ideologies (Bowman 1994).
Bosnia Herzegovina 
In 1991 Bosnia Herzegovina had 4,3 million inhabitants, of whom 43. % were 
Muslims, 31.4 % Serbs, 1.3 % Croats and 5.5 % Yugoslavs.1 With its complex 
mix of different ethnoreligious groups, the republic had for a long time had the 
potential for interethnic tensions. But at the same time, it was almost absurd to 
imagine civil war in this particular republic, as the ethnic groups were mixed 
together throughout the country. Bosnia Herzegovina has no ‘natural’ ethnic 
borders. Splitting up Bosnia Herzegovina into ethnically homogeneous regions 
would require huge forced resettlements and/or ethnic cleansings. Though this 
was exactly what was to come, in the early nineties hardly anyone could imag-
ine it, even in their worst nightmares.
When Yugoslavia recognised Bosnia Herzegovina as a republic after the 
Second World War and gave equal rights to all its ethnic groups – Serbs, Croats 
and Muslims14 – it was believed that the political tensions caused by Serbia 
and Croatia’s competing claims to the territory would be defused. Unfortu-
nately, this was not to be the case under Milošović and Tuđman. Even though 
Milošović’s appeal to Serbian nationalism had originally focused on the rights 
of the Serbian minority of Kosovo, he gradually began to focus on the ‘difficult 
situation’ of the Serbian enclaves in Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina. When 
Tuđman then started talking about reconsidering the territorial borders of Bos-
1  ‘Yugoslav’ was a category invented by the communist regime. People could choose to define 
themselves primarily as Yugoslavs and thereby support the regime’s nation-building project. 
14  Though the Muslims were only recognised as a constitutional group in 191, see Chapter 9.
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nia Herzegovina, politics in Bosnia Herzegovina became more pronouncedly 
ethnic. In the summer of 1990 the actions and demands of the Serbs in the 
Krajina region spread into Bosnia Herzegovina, as the Serbs started expressing 
their desire to establish a Serbian republic in the Krajina area, which would an-
nex territory from both Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina (Glenny 199).
The Muslims were caught in the middle by the claims made by both 
Croatia and Serbia to the territory of Bosnia Herzegovina. Fear of the two large 
neighbours’ territorial claims, coupled with Serbia’s nationalist scare campaign 
against the ‘Islamic fundamentalists’, led the Muslims to organise themselves in 
the Muslim Party of Democratic Action (SDA), led by Alija Izetbegovic. Right 
from the start, the SDA’s ideology was somewhat contradictory. On the one 
hand, they argued for the preservation of Bosnia’s unique ethnic and religious 
heterogeneity. On the other hand, the party promoted a strong partisan Muslim 
ethnic and religious identity: in this respect, they took part in the national-
ist fantasies spreading all over the former Yugoslavia. This tension has sub-
sequently been central in the political life of Muslims in Bosnia Herzegovina 
(Bougarel 199).
In the free election of 1990, all the major parties in Bosnia Herzegovina 
were organised along ethnic lines, and the election itself was a thinly disguised 
ethnic census: people voted not for competent political leaders, but for ethnic 
representation. Misha Glenny (199: 14) reports how easy it was to identify the 
different ethnic districts by the symbols hanging from all the buildings when he 
drove through Bosnia Herzegovina just prior to the election: the green crescent 
(SDA), the Šahovnica15 (HDZ-BiH), and the four Cs (SDS1). All the parties ar-
gued for the preservation of Bosnia Herzegovina. Their disagreements related 
to how and to what extent the republic should be connected to Yugoslavia. The 
Serbs wanted a close connection to Yugoslavia, whereas the Muslims and the 
Croats argued for a loose connection.
After the election the SDA’s leader, Alija Izetbegovic, formed a ‘govern-
ment of national unity’ composed of a formal coalition between all three major 
parties, and government posts were shared between them. Though dedicated to 
the Muslim case, Izetbegovic was also dedicated to the preservation of Bosnia 
Herzegovina, and he tried very hard to make the three ethnic groups cooper-
ate. For a while it seemed as though he would succeed, but there was no room 
for pan-ethnic identifications. Tensions grew, the nationalist aspirations of all 
1  A checkerboard emblem composed of white and red squares. The Croatian coat of arms with 
strongly nationalist, in some respects even fascist undertones.
1  Srpska Demokratska Stranka. The Serb Democratic Party in Bosnia Herzegovina (the Serb 
nationalist party).
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three ethnic groups increased, and with the declaration of independence in the 
spring of 1992, the country would be cast into war (Cohen 1992: 139-3).
The Serbs played a major role in Bosnia Herzegovina’s tragic fate. In June 
1991, when Izetbegovic was still trying to keep the country together, the ethnic-
Serbian party SDS declared three areas of Bosnia Herzegovina to be autono-
mous Serbian regions, and Milošović helped to arm these breakaway areas. And 
when independence was declared in 1992, it was Serbian forces and snipers who 
started the siege and shelling of Sarajevo, and it was Serbian irregular troops 
who oppressed and killed the mainly Muslim population of eastern Bosnia. All 
these actions were part of a clear strategy to integrate Bosnia Herzegovina into 
a Greater Serbia, and they enabled the Serbs to gain control of 0 % of Bosnia 
Herzegovina only six weeks after the outbreak of the war there.
The politics of the nationalist Croats also played a part in the destruction 
of the republic of Bosnia Herzegovina. When the citizens of Bosnia Herzegovi-
na voted for independence in the spring of 1992, the Muslims and the Croats 
were in favour, whereas the Serbs boycotted the election. But the ruling politi-
cal party of Croatia, the HDZ, strongly supported the platform of a faction of 
Herzegovinian Croats led by Mate Boban, who wanted a part of Bosnia Herze-
govina to be annexed by Croatia. And on 3 July 1992, the Herzegovinian Croats 
did in fact establish a self-governing community of Herceg-Bosna in Herze-
govina (see the Prologue). 
Alija Izetbegovic’s political programme was more compromise seeking, 
less antagonistic and less aggressive than those of the Croats and the Serbs. 
Nevertheless, he and the nationalist-minded Muslims also played a part in the 
dissolution of Bosnia Herzegovina. Whereas both the Croats and the Serbs had 
a ‘mother country’ to turn to, or rather political powers that to a great extent 
decided on the politics of ‘their’ respective ethnic groups in Bosnia Herzegovi-
na, the Muslims had no allies.1 The Muslims had to navigate between the po-
litical ambitions of both the Serbs (Serbia) and the Croats (Croatia). For many 
Muslims the destruction of Bosnia Herzegovina was therefore tantamount to 
the eradication of the Bosnian Muslims. In this situation Izetbegovic had to 
choose between Tuđman and Milošović. That is, he could seek independence 
for Bosnia Herzegovina, knowing that Croatia would probably make claims 
upon Herzegovina. Alternatively, he could let Bosnia Herzegovina enter into 
a federation with rump Yugoslavia, knowing that the Muslims would be re-
duced to a minority in a Serbian-ruled state. When the Bosnian Muslims and 
Bosnian Croats declared independence for Bosnia Herzegovina it was not the 
1  Though parts of the SDA openly cooperated with Muslim countries and thereby sought legiti-
macy for a more radical Muslim identity (Sofus 1995: 22).
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cause of the war, but at the very least Izetbegovic should have taken the threat 
represented by the Serbian population of Bosnia Herzegovina more seriously. 
He underestimated their fear of living in an independent Bosnia Herzegovina 
led by what they considered to be Muslim nationalists (Shoup 1995; Sofus 199; 
Cohen 199;  Simić 1993; Mojzes 199a).1
Nationalism for all
The wars that spread throughout Yugoslavia in the early 1990s like wildfire were 
to a great extent ignited by political leaders, all former communists, who were 
using nationalism as a way to (re)gain power. Tuđman and Milošević were ene-
mies, but their ideologies and their methods were the same.1 In fact, one could 
maintain that their ideology and method involved exactly the same thing: eth-
nic cleansing. That is, territorial invasion and ‘cleansing’ were legitimate as a 
necessary attempt to create homogeneous and ethnically clean areas. 
The nationalism that started in the political sphere soon spread through-
out all aspects of society. There was a revival of interest in and politicisation 
of national literatures and national history. For example, the literary work of 
the Nobel Prize winner Ivo Andric was greatly politicised. The Serbs saw him 
as a great Serbian writer, while some Muslims depicted his work as following 
“the Balkan Greater-Serbian agenda which aims to obliterate Muslim Europe-
ans” (Karic 1999: 53-3). The nationalist cultural revival was also reflected in the 
production and growth of underground cultural groups. Cultural production 
in general increasingly referred to and was consumed by the inhabitants of the 
individual republics. As such it both reflected and contributed to the disinte-
gration of a common cultural frame of reference (Ramet 1992a: 29-30). Over 
the course of the war this tendency escalated. Laušević (2000), for example, 
analyses how radio and television music broadcasts became a strong symbol 
of national belonging. Tchaikowsky’s Symphony in B-minor became Serbian if 
performed by the Belgrade Philharmonic Orchestra, and could therefore not 
be aired on Muslim-controlled Sarajevo Television. Bands and genres were 
furthermore strongly associated with the different ethnic groups. Musical in-
struments were invested with national identity. Modes of singing, sound and 
tempo, indeed every possible element in the musical performance was reinter-
preted and given ethnic identity (Laušević 2000; Čolović 2002b).
The disintegration of a shared cultural world was also reflected in the ten-
dency of the different nationalities in Yugoslavia to read their own newspa-
1  See Chapter 9 for details of the policy of the Muslims of Bosnia Herzegovina.
1  Milošović and Tuđman met as long ago as 1991 to discuss the division of Bosnia Herzegovina 
(Glenny 199: 194; Doina 1994: 24-5). 
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pers, a tendency that also spread to Bosnia Herzegovina. Croats read Croatian 
newspapers, Serbs read Serbian newspapers, and so forth (Ramet 1992a: 5-
1). Furthermore, the press increasingly communicated a provincial republican 
perspective at the expense of a Yugoslav viewpoint, as well as contributing to 
the massive demonisation of the ethnic Other (Denich 1993; Bringa 2002). 
The period also witnessed a politicisation of gender relations. One exam-
ple relates to mixed marriages. During the communist period such marriages 
were praised as triumphant results of the ideology of ‘brotherhood and unity’, 
while with the coming of the nationalist ideologies they were increasingly con-
demned as unclean and as defiling the purity of the nation. The period also saw 
a growth in aggressive masculine images and an increased oppression of the 
rights of women (Ramet 1992a; Morokvasic 199). This escalated throughout 
the war, as women and their bodies became symbols of male-directed battles 
over ethnic identity. The rape of women was often used or presented as the 
symbolic rape of territory and ethnic identity (Meznaric 1994; Olujic 199).
Resistance?
It is difficult to evaluate how deeply the nationalist discourses of this period in 
the former Yugoslavia invaded the minds of people. Such themes as nationality, 
ethnic Otherness, self-determination, territory, ancestral blood and so on were 
factors everybody had to relate to: one could not opt out. One could not go 
about as if nothing were happening. But was the nationalist mindset internal-
ised by individuals? Not much has been written about opposition to national-
ism prior to and during the war. The few studies that do exist, however, indicate 
that some resistance existed. 
Cohen’s (1992) analysis of the free elections in the former Yugoslavian 
republics, for instance, shows that the electoral system in both Slovenia and 
Croatia substantially enhanced the winning nationalist parties’ relative posi-
tions in the distribution of legislative seats, and it appears that quite a large 
number of voters opposed the nationalist parties. Additionally, Denitch (1994) 
maintains that the development of a unifying Yugoslav-wide political force was 
never allowed to develop, as no Yugoslav-wide federal elections were ever per-
mitted. Only elections on the republican level came about, and their very exist-
ence in itself indicated opposition to the Yugoslav federation. 
Another indication of resistance to the nationalist ideologies relates to 
a survey conducted in the winter of 199-90, which showed higher levels of 
inter-ethnic tolerance in the ethnically mixed and conflict-ridden republics of 
Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina than in the ethnically homogeneous Slovenia, 
indicating that the strategies and rhetorics of ethnic cleansing were to a large 
extent part of a political project (Hodson et al. 1994). This is also argued by 
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Hayden (199): “Extreme nationalism in former Yugoslavia has not been only 
a matter of imagining allegedly ‘primordial’ communities, but rather of mak-
ing existing heterogeneous ones unimaginable” (ibid. 3). Therefore, he main-
tains, the war was fiercest in Bosnia Herzegovina, as this republic had the most 
heterogeneous population.
In a study of some of the anti-war initiatives which took place throughout 
the war, Devic (199) concludes that resistance to ethno-nationalism emerged 
in a certain cultural milieu, but that the majority of individuals in former Yu-
goslavia shared this resistance. Evidence for this widespread resistance includes 
the rather substantial anti-Milošović protest demonstration in Belgrade in 1991, 
as well as the anti-war demonstrations in Sarajevo just before the outbreak of 
the war (Cohen 1992; Malcom 199). On the basis of such popular resistance, 
Devic predicts that the new nationalist regimes of former Yugoslavia will not 
be able to generate enduring hegemonic cultures, simply because they do not 
have enough public support. 
Finally, even during the war in Bosnia Herzegovina, when nationalist 
propaganda was most passionate and when people were actually experienc-
ing the disastrous and deadly consequences of the war, deliberate resistance to 
ethnic thinking existed alongside pronounced nationalism (Maček 2000a; see 
also Povrzanović 199). 
I have given an account of some of the historical threads leading to a situation 
in which nationalism conquered the public discourse in Yugoslavia in the 190s 
and early 1990s. Though resistance to the nationalist discourse existed, nation-
alist and ethnic thinking came to dominate public discourse completely. Ide-
ologies as well as everyday practices of inter-ethnic coexistence and tolerance 
were damaged. Heterogeneous communities were made ‘unimaginable’, multi-
ethnicity was unmade. Territory and ethnic nationality were seamlessly linked. 
Disbelief in inter-ethnic coexistence meant that territories were cleansed not 
only of the individual ethnic Other, but also of physical symbols of the ethnic 
other and of ethnic heterogeneity.0 Central to the ideology of nationalism was 
the demonisation of the ethnic Other. Fear of the ethnic Other was promoted 
and increasingly came to dominate the everyday world, a process in which the 
media played a very central role. In short, it seems that no spheres of life es-
caped the nationalist discourse. Marriage, cultural production and consump-
tion, the press, history, language, literature, religion – everything had become 
coloured by the idea that ethnic origin was the most important aspect of life. I 
0  The term ‘urbicide’ has been employed to denounce the deliberate destruction of the city as a 
symbol of ethnic heterogeneity (Coward 2002).
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122	 post-war identification
will now turn to the central question of the degree to which this omnipresent 
nationalistic discourse affects the way in which the Muslims of Stolac under-
stand their world. In particular, I will focus on the extent to which my inform-
ants have been able to resist the ideology of ethnicity and to produce alternative 
identifications and narratives.
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Chapter 5 
Politika
In this and the following three chapters, I introduce four categories through 
which my informants’ resistance against the discourses of nationalism is ex-
pressed. The first one is politika. Politika, or ‘politics’, is a central component in 
the lives of the Muslims of Stolac: during the last decade, the politics of the re-
gion and towards the region have had catastrophic consequences, among them 
the politicisation of everyday life. Moving beyond the common understanding 
of politics as ‘realpolitik’, I will analyse politika as a category of moral action 
created and used by the Muslims of Stolac in order to resist the invasion of 
everyday life by ethnic thinking, and to account for the ungraspable aspects of 
the life produced by the war (see also Kolind 200). 
Politika as a moral category
Politicians and the field of politics in Stolac are associated with a certain moral 
(or rather immoral) universe, a universe sharply contrasted to the life and eth-
ics of ordinary people. This view of politics is probably related to the lack of 
political modernisation in Yugoslavia, where civil society as a mediating level 
between everyday life and state politics never seems to have developed (Allcock 
2000: 245-30, 351-; Sunic 199). It also relates to the prohibition of collec-
tive criticism in the former Yugoslavia. Though some freedom of expression 
was permitted – the young could indulge in familiar Western-style ‘sex, drugs 
and rock-’n-roll’ experiences – attempts at organised collective opposition were 
suppressed. Some intellectuals on the urban scene had what Drakulić calls a 
‘contract with the government’, whereby they refrained from criticising the gov-
ernment in exchange for certain cultural and material liberties, and because 
they felt ‘at home’ in Yugoslavia (Jansen 2000a: 109; Drakulić 1995). As a result 
of the absence of civil society and critical public opinion, large parts of the 
Yugoslav population did not participate in political decision-making; contact 
with the political system took place in the form of fixed patron-client relations 
(Allcock 2000: 245-30, 351-; Devic 199: 144-5; Sunic 199). Apparently, this 
distance between politics and everyday life has grown throughout the war and 
post-war period (see UNDP 2000; Maček 2000a: 11). 
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124	 post-war identification
The Muslims of Stolac are very direct when talking about the moral uni-
verse of politika: politics are the pursuit of power for the sake of power: politi-
cians are people who think only of themselves, they are cynical, scheming and 
untrustworthy (see also Helms 200). 
I
Mehmed: I do not like politicians and neither do I like politics (politika). I’m a tol-
erant man, who respects differences. I respect you, that is very important and 
it is human, even though there are differences between you and me; simply a 
tolerance, the tolerance of life, it is very important. But politicians as politi-
cians, they always lie.
II
Munir: We have to look forward in these times. But we do not have the power to 
change the situation here. The politicians we had during the war and who are 
here now, they are very rich, they made money during the war as well as today, 
and therefore it is very hard for them to loosen their grip on power. And they 
all say they work for the people, but they are only working for themselves 
When I asked Emir about the meaning of the word politika, he smiled a little, 
showing that there was much more to the word:
Politics is something that is above you: something ordinary people do not un-
derstand or have any influence on. Politika is something the people far away 
are doing, the ones who do not have to live with the consequences of their 
actions; it is cynical and egoistic acts. For instance our people [Muslim politi-
cians] in Sarajevo are requesting people to return to Stolac, so when the year 
has passed they can say: ‘Look, now a thousand Muslims are living in Stolac, 
now the Croats can no longer say that this is Croatian territory.’ But none of 
them ever come down here to see how we live, or just to talk to us, they do not 
care about ordinary people, what we think or feel. We have a saying ‘politics is 
a whore’ (politika je kurva), they are only doing it for themselves, like a whore 
is only doing it for money.
Politika is also linked to corruption and criminality. Politicians are often seen as 
not only cunning, but directly involved in criminal activities such as fraud and 
bribery, smuggling, drug trafficking, and incitement to actual physical violence. 
As a young man in his 30s said:
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We have a saying: ‘Those Tito jailed, they were not there without reason.’ Now 
they are all in power, all the ones Tito or the communist rule jailed. The crimi-
nals have risen to power. They are now presidents, governors and ministers.1
In general, politika represents an ethically devalued universe consisting of im-
moral actions and immoral persons sharply contrasted to another category of 
persons I will come back to in the next chapter: pošteni ljudi (decent people). 
Politika as resistance
Using politika as an explanatory device constitutes a withdrawal from using 
ethnic stereotypes, and as such resists the dominance of ethnic identities cre-
ated by the war’s violence and the post-war political situation. In using the cul-
tural category of politika, the Muslims of Stolac insist on blaming not the Croat 
or the Serbian Other, but the politicians: the war was not caused by a Serbian 
aggressive mentality but was due to Slobodan Milošević, and it is not because of 
the Croats that they have suffered and still suffer, but because of Franjo Tuđman 
and the HDZ. To put it simply, there is an element of resistance in merely avoid-
ing ethnic categories as explanatory devices. 
It is also possible, however, to find components of a more conscious cri-
tique of the nationalist ideologies and practices which clearly and unambigu-
ously maintain that Muslims, Croats and Serbs cannot live together because of 
differences in mentality. Contrary to the discourse of nationalism, the Muslims 
of Stolac assert that if it was not for politicians and the force of politika, ethnic 
identity would never have become a determinant factor and the war would 
never have occurred. They stress that politicians stir up ethnic divides and fears 
in order to maintain power, that they manipulate people, and that without the 
present politics the citizens of Stolac could easily live together again. They also 
say that their society does not function because of the lack of political will, and 
that if politicians would sit down together and work for the future of Bosnia 
Herzegovina, many of the current economic, social and legal problems would 
be solved. I shall offer some examples.
Mehmed, who holds an important post in Stolac, told me how all the 
present problems come from the political sphere, and that ordinary people do 
not have problems interacting. He then told me about his backgammon board, 
beautifully engraved with a picture of Stolac a hundred years ago. A Croat had 
borrowed the board a couple of days before our conversation, a man who, as 
1  Let me just add that Izetbegović, Tuđman and the Bosnian Serbian leader Šešelj among others 
served time in prison in pre-war Yugoslavia, sentenced for spreading nationalist propaganda.
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12	 post-war identification
Mehmed said, “sits here playing and drinking coffee.” It is not without reason, 
I thought, that he mentioned the engraving. Stolac a hundred years ago was 
the Ottoman Stolac, the Stolac that Croats destroyed during this war – so the 
engraving could easily be read as a Muslim nationalist symbol. The fact that the 
Croat borrowed it, on the other hand, indicates that he did not perceive it as a 
nationalist symbol, but rather a symbol of the Stolac spirit of coexistence and 
ethnic tolerance (see Chapter 12).
The next example is an excerpt from an interview with a family in which 
we were talking about the religious dimension of the war. Here it is the young 
man in the house (who is studying in Mostar) who speaks:
Religion was a cause, but it is the politicians who provided the words. We feel 
the differences, but it is only when the politicians put words to them that they 
become a matter of conflict. Because it is the politicians who control the army, 
they are the ones who decide.
Another example comes from an interview with an old woman:
Džanana: Before [the war], we had good relations with Orthodox and Catho-
lics. It is interesting that after this war, which was so terrible, we have come 
back to this town where Croats have occupied everything. And despite all that 
happened, we still have contacts with our neighbours and we live and work 
together, we are a people who have lived together for a thousand years. Many 
of the politicians are guilty for what happened; they keep repeating that we 
cannot live together. They say that people cannot live together, but in spite of 
that we do.
This image of interethnic relations is perhaps a little romanticised. The woman 
had contact to some old Croat friends, but she also had a very complicated 
relationship with her neighbours, who were Croats from central Bosnia occu-
pying her son’s house. And I often heard her criticising these neighbours. The 
woman’s critical remarks, however, never used ethnicity as a framework, but 
rather the category of not-decent people, which I return to in the next chapter. 
Such ambivalence (both criticising and wanting to tolerate the ethnic Others) 
is not atypical. Rather it is a hallmark of post-war life in Stolac. 
The Muslims of Stolac also talk about how the Croats or Serbs were forced 
by the politicians to participate in the war and in actual acts of violence. Simi-
larly, they often state that violence and discrimination did not occur because 
people in general had gone mad or because ordinary Croats or Serbs are evil. 
People committed immoral acts because they were placed by politicians in situ-
001_316_post-war.indd   126 14/04/08   22:04:37
Denne side er købt på www.ebog.dk og er omfattet af lov om ophavsret. Uanset evt. aftale med Copy-Dan er det ikke tilladt at kopiere eller
indscanne siden til undervisningsbrug eller erhvervsmæssig brug.
	 politika 12
ations beyond their control, in situations without choices. Again ethnic differ-
ence is presented as a positive factor in daily life that had been twisted and ma-
nipulated by the politicians. Ahmet told me about an incident from the Serbian 
occupation of the Stolac area in 1992. Every Serb capable of carrying arms was 
forced into uniform, and anyone failing to turn up at the barracks was picked 
up. He continued:
When the Serbs withdrew from Stolac they were on the hill just behind our 
house, at that time we were communicating with the Croats. We knew that 
the Serbs would withdraw in a couple of days, but just in case we armed our-
selves so that they would not come down and hurt women and children. Then 
my father came and whispered to me and Omer that if we see Goran [a Serb 
friend forced in uniform], we should not shoot at him. But it was war and 
we were afraid of going out of the house, but even so he said that we should 
not shoot at him. Everything happened at night where you cannot see when 
a man is coming with a gun, nonetheless my father said that we should be 
careful not to shoot Goran. This is how my father is, and this is the way he 
taught us to be.
Goran has returned to Stolac. He tills the soil with Ahmet’s father and they are 
still good friends. This is a story of friendship, but it also reveals how people 
distinguish between a man’s real character and what he is forced to do by the 
politicians. 
People’s use of politika and other non-ethnic categories was occasionally a 
source of frustration for me. Sometimes when people were describing a situa-
tion where, for me at least, the guilty party was very apparent, I was the one to 
use ethnic identity as a way of blaming, not my informants. There was the time 
when my landlady said that no Orthodox churches were destroyed during the 
war, but that everything Muslim was. I responded by saying that there are many 
idiots in the world. But I was surprised by her answer, just as I was many times 
before and after. Instead of agreeing she said: “Yes, but it is not everybody. Like 
under the rule of Hitler, not everybody was a Nazi, but the war forces one to do 
things, politicians and the political situation force one.”
The use of politika as counterdiscourse, however, should not be confused 
with actual practice of interaction. There are small islands of inter-ethnic interac-
tion, but the Croats, Muslims and Serbs mostly keep to themselves, and I am not 
sure whether this would change overnight if the political climate were changed. 
This does not mean that people’s construction and use of politika is pretence. 
Instead it should be seen as a part of the (new) world that people creatively try 
to (re)construct around themselves, a world making sense of a senseless past and 
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present, and offering guidelines for future behaviour. It is thus possible to say 
that the use of politika is also political. It is a social vision, an attempt to create a 
picture of a future Stolac rid of the immoral force of politika, a place where the 
Muslims would have the same opportunities and rights as the Croats, and where 
the different ethnic groups could co-exist as they did before the war.
The use of the cultural category politika represents a critique of the ethni-
cisation of the world. But a tension exists when the Muslims state that all poli-
ticians are scheming and power-seeking, but ‘their’ politicians are even worse 
than ‘ours’, and when political parties are seen as in fact representing the men-
tality of the ethnic groups they claim to represent. Then the Muslims of Stolac 
suddenly identify with ‘their’ own political parties. In other cases, they say that 
people have been brainwashed and manipulated by nationalist politicians, but 
that Croats are much easier to manipulate and that ‘they’ are manipulated in 
many more spheres of life than Muslims are: 
Nedžad: In the Bosnian areas SDA loses every time, so that the SDP, SBiH and the 
other [non-nationalist parties] get more and more votes, and SDA fewer and 
fewer. But in the Serb Republic the SDS gets the most votes, and in the Croat 
areas HDZ gets most of the votes […] I am also in favour of those changes 
[against nationalist parties], but they [Croats and Serbs] are not. They think 
that national parties will help them, but if they could understand, they would 
see that the politic of nationalism is losing.
What we have here is a critique of the politicians, and especially the nationalist 
ones who, as I was often told, do not really help ordinary people. However, it 
is also an indirect critique of the ethnic Other. It is an example of how ethnic-
ity is not only resisted by blaming the politicians and referring to the immoral 
state of politika, but also used as a framework for explaining the present lack of 
interaction (because the Croats are not in favour of changes). It is exactly this 
ambivalence that is so characteristic of post-war identification in Stolac.
The results of the general election in November 2000 in Bosnia Herze-
govina provide an example of this ambivalence.Considering the anti-nation-
alistic attitude of my informants, it would be reasonable to assume that the 
majority of the Muslims would vote for the SDP, the only real non-nationalist 
political party in Bosnia Herzegovina. But this was not the case. The question 
then is, how are we to understand the contradiction between attitudes and ac-
tions, between what is said and how people actually behave? Are the Muslims 
of Stolac cunning because they say they want to cooperate, coexist, and get rid 
  One could say that the SBiH is also a non-nationalist party, but in Stolac it joined a coalition 
with the SDA.
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of the nationalists, while at the same time many of them vote for nationalist 
parties? 
First, though some Muslims vote for the SDA (the Bosnian Muslim na-
tionalist party) because they are nationalists, the SDA is itself split: there is a 
division between religious nationalists and secular pragmatists, dating far back 
in Bosnian Muslim politics. It is fair to say that the SDA itself embodies the 
tension between ideals of ethnic coexistence and ethnic separation, which is 
also reflected in many of my informants’ statements, (I return to this issue in 
Chapter 9). 
Second, client-patron relationships are still prominent in local politics in 
many parts of Bosnia (see above, see also Grandits 200). In the elections of 
2000 in Stolac, the two candidates who got by far the greatest number of Mus-
lim votes were Kemal Isaković and Suad Sefo, both nominated by the SDA. 
They were also two important figures in town. Suad Sefo was the manager of 
a big factory with 00 employees before the war and now works at the local 
government offices (opština). He has a good reputation and is a respected man. 
Kemal Isaković is also a person who people approach to ask for favours. He told 
me himself how the system of patronage makes it very hard to be in politics 
because people come to him all day long and expect that he can sort out their 
problems (get a phone line, get more funds for reconstruction, arrange jobs 
etc.). People vote for ideals, but they also vote pragmatically, for a particular 
person whom they respect and can ask for favours. In any case, neither Kemal 
Isaković nor Suad Sefo are nationalists – they are more like local patriots.
Third, it is my impression that many of the young Muslims in Stolac did 
not vote: they did not care about politics or often did not have any knowledge 
about it. For them politicians were all the same. Still others do not dare vote for 
the non-nationalist SDP because they fear what would happen if they voted for 
a non-nationalist political party and the other ethnic groups did not. This is an 
extract from an interview with a young man. I had asked him about what he 
thinks of politicians:
They are all the same, all corrupt. There was a test where all the politicians’ 
toilets were inspected, and all the samples showed trace of cocaine or heroin. 
Imagine! It is not normal; it is crazy, all the politicians are using drugs. They 
are all corrupt, when donations come from abroad; they end in the politicians’ 
pockets. 
  Thanks to Xavier Bougarel, who made me aware of this point.
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TK: What about the SDP?
Young man: No it is not my party, maybe SDA. To be honest I do not care to vote, 
but I have to vote to counterbalance the Croatian parties.
TK: How many political parties exist?
Young man: There are HDZ, SDA … 
He stops. I do not think he is aware of more parties, except the SDP. He simply 
does not care. Indifference towards politics is not restricted to the young. Meet-
ing Džanana on her way back from the polling station at the general election, I 
asked her whom she had voted for:
I don’t know, there were so many parties [on the registration list], but one has 
to vote, for things to get better, they say … If only we have peace so things 
can be better.
I am not inferring that all the politically conscious people vote for the SDP and 
the rest for the SDA. Rather my conclusion is that many Muslims have a com-
plex relationship to the nationalist programmes. Although, in the ballot-box 
people can only place one mark, in their daily life they can place many – and 
these may well be contradictory. This tension between nationalism and every-
day identification I shall analyse in the chapters to come.
Politika as externalisation of the ungraspable
Sometimes the use of politika as an explanatory device extends beyond the sim-
ple rational use I have described so far, and is established as an almost inde-
pendent force or agency operating in the world. It is used to explain, or more 
correctly to put aside events and feelings that are too radically other to be com-
prehended. In such cases, politika is not necessarily somebody doing some-
thing. It is rather a free-floating autonomous power by reference to which the 
unmaking of the world is given a conceptual place. This force is used to explain 
the unexplainable or grasp the ungraspable. People have experiences – and here 
I am referring to both war traumas and present social and personal problems 
– that cannot find relief or expression through ordinary language. There are no 
public symbols or representations that could absorb or give meaning to them. 
Thus people resort to existing cultural and moral categorisations, which they 
mould to function as some kind of representation of the disintegrated and un-
made world. Politika is such a moral category used to exorcise the madness 
from everyday life.
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Once when I was driving through the southern part of town with Nihad, 
we were looking at some of the ruined houses. He told me how the Croats had 
blown up Muslim houses following the expulsion of the Muslims. He then said:
There were good houses here before. Now they are destroyed. Look! They all 
need new roofs. Before – at least in the area where I live – Croats, Serbs and 
Muslims were living together. We all lived together. I had good friends who 
were Muslims, Serbs and Croats. Everybody was having a nice life … it is 
politika!
For my informants it was incomprehensible that Croats, Serbs and Muslims 
could be friends at one moment and at the next moment become enemies fight-
ing each another. 
Here is an excerpt from an interview with an elderly man, which illus-
trates how politika is used to absorb the madness of the war: 
TK: Did you imagine that war would come?
Osman: No, we could not imagine that. I do not have a lot of schooling, I only 
have my primary school, but I consider myself to be a clever man. But I never 
could imagine that such dreadful things should happen. I never thought that 
war would come. Before the war we never fought or quarrelled. And then 
suddenly we were expelled (proteran). Nobody really knows what happened, 
we [Muslims] experienced it our way; maybe the Muslims in Bosnia [central 
Bosnia Herzegovina] said that they [Croats] also had to go to their people 
[that is, that they were expelled themselves]. Politika!
An old woman I visited a lot during my fieldwork often told me about the war, 
or rather tried to tell me about the war, but it was as if she never succeeded in 
creating a story that could explain or give meaning to all the losses she had 
experienced. This is a short extract from my notebook:
She is talking about life during the war, and it is obvious that it is sad, tears 
are running down her cheeks, and her speech is halting. The story doesn’t 
have a clear line or structure; if there is one it is: we were expelled, we came 
to Jablanica to the refugee camp, we stayed there, we did not know what had 
happened to our men, fathers or sons, there were continuous bombardments, 
we had only a little food, it was hard, and then we returned. The war is de-
scribed very personally, in total contrast to a political science analysis. Politika 
is continually evoked to account for this unexplainable element.
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In this excerpt I was trying to discover the narrative structure in the woman’s ut-
terances. Many other war stories exhibit a similar discontinuity of events, mem-
ories and feelings. Politika is a way to link all these fragments, to give them some 
kind of framework and meaning. Abrupt flashes of memory are linked together 
and integrated, not by an overarching and coherent narrative, but by an abstract 
force creating havoc and escaping the understanding of ordinary people. 
Along these lines it is possible to synthesise a structure representative of 
many of the stories I heard in Stolac, a structure with politika at its core: “We 
were living happily together, then came this insane war, it could be so nice here, 
but – politika!”
Politika as a way of analysing
I have some hesitations about analysing my informants’ use of the category 
politika. To put it simply, I take political science analyses of the war as valid 
academic work, but when ordinary inhabitants of Stolac use political reasoning 
as a frame of reference, I see it as either part of a counterdiscourse or as a nar-
rative strategy. Similarly, the Croatian ethnologist Maja Povrzanović (2000) has 
pointed to how Croatian ethnologists from Zagreb have been treated as inform-
ants rather than colleagues by visiting scholars from the West, despite the fact 
that this group of Croatian scientists had produced substantial anthropological 
research in relation to the experience of war and exile. In this last section, I shall 
offer examples of how politika was used not primarily as counterdiscourse or 
a way to externalise the ungraspable, but as a valid political commentary and 
way of analysing events.
With regard to the outbreak of the war, people believe that responsibil-
ity lies with the politics pursued in former Yugoslavia as well as the various 
nationalist leaders, and they criticise the international community’s policies of 
non-interference. They see Europe and the United States as liberators and as 
guarantors of the present peace in Bosnia Herzegovina. At the same time, they 
believe that the shifting political strategies of Europe and the West in general 
played a part in igniting the war. Europe and the West are sometimes depicted 
as having acted like cynical passive spectators for far too long: if only they had 
intervened earlier thousands of lives could have been saved. People sometimes 
have a feeling of having been a part of an experiment, as they call it, just small 
and unimportant pieces of a great jigsaw puzzle. The war was called down upon 
them, they feel, by forces far outside their reach, and some of these forces are 
international politics and alliances, in which Germany supports Croatia, France 
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and Russia support Serbia, and no-one really supports the Bosnian Muslims. 
One elderly woman put this view very clearly:
We have these three nations in Bosnia and then somebody from outside [out-
side former Yugoslavia] comes and bites us and stirs up strife.
Another example of Bosnian political analysis comes from an interview with 
Fahrudin, in which he gave a complex account of the political forces involved 
in the recent conflict:
The history of this war should not be sought here in Bosnia Herzegovina. 
The war was brought from the West. Let me try to explain it to you. When 
I was hospitalised in Sarajevo and when I worked as a police officer [during 
the war], I ate beans two years older than my father. They were produced in 
1934 in the United States. And we paid the United States for these beans, and 
we paid for the uniforms we had. And the biscuits we ate during the war were 
leftovers from the Vietnam War. This project opremi i obuči [literally: teach 
how to use] is a project where all the weapons, Kalasnikov and so on, we used 
during the war, are to be destroyed. And instead we get their weapons, M1’s. 
And these M1’s are very bad weapons. […]
They take something from you in order to give you something else and 
they get paid for it. The Americans have emptied their warehouses, sold arms 
to the Bosnian people, and now their military industry can get started again. 
That’s why I say that the war was brought upon us. And here there were peo-
ple ready to take up arms and start a war. The vision of a greater Serbia and 
greater Croatia existed of course beforehand in the heads of some Serbs and 
Croats. But I cannot understand why, if we could live peacefully for fifty years, 
we couldn’t continue. If the EU had been against the war in Bosnia Herze-
govina and Kosovo they could have stopped it earlier. They could have solved 
the problems if they wanted to… And the Americans, they also wanted to get 
closer to Russia. Before [the war] United States had offered 24 billion dollars 
to Tito, the size of all the national debt of Yugoslavia. In return they wanted 
an island in the Adriatic Sea, Vis, which they wanted to be their military base. 
But Tito didn’t want that island to be a military base, and with this war the 
Americans obtained that island and in that way got the money from their 
humanitarian aid back.
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Also the Romanov dynasty [the Russians] wanted access to one of the 
three warm oceans: the Black Sea, the Indian Ocean or the Adriatic Ocean. 
They have problems with the Turks, they have no real chance of getting to 
the Indian Ocean, so they tried to get through Serbia to the Adriatic Ocean. 
But the Americans were here to hinder it. They arrived first and made a base 
here in Yugoslavia. The greatest wish of America is to get to the Balkans and 
they did.
When it comes to political explanations focusing on the internalYugoslav po-
litical scene, it is primarily the former Serbian leader Slobodan Milošović and 
the former Croatian president Franjo Tuđman people blame for the war (al-
though sometimes the former Bosnian president Alija Izetbegovic is also made 
responsible). People claim that these ‘enemies’ were actually co-operating in an 
identical game for power using the tool of nationalism. This is an example from 
a conversation I had with Nihad:
Nihad: In 1991, we could hear Dubrovnik being bombed and towards the end of 
1991, Serbian military trucks drove through Stolac. And in September 1991 the 
Serbs arrived and made a military camp here in Stolac. But we did not think 
there would be war [he laughs a little]. In April 1992 the Serbs occupied Stolac, 
and they were not met with any resistance. They just came and said, now 
Stolac is occupied. The night before their arrival all the Croats had fled, only 
Muslims were left. The Croats then came back on June 1th and HVO [the 
army of the Bosnian Croats] shot a little and then the Serbs withdrew without 
fight. I think there was a deal between Tuđman and Milošović. Because there 
were no fights. Nothing. The HVO just came and almost the same day the 
Serbs were out of town.
TK: But wasn’t it often the Serbs’ tactic to position themselves on the hillcrests and 
then bomb a city?
Nihad: Yes, but the frontlines between the Serbs and the Croats during the war ran 
exactly like the borders of the old NDH state [The fascist Croat puppet state 
during the Second World War].
I have shown how politika, besides being related to ‘real-politik’, is also a cultural 
category of immoral actions and persons sharply in contrast to the values of or-
dinary people’s everyday life. It is used as a means of explaining and criticising 
without resorting to ethnic identity. Politika is furthermore constructed as an 
autonomous force accounting for ungraspable aspects of the unmade world.
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Chapter  
Pošteni ljudi – decency rather than ethnicity
On the moral scale adhered to by the Muslims of Stolac, politika is opposed to 
the category pošteni ljudi. Whereas politika alludes to actions and persons exist-
ing in a separate and rather abstract sphere, the kinds of actions and persons 
referred to by pošteni ljudi are embedded in local and face-to-face relations. 
Pošteni ljudi means something like decent, honest and straightforward people. 
To behave decently is to be able to provide for oneself and one’s family, to be 
honest and hard-working, to be self-sacrificing, to be considerate toward other 
people and to pay visits to them, and also to remain the same no matter what 
pressures or temptations one is exposed to. It refers to an inner substance or 
character, and sometimes also to religious devotion; implying that if one is a 
true believer one is also a decent human being. As one woman put it, “I only 
believe in God and decent people; money – one day you have some, the next 
day you have nothing.” This utterance came as she talked about how her daugh-
ter and son-in-law were to come to visit her from Germany but she did not 
even have a bed or mattress on which they could sleep. She and her husband 
themselves slept on a bed without a mattress. Before the war, her house had 
been fully equipped. What the woman meant, in other words, was that war can 
strip people of their material possessions, but not of their decency. Honesty and 
hard labour are other central values attached to decency. Mensur, one of my key 
informants, once told me this little story:
During and just after the war there were several abandoned Croat houses, 
which were being robbed by Muslims. I said to my father: ‘Shouldn’t I go 
and take something, there are TV’s and everything, there’s furniture, and they 
have robbed us of everything,’ but my father said no. I then said: ‘Everybody 
else is doing it, why can’t I, think of what they have done to us.’ But my father 
said ‘No!’ And today I am glad he said that, now we have a clear conscience. 
We can hold our heads up high.
With pošteni ljudi, as with politika, the Muslims of Stolac have an important 
tool that can be used to evaluate behaviour without resorting to ethnic catego-
ries. Insisting, therefore, on evaluating behaviour by reference to decency and 
not ethnicity forms an important part of the Muslims’ everyday counterdis-
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course. Just as with politika, though, it is not always clear to what extent people 
succeed in resisting the ethnicisation of their world. The use of the category 
pošteni ljudi sometimes becomes characteristic not of a person, but of an ethnic 
category, as expressed in statements like: We (Muslims) are decent people, they 
(Croats/Serbs) are not (See also Kolind 200).
Decency and moral disapproval 
The category of decency and the values attached to it can be used as a way 
of criticising certain people and certain types of actions in a way that resists 
‘ethnicifying’ social relations. One day Nihad, Anvere and I were talking about 
Villa Ragusa, a house in a beautiful setting by the river, which before the war 
had been the local dom culture (House of Culture) where young people en-
joyed themselves on Saturday nights and where musical performances were 
held. During the war, a Croat family called Raguz rented the house very cheaply 
under some rather unclear circumstances and turned it in to a fashionable res-
taurant serving rich Croats and international personnel visiting Stolac. What 
was more, the Raguz family is extremely influential, and they are said to have 
played a role in the destruction and looting of Stolac, as well as the deporta-
tion of its Muslim population. So the restaurant is perceived as a symbol of the 
destruction of the town, the humiliation of the Muslims, and the enrichment of 
local Croat politicians. As Nihad explained: 
I knew Martin Raguz1 when he didn’t even have enough money to buy ciga-
rettes, and a friend of mine has been in his flat in Sarajevo. It was stuffed with 
genuine paintings, and his daughter plays tennis. But in fact he comes from a 
village, they were not poor, but certainly not rich. The only reason why they 
have become rich is criminality and corruption, because the wealth they have 
… cannot have been obtained by decent work, because you do not become 
rich by that. You cannot become rich by working with your hands. You can 
live well, sure. We have lived well. We have always had food on the table, in 
the summer [before the war] we could go to the seaside, I was able to build 
my own house, but we have not been rich. Even if I had worked twenty-four 
hours a day we would not have been rich. You do not get rich by decent and 
1  Martin Raguz, one of the leaders of the HDZ and one of the most prominent Croat politi-
cians in Bosnia Herzegovina. He was briefly appointed Prime Minister of Bosnia Herzegovina 
between October 2000 and February 2001, and then, on 3 March 2001 the ‘coordinator’ of the 
self-proclaimed ‘Croat self-government’ (see Grandits 200).
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honest labour. If I had been rich, I would have had someone to build my 
house for me. It took me seven years to build my house.
By referring to decency and, implicitly, to the category of pošteni ljudi, Nihad 
was condemning the owners of Villa Ragusa. But everything they represented 
and all the actions they have been involved in were not explained with refer-
ence to an intrinsic Croat mentality but to their personal indecency, in sharp 
contrast to Nihad’s own work ethic. 
Another example comes from an interview with a Muslim couple whose 
flat was occupied by Croats. They lived in very straitened circumstances in a 
small and rather miserable rented house. They had a piece of land outside the 
town which they cultivated by hand. Before the war they had a tractor and a 
rotary cultivator, today they are gone.
Husband: The other day I saw my tractor in my neighbour’s field. I didn’t say any-
thing. Puuuh! But it is not normal, it is not normal to go into another man’s 
home and just take his things…You can’t be normal.
Even though the man who had stolen the tractor was a Croat, the theft is not 
condemned with reference to ethnicity. His action is instead considered anom-
alous.
Džanana 
Džanana was an old woman with a beautiful wrinkled face. She lived with her 
daughter who was hard of hearing. They returned to Stolac in July 2000. Their 
house had been partly rebuilt by the Danish Refugee Council after having been 
burned down by Croats in 199. It consisted of two sparsely furnished small 
rooms, a toilet and a kitchen. They lived on their pensions, which were always 
delayed by several months and amounted to KM300 per month (Konvertibilna 
Marka, Bosnian convertible mark, €1 is approximately KM1.95), which also had 
to cover expenses like transportation and medicine for the daughter’s cancer. 
They grew some vegetables in what used to be the flowerbeds in the walled 
garden around the house. Džanana was friendly, but also very sad. She often 
told me about her wartime experiences: the violent expulsion when she was 
only allowed to bring one plastic bag of clothes, her exhausting flight through 
the mountains to rejoin her daughter, her seven years in a refugee camp, her 
tremendous yearning for her son and grandchildren who lived in Denmark 
and who had nothing to return to, how everybody lived peacefully and was 
well off before the war, and the miserable situation in Stolac, where she had 
had to start all over. It was clearly hard for her to comprehend the events of the 
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last eight years. She often heaved a deep sigh and wiped away her tears with 
her dishtowel, especially when she was talking about her grandchildren; she 
repeatedly showed me the two pictures she had of them while kissing their im-
ages. For her, decency was a very central value, and both the war and post-war 
Stolac were characterised by the total absence of decency. In her accounts of her 
experiences, she often clung to and repeated her few experiences of decency: 
the recurrent story about Camilla, a worker in the refugee camp who was ‘so 
nice’, the ‘Danish people’ who were helping her son, and the visits of neighbours 
when she returned to Stolac. She never condemned the Croats as a group, not 
even when she was talking about the people who lived next door in her son’s 
house. The blame was always on individuals who behaved badly: people with 
hearts of stone, as she expressed it. The following excerpts from the interviews 
I did with her show some of her moral standards.
TK: What was the relationship between the Croats and the Muslims like?
Džanana: It was beautiful. Everybody lived together having a good relationship to 
each other. We helped each other. I had a neighbour whose name is Marko 
[a Serb], and his wife was called Gordana, further down the road I had a 
neighbour called Boris [a Croat]. When they expelled us, I gave the keys to 
my house to this Boris, saying: ‘Just try to save my son’s house,’ he then re-
plied that he didn’t dare, ‘I do not dare.’ That’s how it is. When I returned to 
Stolac for the first time after the war, everything was burned to the ground. 
What a sight. You can see it in this picture, before there was a huge door at 
the entrance.
When they came and told us to leave I just took a bag, and what can you put 
in a bag. I thought that this war would be like the wars before; you leave for a 
little while and then return to your house. But we were gone for seven or eight 
years, it was not easy. And we lived in two square metres, Mala [her daughter] 
and I. Nearly eight years. We lay on the floor like sardines in a tin box, no 
matter who was next to us. We suffered a lot. I didn’t at all expect to survive, 
because it was a very tough life. But we lived.
[During the war] I didn’t know anything about my children. Mala and 
my son’s wife were in Čapljina along with the grandchildren. Mirsad [her son] 
was in prison camp.
TK:  How many months?
Džanana: Six or seven months. I don’t know precisely. It was very difficult. You 
think a lot, and sometimes I feel that it is only by luck that I didn’t lose my 
reason.
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TK: Where did Mirsad go after the prison camp?
Džanana: He didn’t weigh much, and those who lost a lot of weight in the prison 
camps, they were sent abroad. And he chose Denmark. And he is satisfied. 
He says they are really decent people. They are decent people, they welcomed 
us. They sent me a letter of guarantee [some kind of residence permit], so we 
could go to Denmark as well, but I didn’t want to go. I said to Mala that she 
could leave. I just thought that I would return to my house as quickly as pos-
sible. I think that was nice of those people, who received the Bosnians well, 
and they gave them an opportunity to live in a proper manner. But I never 
wanted to go to Denmark. And when I didn’t, my daughter wouldn’t either. 
That’s how it is.
TK: And then slowly the Muslims began to return.
Džanana: They [the Croats] don’t understand that you should not take another 
person’s property. This [house] is mine; I have paid for it with my blood. Isn’t 
that so? My husband worked for forty-one years, forty-one years! And now 
once again we have been reduced to beggars. One came with a chair [she 
refers to the help she and her daughter received when they returned to their 
empty house], the other with a table, the third brought some curtains, and 
sometimes I just wanted to cry. I just remember myself and my life and every-
thing I had, but anyway. You forget everything when you survive.
Last night I said to someone that things are not going the way they are 
supposed to. You have to understand that we returned to an empty house and 
no one came and asked if we had what we needed [she is thinking of politi-
cians and other potential patrons]. They only come and knock at your door 
when you have to pay for electricity, water and other things. And that is not 
humane. I didn’t leave because I wanted to, but they [the politicians] do not 
understand. I do not like that. It is very important to offer one’s help, such 
things I will keep in my heart as long as I live. I will not forget that. You have 
to do good things where you can, that’s how it is, my son.
TK: What was the standard of living like before?
Džanana: The standard of living was good, everyone who wanted to work, they 
worked. Everyone had the opportunity to live well. My husband was a secre-
tary in the town government, and he was also a judge. But when he returned 
from work he also worked in our little garden, and he did it so we could have 
our own produce, so that we didn’t have to buy it at the marketplace. And then 
my son started to work and his wife worked also. My daughter Mala also had 
a job. And I repeat, everyone who wanted to work, they lived well. It was only 
the lazy who didn’t want to work.
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TK: And you had enough money?
Džanana: Yes, we invested a lot in the house. And now I judge myself; why should 
we have so much. Upstairs we had two rooms and the same downstairs. Now 
I’m having a hard time, it ought to be the best time and the children should be 
with me, so that I wouldn’t miss them. Now things are difficult, they should 
be here helping me […].
There are people who have hearts of stone, who do not have feelings. I 
tell you it like it is. And I will tell my children not to forget the good things 
people have done towards them. And those who did the evil things, they have 
done them towards themselves. The evil things will one day strike back at 
them […].
When we returned to Stolac for the first time to visit our house, the 
people who were living in the house [Croat refugees from central Bosnia oc-
cupying her house] said that we could not enter the courtyard. Then I said: ’It 
is mine not yours, my destiny is the same as yours, but your destiny is not the 
same as mine, because I was a refugee, but I did not live in another person’s 
house.’ I demanded of this Franjo that he should give me a room, but he did 
not want to hear of such a thing. There are five rooms, but we could not have a 
single one … that’s how it is … I think that the children learn from the parents 
and behave the way the parents do. When my daughter-in-law entered our 
house, she said: ’Look, there is our lamp,’ then Maja [the Croat], who was then 
living in the house, said: “No it is our lamp”, then my daughter-in-law said: 
‘Yes, it is yours now, but it was ours.’
Džanana sometimes complained about the children of the family living in 
her son’s house. Džanana’s house and her son’s house are both located close 
to one another inside a walled courtyard with only one gated entrance. To-
day Džanana has got her house back, but her son’s house is still occupied by 
the same Croats. Džanana says that these children always slam the door to the 
courtyard and that they never greet her, but then again, she said, neither do the 
parents. Furthermore, they will not agree to lock the gate at night, even though, 
according to Džanana, they know, that she and her daughter are two elderly 
women living alone. Finally, Džanana relates that they have not once offered to 
help her. Nevertheless, Džanana, as the excerpts from the interviews show, does 
not relate this behaviour to her neighbours’ ethnicity, only to a lack of morality 
and decency.
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When we were in the refugee camp we received a lot of help from Denmark. 
We didn’t get new clothes, but it helped anyway. You just washed them [the 
used clothes] and wore them. Sometimes I would say that maybe someone 
died in those clothes, and now we are wearing them. But we accepted the help, 
because we did not have anything. 
When we returned [to Stolac] we were living in darkness, so I went to 
the power station [the power station is in Croat hands, and the withholding 
of a power supply is used as a way of harassing the Muslim population, as it 
is with telephony] and asked if we could get electricity, and they said that it 
could take close to two years. 
TK: For electricity?
Džanana: Yes. So I said it is not necessary to wait that long, you can see there is 
light in the street lamps. Then came Mirsad [her son], and he probably knew 
some of them, so they came and we got electricity. And because of that I feel 
that I lost some of my humanity. Whereas I would have helped them straight-
away. I could not behave in that way. I couldn’t. But that’s the way it is, what 
can you do? [She feels degraded having to ask for such a standard thing as 
electricity].
And then he [the electrician] laughed at me and Mala because we moved 
into a house that was so damp. He said that one should not move into a house 
the first year. But I wanted it very eagerly, to move into my own house, no 
matter how it was. We paid with our lives, it is not easy to move into such a 
morass. The water installation is very bad [in general she felt that the house 
was very unhealthy to live in]. He said that you should give the house to your 
enemy so he can live there the first year. Then I said: ‘If I don’t want to move 
into such a house, neither should my enemy. I don’t want to burden anyone’ 
[…].
I then asked if they [the Danish Refugee Council] could also rebuild 
a room upstairs. But they wouldn’t because we only live two persons in the 
house. But they said, in order to get more rooms, we should just pretend that 
more people lived in the house. But I don’t want to do anything dishonest. I 
just want what I am entitled to, I don’t want anyone to come afterwards and 
hit me in the head. That’s how it is, my son. My father used to say: ‘You should 
be tired of hard work, but not of hunger’ [umorio se od rada a ne od gladi]. You 
have to work in order not to fear the future […].
TK: What was your father’s occupation?
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Džanana: He repaired pots. Before you did not have plates and ordinary pots [of 
metal], you used something very different [stonewarepottery], and when it 
broke, he repaired it. When you make bosnaski lonac [traditional Bosnian 
dish] you make it in a big pot and then cover it with paper, so the aroma won’t 
get out, and you simmer it over a low flame, it is marvellous. But later things 
changed. The times are changing. If only you could know how beautiful Stolac 
was. Now only the remnants are left … The children have to take good care 
of each other, no matter who they are. It has to be as it was before. Madness 
came into people and told them that they cannot live together, how can it be 
true? We can. If we were able to live together before, why can’t we live together 
again? It was politika that did it all. They were only clinging to their office, and 
that is ugly. Ugly […].
TK: I have seen a lot of Šahovnica [the Croatian chessboard coat of arms, an im-
portant nationalist symbol], did you have these before in Stolac?
Džanana: Before the war there were none, but it doesn’t matter that they are hang-
ing there. Maybe some of their [the Croats’] dreams come true with that flag. 
What do I know? The most important is that we have peace. It doesn’t matter 
they are hanging there, but it is not nice. 
TK: What do you think about the future? Will Serbs, Croats and Muslims be able 
to live together?
Džanana: It has to be that way. In my opinion it has to be as it was before, for us to 
live well together and forget all the troubles one has lived through. But I do 
not know if everybody thinks that way. But I wish it could be that way, that it 
could be as before.
I was often surprised that Džanana, who had suffered (and still suffered) so 
much, hardly ever condemned people or their actions by reference to ethnic-
ity. For Džanana the most important things in life were to behave decently, to 
work hard, respect other people, and live with her family. When we discussed 
the neighbours who had behaved badly (see above), I had to ask her about their 
ethnic identity, and when she answered, she said only: “They come from some-
where in central Bosnia”. On other occasions she would refer to their town of 
origin. I could then infer that they were Croats. Naturally, she herself knew they 
were Croats, but this knowledge was of no use to her in explaining their acts, 
instead she made allusions to proper behaviour and decency. Similarly, when 
she talked about the lack of concern shown by the people at the power station 
in Stolac – all of whom are Croats – her reproaches were directed at the inhu-
manity of these people, not their ethnicity. Finally, whenever Džanana explic-
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itly commented on the potential for future coexistence she expressed wishes 
for a future together with Serbs and Croats and she talked about the need to 
forget the past.
People reveal their true nature during hard times
During the war, many people had been disappointed. I heard many stories of 
how friends and neighbours, especially those of other ethnic backgrounds, had 
suddenly let people down, did not help when needed – neither during nor af-
ter the war. They failed to share surplus goods, and they did not even come to 
visit. Though such stories were common, former friends or neighbours were 
seldom criticised explicitly. Instead, the situation was outlined, leaving moral 
judgement to the listener. This aspect of moral judgement very often referred 
to values associated with the category pošteni ljudi and the saying that people 
reveal their true nature during hard times. Armin’s mother originates from a 
mahala (neighbourhood) where many Croats had settled well before the war 
and where her prvi komšija (first neighbour) had been a Croat:
Armin: We had a good relationship with their children. My wife went to secondary 
school with their daughter, and we were kumovi [witnesses] at their wedding. 
We spent a lot of time together. They came here and we visited them. We were 
together at least every second or third week, but today we do not see each 
other. We haven’t heard from them since the war. I know they are rich, they 
have an apartment in Jablanica, and they drive a BMW. But we haven’t heard 
from them. I am not going to contact them and, you know – it would be a lit-
tle like apologising – to ask if we are going to see each other again. But if they 
come to our place, they will be welcome; they will get everything they need. 
But they never called us or tried to help us even though they are rich. 
It was not only Croats who were judged with reference to the moral category 
pošteni ljudi. Nihad only spoke about the time he was interned in the prison 
camp very rarely. One time, though, he told about his fellow Muslim prison-
ers:
And the same is true about life in the camp. Here people also revealed their 
true essence. We were in that big hangar, and we did not get any food, and al-
most no water. And there were some who did not share what they had, if they 
had more than others, and some made a kind of territory of their own in the 
  Čovjek upozna svoje prijatelje u nevolji: You get to know your friends in misfortune.
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hangar. Once I gave a little piece of bread to an old man who was sick. I don’t 
think he has forgotten that. Then I ate nothing. But there were several who 
behaved egoistically. It is in such situations that people’s true essence shows.
Decency and war-related behaviour
The moral universe surrounding the category pošteni ljudi has direct bearing on 
the judgement of war-related actions. Stolac Muslims accept that people were 
forced into uniform, that soldiers shot at each other, in short, that there was an 
immense pressure on everybody. Pošteni ljudi is used to categorise the people 
who behaved decently in such a situation. The day the male Muslim population 
was expelled from Stolac, some of the men escaped and others hid in the hills. 
For those who hid it was terrible to watch helplessly as fathers and husbands 
were taken away, their children and grandchildren calling out desperately. It 
was equally unpleasant in the weeks afterwards to live in a state of uncertainty, 
knowing that the Croats could come back at any time. Amer was one of those 
who hid himself. One day when Croat soldiers returned to his house, he knew 
he had to give himself up, as much as anything for the sake of his family:
In front of the house was a Croat whom I did not know, he was from some-
where in [central] Bosnia. He made a lot of noise and wanted to shoot us. 
But there was another one with him, one of my former colleagues, whom I 
had helped to build his house. And when I recognised him, I knew he was 
not going to hurt me. So I walked out of the house and talked to him. Then 
we smoked a cigarette together, and he said to me: ‘Amer, nothing is going to 
happen to you or to your family, you just have to think carefully’ [not to do 
anything rash]. Nobody touched me.
Amer stressed the fact that his former colleague ‘did not touch him’, and that 
they were smoking a cigarette together: implying that this man had no choice, 
and did not enjoy the situation either. In an interview with a couple in their 
sixties, the husband had a related story to tell.
Osman: When I was in prison camp, if one of the Croats had a chance to hand me 
a piece of bread, he would do it, but I also knew that someone was watching 
him, and that if he helped me it would get him in trouble. That is how the dev-
ilish politic was. You can’t say that all the Croats are the same, not at all. There 
were some decent Croats, whom I knew from before the war, and when I went 
to work [outside the hangar] they would help me. And even if they could not 
give me anything to eat, then just a kind word would be enough, after such a 
word I would be in a better mood when I came back to the hangar. If every-
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body had been the same [if all the Croats had been evil] nobody would have 
survived the camp. If you kill innocent people what will your God say? There 
is always somebody who thinks in that way, even if he has the chance to beat 
or hit someone he will not do it.
This insight into the political situation and the acceptance of the fact that some 
of the Croats could not have behaved otherwise, is the reason that the Muslims 
do not necessarily have problems interacting with Serbs or Croats whom they 
know fought in the war. But there is a very sharp dividing line: people can in no 
way accept or be together with those they know committed war crimes. Gener-
ally the Muslims feel that all war criminals should be convicted, no matter who 
they are. As a mother said while her son was listening: “Anybody who has com-
mitted war crimes should go to The Hague, even if it were my own son.”
Explicit use of decency
Using the category pošteni ljudi to go beyond ethnic thinking is often done im-
plicitly. Sometimes, however, it is also done explicitly. An elderly couple – the 
husband is Serb, the wife is Croat – stated this critique of ethnic thinking very 
unambiguously (showing that the counterdiscourse in not reserved for the 
Muslims only). 
Marko: My oldest son married a Croat girl and the youngest a Muslim girl.
Olga: Even though they are not Serbs those two daughters-in-law are the best in 
the world. First of all you have to be a decent person, next comes if you are 
Croat, Muslim or Serb. If you have to pray to your God, you can do it in the 
house, you don’t have to go to church. The most important is that people are 
decent. All the people I knew before I talk to now, if they are decent people 
(pošteni ljudi). I never had anything to do with the evil people. So if there was 
someone who said that I couldn’t talk to the good people no matter if they are 
Serbs, Croats or Muslims, I would feel like I was dead.
In the interview from above, where Osman discussed the decent behaviour of 
some of the Croatian warders in the prison camp, the subject of decency came 
up again:
Mila: Ordinary people [narod ko narod] are not guilty for what happened, but they 
are the sufferers. The war was not good for anybody.
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Osman: The decent people, they were not ready for what happened. I never thought 
I would leave my home [ognjište: the home fires]. Before the war we lived well 
together with both Serbs and Croats. We were like sisters and brothers. And 
suddenly, as they say, the devil came between us, and people started to quar-
rel. We left Stolac without a fight. I don’t know how it happened other places, 
but here in Stolac we were just expelled [proteran]. We lived well before the 
war, but I am not embarrassed by what I did [that is, living peaceably with the 
Serbs and Croats].
Decency and the legitimisation of interethnic interaction
The categorisation of actions and persons with reference to decency and non-
decency instead of ethnicity can also function as an important tool in facilitating 
interaction with people of different ethnic backgrounds. The category pošteni 
ljudi can go beyond ethnicity, not suppressing it but rendering it less important. 
An obvious case is the relationship with former friends and neighbours of dif-
ferent ethnic backgrounds. As in many other places, rumours and gossip are 
very important sources of information in Stolac. People generally know where 
their neighbours were during the war, whether they have relatives abroad and 
where, what their children do for a living, who their children’s spouses are, and 
all kinds of other information conducive to good relations. Even so, people do 
not know everything, especially when it comes to Serbs who spent the war in 
the Serb Republic or in Serbia, or Croats who remained in Stolac during the 
cleansing and looting of the city. Categorising those people as decent removes 
the uncertainties that always hangs over what they did during the war, where 
their sympathy lay then and now – in short whether one can trust them again 
as one did before (see also Jansen 200). Often when Stolac Muslims are talk-
ing about renewed interaction with friends and neighbours of different ethnic 
background, they unequivocally stress that these people are pošteni ljudi. One 
can say that the category of decency fills in the hole of insecurity that has been 
left behind by the lack of social knowledge. In some cases, in a kind of reverse 
logic, the Muslims of Stolac state that the very fact that people returned shows 
that they did nothing wrong during the war. 
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Munta: There is this woman, her name is Anita [a Croat]. She used to deliver milk 
to us before the war. She came and asked how we were doing, she said she had 
heard that we had returned and she just wanted to ask how we were. All the 
decent people they came – when we moved back – and asked how we were…
We never before noticed who these people are; whether they are Serbs, Croats 
or Muslims, the most important is to be a decent person. To have character. 
Nothing else. But somebody did not like it [that the different ethnic groups 
lived together]. Even today people are shouting that we must be divided, that 
we can’t live together. But I can live together with everybody. As long as the 
situation is just. Because we are used to it [living together]. For instance some 
Serbian neighbours returned; and they at once ran to us and asked how we 
were doing. The kids were always together, I don’t know…
Emir, one of my key informants, used the values attached to the category pošteni 
ljudi in this way to legitimise renewed interaction with former friends:
The Croats have a lot of saints, nearly one for every day. Every family has 
approximately three patron saints, which they celebrate, for instance St. Nico-
las, St. Johanna. And when they celebrated them, we used to bake cakes and 
bring them along for visit. The Serbs did this as well. We have some good 
friends in Berković [in the Serb Republic]. They celebrated their patron saint 
recently, then my mother baked cakes and my brother and I went there and 
visited them, it was the first time we had seen them since the war broke out. 
When they saw us they started crying. And they then came a week later and 
visited us, and celebrated that we had moved back in our own house, and 
they brought presents. They are some very decent people. We own some land 
together. They took care of it while we were expelled from Stolac. And during 
the war in 1992, when you couldn’t buy anything, nothing, not even potatoes, 
this man came with a sack of potatoes, he came in full uniform. They are 
decent people. Our friendship goes way back. My grandfather had a good 
friendship with their grandfather … The reason why we are able to have such 
a good relationship is that I know they did not do anything during the war.
As the quotation show, it was important for Emir to legitimise his family’s 
friendship to the Serbs by labelling them decent. After the war, ethnicity con-
tinued to pervade everything, including friendships and love relationships. 
Cross-ethnic relations are no longer unproblematic, and must be clarified each 
time in a way that is not necessary when Muslims interact among themselves. 
Against this background, the category pošteni ljudi helps resume and legitimise 
these a priori tense relationships.
001_316_post-war.indd   147 14/04/08   22:04:42
Denne side er købt på www.ebog.dk og er omfattet af lov om ophavsret. Uanset evt. aftale med Copy-Dan er det ikke tilladt at kopiere eller
indscanne siden til undervisningsbrug eller erhvervsmæssig brug.
14	 post-war identification
Decency and Muslim identity
I have shown how values attached to the categories pošteni ljudi and poliitka 
are used as a way of resisting the ethnicisation of the social landscape. In using 
these categories, people try to dissociate ethnic identity from moral character. 
However, this dissociation can never be absolute. Ethnic categories also help 
the Muslims of Stolac to make sense of the unmade world by reshaping some 
kind of coherent identity as Muslims. This is a tension people struggle with in 
their everyday life. And sometimes pošteni ljudi is, contrary to the examples 
given so far, used not as part of the counterdiscourse, but to underscore the 
relevance of ethnic identity, as the following examples show. 
Before women and children were expelled from Stolac, they were gath-
ered in central places in the town: the school, the former hospital for skin dis-
eases and a factory. There they were robbed and mistreated. Anvere had her 
jewellery stolen by a man from the town. Anvere’s husband Nihad now works 
with this man.
Nihad: Therefore they [Croats] are insecure, because they know what they have 
done, and they know that we know it. If he had strength of character he would 
give Anvere her jewellery back, but they do not have character [he raises his 
voice and I can feel he is angry].
Munta – who stated in the quotation above that she could live with anybody 
as long as the situation was just, and that all the decent people came and asked 
after her when she came home – was sometimes clearly reproachful towards the 
Croats as Croats, thereby highlighting ethnic differences:
Munta: Stolac was not a big town, but it was always beautiful. The streets were 
clean. Now I see all that dirt and all the litter in the streets.
Daughter: There were four mosques, now there is nothing left, there is only one left 
in Uzinovići [a part of town] that was repaired when we came back. 
Munta: And they [the Croats] call themselves believers, and they tell everybody 
that they believe in God. There is only one God, and if I respect my own, it 
means that I also respect yours. What have God’s holy houses done – are they 
guilty?
The point is not that Munta or Nihad are being inconsistent in making such 
contradictory statements about their views on ethnicity and decency. Rather, 
such tensions are omnipresent: they form an overarching framework that de-
termines the greater part of my informants’ narrative practice. 
001_316_post-war.indd   148 14/04/08   22:04:42
Denne side er købt på www.ebog.dk og er omfattet af lov om ophavsret. Uanset evt. aftale med Copy-Dan er det ikke tilladt at kopiere eller
indscanne siden til undervisningsbrug eller erhvervsmæssig brug.
Chapter 
Nekultura – culture rather than ethnicity
Both politika and pošteni ljudi can be seen as fundamental to a moral scheme 
of evaluation which enables my informants to disapprove of actions and peo-
ple without resorting to the dominant ideology of ethnicity as an explanatory 
framework. Categorising friends of another ethnic affiliation as decent also 
enables them to legitimise and facilitate interethnic interaction. The third and 
final non-ethnic category of moral judgement used by my informants refers to 
‘levels of culture.’ Together the three categories: politika, pošteni ljudi and nekul-
tura make up some of the building blocks of Muslim counterdiscourse.
The uncultured Other
The Muslims of Stolac often see themselves as cosmopolitans and emphasise 
that a lot of prominent and well educated people have come from their town: 
the former Bosnian Minister of Culture, Dr. Fahrudin Rizvanbegović, along 
with well-known writers like Mak Dizdar, architects, doctors and athletes. They 
proudly talk about the festivals held outside Stolac at the old Stecći 1 before the 
war, to which poets came from all over the world. I was told that once even J. P. 
Sartre participated. And people also stress the sophisticated beauty of their pre-
war town. As a foreigner coming from Western Europe to Stolac for the first 
time, you would probably not associate this small provincial town, where eve-
rybody knows everybody else with urbanity, fashion and modernity. But this 
is how the people of Stolac themselves regard their town, as an urban centre of 
culture; and they clearly distinguish themselves as citydwellers from farmers 
and country people. 
One day Ljubica asked me if I had been to the newly reconstructed café 
in town, and how I liked it. I answered that it was OK, I liked the big piece of 
rock integrated into the café, but besides that it was not that cosy (udoban). She 
told me that the rock had also been there before the war, however she had also 
heard that the café was not that cosy even then – but after all it was owned by 
someone from some village, with the implication that the lack of taste shown 
1  A medieval cemetery, with some of the finest so-called Bogomil tombstones in Bosnia, though 
one should rather call them Bosnian tombstones (see Donia and Fine 1994: 23-5).
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by such country bumpkins was not surprising. When Emir and I talked about 
the café, he told me that the people who hung out in the café were people who 
liked to hear modern folk music (novokomponirana narodna muzika) – that is, 
farmers without style. On another occasion Emir told me that at the weekend 
people from the countryside came to town to drink and make trouble.
We can sit in their cafés and they in ours, but not in the weekend, then you 
cannot be there, then all the people from the villages come, all the wild ones. 
But it was also like that before [the war]. People from the country came maybe 
twice a month and drank a lot and behaved like total idiots.
The categories that structure these two anecdotes relate to the conceptual divi-
sion between kultura (culture) and nekultura (non-culture/uncultured). This 
moral dichotomy, which had already been common in Bosnia Herzegovina 
before the war, was used to evaluate all kinds of acts, situations and people, 
from individual behaviour to national cultures, from the tiniest village to the 
pulsating metropolis. It is possible to make a whole scheme of binary oppo-
sitions building on this opposition: primitive:civilised; peasant:middle-class; 
wild:civilised/domesticated; uncontrolled:controlled; countryside:city; Balkan:
European; oriental:Western; backward:modern; dirty:clean and so on (see also 
van de Port 199: 1; Jansen 2000a: 132). A central feature of this conceptual 
division is its relation to context. The dichotomy kultura:nekultura constitutes 
and enables a scheme of moral evaluations articulated in a geographical ter-
minology, but in practice not reflecting fixed geographical patterns. The Stolac 
Muslims, for example, clearly judged people coming from the small villages 
around Stolac as farmers and as lacking culture (nekultura): they start fights in 
the cafés in Stolac on Friday and Saturday nights, they only have seven years of 
schooling, and they envy those living in the town. However, when my inform-
ants compared Stolac to Sarajevo or Mostar, they themselves represented the 
less cultured party. I had some informants I sometimes went out with on Friday 
or Saturday night. Mostly we would stay in Stolac, but sometimes we drove to 
the larger city of Mostar, and it was noticeable how our behaviour changed. We 
were much more focused on not behaving primitively or foolishly in Mostar 
than in Stolac. One of these informants proudly told me one night in Galerija 
(the Muslim café in Stolac) that: “In here you can do what you want, nobody 
cares or resents you.” This was not the case in Mostar. Bringa (1995) has made 
similar observations about the situational aspect of the moral division kultura:
  It is not a widespread practice as far as I have observed, and mostly it involves Muslims fre-
quenting two to three specific Croat cafés. 
001_316_post-war.indd   150 14/04/08   22:04:43
Denne side er købt på www.ebog.dk og er omfattet af lov om ophavsret. Uanset evt. aftale med Copy-Dan er det ikke tilladt at kopiere eller
indscanne siden til undervisningsbrug eller erhvervsmæssig brug.
	 nekultura – culture rather than ethnicity 151
nekultura. Her informants in the village where she conducted fieldwork dis-
tinguished clearly between those from the upper part of the town, who were 
poorer, less educated and more traditionalist, and those from the lower part 
who were more ‘modern’. However, this did not mean that people coming from 
the upper part of Bringa’s village were automatically labelled as uncultured. De-
pending on the person, the social situation, the actual behaviour in question, 
the strategies of identification (association or distancing), the location or the 
matters discussed, the labels were used differently. 
In relation to my study, the division kultura:nekultura is an important 
non-ethnic set of categories, which the Muslims of Stolac used in order to ex-
plain the war and make sense of their ruined lives. It is a dichotomy which my 
informants used to condemn blameworthy behaviour and locate responsibility 
without resorting to ethnicity. As an informant explained while talking about 
causes of the war: “The wild people came and exterminated the cultivated ones.” 
In other words, the war can be seen as a conflict between uncultivated country 
people and cultivated city dwellers. This is from an interview with Mustafa and 
his wife:
Mustafa: None of the intellectuals with a good education started this war. I have 
an interesting explanation for this war. It was a man who told it to me. He 
said that this war was a war where the asphalt [symbol of civilisation] fought 
against the opanak [traditional peasant shoes]. Those from the villages try to 
come down [from the mountains] to the towns by every possible means. And 
the only way they could come down to the towns was by creating a crisis and 
then a war.
Wife: A lot of people from the villages around Mostar moved to Mostar during the 
war, and now it is impossible to make them return to the villages. They oc-
cupied someone’s flat and now they live there.
Mustafa: It is the same in Stolac, where those coming from the villages occupied 
someone’s house or flat, and now they don’t want to go back to the villages. 
And before the war they tended the sheep. 
Fahrudin is a man who cares about Stolac and knows a lot about its architec-
ture. He also took part in the reconstruction of some of the Muslim houses 
when people started returning in 199, and he witnessed the reconstruction 
project being obstructed by violent Croats. 
There are still some unfinished problems with houses and flats. And this war, 
like other wars before, was a fight between those from the town and those 
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from the villages. A fight between the urban and the rural. Many of the Croats 
living in Stolac, they have their own houses in the villages around Stolac, but 
they do not want to go back. It is crazy. They do not like their own, but rather 
something which is not theirs. He does not want to go back to his house in 
Dubrave, but wants to stay here in Stolac in my house or yours.
Once when Nijaz and I were walking through the centre of Stolac, where the 
old Sultan Selim’s mosque (1519) had been located, he told me as he had done 
several times before that:
…this was the place where the mosque was, and here was also a Muslim cem-
etery [Harem].
TK: It must have been huge?
Nijaz: Yes, it was very huge, and there were bazaars all around.
TK: What did they [the Croats who demolished the mosque] do to all the stones 
[which the mosque was built of]?
Meda: They blew it all, loaded them on trucks and drove them away, into the 
mountains. It is uncultured [nekultura]. For certain.
Another time, after coffee at Café Galerija, Nijaz and I passed a place where 
there was a lot of broken glass and broken bottles. Nijaz commented: “Balkan; 
it is the Croats from the small villages in central Bosnia. Nekultura, they have 
no culture.”
The black market
A couple of kilometres outside Stolac was a black market where stolen and con-
traband goods were sold. The market opened during the war. Everybody knew 
about its existence, including the authorities. Some years ago it was partially 
closed down by the international community before that it had been a huge 
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market where people came from all over to buy and sell. Before the market was 
partially closed down it was also a place where stolen goods from the looted 
Muslim houses were sold: windows, furniture, electrical articles, doors etc. – or 
so I was told. The young Croat from Stolac who ran the market is now wanted 
by Interpol. The market was nothing more than a big parking lot, recently con-
structed by filling large parts of the River Bregava with stone, sand and gravel. 
This really annoyed many of the Muslims in Stolac, for the market ruined a place 
popular for swimming, destroyed the gardens of the Muslims who live nearby, 
and sand was continuously washed out into the river, which made it muddy 
and drove away the fish. Though reduced in scale, the market is still operating. 
The market was a rather unpleasant place – noisy and dirty. There were some 
primitive and unappetising fast food stands selling čevapčići [grilled meat] and 
chicken, and one could buy lukewarm cola or beer all over the market. When 
people tried out the cars, they drove around the parking lot making the tires 
spin and jamming on the brakes so that dust filled the air. This, naturally, is my 
subjective experience, but I think it corresponds with the experiences of many 
of the Muslims in Stolac. For them the black car market is a provocation and a 
disgrace for the town, especially considering that before the war Stolac had an 
active, charming and very popular market (Tepa) in the centre of town, where 
all kinds of agricultural products were sold. 
When my informants talked about the black market or when I asked 
about it, they always described it or categorised it as nekultura. This word sums 
up their feelings about a number of the market’s negative characteristics. It was 
started by Croats, what is more Croats from Stolac: here household effects sto-
len from Muslim homes by Croats were sold. Here the Croats have violated 
the unwritten rules about how to treat the river, which in turn symbolises the 
corruption and decay of Bosnian society. In short, the market could very well 
be taken as a symbol of Croat aggression, of Croat lack of culture. However, 
people never once associated the black market with Croats or Croat mental-
ity or Croat discrimination. Instead the market was described as uncivilised, 
  Here follow some passages from an article in the New York Times in 1999: “The used car mar-
ket in Stolac, which convenes every Sunday in the Croat-controlled part of Bosnia, has one of 
the largest collections of stolen vehicles in Europe, according to the international police […]. 
On one recent Sunday, some 400 cars, most with forged registration papers and German, Swiss 
and Italian license plates, were being sold for large wads of German marks. The gangs that 
bring the cars into Bosnia oversee the sales […]. 
The Office of the High Representative has outlawed the market. It pressed in January 
to have the market’s organizer, Jozo Peric, arrested. But the local Croatian court released him 
a few days later and dismissed the charges. Now Peric is in hiding. When federal tax officials 
showed up last year to try to carry out an audit, they were beaten so badly they were hospital-
ised.” (Hedges 1999).
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ugly, typically Balkan, criminal, mafia-like, and so on: in sum, nekultura. The 
Muslims’ attitude towards the black market thus showed very clearly how the 
cultural category nekultura was used to condemn and explain immoral actions 
in an ethnically neutral way – actions which might easily have been associated 
with Croat political discrimination, post-war violence and Croat mentality: 
ethnic identity. 
As with politika and nepošteni ljudi, my informants’ use of the category 
nekultura dissociates ethnicity from blameworthy behaviour. Their use of these 
categories runs counter to the rhetoric of nationalism and is part of the Stolac 
Muslims’ counterdiscourse. The resistance to nationalism consists of the at-
tempt to facilitate coexistence and interaction with the ethnic Other by persist-
ently judging behaviour by reference to non-ethnic cultural categories.
‘The revenge of the countryside’
The cultural construction kultura:nekultura and the marked division between 
the rural and the urban on which my informants drew when evaluating and 
criticising behaviour as well as character are deeply rooted in the Yugoslav 
cultural and sociological processes of industrialisation and modernisation.4 
Yugoslavia was a very agrarian and underdeveloped country for most of its 
history. When industrialisation and the processes of economic modernisation 
did finally occur, development came rapidly. One can get an idea of the late 
development of Yugoslavia by looking at the infrastructure of the area in the 
19th century. Mobility in Bosnia, as in most of the Ottoman territories, was then 
very poor: there were hardly any railroads, and the road network was primi-
tive. Though the Ottomans had begun a programme of constructing improved 
trunk roads through the Balkans, they had not reached Bosnia by as late as 1 
(McCarthy 1993). According to the 195 census,  % of the Bosnian population 
was engaged in agricultural production (Donia and Fine 1994: -). This had 
not changed much by the middle of the 20th century: in 194, 3 % of the Yu-
goslav population still lived on farms (Bougarel 1999: 15). As the country had 
not yet experienced land reform, semi-feudal relations were still characteristic 
in agricultural production (Donia and Fine 1994: 1). Then after the Second 
4  One does need to beware the Eurocentric aspect of the concept of modernisation, as well as to 
consider how processes of modernisation and industrialisation are directly related to the ab-
sence of the same processes in other places. What Andre Gunder Frank calls the ‘development 
of underdevelopment’ is central for understanding the underdevelopment and late industri-
alisation in Yugoslavia. The backwardness of the Balkans, therefore, relates to their historical 
structural position vis-à-vis Europe and not to some reactionary force in the Ottoman Empire 
or the religion of Islam (Allcock 2000: 2-).
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World War things began to change rapidly. Yugoslavia went through an intense 
phase of urbanisation and industrial and cultural development. By 191, only 
2 % of the population was still living on farms (Bougarel 1999: 15). This mas-
sive urbanisation and industrialisation, along with the quest for education and 
culture that started with the Tito era, created the basis for the kultura:nekultura 
tension. The cities witnessed a massive influx of immigrants from the country-
side, and though Yugoslavia was officially a classless society, the process of in-
stant urbanisation produced a clash of cultures (see e.g. Simić 193). Suddenly it 
became important for city-dwellers to distance themselves from the rural back-
ground of their parents, or the latest newcomers, or perhaps even their own 
background and origins. Many of the ‘original’ citydwellers saw their lifestyle 
polluted by the ignorant farmers, and a cleavage of identification evolved in 
which education became the paramount distinguishing factor (Drakulic 1995; 
van de Port 199; Jansen 2000a; Ramet 199). The modernisation/urbanisation 
process thus moved the traditional antagonisms between town and the coun-
tryside into the towns themselves, and made them much more conscious and 
significant. 
From the 190s onwards, Yugoslavia experienced a period of ‘re-tradition-
alisation.’ Allcock (2000: 351-1) has shown how the process of modernisation 
is not the same as the passing of traditional society: customs rooted in peasant 
society – in relation to family life, land ownership and patron-client relations 
– continue to provide important resources for living in the present. Re-tradi-
tionalisation, though, is something else: here traditions become a matter of the 
politics of identity. This politicisation of tradition or peasant identity is cen-
tral to the resurgence of the nationalist ideologies that began in the 190s and 
which ultimately culminated in the Yugoslav war. The nationalist ideologies of 
both Milošević and Tuđman linked national identity to the soil and nature, as 
well as to notions of an unspoiled, unsophisticated ruralness and to the ‘authen-
tic’ cultural practices originating in the countryside. At the same time, genuine 
national identity was contrasted to the decadence, bureaucracy and heteroge-
neity of the cities (Bringa 1995: 149-53; Donia and Fine 1994: 1; Jansen 2000a: 
113-1). The success of the nationalist politicians was consequently largely due 
to support from the countryside, and the relatively sparse opposition against 
the nationalist crusade was located in the cities (Jansen 2000a: 113).
  Besides the socio-economic background Bougarel (1999) has shown how the discursive op-
position between ‘civilised’ towns and ‘barbarous’ countryside/mountains has its roots in 19th 
century Yugoslav literature. The opposition was then articulated as lying between the moun-
tains and the towns.
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In sum, Yugoslavia before the Second World War was very rural and un-
derdeveloped with marked but rather unproblematic cultural dividing lines be-
tween the cities and the countryside. With the rapid urbanisation following in-
dustrialisation and the focus upon education and kultura of the Tito era, these 
cleavages moved into the cities and became much more articulate. Then came 
a resurgence of nationalism starting in the 190s, which initially drew support 
from those who were marginalised by the economic modernisation and who 
therefore experienced an identity crisis: that is, the rural population and the 
disintegrated urban population. On this loosely sketched background, one 
can begin to understand the antagonistic relation between the urban and the 
rural, the cultured and the uncultured, the decadent and the authentic. These 
tensions have led many city-dwellers of all ethnic affiliations to perceive the 
recent conflict as one in which primitive peasants have sought to destroy urban 
civilisation in Bosnia and Croatia (see also Frykman 2001), an interpretation 
Bougarel (1999) has termed ‘the revenge of the countryside.’ Towns like Mostar 
and Sarajevo, relatively untouched by the fighting of World War II, were delib-
erately destroyed in the recent war. Serbian forces on the hillcrests around Sara-
jevo deliberately bombed the town’s cultural monuments. And the Old Bridge 
in Mostar from 155, the symbol of tolerance and ethnic coexistence, was con-
tinually shelled and finally hit by Croatian forces. One might see these major 
cities as living proof against the nationalist dream of ethnic homogeneity. The 
cities were ethnically mixed and a cosmopolitan attitude prevailed. The term 
urbicide has been employed to describe the conscious destruction of cities like 
Sarajevo, Mostar and also Stolac. As Jansen defines the term urbicide, it does 
“not only refer to the physical destruction of cities, but also, and maybe more 
importantly, to the killing of urbanity” (Jansen 2000b: 11). In other words, the 
target of urbicide is kultura (see also Bogdanović 1993; Coward 2002). 
When the Muslims of Stolac continue to mourn the onslaught on their 
town and other cities of the former Yugoslavia, and when they blame the uncul-
tured people from the countryside for the war and the present discrimination 
in Stolac, they are also expressing feelings of loss related to everything kultura 
  In fact, one can see the antagonism between town and the village/mountain as a result of an 
unsuccessful and incomplete modernisation of Yugoslavia. First, the “…various militias [in the 
recent war] attracted first of all the neo-urban strata of the population, disintegrated in the ur-
ban economy and culture, whereas the urban elites formed the principal support of the pacifist 
movement” (Bougarel 1999: 15). Second, the recurrent emergence, throughout Balkan history, 
of different militias living on the fringes of the shifting empires, alternating between armed 
rebellion against the state and armed service to the state, shows how the state has not been able 
to monopolise violence. In the recent war, as throughout the Balkan history, various more or 
less independent militias undertook military operations which the established military units 
were not willing or able to perform.
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stands for: the ideals of education, cultivation, beauty and coexistence. Alija 
was a man who loved Stolac and who worked hard (see below) to make it a 
pleasant place to live once again. This is from an interview with Alija:
Alija: Lenin always said that one has to beware of socialism coming from the coun-
tryside. In the villages around Stolac, people live in their own world, they 
never wanted to send their children to secondary school or university. They 
have had their own world, which was different from ours, and there is a hatred 
between these two worlds. We Stolac people [Stočani] take care of the town. 
Before the war, if somebody came from Europe or another place, he came 
here to see the Begovina [and all the old houses and antiquities, and people 
enjoyed seeing this. But these people who lived outside [of the town] Stolac, 
they didn’t like it, and this is why they did all these things]. 
Emir: For instance they burned down the mosques and razed Begovina because 
they think in a different manner. 
TK: Those from the villages?
Alija: Yes. 
Nekultura as ethnic condemnation
As was also the case for the categories politika and nepošteni ljudi there is also 
ambivalence attached to my informants’ use of nekultura. One could argue that 
using the category nekultura in remaking the world is just an implicit way of 
blaming the Croats, as the Croats constitute the majority of those coming from 
the countryside. It is impossible to fully distinguish those situations where cat-
egories like nekultura, politika, or nepošteni ljudi are used as the basis for im-
plicit ethnic condemnation from those situations where they form part of the 
counterdiscourse by implicitly criticising the ethnicisation of the social land-
scape. But as argued previously, this uncertainty is not due to the lack of ana-
lytical tools. Rather, the nationalist discourse and my informants’ counterdis-
course are interwoven and often hard to separate for people themselves. Blam-
ing the ethnic Other and the wish for ethnic coexistence exist simultaneously. 
Here is an example of the category of nekultura used as an implicit way of blam-
ing the ethnic Other. The speaker tries to establish an objective link between 
being Croat and a lack of education/nekultura. This viewpoint is presented as a 
neutral statement of facts, while I hear it more as a moral evaluation. 
  The Begovina (‘house of the bey’) was a residential ensemble of substantial architectural and 
historical value dating back to the 19th century. It was set on fire in 1993. 
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15	 post-war identification
Muhamed: Stolac has always been special. A lot of intelligent people lived here, 
with many different ideas. Before the war there were, according to the census, 
03 Croats in Stolac. And not many of them had important positions, or a 
university degree. And the situation changed totally after the war. Now they 
[Croats] produce diplomas as they produce ordinary papers. Now in Stolac 
there are eight or ten constructional engineers, but before the war no Croats 
had such an education. They needed people with education and then they just 
handed out diplomas; if one wanted a diploma, one got one.
As Muhamed sees it, Croats are generally less educated (than Muslims), hereby 
linking ethnicity and culture.
I have so far presented three categories which the Muslims of Stolac employ 
when trying to remake their shattered world and placing the blame for the dev-
astating events of recent years: politika, ne-pošteni ljudi, and nekultura. Nekultu-
ra – as an element of the Muslims’ counterdiscourse – works by putting ethnic-
ity aside as a relevant factor in understanding the war and instead introducing 
culture, civilisation and urbanity as the most salient factors, all connected to 
the post-Second World War process of modernisation.
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Chapter  
Complexity in ethnic categorisation  
as part of the counterdiscourse
The Muslims of Stolac operate with several categories of Croats, and different 
moral value is attached to each category. Heterogeneity and not uniformity is 
the hallmark of what it means to be a Croat in the eyes of the Muslims. One of 
the aims of nationalist policy and violence was to reduce categorical complexity 
and create clear-cut ethnic identities. The complexity attributed to Croat ethnic 
identity, therefore, is part of the Muslim counterdiscourse. In some situations, 
Muslims state that the Croats are all fascists and have always been and that 
history is only repeating itself. On other occasions they stress that you cannot 
lump all the Croats together because only the ones from outside Stolac cre-
ate trouble. It is not that some of the statements are false and others true. The 
identifications are context-dependent: they mirror the persistent tension in the 
Muslim community between tolerance and hate, condemnation and explana-
tion, remembering and forgetting. 
Croats from central Bosnia
One of the categories of Croats in Muslim discourse consists of ‘Croats from 
Central Bosnia’. Before the war the Croat population in Stolac town made up 12	
% of the total town population (in the whole municipality they made up 33	%; 
many of the Croats lived in the countryside). No figures were available during 
my fieldwork, but my estimate is that Croats were in the majority, even after 
many Muslims had returned. Many Croats, mostly from central Bosnia, have 
moved to Stolac during and after the war, a displacement that on a general level 
has been part of a broader political strategy of making a slice of Herzegovina 
(Herceg-Bosna) part of a greater Croatia (see Prologue). One could encoun-
ter a sad example of these policies when driving from Mostar to Stolac. Here 
one could pass through a small, newly built village looking like a ghost town. 
Between thirty and forty new houses had been built in a barren and grey land-
scape that made growing vegetables very difficult. Here several Croat families 
from central Bosnia lived, struggling to make a living. There were no shops of 
any kind – only these almost identical houses, all cement grey. The houses were 
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10	 post-war identification
only partly finished and will probably never be finished now, since the Herze-
govinian Croats no longer receive funding from Croatia.1 And this village is not 
unique. The Muslims of Stolac were well aware of the broader ethnic game the 
central Bosnian Croats were a part of: 
Dino: Before only few Croats lived in town. These new Croats, they do not know 
Stolac, but were sent here by Tuđman, who paid for them, they came from 
central Bosnia. Before they were Bosnians, suddenly they became Croats.
However, some of my informants also feel that it was a little too easy for leading 
Croat politicians to convince the Croats to come and live in Stolac.
Suljeman: I have heard several times from those Croats from Bosnia now living 
in Stolac that they had been told that they could stay in our houses, that they 
were theirs. And this is how they think, they come to one’s house and then it is 
their house. It is as if they were blind; they did not ask any questions. It is very 
easy to manipulate them. Often they think that they are the only ones who 
exist, that there is no Europe, no America, no universe, only them. It has been 
nearly impossible for them to understand that the Muslims were to return to 
Stolac, because they were told that we would never come back.
Even though my informants knew that the presence of the many central Bos-
nian Croats in Stolac formed part of a political game, they were not always 
certain about the real circumstances behind the Croat population movements. 
Some Stolac Muslims were aware of incidents of Muslim violence and intimi-
dation against Croats in central Bosnian villages; experiences which may have 
made them want to leave. In general, though, the Muslims of Stolac believe that 
the Croats moved by their own free will, or, more precisely, by the will of the 
nationalist politicians in Croatia and in Herzegovina. A prominent member of 
the SDA in Stolac had this interpretation.
1  Herzegovinian Croats do not have the same sympathy from the citizens in Croatia that they 
did before. After being perceived as spearheading the struggle for a Greater Croatia, they are 
back to their pre-war status as backward, uncivilised farmers from underdeveloped Herzegovi-
na. Furthermore, many people in Croatia have been provoked by these boorish people driving 
in big Mercedes and engaging in luxury consumption financed by the Croatian government, 
while ordinary Croats have been getting poorer and poorer (Jansen 2000a: 120-3, 144; Grandits 
200).
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Salko: Some of the central Bosnian Croats return home, some go abroad, and some 
are building houses down there [central Bosnia], and I hope they will leave 
[Stolac]. The only thing a Croat has here is the house HDZ gave him. In Bos-
nia where he lived before, he has his house, his fields, his animals, his apples, 
his plums; he has a life waiting for him. And it is a fact that no Croats from 
central Bosnia were expelled. Tuđman wanted them to come here, because 
then it would be easier to divide Bosnia. I think Tuđman made a huge mis-
take. He could not move all the Croats from central Bosnia. Some of them 
wanted to stay there, even though it was a very fierce war. Did you hear what 
happened in the village Arkućer? There was a massacre in a village close to 
Vitez, and everybody was killed, even small babies, and it was Croatian sol-
diers who did this, and why did they do it? Only because they hoped it would 
provoke a big hatred in the Muslims, the Bosniaks, and that the Muslims then 
would drive the Croats out of there. And then they [Croat politicians] could 
say that: ‘we cannot live together’, that: ‘we [the Croats] are expelled from 
here’. The Muslims were to drive out the Croats and then Bosnia was to have 
been divided. But things do not always go as planned.
The main issue associated with the presence of Croat displaced persons from 
central Bosnia in post-war Stolac is housing. I have met several Muslims in 
Stolac who lived in a rented house or with relatives because their own home 
was occupied by refugees. These Muslims obviously want the occupiers to leave, 
saying that they have no right to settle in their houses or flats. The Muslims of 
Stolac often say that it is precisely this group of Croats that is making trouble, 
burning down houses, beating up Muslims, vandalising the Muslim café, and 
generally intimidating the Muslims in the hope that they will give up the idea 
of returning to reclaim their property. 
The line of reasoning is clear. Croats from central Bosnia were told that 
Muslims would never return. Suddenly, however, Muslims started to return 
and, even though the first step was to rebuild destroyed Muslim houses, it was 
clear that the repossession of occupied houses would be next thing to happen. 
Croats from central Bosnia occupying Muslim houses are therefore the ones 
who have the most to lose by the return process. Even so, many Muslims have 
a contradictory attitude towards them, feeling some pity for them as well. The 
Muslims can see the dilemma the displaced Croats are caught in, and say that 
the Croats have been betrayed. As Armin put it when talking about a friend 
whose house were occupied by central Bosnian Croats:
  HDZ, though the name of a political party, is also a general term people use for influential local 
Croat rulers, see also below in the section about HDZ.
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They [the friend] pay KM150 [€5] in rent; they have built their own house, 
but now a family from Konjic lives there. The problem is that if they [the 
Croats] have to leave they will have nothing. 
Or Munir:
The central Bosnian Croats have been double-crossed. They were told that if 
they stayed [in central Bosnia], the Muslims would come and kill them, but if 
they came here to Stolac, nobody would touch them. In a way, I feel pity for 
them.
He laughed, not maliciously, but at his own words. On the one hand Munir 
thought that the Croats, coming as occupants, are only getting what they de-
serve; on the other hand, he could not help sympathising with them. I did not 
talk with many Croats in the course of my fieldwork, but Davor was one of 
them. He ran a small kiosk in Stolac. He came from a small village in central 
Bosnia, but fled to Croatia in 1995 and came to Stolac in 199. He told me that 
he believed that Croats, Serbs and Muslims could probably live side-by-side 
again, but not together; history has shown that the fall of the Ottomans resulted 
in war, the fall of the Austro-Hungarians, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the fall of 
Tito – all resulted in war. He did not want his children to experience the same 
things; therefore, the ethnic groups had to live separately:
We have different identities; we are different peoples with different language 
and culture. It is the same with Denmark, they are members of the EU, but 
they are still a people and it is important for them to be, they are not German 
or French.
He felt it was wrong that Croats took Muslim property, and he found that Stolac 
had become an ugly town. He said that even though he is Croat, he is a Bosnian 
Croat, and that he wanted to go back to his own town, but there was no work 
there. In Stolac he was able to support his wife and child. He was not proud of 
living in a Muslim house, but had nowhere else to go. When I talked to him, he 
had been told by the authorities (representatives of the OHR in Mostar) that he 
had to leave the occupied house in one month; but the house promised him by 
the HDZ was not yet finished, and there was no more money to build with.
Another arena of conflict is more cultural and relates to social knowledge. 
There is a feeling shared by all Muslims of Stolac that Croats from central Bos-
nian do not know the local culture and codes of behaviour; they simply do not 
fit in. One day I met Muhamed at one of the small bridges [ćuprija] in Stolac. 
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We admired the River Bregava for a while, then he started talking about the 
central Bosnian Croats:
Today a lot of people from Kakanj [in central Bosnia] and other places live 
here, but they do not feel at home. When you meet them, you do not know 
who they are, they do not know you. In summertime when we sit down by 
Bregava – there is only one Bregava in the world – in summertime, we sit by 
the river and grill and bathe and have a good time, it is wonderful. But the 
Croats from central Bosnia, they do not know it [the river]. They are insecure 
towards it. They do not value it. There is a field down there where we play 
football, and afterwards we go and drink from the river; without the river 
there would be no town. But they do not appreciate it in the same way. I would 
never throw anything in the river, never. [Today there is a lot of garbage in the 
river, the riverside is becomming overgrown, and the wreck of a car mars the 
eastern part of the river].
Many Muslims think that a lot of the problems and tensions in the city would 
be solved if these strangers would only go back to their own villages, just as 
it would also be better for themselves to return to their place of origin. Emir 
explains why:
The places where they come from, there everything is very primitive. Have 
you been north of Sarajevo? There are only mines. People work in the mines 
all day, they do not have running water in the houses, and the weather is 
awful. Then they come down here and experience how wonderful it is here. 
Therefore they do not want to go back again. But they are different; they come 
from a different culture. Many [of us] would like to ask them to return, but 
that is also difficult.
Muslims attach various stereotypical characteristics to the Croats from central 
Bosnia: they say they are backwards but sly at the same time, having left miser-
able central Bosnia for pleasant Stolac. The point is, however, that such stere-
otypes are related to specific situations and experiences and, furthermore, that 
the problem with these people in the Muslims’ eyes is not that they are Croats, 
but that they are strangers occupying someone else’s houses.4
  The Muslims of Stolac are generally very proud of their ‘Mediterranean climate’ as they like to 
call it. 
4  Related problems exist elsewhere in Bosnia. In Sarajevo, for instance, there are tensions be-
tween Muslims from Sarajevo and Muslim refugees from eastern Bosnia (Steffanson 200).
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Croats from the countryside
Sometimes Croats from central Bosnia are merged into a larger category of the 
‘Croats from the countryside’. This in turn is linked to the central distinction 
between kultura (culture) and nekultura (non-culture), analysed in the previ-
ous chapter. Muslims of Stolac often use this distinction to explain the war and 
make sense of their ruined lives, to condemn bad deeds and locate respon-
sibility. The wartime violence, ‘urbicide’, and the present lawlessness are thus 
basically seen as a struggle between people from the countryside and people 
from the town. Croats from the countryside living in Stolac are therefore con-
sidered illegitimate occupiers of both Muslim private houses and the urban 
public space.
Fahrudin: Those people living in the villages always wanted to move to town. For-
merly this took place more normally. You bought a piece of land in the town 
and built a house. And you paid for it and it was yours. But those living here 
now, they want what they have taken over and do not want to give it back to 
the owners. So your house becomes my house.
Salko: It is a hard process to tell the Croats from the villages around Stolac to re-
turn to their properties. They have realised that it is much easier to live here 
than in their own villages. It is very hard for the young ladies to go back to 
their villages. The only thing waiting for them is cows and fields. 
Like the central Bosnian Croats, the Croats from the countryside around Stolac 
are presented as uneducated strangers hungry for the options a town like Stolac 
can give them. Some Muslims think that the original Croats of Stolac accept the 
presence of both Croats from the countryside and from central Bosnia since, 
otherwise, they would become a minority again, and would then have to face 
the consequences of their own misdeeds. The point to bear in mind is that 
while this category of people constitutes a more or less well-defined class of 
Croats, their main characteristics relate not to their Croat ethnic identity but to 
a narrow-mindedness stemming from their lack of education and ‘non-culture’. 
Its potential for resistance rests in its ability to disconnect ethnicity and bad 
deeds, and to make possible interaction with the ethnic Other by blaming only 
some particular Croats for the war. In this way it constitutes an element in the 
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Croats from Stolac
‘Naši Hrvati’ (‘our Croats’) and ‘naši domaći Hrvati’ (‘our local/homegrown 
Croats’) are expressions used about yet another category of Croats: ‘Croats from 
Stolac’. Local patriotism constitutes an important source of identification for 
the Muslims of Stolac (see chapter 11), and the ‘homegrown’ is more or less the 
icon of this identity: it is by definition superior. Even though it is not always 
consciously intended, therefore, the utterance ‘naši domaći Hrvati’ has positive 
connotations. The class of Croats from Stolac is also in definitive opposition 
to that made up of Croats from both central Bosnia and the countryside, who 
clearly are not ‘homegrown’.
When Muslims have social relations with Croats it is mainly within this 
group of people who they knew before the war. It is, however, not easy to 
resume relations in an ethnically segregated town like Stolac. Some Muslims 
told me that the HDZ forbids the Croats to mingle with the Muslims, sanction-
ing against fraternisation by means of access to jobs, houses and scholarships. 
Nihad, for instance, told me that when he came back to visit Stolac for the 
first time after the war he met several old Croat friends and acquaintances, but 
everybody turned their faces away, except for one man (a former colleague) 
who greeted Nihad. Naturally, this pleased Nihad, but the Croat was fired from 
his job a couple of days later. People also recount how when they returned to 
Stolac, former Croat friends would not dare to pay them a visit in daylight; only 
at night did they go to their Muslim friends’ houses and welcome them back. 
According to Nihad, however, relations between Croats and Muslims have im-
proved.
Nihad: Those who hid and turned their faces away now greet you.
Anvere (his wife): But it is only the domaci who do it, not the ones from the villages 
or central Bosnia.
Some consider that Muslims and Croats from Stolac have much more in com-
mon than Croats from Stolac do with Croats from central Bosnia: people origi-
nating from Stolac want to talk to each other, they are glad to see each other 
again, and they want to hear what happened during the war. Some Muslims 
also emphasise a level of understanding and respect between themselves and 
Croats from Stolac which outsiders do not understand. I asked Alija if the hos-
tility against the Muslim café in the centre of town, which has been vandalised 
twice, was shared by all Croats.
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The Croats living in Stolac before the war, they don’t have much against it [the 
café], because they understand that we will be staying here in the future, and 
therefore there has to be something for us also. But the others living around 
Stolac [from the countryside] and those coming from central Bosnia, they are 
against [the café]. 
A common attachment to the town, which unites all ‘true’ citizens of Stolac, is 
also stressed when talking about Stolac Croats. The total destruction of the city 
is hard to grasp, and many Muslims express the idea that the wrongdoers must 
have come from outside. Some of them even consider that, if it were not for all 
the Croats from the countryside or from central Bosnia, the Croats who are 
originally from Stolac would return to their pre-war attitude and everything 
would be as it had been before. As Mensur expressed it, “If we only had real 
Stolac people [pravi Stočani], people born here in Stolac, then we would not 
have any problem. These people come from outside.” Salko, a leading member 
of the SDA in Stolac, told me about his experiences during an interview:
It is a huge problem that the Croats in the leadership of HDZ here in Stolac 
come from the villages around Stolac, that they are not real Stolac natives. 
They do not feel as if Stolac is their own, you have probably noticed. Walking 
around Stolac, one can see it [garbage and car wrecks in the streets, ruined 
houses, graffiti etc.] I was asked, when the last mayor was sacked [a Croat], I 
was asked which mayor do you Bosniaks want. I said I very much wanted a 
Croat from Stolac [gradski, urbani Hrvat; a native, urban Croat]. One living 
here, who will notice that there is a lot of garbage that needs to be removed, 
one who feels for the town. Our last mayor Pero Raguz, he lived in Čapljina 
[some 40 km away], when he finished at work he closed the door and went 
home. And the other mayor [the one before Raguz] he was also from Čapljina. 
Now we have Kuzman, he is a little different. He wants to talk, he wants to 
drink coffee, sit together. He is married to a lady who comes from Stolac itself, 
and his wife has a big influence on him, and therefore he behaves differently 
than the other Croats. I knew him before I was married, and met him a couple 
of times when I was in prison camp. He was a hardliner in HDZ, but his wife 
and father-in-law have influenced him a lot. His wife was born in Stolac, and 
has lived her entire life here, and she definitely loves the town.
There is a dilemma embedded in such semi-romantic feelings, since Muslims 
also know that some of the Croats from Stolac participated in the expulsion of 
Muslims, and even in some of the atrocities, but they do not always know who 
did what and, more to the point, they do not know how the Croats feel about 
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the expulsion of the Muslims. Did they support it or were they too afraid to 
stand up and oppose it? Croats from Stolac are therefore simultaneously seen 
as pravi Stočani who identify with the town and respect the Muslims, as well as 
the very people who let their former friends down. I asked Emir if it had been 
people from Stolac who picked them up them when they were expelled:
Emir: The majority of the Croats from Stolac participated in catching us, but those 
giving the orders, they were not from here. Those who gave the orders came 
from somewhere else. 
TK: Were they forced to capture you?
Emir: I think that the greater part didn’t want to, but there were also those who 
did it very gladly. The Croats who lived here always had to prove that they 
were real Croats. The Croats living in 100 % Croat-dominated towns think in 
another way than Croats living in mixed towns.
The ambiguous feeling towards the Stolac Croats also results in different strate-
gies of interaction. 
Osman: In the beginning [when he returned] it was a kind of tough with the 
Croats. But I walked proudly in the streets, and I was also pleased if some 
Croats greeted me. I just went for a little walk to see if there was somebody 
who would say something to me. In the beginning only a few would say some-
thing, even though I smiled to them and hoped they would say something to 
me, but now it is different. Now I go to town and meet the people I worked 
with before and we shake hands and greet each other, as if nothing had hap-
pened. 
When I referred to this strategy of ‘smiling to the Croats’ in the course of a 
conversation with another informant, he commented that he would never hu-
miliate himself by doing that: 
They owe us an apology. They are the ones who did something wrong, not 
me. If I met someone in the street, whom I knew did something wrong – and 
here everybody knows what everybody has done – then I would pretend that 
I did not see him.
In Stolac lived a native Croat whom people labeled as a little crazy. In a way, 
he symbolised the dilemma that the category ‘Croats from Stolac’ entails. Ivan 
was a small, thick-set man who rode around Stolac on a woman’s bike, and he 
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was related to some of the powerful Croats in town. He stayed in Stolac during 
the whole war. I sometimes met him on the (Muslim) bus going to Mostar talk-
ing to everybody including himself, and he seldom payed the fare. People felt 
a little embarrassed in his presence; at the same time, they had sympathy for 
him. He was not crazy before the war. At that time he worked at the hospital. 
Some people said that the war was what drove him crazy. Emir told me that 
Ivan cycled around Stolac shouting at the Croats who ‘did something’ during 
the war: “I know what you have done, I know who blew up the mosques, you 
are criminals.” Once he came to Mostar in the Muslim part of town wearing 
a cap with a Šahovnica,5 but nobody said anything. Some ‘big Croats’ (veliki 
Hrvati, powerful and strongly nationalist Croats) lived opposite Ivan, I was told 
that they took part in the destruction of the mosques. In the window facing 
towards these Croats, Ivan had a big poster of Franjo Tuđman, he said that he 
would not remove it until these big Croats were caught and sent to The Hague. 
He wanted to show that he was a bigger Croat than they were. Once Ivan gave 
a list of all the Croat war criminals to one of my informants while all the ‘big 
Croats’ sitting in the café nearby were watching. He also sometimes went to the 
police station shouting out who did what. Occasionally he kicked the supposed 
wrongdoers in the shins or placed small notes in their cars. As people said, he 
was a good Croat and he was crazy, but not totally crazy. 
Muslim attitudes towards Croats from Stolac depend on the situation, 
therefore. In my view, the category of ‘good Croats from Stolac’ is especially 
invoked in statements about the legitimate presence and property claims of the 
Muslims in post-war Stolac, and about the possible expulsion of all its non-na-
tive citizens. Speaking more generally, the category of the Croats from Stolac is 
also an attempt to reconcile the tensions between forgiveness and hate, oblivion 
and remembering – between resistance to the world’s ethnicisation and the use 
of ethnic categories to make sense of the world. By creating the category of the 
‘Croats from Stolac’, the Muslims have constructed a group of people they can 
interact with without persistently having to question the very foundation of the 
interaction. That is probably why it is important for the Muslims to insist that 
the Croats from Stolac are ‘glad to have them back’, or for example that some 
  The Croat coat of arms and strong nationalist symbol.
  Posters of Franjo Tuđman are placed several places in Stolac in public buildings. For many 
Croats he is a hero, supporting the Herzegovinian Croats’ fight for an independent state, Her-
ceg-Bosna. For the Muslims such posters signal ethnic violence and implacability. Ivan’s delib-
erate use of Croatian nationalist symbols is also a reinterpretion and challenge to the meanings 
attached to Croat identity. He showed that he was proud of being a Croat, but at the same time 
he distanced himself from the ethnic violence and the implacability; he did interact with the 
Muslims.
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Stolac Croats attended a Muslim’s funeral because ‘they can’t forget the good 
times we had together either.’
Croats from Croatia
One might expect that the misdeeds of Croatian soldiers during the war and 
the physical and political violence that have taken place even after the Day-
ton agreement would have affected the Muslims’ general image of the Croatian 
Croats; after all, a lot of the more organised violence and a lot of the propagan-
da were orchestrated from Croatia. Croatian army groups operated in Herze-
govina, and the military objective of Croatia and the Herzegovinian Croats 
was to make Herzegovina part of a greater Croatia. It therefore surprised me 
that I never heard anything really negative about Croatia or about ‘Croats from 
Croatia’. It appeared to me that for many Muslims of Stolac, Croatia was still a 
part of their sense of self. In this connection, it is important to remember that 
such attractions as the beautiful coast of Croatia and the old town of Dubrovnik 
are less than an hour’s drive away from Stolac. Before the war, the coast was not 
thought of as Croatian but rather Yugoslavian, and people in Stolac were proud 
of its beauty. In a way, people still reckon Croatia – especially the coast – as 
theirs. On a number of occasions people asked if I had been to the coast, and 
said that: ‘You should go, it is so beautiful down there’. Also they would tell me 
about their splendid summer holidays and weekends there.
One example of my informants’ positive attitude towards Croatia relates to 
Croatian television. As part of the discrimination against the Muslims in Stolac, 
they were not able to watch Bosnian TV programmes unless they had a satel-
lite dish. The annoyance people felt, though, was due more to the intention to 
discriminate than to a preference for Bosnian TV programmes. Even when the 
OSCE sponsored an all-Bosnian Muslim TEST channel that was broadcast two 
hours a day, people still supplemented it with Croatian news programmes. Even 
those with a satellite dish often preferred Croatian programmes because they 
felt the quality of the programmes was better – better movies and better docu-
mentary programmes. Young people preferred Croatian channels because they 
showed the most exciting sports events, and the Croatian basketball league was 
clearly better than the Bosnian one. In short, though people did miss watching 
television programmes from Sarajevo and the local channel from Mostar, they 
were still seen as only a supplement to Croatian programmes. Many mornings 
while my hosts and I were eating breakfast, the TV would be on in the back-
ground, and my landlady loved the programmes with food recipes and folk 
culture, many of which could easily be disliked on ideological grounds, as these 
programmes were obviously intended to be part of a Croatian nation-building 
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process centred on shared cultural values. When the weather forecast was sent, 
lovely pictures from the Croatian coast covered the screen; we all agreed that 
the coast was picturesque and unique. 
People also generally respected Stipe Mesić, Croatian president since the 
elections in 2000. They appreciated him as a responsible politician, especially 
because, as the Muslims put it: he believes that the Croats in Herzegovina have 
to realise they live in Bosnia Herzegovina and not in Croatia. My informants’ 
positive attitude towards Croatia is also apparent from the experiences of those 
who had recently been at the Croatian coast, who said that it was easier and 
more relaxed to interact with the Croats there than in Stolac. “They know what 
they are, and do not have to prove it all the time, in opposition to Stolac, where 
the Croats persistently have to prove they are real Croats,” as Alija said. This 
corroborates experiences people have had when visiting pure Croat cities in 
Herzegovina. Once Emir told me how he and his brother had made a business 
trip to Ljubuški, a pure Croat town next to the Croatian border, a forty-minute 
drive from Stolac:
We had been in Ljubuški one day to sell firewood. When we came to the town, 
we were quite nervous, because virtually only Croats live there, about 95 %. 
But when we arrived at the market where you sell firewood on Mondays, then 
we said that we came from Stolac and our names were Emir and Senad, then 
they knew we were Muslims [most Muslim first names reveal one’s ethnicity], 
but they were friendly. They helped us get the firewood sold and we drank cof-
fee together. It was fantastic sitting and drinking coffee with Croats like that. It 
was incredible talking so pleasantly with them; they were kind to us. And later 
we met them at Hrgud [the mountain east of Stolac where they go to fell trees 
for wood] and we helped each other. Before going to Ljubuški my mother had 
said that we should try to sell the firewood here [in Stolac], and if we didn’t 
sell it, it couldn’t be helped. She didn’t think we should leave, but we did.
The category ‘Croats from Croatia’ adds yet another piece of complexity to the 
general ethnic stereotype of Croats, and is as such part of the Muslims’ counter-
discourse.
Ethnic denunciations
I have argued that Stolac Muslims use non-ethnic moral judgements, that is 
moral classifications and condemnations through reference to non-ethnic cul-
tural categories such as politika, pošteni ljudi, and nekultura. This is not to say 
that ethnic denunciation does not exist. Sometimes Muslims harshly criticise 
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Croats in general. Such stereotypes are obviously not counterdiscursive in that 
they show that ethnic thinking has in some way become automatic. Neverthe-
less, such statements should be seen as but a part of the overall complex catego-
risation of Croats, as they are clearly related to specific situations and experi-
ences. For example, when people say that ‘all Croats are fascists’, this does not 
mean that they are incapable of different and diverging utterances in other situ-
ations, as we have seen in the nuanced judgments above. The Muslims’ ethnic 
denunciations, therefore, constitute but one category of Croats among others. 
It is, however, not clear for me to what extent I am able to fully objectify 
the Muslims’ ethnic denunciations. While conducting fieldwork in Stolac, I be-
came aware of how I myself interpreted the local world by using ethnic stere-
otypes, as some incidents from my fieldwork show. Once I drove by car with my 
family from Denmark to Stolac. Passing through the Serb Republic I was afraid 
of harassment and of being robbed by people in the area. And I remember the 
relief I felt on entering the Federation. My wife was surprised by my nervous-
ness. When trying to explain the causes of my fear, I realised that a lot of the 
fear must have come from the stories I had heard from my informants about 
the evil deeds of the Serbian people. Reflecting on this fear and the stereotypes 
I had internalised, I recalled the insecurity I had felt when watching football 
matches at the stadium in Stolac, which is only used by Croats. I had thought 
that all these Croat spectators looked the same, with their military haircuts and 
arrogant grins. I also remembered the nervousness I had felt when sitting in 
Croat cafés or walking in Croat-dominated parts of Stolac in the evening, in 
contrast to the feeling of security I felt in Muslim areas. I often felt that Croatian 
shop clerks were unfriendly, and I felt hate and anger watching Croats drive by 
in their big, expensive Mercedes. Some of these feelings were probably gener-
ated by the misery I saw among the Muslims for which the Croats had been 
responsible, and the horrible stories I heard in Stolac about the Croat misdeeds. 
However, I also think that simply being among Muslims in Stolac had caused 
some of these stereotypical reactions to become a part of me. 
For these reasons, I find it reasonable to assume that ethnic stereotyping 
does exist among the Muslims of Stolac at a level too deep for me to objectify. I 
will therefore turn to the generalisations I can objectify and see how such eth-
nic stereotypes relate to specific situations. I begin with a list of related negative 
categories used to describe and generalise about the Croats one wants to criti-
cise: HDZ, nationalist, war-criminal, violent, fascist, rich, corrupt, criminal, 
veliki Hrvati (‘big Croats’), arrogant, undemocratic, Ustashe, exile-Croat, nonc-
onciliatory/provocative. In what follows, I will elaborate on the most important 
of these categories.
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HDZ
The HDZ (Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica; the Croatian Democratic Union) 
is a prominent player both in local politics and also in the Muslims’ catego-
risations. To the Muslims, the HDZ is much more than a political party. It is 
the quintessence of Croatian discrimination, corruption, violence, fascism, un-
compromising attitude and nationalism. Therefore, saying that ‘the Croats are 
all members of the HDZ’ is a strongly negative and ethnically charged utter-
ance. But at the same time, it also expresses a resignation on Muslims’ behalf. In 
their daily life, they long for progress in relation to coexistence with the Croats, 
work opportunities, the economy, political stability, etc. But more often than 
not, they experience retrogression, sudden outbursts of violence, nationalist 
manifestations, scandals of corruption, and economic recession. So saying that 
all Croats are members of the HDZ is not primarily a declaration that all Croats 
are fascist; rather it is a way to say that they do not try to change the present bad 
situation in an active way. For instance after the general election in November 
2000, when 90 % of the Croatian vote had fallen to the HDZ, some Muslims 
felt betrayed by the Croats. The election confirmed their belief that the Croats 
either did not want to resist, or did not have the courage to resist the nationalist 
politics that had ruined the country. In short, identifying Croats with the HDZ 
is directed both at the Croats’ passivity and their active misdeeds. Furthermore, 
it is a way for the Muslims to criticise Croats for being easy to manipulate. 
Suljeman’s reply when I asked him if the war had changed people’s mentality 
confirms this interpretation: 
No! That’s my opinion. It is not easy to change one’s mentality, maybe the 
young and the children. Maybe it happened for the small children, because 
they grew up in such times. It is easy to convince a Croat child who goes in a 
Croat school that they have to learn to speak Croatian and learn the Croatian 
history. Most of them are confused. 
In January 2000, there were demonstrations in Split (Croatia) against the trial 
of the Croatian officer Mirko Norac, who was accused of having killed civilian 
Serbs in 1991 in the village of Gospic in Croatia. I watched the demonstrations 
on TV while one of my informants laughingly commented: “Look, there are 
lots of Herzegovinians, [he knew them by their banners], the HDZ arranges 
the demonstrations and gives ignorant farmers a free journey and KM50 (€25) 
if they participate.”
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The church
The Catholic Church is also depicted by Muslims as a major manipulator of 
the Croats, in close cooperation with the HDZ. They say that on Sundays the 
priests tell the Croats how to vote, what to say, and what to think. Related to this 
is the view that Croats are not really true believers, they only pretend to be. As 
some Muslims say ‘God is only one.’ This saying means that it does not matter 
what God you believe in, the important thing is that you believe, as true believ-
ers will always behave righteously towards their fellow men. The crimes of the 
Croats against the Muslims are therefore proof of the weakness of their faith. 
Muhamed made the following associations:
After the Second World War, the Chetniks left something in the Serbs, and 
Ustashe left something in the Croats. And even though this war is over, many 
people have been killed, and everything could happen again. Like when you 
are weeding, if you don’t remove the roots it can grow again, the right thing is 
to remove the roots, but this hasn’t been done after this war. Right now, if all 
the UN forces were to withdraw, the problems would come again. That’s how 
it is. We are sick and tired of this. But I don’t think it is the same with them 
[the Croats], that’s the kind of people they are, that’s the truth. They love nei-
ther Muslims nor Serbs, nor Englishmen, nor Americans, nor Chinese, nor 
Danes, nor Finns, they only love themselves…They want to show the whole 
world that they are the greatest Catholics in the world. A real Catholic is what 
you are in your soul, you cannot show that. You just have to go to church and 
pray to your God and be a decent human being, and in that way, you show 
yourself. For instance if I take a gun and shoot a couple of people and go to the 
mosque and say Allahu Akbar [Allah is great] and then I am forgiven…but it 
doesn’t work that way.
‘Pure fascism’
The Croats are perceived as being generally better off than the Muslims, tak-
ing all the jobs and controlling the local political scene. Despite this, Muslims 
say that Croats are always complaining of discrimination by the ‘international 
community’. This is felt to be a provocation by the Muslims of Stolac, since 
they consider themselves the ones who suffered and who still face severe dis-
crimination. At the time of the election in November 2000, the HDZ made a 
very controversial election poster with the slogan: Opredeljenje ili istrebljenje 
(Determination or extermination). The OHR banned the poster a week before 
the election for being too provocative and aggressive. Some of the posters in 
Mostar were removed, or white semi-transparent pieces of paper were placed 
over the second part of the slogan. Nevertheless, in many other places, the post-
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ers were not removed and fliers printed with the same slogan were abundant. 
The symbolism of the poster focused on the threat against Croat national iden-
tity, represented by what was seen as forced coexistence with the other ethnic 
groups, and the inability to express and maintain Croat national characteris-
tics. From this nationalist viewpoint, it was the Croats who were the victims. 
The slogan was also an attempt by HDZ leaders to restore ethnic loyalty in a 
period when HDZ domination was decreasing (Grandits 200). One evening 
I talked to Nihad about this poster, and this is how I recalled the conversation 
afterwards:
Nihad: It is a provocation. Have you seen the poster with the slogan Opredeljenje ili 
istrebljenje? What is that? It plays on people’s fear: extermination [istrebljenje]. 
We are the ones who were exterminated. They are fascists. But the slogan has 
been forbidden. Nicolas [my second name], have you seen the crosses put up 
in different places [the three-metre-tall white or grey concrete crosses placed 
in the countryside in Herzegovina].
TK: Yes I have seen them, those white ones along the road?
Nihad: Yes, and in front of the municipal office [opština], why do they have to do 
it? If they want them in their garden or on their houses it is up to them, but 
not these public places, why do they have to do it? It is simple provocation. 
When I was in prison camp, we were forced to kiss the Croatian flag, and it 
was painted on our foreheads. The old man Rizvanbegovic, they painted a 
cross on his forehead. Who do they think they are? And the street names, they 
are changed, before the road was called Begovinska now its name is Banovin-
ska. It is pure fascism [čisti fašizam].
He then went on talking about the day when he was picked up by Croatian 
soldiers and placed in prison camp.
Croat nature
Specific experiences can lead Muslims to invoke negative Croat character traits, 
such as deceitfulness or moral cowardice. One central experience is, naturally, 
the feeling of betrayal. Once trusted friends and acquaintances suddenly let 
people down, either by participating in the violent expulsion of the Muslims or 
simply by failing to act, even to warn those they knew. Such deceit is difficult to 
come to terms with. Sometimes Muslims explain this shift in attitude by ascrib-
ing it to the Croat mentality, along the lines of, ‘They let us down because they 
are that kind of people and we were stupid to trust them.’ Once Safet told me 
about an episode from the local post office where he had been to get his driv-
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er’s licence. The clerk working there was an old Croat acquaintance. Safet was 
therefore astonished when he was formally asked to give his name. “But you 
know me”, Safet responded: “and then he asked me about my name once again.” 
Safet’s friends were also amazed; they know that before the war Safet and this 
man had coffee together several times.
Safet: When I was caught, and was sitting on the truck, I saw him driving the car 
behind us.
Sernad: We have had coffee with thousands [meaning we had many Serbian and 
Croatian friends].
Safet: When the war started, he [this Croat] said that Muslims are good and Serbs 
evil, šta ćeš? [what can you do?]
Omer: Do you remember when I told you that Croats are not good? 
The last sentence is Omer’s way of indicating that he knew that the Croats were 
bad all along, and that they always will be. Today, distrust is very pronounced 
between Stolac Muslims and Croats. When I asked Muslims whether it was 
possible for the two groups to live together again, many responded that it was 
too soon. The feeling of not being able to trust Croats is one of the major obsta-
cles to (re)building relations with them. In addition to being deceitful, Croats 
are also sometimes depicted as born nationalists or as having a tradition for 
committing genocide, as expressed in the following excerpt from an interview 
with a father and his son. Here history is used as a frame of reference linking up 
Croat atrocities in the Second World War and in the recent war.
Aziz: During the Second World War exactly the same happened to the Serbs here 
in Stolac as has happened to us now from the Croatian side. The Croats caught 
the Serbs and threw them in big mass graves in the ground. For instance they 
tied together thirty people and threw them in these holes, and that’s why they 
escaped from the Croats during this war.
Senad: It happened in ‘41 and ‘42.
Aziz: During Second World War the Croats killed a lot of Serbs from the Stolac 
area, and during this war they did nearly the same to us.
The Muslims are confident about their own righteousness, and some believe 
that the Croats must also understand they have behaved inexcusably, but are 
just too ashamed to admit it. Feeling this way is part of the Muslims’ attempt to 
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piece together their world. Right and wrong still exist, even in the minds of the 
Croats, even though the war has made one doubt. 
Muhammed: I don’t want you to think that we are lying to you. If you sit down 
with a Croat family, they may tell you something totally different, therefore 
it would be the best to take a Croat family living in Stolac and a Muslim one 
also living here, then both families can tell each other what they have to tell. 
I believe every Muslim family would agree to such a conversation, but no 
Croatian families would.
Mensur: Sure.
Muhammed: They wouldn’t go along with it because they are ashamed. 
Context-dependent condemnations
Fierce statements resting on ethnic stereotypes are often expressed during talks 
about nationalism, war-related violence, and post-war political discrimination. 
The fact that a Muslim says, for instance, that ‘all Croats are fascists’, or that 
‘they will never change’, therefore does not demonstrate anything. It is impor-
tant to take such utterances in their context and to know what the same person 
says about Croats under different circumstances. Sometimes Stolac Muslims 
state that all Croats are and have always been fascists, and at other times they 
insist that you cannot group them all together because only Croats coming 
from outside Stolac cause trouble. This suggests that even though the war and 
war-related violence have clearly carved out different ethnic identities, these 
identities remain complex, fragmented, inconsistent, and very much related to 
the situation in which they are employed and in which they function as order-
ing devices. I shall give some examples where the relevance of such contexts 
as nationalism, war-related violence and post-war political discriminations are 
particularly visible.
One day, I was having coffee with Nusret and his father in their house. 
Nusret’s father was talking about classical Bosnian architecture. Then on a sud-
den impulse he fetched a book from his bookshelf which documented the mas-
sacres of Muslims committed by the Germans and the Chetniks during the 
Second World War. The book was published in 1991. It was a horrifying read. 
The inhabitants of entire villages were killed: the old, the young, everybody. 
Small children were thrown in the air and run through with bayonets. Nusret’s 
father showed me the names and age of the victims; everything was systemati-
cally registered in the book. Nusret carefully attended his father’s words. His 
father showed his grandfather’s name, as well as the names of other members 
of his family who were massacred in a village not far away. He showed me pic-
001_316_post-war.indd   176 14/04/08   22:04:49
Denne side er købt på www.ebog.dk og er omfattet af lov om ophavsret. Uanset evt. aftale med Copy-Dan er det ikke tilladt at kopiere eller
indscanne siden til undervisningsbrug eller erhvervsmæssig brug.
	 complexity in ethnic categorisation 1
tures of soldiers ‘practising’ throat slicing on civilians. Nusret was laughing, but 
a sad laughter indicating madness. By showing me this, Nusret’s father meant 
something like: ‘Look how crazy these Chetniks were, and still are, they are 
barbarians.’ The pictures he displayed illustrated Chetniks with the typical long 
hair and long beard. “They looked the same during this war,” Nusret comment-
ed. His father also told us about some episodes from the Second World War 
where Croatian soldiers dressed as Muslims (at that time the different ethnic 
groups dressed differently) decimated Serbian villages. They were disguised so 
that the Serbs would afterwards take revenge on the Muslims: but the trick was 
revealed because some of the survivors had noticed how the Croats addressed 
each other by their real, non-Muslim names. We then got up and Nusret asked 
if he and I should step outside in the nice weather. He then started the car 
and drove towards the Serb Republic; the unmarked border was located only a 
couple of kilometres down the road. He asked if I had been there before, I said 
“no.” “OK, let’s go” he said, “but we will stay in the car, I will not get out.” “Why 
not?” “No, it is not entirely safe.” We passed the black market in the no-man’s-
land between the Serb Republic and the Federation: “Here the criminals sell all 
kinds of things.” We continued driving and after a couple of minutes: “Now we 
are in the Serb Republic, in Chetnik-land, just look,” he was pointing at a huge 
pile of garbage by the roadside (not actually any larger than the one in his own 
street). “You can see they are different.” We drove the tour in order for me to 
see these ‘others’ that his father had been depicting just five minutes earlier with 
the book. Nusret said that he was not feeling well, that we had seen enough and 
that we should return. But the sightseeing was not over. Coming back to Stolac 
we continued through the town and stopped at a hillcrest overlooking a new 
part of the town where forty or fifty new Croat houses were under construc-
tion. Nusret: “I will show you something very symbolic, these are Croat houses 
funded by HDZ and the former power in Croatia, that is a way of doing ethnic 
cleansing.” On our way back we passed the site in the centre of town where the 
old mosque from 1519 used to be located. Nusret: “Now it is a car park, and over 
there [he pointed] where the HDZ is now holding a meeting [regarding the 
referendum of November 11, 2000, where Croats were to vote for the independ-
ence of a Croatian miniature state Herceg-Bosna], that was a Bosnian house 
before; before all these houses were Bosnian. By the way, the president of the 
  These new houses were built to accommodate some of the Croats who came from central Bos-
nia. They are situated systematically on a big piece of flat land. I was told that one never erected 
houses here before the war, because it was some of the best farming land in Stolac. The building 
project was not finished when I left Stolac; like many other of its kind it stopped when Tuđman 
died and the new government took over in Croatia.
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Bosnian Croats stated this morning that from this day forward he will have 
nothing to do with either the West or Bosnia Herzegovina.” Nusret clearly sig-
nalled with a shake of his head what he thought about that. I know that he saw 
the referendum as nothing more than a provocation. Passing the only Muslim 
hairdresser in town, he read aloud the graffiti spray-painted on the shop’s white 
wall: ‘This is not Croatian state but nonetheless Croatian property’ [Ovo nije 
hrvatska država, ali jest hrvatski prostor]. The guided tour was over and it had 
shown me the enemy in no uncertain terms, as well as the innocent victims. We 
had seen the Chetniks and we had seen the Croat fascists and their symbols. 
Knowledge is always contextual, and I am aware that this ‘sightseeing’ 
tour was an explicit statement caused by my presence as a ‘war tourist.’ But this 
does not make it untrue. The point is rather that it was not the whole truth, but 
rather part of a wide-ranging and contradictory way of categorising the ethnic 
Other. The context of the sightseeing was the stories Nusret father’s had told, 
and in addition the tour was influenced by the impressions we received driv-
ing through Stolac – seeing the spot where the mosque had been, the meeting 
attended by the HDZ elite, and the nationalist graffiti. Nusret was clearly sin-
cere in his feelings and statements denunciating the Croats and Serbs. But on 
other occasions he could also be rather neutral when talking about Croats, for 
example when he stressed that interacting with the Croats at the coast was un-
problematic. I also know for a fact that he still had a couple of Croatian friends 
in Stolac. So the stereotypical image he presented to me during the sightseeing 
tour was just one statement about the Croats among others, even though it was 
a central one.
Another example of how fierce condemnation of Croats is tied to the 
(speech) situation comes from an interview with Muhamed, a friend of his, and 
his mother. The ethnic condemnations first appeared when the talk turned to 
the subject of violence.
Muhamed: First they captured the men who were ready to take up arms, and then 
only women and small children were left. A lot of people didn’t want to leave, 
they just wanted to stay in their houses. With force they dragged them to the 
lorries, the elderly and the children, and drove them to Blagaj or Jablanica. It 
was a terrible sight. A lot of children, the elderly who didn’t have anything to 
  The message of this graffiti has to be understood in relation to the Croatian politics of ethnic 
segregation. The Croats wanted Stolac to be only for Croats. Then the Muslims started to re-
turn, their presence protected by the SFOR, and today there can be no doubt that they will stay. 
But the local HDZ do not to accept this fact; they therefore continue the segregation where it is 
possible. The graffiti can be seen as communicating something like: ‘OK, you have come back, 
you have opened a café, some shops and now this hairdresser, but Stolac is still ours!’
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eat or drink. When they were arrested the soldiers checked them to see if they 
had money or gold. They had to undress completely, they [the soldiers] took 
their golden rings and bracelets, and afterwards they had to walk ten km from 
the lorries [to Blagaj]. Most people knew that something was going to happen 
[before they were expelled]. Some were relieved, because it is hard to face the 
thought of somebody knocking at your door, beating you up and plundering 
you, every day. Maybe they might rape the women or the girls. 
Mother: All the women were searched at the school.
Friend: It happened one or two hours before they were expelled.
Mother: We had to go into a classroom where three or four Croats were sitting, and 
then they checked us. And then a girl came in, maybe fifteen, sixteen, seven-
teen years old, and she said ‘no!’ and then they said she had to take off all her 
clothes so they could check if she had money hidden in her underwear. I have 
seen such situations myself. 
Friend: They are sexual maniacs. 
Mother. There was a girl just before me and she had to take off all her clothes even 
though she was only 15 years old. When she came out she was crying and she 
told the others what they [the soldiers] had done to her. The little girl was 
TK: Was it planned or was it impulsive?
Muhamed: Everything was planned, everything. Today some of the men who did 
these things have expensive cars and they own some of the cafes in Stolac. Do 
you know how such a man will end up? Like an animal [živina, vermin]. Such 
people don’t die, they rot to death. [krepati; there is no equivalent English 
word, but humans umiru, animals krepaju].
Like Nusret, Muhamed was usually a tolerant person who tried to avoid fierce 
accusations. He just wanted to get on with his life, provide for his family and 
stay out of trouble. But the context of the speech provoked his fierce burst of 
anger directed at the Croats. 
The last example: one night the TV news had a story about some Croats 
who had mined a Partisan graveyard in Zagreb, and an HDZ politician made 
some nationalist comments justifying the mining. This incident really angered 
my hosts for several reasons. The war in Stolac had in some way started with the 
mining of the Partisan monument at the centre of Stolac, and furthermore for 
the Muslims, Tito’s Partisans were in general seen as liberators and figured as an 
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important part of their national imagining (of Yugoslavia). Finally, the destruc-
tion of the memorial was also a way of rejecting the past and the time of ethnic 
coexistence. My hosts started making generalisations like ‘fascist’, ‘bastards’, 
and so on – at that moment Croats were truly the enemy. 
‘Good Croats’
The last category I will introduce is more consciously linked to resistance. It 
relates to the identification of ‘good Croats’. It struck me how many people had 
one or two stories about some ‘good Croats’ they knew. It was as if people col-
lected such stories. I deliberately use the term ‘stories’ because they were com-
monly told in a clearly dramatic form. Here are some examples. 
I
One day when visiting Ljubica and Armin I was served some lovely white wine, 
which I commented on.
Ljubica: Yes, it is homemade, my aunt brought it, she got it from her neighbours, 
they are Croats! Yes! My aunt told me how when she was riding with Bregavat-
rans [the Muslim bus company], two Croatian women boarded the bus.
TK: Was it the first time she saw Croatian women in the bus?
Ljubica: Yes. And it was two women my aunt knew. One of them was one of her 
good friends, but it was my aunt who had to make contact [prva zvala: called 
first], they did not do it. They hadn’t talked for ten years, and my aunt said: 
‘come and sit!’ and then they talked. Now it is difficult to make the first step, 
but one side has to do it. This woman and my aunt gave birth at the same time, 
they were at the hospital together, and then my mother did not have enough 
milk in her breasts to give to her daughter, and then she was given milk by this 
Croat woman. Yes that’s how it was then, and you don’t forget such things.
II
Miho told me that he has a piece of land outside Stolac where he grows grapes. 
Luckily it was not destroyed during the war because the Croat who owns the 
neighbouring field took care of his field. A vineyard has to be continually main-
tained; otherwise it becomes useless. Miho was therefore very grateful towards 
this Croat, who also lent him some machinery when he returned, because Mi-
  The Croats who blew up the memorial, however, probably also had other motives (see e.g. Bax 
199).
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ho’s own had been stolen. What he did not mention was that this Croat har-
vested grapes from Miho’s field for many years and had probably come to think 
of it as his own – though I do not want to belittle the significance of the unprob-
lematic transfer of the land.
III
Mensur once told me about a Croatian friend who went to his house and re-
moved the furniture after Mensur and his family had been expelled in 1993. 
When Mensur returned almost five years later, the Croat gave the furniture 
back. As Mensur explained: “He knew what was going to happen [the looting 
of the Muslim houses], and that we would need the things when we returned, 
because when we would return there wouldn’t be anything, he is a good friend 
today.” On another occasion, Mensur told me about how he had in fact phoned 
this friend to ask him to remove and take care of his possessions. Nevertheless, 
Mensur reckons it was a remarkable act.
IV
This is an excerpt from my field notes:
Meliha told me yesterday that a Croat took care of her clothes and some ta-
blecloths and that she got them back after the war. It was one of these stories 
about the ‘good Croats.’ I said that it sure was a nice thing to do, and after a 
while Meliha said: “Yes, but she also took some tables and wardrobes from the 
house, and she hasn’t returned these things.” This was a new twist, not so black 
and white: obviously, this Croat had spotted an opportunity to enrich herself, 
and Meliha knows this – why then did Meliha start by telling the story of how 
the Croat had helped her? 
I do not dispute the correctness of the story. It seems that people sometimes 
deliberately omit negative aspects, but this is not the point. People could still 
choose not to speak about ‘good Croats’, or they could read events differently. 
So when informants presented me with such anecdotal accounts I saw it as a 
more or less deliberate choice which served at least two functions. First, these 
stories work against the erosion of the moral world that the war and war-related 
violence have caused. They express the idea that good and righteous action 
still persists even in a world which seems to be completely morally flawed; it is 
still possible to believe in the goodness of a fellow person, even one of differ-
ent ethnic background. Second, these stories resist the ethnic generalisations 
and stereotypes which I outlined in the previous section. The use of Croats’ 
individual names has faded away after the war at the expense of the general 
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expression ‘they’, a development some Muslims explicitly acknowledge. The 
narratives about ‘good Croats’ can be seen as working in the opposite direction, 
as attempts to reinstall the personal pronouns and personalise the relationship 
towards those Croats one still feels or wants to feel connected to. It is a strat-
egy that attempts to personalise relations which the war-related violence has 
depersonalised.
This chapter has focused on the production by Stolac Muslims of various cat-
egories of Croats. What this intra-ethnic categorisation shows is an internal 
complexity full of contrasts and differences: there are ‘evil fascists’ on one side 
and ‘good Croats’ on the other, Croats belonging to the city and Croats per-
ceived as foreigners, Croats from the beautiful Croatia and the greedy and un-
cultured ones from the countryside. Even when Stolac Muslims make fierce 
and generalising condemnations, these are rather specific and linked with dis-
cussions of violence or discrimination. It is therefore possible to view this com-
plexity as part of a Muslim counterdiscourse resisting ethnic categories: stated 
simply, the complex and fragmented way the Muslims of Stolac use the ethnic 
label ‘Croat’ is also an implicit denial of its very relevance.
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Summary of Part II
The chapters making up Part II have been the first of two steps showing how 
the Muslims of Stolac remake their unmade world (the next step is taken in 
Part III). For most people the war came as a shock. The three ethnic groups 
had lived unproblematically side-by-side, and on a daily basis ethnic affiliation 
was simply not relevant. Most people had had a job or were following a course 
of study and generally speaking had few worries. Then suddenly the war came 
like a bolt from the blue and totally destroyed people’s lives. In order to make 
some sense of it all, now that the war has ended, a central question has been: 
who are they, the ones who did this to us? I have outlined four answers to this 
question, which also constitute four categories of people. The first is politika, 
through which an abstract and morally loaded class of people is constructed to 
account for the war. Pošteni ljudi is another cultural classification, operating at 
the local and everyday level, used for evaluating concrete actions and persons. 
Thirdly, ‘people from the countryside’ and more generally ‘people without cul-
ture’ (nekultura) make up yet another non-ethnic grouping used to account for 
the war. Finally, the Muslims of Stolac distinguish between various kinds of 
Croats, identified with reference to dissimilar values and mentalities. This very 
complexity is a challenge to any monolithic representation of the Croat ethnic 
identity. 
These categorisations are part of the Muslims’ counterdiscourse, which 
argues for the possibility of future existence among the different ethnic groups. 
The element of resistance in this counterdiscourse is the shift away from ethnic 
categories towards non-ethnic cultural and moral categories in order to con-
demn actions, claim properties, explain misfortunes and changes, and make 
the world predictable and possible to live in once again. This ‘shift’ I have also 
called recontextualisations of the narratives of destruction. The resistance, or 
the recontextualisations, therefore, need to be seen in relation to the over-
whelming nationalist discourses outlined at the beginning of Part II. Here I 
showed how the nationalist politics and the war profoundly changed the land-
scape of identification at all levels of social life, and how ethnoreligious identity 
had been foregrounded in both the public and private spheres to become the 
most important identity, determining or influencing nearly all others. There 
were thus two contrasting discourses present in the lives of my informants: a 
nationalist antagonistic discourse seeking to make ethnic affiliation as well as 
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ethnic segregation the most important aspects of life, and on the other hand the 
counterdiscourse which worked to downplay ethnicity and facilitate interethnic 
coexistence. The counterdiscourse is not an ideological, deliberate or even fully 
conscious endeavour, it is rather a steady reintroduction and reshaping of al-
ready existing cultural categories. Furthermore, it is impossible to fully separate 
those situations in which categories like politika, nepošteni ljudi or ‘Croats from 
the countryside’ are used as the basis for implicit ethnic condemnation, from 
those situations in which they are used as implicit critique of the ethnicisation 
of the social landscape. This is not due to a lack of analytical tools, but because 
these two implicit and sometimes explicit tactics are interwoven and hard to 
separate, even for people themselves. Blame and exclusion of the ethnic factor 
exist simultaneously with a desire for ethnic coexistence and dissociation from 
the exclusiveness of nationalist politics and rhetoric. This tension constitutes 
one of the central features of the everyday life among the Muslims of Stolac 
in their attempts to make sense of the world, which the war and war-related 
violence have unmade, and it results in a feeling of personal and societal confu-
sion. As already stated, people may act and appear in self-contradictory ways, 
not because they are schizophrenic, but because the social situation is.
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Part III
Who are we, since this was done to us?
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Introduction to Part III
I never thought of myself as a Muslim. I don’t know how to pray, I never went 
to mosque, I’m European, like you. I do not want the Arab world to help us, I 
want Europe to help us. But now, I do have to think of myself as a Muslim, not 
in a religious way, but as a member of a people. Now we are faced with oblit-
eration, I have to understand what it is about me and my people they wish to 
obliterate. (A young Bosnian Muslim soldier; quoted in Vulliamy 1994: 5).
In Part III I examine the ways my informants identify themselves as a group. Be-
fore the war, Muslim ethnic identity was primarily related to practices embed-
ded in the routines of everyday life, partly non-conscious, and only one aspect 
of identity among others. With the war this changed. Ethnic identity became 
a matter of life or death, Muslim ethnic identity became the most important 
identity, and Muslims became much more aware of themselves as constituting 
an isolated and defined group. On the basis of these changes one might expect 
that a religiously based nationalist identity highlighting difference and arguing 
for ethnic segregation would prevail among the Muslims of Stolac, but this is 
not the case. I will analyse four different types of identification among the Mus-
lims of Stolac, making up the second half of the Muslims’ counterdiscourse. 
Taken as a whole, the identifications reflect a world characterised by complexity 
and contradictions rather than clarity and simplicity; a world that rests upon 
pre-war everyday inter-ethnic experiences and cultural categories rather than 
the more recent ideological discourses of nationalist exclusion. Inertia seems 
to be a leitmotiv.
In Chapter 4, I outlined the emergence of Yugoslav nationalism. In Chap-
ter 9, I will concentrate on the emergence of a specifically religious nationalism 
among the Bosnian Muslims before the recent war, a nationalism which inten-
sified during the course of the war itself. Familiarity with these developments 
will clarify how present group identifications among my informants form part 
of a counterdiscourse, in the sense that they do not draw on this public religious 
nationalism. In Chapter 10, I analyse pre-war ethnic identity in Bosnia Herze-
govina showing how ethnicity was a part of everyday life instead of separate 
and politicised; present Muslim identifications rest upon this pre-war habitual 
understanding of ethnicity. Chapter 11 shows how neither national nor religious 
identifications have colonised the minds of the Stolac Muslims, and Chapters 12 
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1	 post-war identification
to 14 analyse the ways the Muslims identify themselves today. In Chapter 15, I 
introduce a theme that complicates the analysis presented in previous chapters: 
this chapter shows how the Muslims’ use of ‘the role of the victim’ clearly sets 
the different ethnic groups apart, thus running counter to the counterdiscur-
sive ideals of ethnic tolerance and coexistence.
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Chapter 9 
The rise of Muslim national  
identity in Bosnia Herzegovina
This chapter outlines some of the important moments in the history of Bosnia 
Herzegovina central to the rise of Bosnian Muslim national identity. The Ot-
toman conquest of 143 resulted in the imposition of Islam in Eastern Europe. 
The occupation by the Austro-Hungarian Empire of Bosnia Herzegovina in 
1-191 motivated a politicised ethnoreligious Muslim identity. The politics of 
Tito supported a secularisation of Muslim identity. Finally, the period from the 
death of Tito in 190 up to and including the recent war saw the conjunction 
of religion and nationality for the first time in Muslim religious-political life. 
The outline of the rise of Muslim nationalism in political life will not stand 
alone. Using anthropological pre-war data, I will outline the central elements in 
everyday Muslim identification. This analysis shows that although the mainte-
nance of ethnoreligious differences was central to Muslim everyday identifica-
tion, such differences were not considered primary. They were perceived not 
as a hindrance to interaction but rather as the very foundation for coexistence. 
Furthermore, ethnoreligious identity was established by practices related more 
to embedded localistic value systems than to objectified nationalist religious 
symbols. This traditional pre-war way of creating, preserving and respecting 
ethnic differences is a cultural resource that the Muslims of Stolac draw upon 
today in their attempt to make sense of the war and post-war situation and 
identify the ethnic Other and themselves.
The introduction of Islam
In 143 Bosnia was conquered by the Turks, and Islam and Turkish traditions, 
values and customs were introduced to the area, and by the end of the 1th 
century a majority of the Bosnian population had become Muslim. The writ-
ing of the history of the Bosnian Muslims has focused on how and why this 
conversion and transformation of their society took place, and historians have 
attempted to answer the question of what the Muslims were before they became 
Muslims. Especially the last question has been rather politicised, as it has led 
to a discussion of the authenticity and origin of the existing Muslims of Bosnia 
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190	 post-war identification
Herzegovina. Nationalist-minded Serbs and Croats have made claims on the 
Muslims and the territory of Bosnia Herzegovina. Some Croats maintain that 
Muslims in reality are ‘islamicised’ Croats, while some Serbs hold that Bosnian 
rulers were at one time vassals of the Serbian kings. And according to Muslim 
nationalists and others promoting the idea of an independent Bosnia Herze-
govina, the Muslims were originally Bogomils.1 Maintaining that Bosnian Mus-
lims are descendants of the Bogomils legitimises contemporary claims about 
the territorial and cultural uniqueness of the Bosnian Muslims. The process of 
Muslim nation-building that these claims have contributed to is seen as follow-
ing a course similar to that of Serbs and Croats, although with a delay. I will not 
discuss the authenticity of the Bosnian Muslims. Instead, I start my account 
1  In the early Middle Ages – primarily due to political controversies with Hungary, which was 
trying to gain control of parts of Bosnia with the support of the Pope – the Bosnians broke with 
international Catholicism and established their own church. The status and theology of this 
relatively independent Bosnian church have been highly debated in modern times, and his-
torical interpretations have often been highly political. In 19-0, the Croat historian Franjo 
Rački attempted to prove that this Church was derived from a Bulgarian heretical sect called 
the Bogomils, which preached a Manichaean dualist theology in which man only could free 
himself from the temptations of Satan by following a highly ascetic way of life. The theory was 
popular. First, it could explain the mass conversion of Bosnians to Islam at the time of the 
Ottoman invasion. It was argued that after having held out for centuries against the Catholic 
and Orthodox Christian churches, which made claims on the Bosnian church, these Bogomils 
finally decided to convert to Islam. Second, it could account for the many medieval grave-
stones (stecći) found in many parts of Bosnia Herzegovina. These unique stones with special 
engravings were then interpreted as a distinct Bogomil art form. The theory, however, has been 
highly criticised since. Today it is understood that many factors were involved in the spread of 
Islam, and one of these was in fact the absence of strong religious organisations. Furthermore, 
members of all three religious communities who could afford it erected the engraved stones. 
Instead of speaking of Bogomils, one should therefore rather talk about the Bosnian Church, 
which probably never had a huge membership. It was more of a monastic organisation than 
a Church with a strong hierarchy. However, sources from that period and area are extremely 
sparse (Bringa 1994; Friedman 199; Donia and Fine 1994; Malcom 1994). The Bogomil theory 
is nevertheless still popular, especially among Muslim nationalists (Höpken 1994; see for ex-
ample Karić 1999: -99, for a contemporary philosophical-political identification with the 
Bogomils).
  Recent scholarly studies of the history of Bosnia Herzegovina have had as their hidden (and 
sometimes more open) agenda an attempt to legitimise the existence of the Muslims and/or 
Bosnians of Bosnia Herzegovina and their legitimate demand for an independent state by re-
ferring to both the long existence and the special cultural traditions of the area, especially the 
tradition of coexistence (Pinson 1993a; Donia and Fine 1994; Malcom 1994; Friedman 199). 
These studies were published in a period during the war when the Muslims in reality were in 
danger of annihilation, and when the international community was reluctant to respond to the 
Muslim cry for help. As the editor of one such book writes in the introduction: “One of the 
goals of this conference [upon which the book is based] was to present sufficient historical ma-
terial to show that this group [the Muslims of Bosnia Herzegovina] has existed long enough to 
warrant serious consideration by the world”. This chapter makes use of these studies, but I am 
aware that they are also a part of the present politicised construction of the past. See Allcock 
(2000: 323) for a similar remark.
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of the rise of Muslim national identity in Bosnia Herzegovina at the time of 
the decline of the Ottoman Empire, focusing on the Muslim elites and their 
self-understanding at that time, and then move on to the Austro-Hungarian 
occupation.
The mass conversion to Islam during the Ottoman rule should rather be 
called an acceptance (Donia and Fine 1994: 44) because it was rather superfi-
cial: people did not change their customs profoundly, instead merging Islamic 
symbols and practices with already existing Christian practices, a syncretism 
which was accepted by the Turks (Velikonja 2003). In any case, the Christian 
church was not strong in Bosnia Herzegovina, so one cannot really talk about 
the changes in the Bosnian practices as conversion per se. Three factors were 
central for the widespread acceptance of Islam by the population of Bosnia 
Herzegovina. Economic opportunism was one factor. One central institution 
was the system of boy-tribute, where young boys were either kidnapped or 
given up voluntarily to be raised as true Muslim believers inside the Ottoman 
system. In return they were given an education, which meant that they could 
later return to their villages as high-ranking soldiers or as officials. Secondly, 
slaves taken from other parts of the Balkans were often given their freedom if 
they converted to Islam. And finally, the impressive Muslim cities of the Otto-
man Empire – among them Sarajevo – with their beauty, sophisticated lifestyle 
and wealth, probably tempted some to convert to Islam in order to become 
part of this way of life (Malcom 1994: 43-9; Babuna 1999: 19). In 10, in the 
Bosnian Province 0,12 out of a total population of 1,4,399 were Muslims 
(McCarthy 1993: 5).
But what characterised Bosnian Muslim identity under the Ottomans? 
According to Friedman (199), Bosnian Muslims were caught between two 
different set-ups. On the one hand, they felt some kind of solidarity with the 
Turkish conquerors. They shared the same religion, and more importantly, the 
Ottomans were the guarantors of Muslim feudal holdings, in return for which 
the Muslim landowners supported the suppression of anti-Turkish rebellion. 
On the other hand, Bosnian Muslims exhibited a local patriotism that set them 
apart from the Turks, making the Bosnian Muslims mistrusted and not ful-
ly accepted. This is reflected in the use of names. The Bosnian Muslims were 
called (by the Turks) and called themselves Bošnjak, a name that emphasises 
their regional origins and interests. Bosnian Christians called them Turci to 
distinguish them from Bosnian Christians, while the Bosnian Muslims called 
the Ottoman Turks the negative name Turkuš. But if the Bosnian Muslims 
identified themselves and were identified by the Turks as different from the 
Turks, thereby stressing their local origins, they were also set apart from their 
Christian neighbours. Being feudal landowners who often exploited their serfs 
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(kmets), who were largely Christian, they risked serf resistance. In other words 
they were caught between two exclusive identities: Bošnjak or part of the ruling 
Muslim elite (by being feudal landowners). In addition, the Bosnian Muslims 
were not even a homogeneous group internally, as tensions existed between 
Muslim landlords and Muslim serfs. The Ottoman period, therefore, was not 
characterised by a strong and coherent Muslim identity; instead the category 
‘Muslim’ was internally fragmented, split along both religious and economic 
axes. The Bosnian Muslims did develop some common cultural traits during 
Ottoman rule which distinguished them from non-Muslims in Bosnia. In ad-
dition, it is evident that there was a kind of common Bosnian Muslim class 
interest, as the landholding group was predominantly Muslim. However, these 
common traits and interests did not add up to a real ethnic self-awareness, and 
as a consequence, there were no national aspirations as such (Friedman 199: 
29-5). 
The Ottoman period did not witness any major violent conflicts in Bosnia 
until the turn of the twentieth century. The Ottoman Empire was declining, and 
in response to pressure from the European powers, the Ottomans tried to mod-
ernise Bosnia by reducing some of the privileges of the Muslim aristocracy. But 
the Muslims resisted and tried to hold on to their position, and in fact increased 
the pressure on the serfs. This provoked armed rebellions from angry peasants, 
mainly Serbs, but also some Muslims, the largest of which (15-) brought 
about the intervention of the Great Powers of Europe and the end of Ottoman 
rule. Though these peasant uprisings were economic in origin, the nature of the 
rebellion changed when Serbs began making religiously motivated attacks on 
Muslim villages, inspired by the escalating nationalism in Serbia. The Muslims 
retaliated with counterattacks on the Serbs. It was thus not until the end of Ot-
toman rule that Ottoman Bosnia witnessed its first explicitly religious armed 
conflicts, conflicts which were rooted in the worsening economic conditions of 
Bosnian serfs, most of whom were Serbs. In 1, the Austro-Hungarian Em-
pire conquered Bosnia Herzegovina, and though economic/religious conflicts 
between serf/Serbs and landowners/Muslims had been going on for some years 
by this time, it was only under Austro-Hungarian rule that a politicised Muslim 
identity really began to emerge. The different religious communities classified 
as millets had existed during Ottoman rule, but religion, or Muslim identity, 
had never been used as a basis for making political claims uniting all Muslims 
(Donia and Fine 1994: 35-1; Friedman 199: 29-5; Malcom 1994: 43-13; Mc-
Carthy 1993; Velikonja 2003).
  Velikonja, though, argues that in important ways, politicised ethnoreligious identities started 
to emerge as early as the end of the Ottoman rule.
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Austro-Hungarian rule and the emergence of a  
politicised ethnoreligious Muslim identity
The Great Powers of Europe supported the occupation of Bosnia Herzegovina 
by the Habsburg Monarchy in 1. However the Austro-Hungarians were not 
really interested in the area. Although rich in natural resources, the region was 
under-developed and unstable. But because of expanding Serbian and Croat 
nationalism and a fear that the Serbs, together with their Russian allies, would 
come to control the greater part of the Balkans, Austro-Hungary accepted the 
mandate to occupy Bosnia Herzegovina granted in The Treaty between Great 
Britain, Germany, Austria, France, Italy, Russia and Turkey, for the settlement 
of affairs in the East. The occupation did not proceed as easily as anticipated. 
Initially only the Catholics (Croats) welcomed their Austro-Hungarian co-re-
ligionists, and in fact the Catholic Church became more active than ever be-
fore under the Austro-Hungarian regime. The Serbs for their part feared that 
the occupation of Bosnia Herzegovina would be a step towards the occupation 
of Serbia, and the Muslims were rather insecure about what their new status 
would be, after belonging to the ruling class for centuries. At the end of the 
military operation Austro-Hungarian had engaged 2,000 soldiers and suf-
fered the loss of ,000. The losses of the population of Bosnia Herzegovina are 
not known (Karčić 1999: 5-0).
The Austro-Hungarians did modernise Bosnia Herzegovina. Infrastruc-
ture was developed, industries set up and education supported. Nevertheless, 
in 1910 after 30 years of occupation,  % of the population was still employed in 
agriculture. Only relatively minor land reforms were introduced, disappointing 
Bosnia’s Christian peasants and resulting in sporadic violent peasant uprisings. 
The preservation of the status quo meant that Muslims continued to represent 
the majority of landowners and free peasants, whereas Orthodox Christians 
and Catholics were mostly tenants and sharecroppers. According to the 1910 
Bosnian census, there were 10,43 landowners, 13,54 free peasants, 9, 
customary tenants and 31,41 tenants who also owned their land. Muslims con-
stituted 91 % of the landowners, 55 % of the free peasants and 4 % of tenants 
who also owned their land (Karčić 1999: -9; Malcom 1994: 140). So when the 
Muslims discovered that their new rulers would not change their privileged po-
sition in any major way, they came to support the Austro-Hungarians to some 
extent. However, the structure of the agrarian relations increasingly became a 
great source of conflict and politico-religious mobilisation of the Muslims.
Initially the Austro-Hungarians tried to promote a common Bosnian 
identity (bošnjaštvo) to counter the growing Serbian and Croatian nationalism, 
but this ideological project was never successful. Instead the Muslims slowly 
began to develop a feeling of distinctive identity as a response to the experience 
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of living under a non-Muslim regime, while trying to maintain as many privi-
leges as possible against Austro-Hungarian attempts to reduce the influence of 
the different Muslim institutions. Muslims from Mostar were the first to or-
ganise continued political action. The incentives leading these Muslims to seek 
greater political influence were religious issues, for instance some controversial 
conversions of Muslims to Catholicism. The Muslim elite transformed the dis-
comfort attached to these conversions into anti-Croat and anti-Austro-Hun-
garian protests directed against what they presented as a general repression of 
Muslim cultural and religious rights. And the protests against Austro-Hungary 
gradually increased. However, the Muslim community was still far from ho-
mogeneous and unified. Three main groups existed in this period: the intel-
lectuals, the landowners and the clerics. The complex rivalries and conflicts 
within the Muslim elite, as well as between the Muslim elite and elites of other 
ethnic groups and the Austro-Hungarian administration, contributed to the 
formation of Muslim political consciousness: the persistent discussion of what 
constituted Muslim rights and interests in relation to a non-Muslim regime and 
how these were best promoted gradually produced a politicisation of Muslim 
identity which had not existed before (Babuna 1999). 
One of the most important developments in this period was the crea-
tion of a Muslim political party in 190 (Muslimanska narodna organizacija: 
MNO). The party was formed in order to promote the interests of the Muslim 
community (mainly the landlords), but it was also encouraged by the Austro-
Hungarians, who believed that the creation of moderate political parties could 
hinder the increasing Serbian nationalism in the area, and decrease the con-
frontational line of the Serbs and the Muslims towards the regime. The result 
was the creation of a myriad of ethnically based parties in Bosnia Herzegovina. 
For the first time Muslim interests were organised, objectified and generalised 
in a formal institution (a party), instead of the interests of private Muslims being 
pursued through the exploitation of personal networks (Pinson 1993b). 
Although the MNO campaigned for cultural, educational and religious 
autonomy for all Muslims in Bosnia Herzegovina, it represented the views of 
the landowning class to a great extent. For instance, the MNO cooperated with 
wealthier Serb peasants to prevent land reforms that had been promised to the 
peasants, including the Muslims. These kinds of alliances greatly undermined 
cohesion among Bosnian Muslims. As Friedman (1995: 2) concludes, “The 
earliest Muslim political party was thus controlled by those who deemed class 
interests, rather than solely communal [ethnic] interests, to be paramount.”
 When the ethnically based parties were created in 190, nationalist move-
ments in independent Serbia and Croatia respectively influenced both Ser-
bian and Croatian political parties in Bosnia. Both groups asserted the same 
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– though mutually exclusive – claim on the Muslim population, maintaining 
they were Islamic Serbs or Croats, and that the territory of Bosnia Herzegovina 
should therefore be joined with Serbia or Croatia. Neither the Serbs nor the 
Croats constituted a majority in Bosnia Herzegovina, so without the Muslims 
they would have difficulties making territorial claims. The Muslims alternated 
between calling themselves part of the Serbian or the Croatian nation, but the 
ultimate failure of the Serbs and the Croats to represent Muslim identity speaks 
of the existence of a relatively solid Muslim identity and of specific Muslim in-
terests. The Muslim political discourse was centred on religion and Muslim cul-
tural rights, and the MNO managed to obtain relative religious autonomy for 
the Muslim community in 1909. However, despite the existence of an emerging 
Muslim self-consciousness, the Bosnian Muslims did not tie Muslims’ cultural 
and religious rights to national consciousness, as they lacked the nationalist 
outlook which would have been encouraged by an autonomous or semiautono-
mous neighbouring political entity. Instead they continued to promote multi-
nationalism, as they believed this was in their best interests. From the outset 
the actual politics of the Bosnian Muslims were thus very pragmatic, a feature 
which in fact endured up until the late 190s (Pinson 1993b; Donia and Fine 
1994: 93-120; Malcom 1994: 13-5; Friedman 199: 5-9; Babuna 1999). 
Several commentators see this political pragmatism as a hallmark of Bos-
nian Muslim mentality. They identify a Bosnian Muslim cultural core or tradi-
tion which is characterised by tolerance, a tolerance which was “betrayed” dur-
ing the recent war (Donia and Fine 1994). This account is a simplification. In-
terethnic tolerance existed on the everyday level, and political pragmatism was 
an important element in the strategy of Muslim politicians, especially when 
trying to manoeuvre between Croat and Serbian national claims. But as we 
shall see, radical and dogmatic (at times pan-Islamic) religious thoughts also 
began to play a central part in the political life of the Bosnian Muslims.
The communist regime and the  
secularisation of Muslim identity
In the 1920s and 1930s Muslim religious identity, which had experienced relative 
freedom during the Austro-Hungarian period (ending in 191), was increas-
ingly threatened by the territorial and institutional claims made by both the 
Serbs and Croats in The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The Bosnian 
Muslims increasingly lacked a strong identity and a clear perspective. In this 
climate of repression, a relatively radical pan-Islamic group, the Young Muslims 
(Mladi Musliman), emerged for the first time. They advocated the creation of 
a greater Islamic state and the reawakening of Islam in Bosnia Herzegovina. 
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The Second World War put a halt to the group’s activities, but after the war 
– during which Muslim political allegiances had been rather changeable – the 
Young Muslims re-emerged in more than thirty cities in Bosnia Herzegovina. 
Their success, however, was short-lived and their existence was threatened by 
the communist regime’s repression of all religious communities after the war. 
Muslim religious and educational institutions were closed down and privileges 
linked to the 1909 Statute of Autonomy were attacked. In the agrarian reform 
of 194, the Muslims’ privileges linked to the semi-feudal agricultural system 
were abolished. Together with the state’s confiscation of clerical property, this 
deprived the Muslims’ confessional community of its material basis. Instead 
of pursuing an abstract pan-Islamic state, therefore, the Young Muslims con-
centrated on fighting the new repressive state and trying to create a Muslim 
national consciousness (Bougarel 199: 533-5; Banac 1993: 129-41). The Young 
Muslims were soon attacked. The first arrest came in 194, and with the trial of 
the principal leaders of the group4 in Sarajevo in 1949, which led to the death 
sentence for four others, the organisation broke up (Bougarel 199; Friedman 
199: 14-; Höpken 1994). 
At this time the communists were very wary of any national uprising which 
might undermine the fragile post-war situation. Muslims, therefore, were not 
recognised as one of the constituent groups of Yugoslavia on an equal footing 
with the Serbs and the Croats. They were only accepted as a minority popula-
tion with special cultural and religious characteristics. This policy is reflected in 
the censuses from the post-war period. Though it was possible for Muslim re-
spondents to identify their religion as Orthodox Christian, Catholic or Muslim, 
their nationality was to be designated as Serb, Croat or ‘undetermined’. That 
is, Muslims were Muslims by faith whereas their nationality was either Serb or 
Croat, the category ‘undetermined’ implying that they had not yet settled their 
relationship. Looking at the census figures it is not clear to what degree and in 
what way (or if) the Muslims in general perceived themselves as constituting a 
coherent national group, but it is clear that they did perceive themselves as re-
ligiously distinct and that they did not recognise themselves as Serbs or Croats. 
In the 194 census 90,094 of Bosnia Herzegovina’s people classified themselves 
4  Among them Alija Izetbegovic.
  As stated in the Prologue, the English word ‘nation’ does not fully cover the status of the differ-
ent groups in Yugoslavia. The Bosnian term narod – more or less the same as the German volk 
– rather means a people, political group, or Nation.
  Those who were members of the Communist Party were forced to align themselves with one 
of the other of the two nationalities (Höpken 1994: 229).
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as Muslim by faith; of these ,34 chose the option of registering themselves 
as ‘Muslim undetermined’ (Donia and Fine 1995: 1). 
The communist regime’s constitution of Bosnia Herzegovina also reflect-
ed the uncertain status of the Bosnian Muslims. After some intense disputes, 
it was agreed that Bosnia Herzegovina should be given the status of a federal 
republic instead of merely an autonomous province like Vojvodina and Kosovo. 
But where the other five republics were defined as republics consisting of one 
nation, Bosnia Herzegovina was a republic made up of ‘parts of the Serbian and 
Croatian nation as well as the Bosnian Muslims’ (Höpken 1994: 22). 
Then in the beginning of the 1950s, the policies of the Communist Party 
concerning the Muslim community changed somewhat. These ‘undetermined’ 
people were now to make up the core of the party’s new strategy of promoting 
Yugoslavism, a general national identity for all the people of Yugoslavia. The 
option ‘Muslim, undetermined’ was changed in the census form to ‘Yugoslav, 
undetermined’, and results of the census from 1953 show that the majority of the 
Muslims chose this category. The attempt by the League of Communists of Yu-
goslavia (LCY) to create an overall nationality was soon abandoned, however, 
and in the 190s their approach to nationalism took a new direction. Concur-
rently with the suppression of the more radical forms of Bosnian Muslim politi-
cal organisation (such as the Young Muslims) and the general ban on explicit 
public religious expression, the communist regime embarked on a strategy of 
supporting another branch of Muslim political life. The communists’ legalisa-
tion and support of Islamska Vjerska Zajednica at one and the same time ‘creat-
ed’ a Muslim community that was both secular and supportive of the commu-
nist regime. Islamska Vjerska Zajednica, renamed Islamiska Zajednica (Islamic 
Community) in 199, became the official religious representative of the Muslims 
of Bosnia Herzegovina, or as Bougarel writes: “It became for the Muslims of 
Bosnia Herzegovina a veritable substitute national institution” (199: 540). The 
secularisation of Muslim political life represented by this development posed a 
problem for the more devout Muslims, particularly the former members of the 
Young Muslims, who had by now completed their prison sentences. The slow 
but sure integration of this branch of more radical and religiously devout Mus-
lims into the Islamic Community created two distinct wings in Muslim politics: 
a secular Muslim nationalism on the one side, and a revival of Islamic religious 
belief on the other (Bougarel 199: 540-3; Malcom 1994: 200). 
Although the communists supported the secularisation of the Muslims, 
Muslims still did not constitute a nationality in constitutional terms. Finally, in 
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19	 post-war identification
the 190s, things started to change. A first sign of the new recognition came in 
191, when Muslims in the census could declare themselves ‘Muslim in the eth-
nic sense’, though they were not yet fully ‘national’ like the Serbs and the Croats. 
A lot of discussion then followed in the LCY concerning the future status of 
the Muslims of Yugoslavia, and in 19 the central committee of the League of 
Communists of Bosnia Herzegovina stated that: “Experience has shown the 
damage of various forms of pressure and insistence, in the earlier period, that 
Muslims declare themselves ethnically to be Serbs or Croats because, as was 
demonstrated still earlier and as contemporary socialist experience continues 
to show, the Muslims are a separate nation” (in Ramet 1992b: 19). 
Then finally in 191, the nationality ‘Muslim’ was formally recognised in 
the census form. In a way this was the ultimate fusion of religion and nation-
ality for the Muslims of Bosnia Herzegovina – a fusion made by Orthodox 
Christian (Serb) and Catholic (Croat) Bosnians’ nationalist movements of the 
late 19th century – and it was a rather unique constellation among the world’s 
contemporary national identities. As Banac (1993: 14) has noted, the peculiar 
composition of Bosnian Muslim socialist nationhood allowed one to be a Mus-
lim by nationality and a Jehovah’s Witness by religion (as is commonplace in 
the town of Zavidovići). The designation of Muslim nationhood was fully ac-
cepted by the Muslim population, as can be seen in the census of 191, 191 and 
1991 (Donia 1995: 1; Ramet 1992b: 10).
The recognition of Muslim national identity was part of the communist 
regime’s strategy of secularising the Muslims. In addition, it was related to the 
regime’s new views on national identity in this period of increasing regionalisa-
tion of power (see Chapter 4). It was also an attempt to create a buffer against 
the nationalistic aspirations of the Serbs and the Croats. The elevation of Mus-
lim religious identity to the status of Muslim national identity, however, was 
not easily accepted by the Serbs and the Croats. For one thing, federal offices 
and positions were allotted in accordance with a nationality-based propor-
tional representation. The new constitutional status of the Muslims, therefore, 
introduced a new factor of power in Yugoslav politics. In Bosnia Herzegovina 
it improved the political influence of the Muslims and decreased that of the 
Serbs and the Croats. Serbs had yet another more specific reason to resent the 
  Malcom claims that a major reason for the improvement in the regime’s treatment of Islam 
was due to Tito’s new ‘non-aligned’ foreign policy. Several of his potential international part-
ners came from Muslim-dominated countries. Muslim identity suddenly became important 
for working in diplomacy, even though these Muslim diplomats were also members of the 
Communist Party (Malcom 1994: 19-).
  Of the 1.9 million Muslims in Yugoslavia (.9 % of the total population),  % lived in Bosnia 
Herzegovina according to the 191 census (Bringa 1995: 24).
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Muslims’ new political influence. In the 1950s and 190s, Bosnia Herzegovina 
had experienced a period of underdevelopment and poverty in relation to the 
other Yugoslav republics. As a consequence a lot of Bosnian Serbs had migrated 
to Serbia during these years. With the new census model the Serbs suddenly 
found themselves only the second largest population in Bosnia Herzegovina, 
with the Muslims as the largest (Friedman 199: 143-; Ramet 1992b: 1-; 
Höpken 1994: 231-9; Malcom 1994: 193-212). 
The recognition of the Muslims as constituting a national group was an 
impetus for a reawakening of Muslim religious identity. And at the beginning of 
the 190s, both pan-Islamic ideas and Bosnian Muslim nationalism flourished. 
Advocates for the latter argued for the formation of a Muslim nation in Bosnia 
Herzegovina, whereas the others focused more on strengthening Islam among 
the Muslims of Bosnia Herzegovina (Ramet 1992b: 14-; Bougarel 199: 543-). 
The secular wing of the Bosnian Muslims continued to be supported by the LCY, 
but the period also witnessed a general national awakening in Yugoslavia. As a 
result, the tensions in the Islamic Society between secular and more dogmati-
cally religious trends grew. This development worried the Communist regime. 
Any signs of religiously motivated politics among the Muslims as well as the 
Serbs alarmed the Bosnian republican government. They feared that a growth 
in Muslim religious politics would provoke and increase Serbian nationalism. 
The government’s anxiety about growing religious and national identification 
on the political scene among the Bosnian Muslims and in Yugoslavia in gen-
eral led in 193 to an attack on Muslim activists in Bosnia Herzegovina. Thir-
teen people, among them Alia Izetbegovic (later to become president of Bosnia 
Herzegovina) and three other former members of the Young Muslims, were 
tried for ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ and ‘Muslim nationalism’ and condemned to 
heavy prison sentences (Bougarel 199: 543-; Malcom 1994: 20-). As Ramet 
notes regarding the incoherent policy of the LCY towards the Muslims in this 
period: “The LCY, which feared the identification of religion and nationality, 
wanted to have it both ways: namely, to derive a new nationality from religion 
[the Muslims], but yet to deny that derivation and suppress demands based on 
it.” (Ramet 1992b: 1). The attack on the Muslim doctrinaire religious wing in 
Bosnia Herzegovina had an intimidating effect, and it consolidated the position 
of the promoters of a secular Muslim national identity – a situation which was 
not to last for very long. 
  The question remains of whether these Muslims were just scapegoats in a larger political puz-
zle, and whether Izetbegovic’s unpublished Islamic Declaration (completed thirteen years be-
fore) – treated by the LCY as a Muslim religious nationalist manifesto – was more than just a 
general discussion of politics and Islam without reference to Bosnia Herzegovina. 
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The SDA and the emergence of Muslim  
nationalism in the post-Tito period
Since the fall of the Ottoman regime, the Muslims of Bosnia Herzegovina had 
primarily been viewed as a religious group possessing the same privileges as 
other confessional groups: they could build mosques, develop and maintain re-
ligious institutions, educate according to Islam, and so on. Only in 191 were 
they officially recognised in the census as constituting a nation, that is, a political 
group or a people. Only then did they come to represent a population with rights 
and privileges. However, Tito’s secularisation of the Muslims of Yugoslavia had 
been a success. The rather substantial surveys investigating the religiosity of the 
citizens of Yugoslavia which were conducted from the 1950s to the beginning 
of the 1990s show an unmistakable trend towards a diminishment in the power 
of religion over people. In 1953, . % saw themselves as religious believers, 
whereas by 19 only 39 % did the same. Furthermore, religious elements in na-
tional identification were giving way to more secular aspects of life. These trends 
were most prominent among the young, who adopted the anti-religious views 
of the Titoist state most easily (Cohen 199: 4-55; Velikonja 2003).10 From the 
1950s up until the 190s, the Muslims’ interests were primarily secular, and many 
of Tito’s most loyal followers were to be found among this group of secularised 
Muslims. Religious Muslims played only a secondary role in political life, and 
attempts at merging religion and national interest were harshly suppressed by 
the Communist regime, as seen in the trial in 193. During this period, being 
Muslim by nationality was not the same as being Muslim by faith. 
At the end of the 190s and the beginning of the 1990s, the situation began 
to be reversed. Yugoslavian society was disintegrating, and the country expe-
rienced religious reawakening, party pluralism, a centralisation of power, and 
most of all a surge of nationalism (see Chapter 4). Just before the coming of the 
war and during the course of the war a rather sudden fusion of religion and 
nationality emerged among the Bosnian Muslims. Muslim national identity 
became increasingly defined on the background of faith (Islam), and religious 
institutions came to play a central role in the nationalist mobilisation of the 
Muslim community. In short, an explicit Muslim national identity emerged for 
the first time during this period.
In 1990, inter-ethnic relations among the people of Bosnia Herzegovina 
were becoming more and more tense, and the multi-party election led to the 
emergence of distinct political parties representing each of the Republic of Bos-
10  Even though the importance of religion decreased throughout these years, ethnoreligious 
identity was still an important factor in people’s lives. This may seem contradictory. In the 
next section, however, I will show how such ethnoreligious identities in embedded everyday 
practice are rather different than when they exist in the politicised sphere of public life.
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nia Herzegovina’s three ethnic communities. This represented a rather crucial 
change in the formation of Muslim identity. As Bougarel (2001: 2) describes this 
development: 
The Communist period encouraged the formation of a new Muslim elite […] 
and the crystallization of national identities, which until then had remained 
unclear and fluid as shown by the case of the Bosnian Muslims and the Al-
banians in Yugoslavia. But it was only after the collapse of the communist 
regimes in 199/90 that these social and cultural changes got their political 
expression. 
The Muslims’ ‘political expression’, the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), was 
formed in March 1990, mainly by devout religious members of the Islamic 
Community who were directly involved in Islamic religious activities. Alija 
Izetbegovic, who had been religiously engaged all his life, was head of the party. 
Though the party was not given good odds, it managed to mobilise a huge part 
of the Muslim population of Bosnia Herzegovina in only a couple of months, 
and in the election the same year the SDA got 30.4 % of the votes, while the 
Bosnian Serb nationalist party SDS got 25.2 %, and the Bosnian Croat national-
ist party HDZ 15.5 %. A collective presidency was established, consisting only of 
members from the three nationalist parties (Bougarel 199: 9-; Cohen 199: 
5-1; Malcom 1994: 21-22).11 
11  How could SDA, a nationalist party, manage to obtain the majority of the Muslims’ votes in 
such a short time? After all, only a few years before Muslims had been characterised as a very 
secular population with only little national consciousness. Bougarel’s (199, 199, 2001) answers 
seem convincing. First, if one adds Muslim votes cast for non-nationalistic parties and the 
number of Muslims who did not vote, it appears that some kind of opposition existed. Second, 
the votes for the SDA were not uniform. SDA, which was founded on a purely ideological basis 
as ‘a political alliance of the citizens of Yugoslavia belonging to the historical-cultural sphere 
of Islam’, soon changed its outlook and integrated both a secular and a (pan)-Islamic wing. The 
SDA both strengthened Muslim nationalism by emphasising the most distinctive thing about 
it, its religious element, and managed to incorporate intellectuals and other prominent people 
from the LCY by emphasising that the SDA stood for the preservation of Bosnia Herzegovina’s 
unique character as a multi-national and multi-religious republic (Malcom 1994: 21-219). By 
incorporating local intellectuals and influential people, the SDA also managed to strength-
en the support of the local patron-client networks central to politics in Bosnia Herzegovina 
(Grandits 200; Bougarel 199: 9). Third, the nationalist voting pattern in Bosnia Herzegovina 
in 1990 had parallels to the election of representatives to the local and federal legislatures in 
Yugoslavia, where representation was always distributed along ethnic lines. In addition, the 
censuses held throughout the years were the only time people could express individual choice; 
the censuses were politicised as they formed the background for the distribution of national 
position, and the logic of these census ‘votes’ was national membership. Finally, with Izetbe-
govic in front the SDA used and enforced the fear the Muslim population of Bosnia Herze-
govina traditionally had had of Serbian and Croatian nationalism, thereby contributing to the 
strengthening of Muslim nationalism (Cohen 1993: 145, Bougarel 199: 9).
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The division of power in Bosnia Herzegovina along ethnic lines after the 
1990 election resulted in an increasingly ineffective and corrupt society. Moreo-
ver, with the break-up of Yugoslavia in June 1991, the future status of Bosnia 
Herzegovina became a hot topic. The SDA and HDZ insisted on sovereignty for 
Bosnia Herzegovina, whereas the SDS did not want Bosnia Herzegovina to se-
cede from Yugoslavia/Serbia. The SDA’s behaviour was in fact inconsistent. On 
the one hand, the SDA supported a united multi-ethnic Bosnia Herzegovina 
run by a secular Western-style government. On the other hand, it also pro-
moted Islamic revival, in addition to contributing to and at times supporting 
the nationalist division of Bosnia Herzegovina.1 
From the beginning of the war, the SDA had two potential alliance part-
ners: Europe and Pan-Islamists (Islamic countries). And to a degree, the SDA 
managed to manoeuvre in this ideologically contradictory landscape of multi-
culturalism, pan-Islamicism, Europeanism, secularism, democracy and Mus-
lim identity. The Bosnian Muslims’ leader Alija Izetbegovic expressed the con-
tradictory ideologies in this way:
Our folk [people] like the faith, but in faith they do not like exaggerations. 
They are typical folk of the great border, of the borderline between worlds. 
By our faith we are Easterners, by our education Europeans. With our heart 
we belong to one world, with our brain to the other. Well, even the ancient 
Bogomil component of forgiving and goodness is blended here. Each of us 
who is honest has to admit that he asks himself often to which world does he 
belongs. When it comes to me, I have answered myself that I am a European 
Muslim and I feel as comfortable in this definition as in a pair of comfortable 
shoes (Izetbegovic from 1994, cited in Maček 2000a: 213-4).
The SDA’s identity politics, however, was not only a result of a concern for in-
ternational political alliance partners, nor was it merely an attempt to reconcile 
the traditional tension in the SDA and Bosnian politics in general. The SDA’s 
1  Throughout the 20th century, the Muslim community of Bosnia Herzegovina had two contra-
dictory aims: a) to preserve Bosnia as a distinct territorial unit, and b) to avoid the assimilation 
of the Muslim community into a larger group, be it Austro-Hungarian bosnjastvo, Serb and 
Croat nationalism, or Yugoslavism. In other words, to co-exist as an independent, sovereign, 
national group together in the same territorial state with other nations who do not acknowl-
edge such claims. For instance, the tension in Bosnian political life between the SDA and the 
secular non-national party the SDP reflects this cleavage. The question is if this cleavage should 
be seen as a division between nationalists and non-nationalists, or between religious national-
ists and secular nationalists. (This line of reasoning rests on personal communication with 
Xavier Bougarel, but see Donia and Fine (1995: 23-) for a different claim, namely that this 
cleavage represents a special non-contradictory Muslim political culture).
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politics also reflected the ambivalence felt by Muslims during the war, when 
ethnicity suddenly moved to the forefront and when people feared for their life, 
and when ordinary Muslims thus became both nationalists and anti-national-
ists at one and the same time (Maček 2000a: 153-29).
The war – Muslim nationalism escalates
Muslim religious nationalism was further strengthened by the war. The ethnic 
logic of carving up the territory of Yugoslavia and Bosnia Herzegovina along 
ethnic lines gained more and more predominance – a development strongly 
supported by the diplomatic activities of the ‘international community’. As-
saults on Muslims by both Croats and Serbs caused leading Muslims to become 
increasingly separatist, religious and nationalistic, and the space left for imagin-
ing a secular multiethnic society became more and more limited. For example, 
Džemaludin Latić, editor of the important Muslim publication Muslimanski 
glas (Muslim Voice) warned against the secularised Muslim intellectuals who 
were “more dangerous to the Muslim believers than the Chetniks” (Velikonja 
2003: 29),1 and several religious leaders critical of the SDA’s nationalistic poli-
tics were removed from office (Bougarel 199: 105).
Religious Muslim nationalism spread throughout society and its institu-
tions. The Bosnian army, which had been multi-ethnic at the beginning of the 
war, soon became almost completely dominated by Muslims and controlled 
by the SDA. Religious, spiritual and moral education was introduced into the 
army. Radical Islamic units appeared: they made great use of Islamic symbols 
and preached strict adherence to an Islamic code of conduct. Volunteer Muslim 
fighters from Islamic countries, the so-called Mujahedin, also played a role in 
the ‘Islamicisation’ of the Bosnian Army14 (Cohen 199: 9-0; Mojzez 199: 
95;). And though the Muslims did not commit genocide or urbicide in a sys-
tematic or programmatic fashion, there is evidence that radical Muslim fighters 
committed atrocities against non-Muslim populations during the war (Cigar 
1995).
Religious Muslim nationalism also increased in the educational system 
with the introduction of Islam into most school curricula. In particular, the 
subjects of History and Language and Literature were changed in accordance 
with the ongoing ideological programme of forming Bosnian Muslim identity. 
This is an example from a fourth-grade history book:
1  See Vukovič (1993) for a personal account of the impossibility of insisting on a non-national 
identification.
14  There are no precise figures on how many mujahedins participated in the war. Anywhere from 
1,000 to ,000 has been suggested (Velikonja 2003).
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204	 post-war identification
[In] the Middle Ages Bosnia was populated by a homogeneous Bosnian peo-
ple, called Bošnjani…Turkish authorities populated the desolate parts of the 
land (desolated because of the frequent plague epidemics and the death of 
Bošnjaci on the Turkish Empire’s battlefields) with Croats and Serbs from the 
surrounding countries. These were mostly stockbreeders and work-elements 
(serfs) …  So, the Bošnjaci Muslims were left as the only representatives of 
the Bosnian people – descendants of the Medieval Bošnjani (Imamović and 
Bošnjak 1994, cited in Maček 2000a: 13).
Language also gained nationalist importance, which is not surprising, since 
language is traditionally an important signifier in the creation and imagination 
of national identities. Leading Muslims renamed their language ‘Bosnian’ (be-
fore Serbo-Croat), emphasising its supposed Turkish roots by introducing ‘h’, a 
sound associated with Turkishness, into new words and using as many Turkish 
synonyms as possible. Even greetings were affected: on an everyday level, the 
choice of greeting became a political act and religious greetings became more 
frequent. Among other symbolic gestures, the colour green (associated with 
Muslim religious identity) became increasingly important, religious holidays 
became increasingly popular, and TV and radio broadcasting became oriented 
towards promoting a Muslim religious national identity (Maček 2000a: 12-
).
The names of streets were changed into Muslim names. In Yugoslavia, 
street names have always been a way of expressing current state ideology, so the 
practice was not new, and it occurred in all parts of Bosnia Herzegovina. But 
the new names reflected a rather profound change in Bosnian society.
Even streets named after partisans and Communists of Muslim nationality 
were taken away, which proves the point that the shift of ideology was not 
only from ‘brotherhood and unity’ into nationalism, but also from socialism 
to capitalism (Maček 2000a: 12).
A last example of Bosnian Muslim nation-building and the politicisation of 
Muslim ethnic identity is the decision taken by the Bosniak Assembly (Bošnjački 
Sabor) in September 1993 to replace the national name ‘Muslim’ with the new 
name ‘Bosniak.’ This can be seen as an attempt to resolve the issue of national 
and territorial claims on behalf of the Muslims. With the new name the politi-
cians stressed the transformation of the Bosnian Muslim community into a 
political and sovereign nation, closely linked to the territory of Bosnia Herze-
govina (Bougarel 2001: ). Prior to this decision people who favoured a mul-
tiethnic state had argued that ‘Bosniak’ should be a national term for anyone 
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(Serb, Croat or Muslim) who considered him or herself to be primarily Bos-
nian. Others had claimed that the term ‘Muslim’ had been secularised enough 
to denominate national adherence, and that a common Bosniak identity would 
probably soon be co-opted by nationalist Serbs or Croats. Finally, the SDA and 
nationalist-minded Muslims of Bosnia Herzegovina preferred to reserve ‘Bos-
niak’ as a name for Muslims as opposed to the other ethnic groups, a name 
which could be used as a basis for political claims (Bringa 1995: 33-; Bougarel 
199: 109; Hayden 2000). As Izetbegovic asserted in one of his typically ambigu-
ous statements: “We Bosniaks, the Muslim nation of Bosnia, are predestined to 
be the leaders of the new integration of Bosnia” (quoted in Velikonja 2003).
Thus on a general level, despite contradictions and ambivalence, Bosnia 
Herzegovina witnessed the rise of a Bosnian Muslim nationalist party, the SDA, 
and nationalist ‘Bosniak’ politics within a relatively short period of time. And 
though secular opposition to these trends existed throughout the war both 
outside and inside the SDA, an antagonistic Muslim nationalism dominated 
many public and political settings, a situation not many people would have 
imagined only a few years before the beginning of the war. A war was going 
on, the Muslims were under attack from both the Croats and the Serbs, and the 
international community (apart from the Islamic world) had abandoned them. 
In such a situation violence contributes to creating or strengthening clear-cut 
identities. I therefore agree with Velikonja’s (2003) analysis of the relationship 
between islamicisation and inter-ethnic conflict: “The invigorated religiousness 
of the Bosniaks was […] more a consequence than a cause of the war.” Fried-
man sums up the difficult Muslim situation very precisely:
Thus, the Bosnian Muslims have been caught up in a game that has been larg-
er and tougher than their capacity to cope. Throughout their history up to 
the present, they were safest when they were part of a multinational coalition, 
with their position protected by a strong central government. Their vulner-
ability increased when they were recognized as a nation within Yugoslavia, 
because their needs had to be met and recognition meant that the Serbs and 
the Croats could no longer use them as subordinates. Instead, until war struck 
the area, the Bosnian Muslims had become equal partners in Bosnia Herze-
govina and as such had to be dealt with rather than manipulated (Friedman 
1995: 225).
Bosnian Muslim nationalism grew, therefore, not because it had been latent 
throughout the years, but because the logic of the war created it. In fact, Muslim 
nationalism had always been weak, in part because attempts to articulate a uni-
fying Muslim identity had traditionally been centred on devotion, cultural tra-
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20	 post-war identification
ditions or pan-Islamism, all of which hindered the growth of a strong national 
identity (Bougarel 199; 199). Bringa sums up the tragic creation of Muslim 
nationalism in this way:
The Bosnians have apparently been organized into tidy, culturally and ethni-
cally homogeneous categories, and the Muslims seem finally to have become 
a neat ethno-national category its neighbours and the international commu-
nity can deal with and understand. They have been forced by the war and the 
logic of the creation of nation-states to search for their origins and establish a 
‘legitimate’ and continuous national history (Bringa 1995: 3).
Summary 
I want to highlight three aspects of the last century of identity politics among 
the Bosnian Muslims. First, Bosnian Muslim nationalism came late. Only in 
the 1990s were aspects of religion, nationality, territory, language and history 
combined and staged in Muslim politics. Up until then Bosnian Muslim poli-
tics had been pragmatic, caught between Serbian and Croatian national aspira-
tions. Bosnian Muslim nationalist movements had existed, but they were rela-
tively marginal and their aims were never clearly articulated. Second, Bosnian 
Muslim political life has been divided into two wings, at least from the 1930s 
onwards: the secular and the religious. Prior to and during the war this division 
was played out in the conflict between (religious) nationalists and (secular) 
anti-nationalists, in other words between those who defended a sectional eth-
nic political course and those in favour of a multiethnic society. In the Tito era 
the secular non-nationalists were dominant. In the years up to and during the 
war the relationship of dominance was turned around, as seen in the politics 
of the SDA. The cleavage still exists, and as we shall see, it is also at play in the 
everyday identifications of the Muslims of Stolac. The third important point 
is that the promotion of a strong and politicised Muslim identity has mostly 
been a project of the urban elite: it is not atypical of nation-building projects 
in general. That granted, it still remains to address the question of the extent 
to which this project of creating a strong religious or national Muslim identity 
corresponded to the experiences of the Muslims of Bosnia Herzegovina in their 
everyday life. This is the question I will turn to now. 
001_316_post-war.indd   206 14/04/08   22:04:56
Denne side er købt på www.ebog.dk og er omfattet af lov om ophavsret. Uanset evt. aftale med Copy-Dan er det ikke tilladt at kopiere eller
indscanne siden til undervisningsbrug eller erhvervsmæssig brug.
Chapter 10 
Bosnian Muslim identity in everyday practice
Among (young) people in urban environments in Bosnia Herzegovina a cos-
mopolitan identity existed and Yugoslavism was popular, ethnic identity mat-
tered little, and inter-ethnic marriage was common. This modern, secularised 
and non-sectional grouping has sometimes been taken as representative of the 
general Bosnian mentality. Such a view, however, neglects such tensions as the 
huge cleft between the rural and the urban in Bosnia Herzegovina (see Chapter 
), as exemplified by the way in which the citizens of Sarajevo (Sarajlije) have 
tried to symbolically disconnect themselves from rural culture by downplay-
ing ethnic affiliation. However, when the focus is shifted to the countryside, it 
appears that ethnic identity was a and sometimes the most important identity. 
People knew the ethnic identity of their neighbours and inter-ethnic marriage 
was rare (Banac 1993). So even though Bosnian Muslim nationalism did not 
begin to develop in earnest until the late 190s, this does not mean that a strong 
sense of ethnic belonging did not exist among the Bosnian Muslims, particu-
larly in the countryside. But it is a sense of belonging one should not confuse 
with the Muslim nationalism of the late 190s. 
Several writers have argued that the political sphere of Bosnia Herzegovi-
na has never truly been modernised. In this view, communitarianism, which 
gives ethnic identities priority in social relations, has continued to be the defin-
ing characteristic of society. The project of creating a strong and legitimate state 
never succeeded (that is, it was everywhere and nowhere), and extra-communal 
identifications never managed to supersede local ethnic identifications (Simić 
1991; Bougarel 199; Sunic 199). The central element in these ethnic identifica-
tions has been religion: Serbs have been Orthodox Christian, Croats Catholic, 
and also for the Muslims a strong relationship between religion, faith and eth-
nic identity has existed. Lockwood (195), for instance, who at the beginning 
of the 190s did fieldwork in a small Muslim village, observed that religion was 
the most important source of identification in relation to one’s ethnicity, and 
Bringa (1995) reported the same from a village with a mixed Muslim-Croat 
population twenty years later. 
To clarify the characteristics of this local identification, in which religion 
plays a constitutive part, Bringa (1995) explores the native concept of nacije. At 
first glance one could translate the word as ‘nation’, but this would not capture 
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the important distinction between nacije and ‘nation’ – especially in Yugoslavia 
in the late 190s. Both Sorabji, who did fieldwork in Sarajevo in the 190s (1993, 
199) and Bringa (1995) report that informants often asked them about their 
nacije. Bringa’s initial answer was ‘Norwegian’, as she thought it was her nation-
ality they wanted to know, but she learned that the answer they were after was 
‘Protestant’ – in other words her faith. However, nacije is not only a religious 
community, even though religion is the defining element of the nacije, because 
these religious identities are also cultural and social identities. They are some-
thing to which people feel strong emotional attachment, something into which 
one is born and socialised, something that is normally ‘inherited’ from parents, 
something unquestionable. On the other hand, national identity in Yugoslavia 
was something one could choose from among the options offered by the state1, 
and it often lacked the essential emotional connotations attached to nacije in 
everyday identification. Bringa (1995: 22) translates nacije as ‘ethnoreligious 
identity’, and concludes that the Muslims of Bosnia Herzegovina had a strong 
sense of ethnoreligious identity, but a weak sense of national identity. Filipovic 
has argued that the term ‘Muslim’ understood as ‘nationality’ did not exist 
among rural people even as late as 1990 in several parts of Bosnia Herzegovina 
(Bringa 1995: 21). This is supported by Bringa’s own findings. She reports how 
Muslims referred to their collective identity not in an idiom “of shared blood 
and a myth of common origin,” but “in an idiom which de-emphasized descent 
(‘ethnicity’) and focused instead on a shared environment, cultural practices, a 
shared sentiment, and common experience” (ibid. 30). This difference between 
ethnoreligious identity (nacije) and nationality was then exploited by the na-
tionalist projects of the late 190s in Yugoslavia. In Maček’s words:
[T]he new national political elites could mobilise the ethnoreligious notions 
of belonging into the new national projects of constitution of sovereign states 
for Muslims, Serbs and Croats respectively, [by] filling the new national iden-
tities with the old ethnoreligious feeling of essential belonging (2000: 15).
1  Note the shifting categories available over time for the Muslims of Bosnia Herzegovina: ‘Serb’, 
‘Croat’, ‘Yugoslav’, ‘Muslim undeclared’, ‘Muslim in the ethnic sense’ and ‘Muslim by national-
ity’. 
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Pre-war Muslim identity in everyday life
I will now highlight four related characteristics of the pre-war, embedded, local, 
everyday ethnoreligious identification.
Religion as ‘a domain of loose moral imperative’
First, though Islam was an important identity marker for Muslims in Bosnia 
Herzegovina, it should not be understood simply as a set of clearly defined rules 
of conduct. Religion was rather, as Sorabji (199: 54) puts it, “a domain of loose 
moral imperatives.” She mentions hospitality, cleanliness, generosity, honesty, 
kindness, courtesy, industry and the like. Though these values are central for 
Muslims, they are not specifically Muslim virtues; they are part of a general 
field of morality in which there are overlaps with the ideology of communism, 
the moral imperatives of which were “work hard, don’t cheat your neighbours, 
redistribute your wealth, and so on” (ibid. 55). Sorabji seldom found that her 
informants evaluated each other’s actions in religious terms. It was thus, as she 
reports, not haram (Arabic: forbidden by God) to slander someone, but rather 
ne valja (Serbo-Croatian: no good); it was not sunset (Arabic: recommended by 
the Prophet and pleasing to God) to wash your hands before meals, but rather 
fino (Serbo-Croatian: good) (ibid. 55). Furthermore the Islamic Community 
(see previous chapter) was viewed neither as a body offering guidance on mat-
ters of faith nor as the representative of Islam in Bosnia Herzegovina. Rather, 
the Islamic Community was perceived as no different from other (secular) au-
thorities one might possibly benefit from or negotiate with (ibid. 5).
Likewise, Bringa (1995) found a key difference between how Muslim iden-
tity was viewed and practised by Muslims in ‘her’ village of Dolina and by the 
Islamic establishment. For the latter group, being a Muslim entailed observing 
the practices of Islam, whereas for her informants being a Muslim was defined 
primarily in contrast to the non-Muslim group closest to them, the Catholics/
Croats, and practices of identification involved both Islamic and non-Islamic 
elements. “The important question was therefore not whether a practice was 
‘according to Islam’ (po islamu) or prescribed (propisano) or not, but rather 
that it was what Muslims in Dolina did and their next-door Bosnian Catholic 
neighbours did not do” (Bringa 1995: 230).
  To my knowledge, not many qualitative studies focusing on ethnic identity in Bosnia Herze-
govina have been conducted. Beljkašič-Hadžidedič (199), in a survey of ethnological work in 
Bosnia Herzegovina from 1945 until 19, reports that a lot of ethnography was produced in 
the period, but that it primarily focused on the material culture and not social organisation of 
the ethnic groups. The following discussion therefore rests mainly on Bringa (1995), Lockwood 
(195) and Sorabji (1993, 199), as well as on the memories of my informants.
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Lockwood (195), who did fieldwork approximately twenty years before 
Sorabj and Bringa, came to similar conclusions about the role of religious or-
thodoxy in Bosnian Muslim identity. Though Islam was much more visible and 
pronounced in ‘his’ village than in Dolina, people were still relatively indif-
ferent to doctrine. Instead, people focused on everyday practices: “Relatively 
little stress is placed on religious doctrine; much more important are outward 
signs and symbols. In practice, a man is considered a Moslem, not because he 
holds to the tenets of Islam, but because he is circumcised or observes Rama-
zan” (Lockwood 195: 4). Although religion was the most important element 
distinguishing the ethnic groups, other non-religious cultural practices which 
might seem trivial to an outsider, were also central to processes of identifica-
tion. Lockwood mentions how clothing, eating and drinking habits and lan-
guage followed a rural-urban dichotomy more than a religious one. 
Religion, then, did play an important role in pre-war ethnoreligious iden-
tity. For the Muslims a non-dogmatic, locally defined version of Islam – what 
Bringa (195) calls ‘being Muslim the Bosnian way’ – was central to their iden-
tity. 
Religion, a way to maintain difference
The second characteristic of pre-war Muslim identity as it was played out in 
everyday practice is its contrastive aspect. Cultural differences between the eth-
nic groups result, as Lockwood writes: 
… in all probability, from historical differences of origin and contact. Their 
persistence however, is due to their existence within relatively closed commu-
nication systems, their conscious maintenance as markers of social groups, 
or, most probably, the interaction of both of these principles. They function 
equally as focal points of ingroup sentiments and criteria of outgroup identi-
fication. They serve, in either function, to reinforce the basic belief that each 
religious or ethnic group constitutes a separate nacije (Lockwood 195: 53).
This Barthesian (Barth 199) understanding of Bosnian ethnic identity is also 
fundamental to Bringa’s interpretation and findings. Within this interpretive 
framework, the point is not to describe how Catholics and Muslims are dif-
ferent per se, but rather to examine how they continually accentuate perceived 
differences as a strategy for establishing identity. Bringa describes a parallel-
ism in the ways the two communities have constructed Otherness, where each 
community chose the same practices to represent its difference from the other. 
“We do like this, they do like that” was communicated in many different situ-
ations. However, the comparisons were actually implied contrasts which pro-
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vided a justification for one’s own practices (Bringa 1995: -4). The different 
ethnoreligious groups needed each other (or each other’s Otherness) to con-
struct identity, and this Otherness was embedded in a local setting and every-
day practices. In other words, while elements of religious difference might have 
been involved in these local identity negotiations, they took place on a different 
level from the national identities constructed and represented in the public and 
national spheres. If modernisation means increased disembeddedness of social 
relations, then large parts of Bosnia Herzegovina cannot be considered very 
modern. Before the war, identity in Bosnia Herzegovina was to a great extent 
premised on local face-to-face interaction. Religion was not that important in 
itself; it mainly mattered as a way of maintaining ethnoreligious distinctions in 
everyday local life.
Ethnoreligious identity, one among many
A third aspect of the pre-war Muslim everyday identification is related to the 
fact that, even though ethnoreligious identity was fundamental in everyday life 
before the war, it was but one identity among many. Relatively ‘ethnicity-free’ 
zones of social interaction existed in which identification depended on the con-
text. 
In pre-war life as described by my informants, work relations and social 
status were highly important markers of identity. Relationships with colleagues 
were important social relations. Often people stressed whether someone they 
were discussing had been a person in a managerial position, and if so how 
many people he had been in charge of. Level of education and professional 
qualifications also stand out as important elements of identity. Usually my in-
formants knew who had been or who still were doctors, architects or high-
ranking officials, and more than once I had these people’s houses pointed out to 
me, even though they were often only ruins. Surveying Yugoslav scholars’ work 
on class relations in Yugoslavia, Allcock (2000: 10-211) similarly concludes that 
income, distribution of social power, prestige and other aspects related to class 
and job position were important elements in former Yugoslavian life. It was of 
great significance whether one was a skilled worker, unskilled worker or unem-
ployed, if one was a peasant or self-employed, or a member of the humanistic 
or technical intelligentsia. 
Another important aspect of identity other than the religious was gender. 
Bringa’s (195) thorough investigation of this matter shows how ethnoreligious 
identity was primarily attached to the socialisation of girls and to women’s role 
in general; whereas boys could participate in urban, Western, non-ethnic youth 
cultures to a greater extent. Similarly, men could engage in networks of col-
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leagues, get further training, work in foreign countries, and be more involved 
in the public sphere in general.
A third identity cutting across ethnoreligious identity relates to culture. 
The distinction between the uncultured and the cultured was, as argued above, 
very important in Yugoslavia, and though geographically related to a rural-ur-
ban dichotomy, this division should be seen more as a geographical symbolism. 
Culture, though sometimes attached to ethnic identity, was at other times more 
important in social interaction and group preferences than ethnic identity.
Ethnoreligious identification should furthermore be contrasted with high-
er levels of identification. In Dolina, Bringa reports, ethnoreligious identity was 
connected to the household, the family and sometimes one’s neighbours; but 
at a village level a unifying localistic identification transcending ethnicity held 
sway. Such solidarity was created through social exchanges like regular private 
visits, obligations between households, evening gatherings in the village, com-
munal voluntary work, and common house building (akcija) (1995: 5-3). The 
most central ethos attached to such local super-ethnic identification was that 
of komšiluk, hospitality and neighbourliness. The practice of komšiluk was, as 
Bougarel defines (199: 9) it, a “permanent guarantee of the pacific nature of 
relations between the communities, and thus a security of each of them.” In 
post-war Stolac I too found such local identification and an ethos of intereth-
nic hospitality and mutual connexion (see also Sunic 199). At an even higher 
level of identification was the Yugoslav state, which penetrated village life with 
its various institutions and enforced unification. We have seen how the com-
munist regime indirectly contributed to the national tensions in Yugoslavia by 
dividing power along republican lines (Chapter 4). At the same time, though, 
the state also supported the existence of a unified Yugoslavia and of a Yugoslav 
identity. Bringa (195) reports how the villagers in Dolina participated in sev-
eral different spheres defined by such a Yugoslavism: the educational system, 
the Yugoslav People’s Army, and various communist youth clubs. Additionally 
there were the state-controlled media as well as the various social benefits peo-
ple received.
The skill of living with ethnoreligious difference
The fourth and last element relates to the skill of living with difference, an ability 
which many Bosnians had developed in the pre-war period. Such a competence 
should not be romanticised. Some experts have even questioned the very exist-
ence of such tolerance, dismissing it as a myth constructed by Western intellec-
tuals about the presumedly tolerant Bosnian mentality. The reality is rather one 
of inter-ethnic distrust, it is argued (Simić 2000). After all, monoethnic com-
munities existed all over pre-war Bosnia, and as Lockwood (195) shows, inter-
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ethnic interaction in such settings as weekly markets does not necessarily lead 
to more profound cultural integration. Furthermore, we also have examples of 
villages and areas where inter-ethnic coexistence was marred by continual and 
cyclic outbursts of violence and inter-ethnic (blood)strifes even before the de-
velopments that led to the war (Bax 1995, 199, 2000; Boehm 194). Researchers 
have also observed how traumatic memories from the Second World War have 
been passed on to the younger generations (Denich 1994). I shall not enter the 
often intense debate in anthropology about the reality of the tolerant Bosnian 
mentality, a debate which has been especially fierce during and after the recent 
war (see Brandt 2002 for a thorough discussion). My point is rather that at the 
very least, it is true to say that the people of Bosnia Herzegovina regularly came 
into contact with members of different ethnoreligious groups in different areas, 
both in the public sphere and often also in the private sphere. One should not 
forget that the young and the middle-aged had lived in peace for almost fifty 
years when the war broke out in 1992. Ethnoreligious identity could have been 
a significant factor shaping the content and atmosphere of inter-ethnic inter-
action, but it was seldom a hindrance to such interaction. What is more, the 
interaction between the different ethnoreligious groups was often characterised 
by respect. 
Central for understanding the Bosnian skill of living with difference is 
that differences were not downplayed: equality as sameness was not the ideal, in 
contrast to some Scandinavian contexts (Gullestad 1992). Instead, differences 
were persistently nurtured in a way that Georgieva (1999), analysing interaction 
between Muslims and Christians in Bulgaria, has described as ‘familiarisation 
of differences’, that is, the network of interconnected lines that comprehends 
all levels of everyday life, eliminating Otherness and changing it into familiar 
difference. The ‘others’ are therefore ”perceived not as a menace, but rather as 
an inseparable part of the complex world of everyday life” (ibid. ). The skill of 
living with difference was also central in Bringa’s finding:
To most Bosnians (and particularly to the post World War II generations) 
difference in ethnoreligious affiliation was one of the many differences be-
tween people. […] It was acknowledged and often joked about but it never 
precluded friendship. Indeed, for these Bosnians being Bosnian (bosanac) 
meant growing up in a multicultural and multireligious environment, an en-
vironment where cultural pluralism was intrinsic to the social order. Dealing 
with cultural differences was part of people’s most immediate experience of 
  Cf. Hayden’s (2002) definition of passive versus active tolerance, where the first is marked by 
non-interferences and the second by embrace of the Other.
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social life outside the confines of their home, and it was therefore an essential 
part of their identity. In the village mutual acknowledgement of cultural di-
versity and coexistence was an intrinsic quality of life and of people’s everyday 
experience, and therefore an important element in the process of individual 
identity formation (Bringa 1995: 3).
The practice of living with and managing Otherness can explain how most or-
dinary people were totally taken by surprise not only when war started in Yugo-
slavia, but also when it came to their village. Even when war had hit neighbour-
ing villages or areas, people simply could not believe that it could come and 
destroy the ‘familiarisation of differences’ or inter-ethnic respect characteristic 
of their own communities (Bringa 1993; Julie 199; Feldman 1993). This feeling 
of shock is also one of the central experiences of my informants. 
The influence of war on Muslim everyday identity 
The war and nationalist politics changed aspects of everyday identification 
among the Bosnian Muslims in many ways. The religious content of the eth-
noreligious identities, which before the war had been a domain of loose moral 
imperatives, became much more closely connected to a doctrinaire reading of 
Islam. This happened when religion became the most central element in the 
construction of Muslim nationalism. 
Before the war, ethnoreligious Otherness had been primarily embedded 
in everyday practice. That is to say, difference was mainly related to actual ex-
periences with concrete Others. With the coming of the war and nationalist 
politics, Muslim ethnic identity became increasingly detached from these local 
contexts, and was represented in new more abstract, rigid and politicised reli-
gious categories. These categories, however, became rather real when people 
realised that ethnicity was – or could easily become – a matter of life or death. 
Before the war ethnoreligious identity had been important, but it was still one 
identity among others, depending on the situation. Occupation, networks of 
colleagues, level of education, gender and degree of cultivation were all im-
portant alternative identifications, as was the case with localistic and national 
(Yugoslav) identifications. But when the nationalist obsession began spreading 
throughout Yugoslavia, in Bosnia Herzegovina ethnic identity came to super-
sede all other identities, colonising every aspect of life: music, pronunciations 
of words, street names, love relations, choice of colours and so on. 
The familiarisation of and the living with difference that had characterised 
respectful interethnic interaction in many parts of Bosnia Herzegovina was at-
tacked in the war. Ethnoreligious identity, which had not been a hindrance to 
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interaction before the war, suddenly made such interaction difficult or even 
impossible. In other words, though previously difference had been persistent-
ly created and reinforced, it had not posed a problem for interaction. During 
the war this relationship was reversed: difference was now all there was, and it 
posed a problem for interaction.
The following chapters will explore how much the general changes in iden-
tification described so far have penetrated my informants’ everyday life, and the 
extent to which these identifications have rendered impossible different kinds 
of non-ethnic identifications. In looking at how the Muslims of Stolac identify 
themselves, it will become clear that although the Bosnian Muslim nationalist 
discourse has radically changed patterns of everyday identification, counterdis-
cursive practices also exist. In short, my analysis shows that although the im-
portance of Muslim identity has increased and become much more conscious, 
‘Muslimness’ is still not defined primarily in nationalist terms. Rather, Muslim 
identity is defined by reference to a rather heterogeneous group of different val-
ues, including the ‘Stolac spirit’ (Chapter 12), ideals of tolerance (Chapter 13), a 
Balkan-Europe dichotomy (Chapter 14), and a ‘victim role’ (Chapter 15).
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Chapter 11
The national identity that failed
One might assume that nationality and religion, Bosnia and Islam, would be 
the most important signifiers of identity in the Bosnian Muslims’ life. After all, 
they have experienced massive nationalist propaganda, a nationalist politics 
of leading Bosnian Muslims, as well as the fact that ethnic identity became a 
matter of life and death throughout the war. But in Stolac this is not the case. 
Here, Bosnia Herzegovina as a nation (language, history, symbol, territory etc.) 
and Islam as a dogmatic religion play only a minor role. Before I analyse the 
identifications that do actually matter most in my informants’ everyday life, I 
shall clarify the Stolac Muslim lack of attachment to Bosnia Herzegovina and 
to Islam.
National identity
Nationalism versus survival
I was sitting with some of my informants one Saturday evening at Café Galerija. 
It was getting late. We were talking, joking and listening to popular Balkan-
rock music. One particular new pop song from Beograd made people dance 
and shout. Suddenly a police car stopped outside and everybody went to the 
big panorama window to watch. So did the guests from the Croat cafés from 
across the road. The police were just stopping to report on a car that was parked 
illegally. Suddenly there were about fifteen Muslims standing outside the café, 
and outside the Croatian cafés there were about sixty Croats. The situation was 
getting tense. Everybody was a little nervous, especially considering an incident 
only a few months earlier, in which violent Croats had destroyed the Muslim 
café. Suddenly one of the Muslim café guests ran across the road, where he 
started shouting and walking in the middle of the Croatian crowd very pro-
vocatively. But nothing happened. Then after a while the waiter from the Mu-
slem café went over to him and pulled him back, but since he was drunk and 
angry he ran back and started to provoke the Croats again, shouting “What is 
wrong with you, why do you not come over and sit at our place?” Nusret, who 
had served in the Bosnian Army during the war, said to me: “This is a revolt, 
an authentic revolt, and because of this we survived. They are over 100 people 
over there and we are only ten, but they are afraid, they do not dare to do any-
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thing, they know us, they know who we are. There are four million Croats in 
Croatia, there are seven million Serbs in Serbia, they were attacking us from 
both sides, but we survived, we survived. It is like the movie from Scotland, 
Braveheart. Have you seen it? There are many more of them than us, but we 
will survive.” He repeated the statement, clearly proud not of the drunken man 
who ran alone towards the Croats, but of the symbolic messages his act carried. 
The incident reflected the essence of the war. Another of the guests said to me 
“They are the HVO [the army of the Bosnian Croats], we are Armija Bosnia.” 
The tense situation continued for half an hour, during which time the police 
just drove off. Then slowly people began stepping inside their cafés again. 
At the café there was also a young guy, rather drunk. He came from Stolac, 
but he was living in Germany. He was only in Stolac to visit. He was furious. His 
friends tried to calm him down and they started quarrelling. At one point, he 
shouted to everyone in the café: “So here we have the Bosnian patriots, ha! I will 
return to Germany tomorrow.” He found the others to be cowardly for not con-
fronting the Croats. Though he was drunk, I think his statement also indicates 
that unambiguous and fierce national feelings thrive best in exile. Then after a 
while people finished their drinks and went home. Driving back from the café, 
one of my informants said, “It surely has rained”; apart from that, nobody said 
anything. 
In the days after the episode, I thought that this was the Bosnian national-
ism which I had not encountered before. It only needed this provocation to-
gether with some alcohol to surface, and I started noticing other statements of 
the same kind. Senad, for instance, told me how he sometimes relives situations 
from the war and wakes up totally upset. His brother commented: “The ques-
tion is if they would dare to do it again. It was the only chance they had to kill 
us all, they will never have such an opportunity again.” And Mehmed proudly 
told me that: 
The Bosnian people [Bosanac] are a very brave people. When we pursue an 
aim, we either get killed or reach that aim. There are no in betweens. They 
did not count on that. They did not expect such high morals as the Bosnian 
people had in this war…We succeeded, due to our reason and our strength 
and our braveness in creating Armija [Armija BiH]. It is a unique thing in the 
world that a people create their own army in such a short time. Often it takes 
six-seven-eight years to create a fully organised army. And we succeeded in 
two years. And with such an army we defended ourselves against Croatia, 
which has four million citizens, and Serbia, which has ten million citizens.
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Or consider this statement by Nusreta:
When the Muslims fought against the Croats, there was a Serbian officer in 
the mountains at Mostar, and he watched the battles, and he said, if only I 
had Alija´s [Izetbegovic’s] land forces, I would conquer the whole of Bosnia 
Herzegovina. The Muslim soldiers were that good. 
Her husband replied: “So said Karadžić.”1
Then I started asking myself what it really was that Nusret and the others 
were proud of. Obviously they were proud of Armija BiH, and proud that as a 
people they could withstand both the Serbs and the Croats. Seldom, however, 
did I hear people talk about ideals. They did not say, ‘We fought for Bosnia’, ‘for 
our people’, ‘for our nation’, and they did not refer to any national values. What 
people said was that they fought, and that they survived. In fact the issue of 
survival is very central to understanding what we for lack of a better term might 
call Bosnian nationalism. 
In his book Fallen Soldier, Moose (1990) has analysed how the emergence 
of nationalism and compulsory military service went hand-in-hand. Formerly 
a soldier would risk his life for money, but with the coming of the modern na-
tion-state the soldier was to die for his nation, and the nation would be imag-
ined through him. Moose calls this phenomenon the cult of the dead soldier. In 
Stolac today people are generally proud of Armija BiH, or Armija as it is called, 
in which the majority of the male population served in some way or another. 
However, their fight, suffering and victories, and the death of relatives, are not 
linked to Bosnia Herzegovina as a national symbol. Their fight was for survival, 
not for a nation. One of my informants once said that: “Everyone who survived 
the war is successful.” During the war, about 100,000 people were killed, and 
many more fled, fearing for their lives, and survival was not at all a given during 
the war. For many of my informants I think it is true to say that they fought for 
survival, for their homes, their property, their families, and, as I will later show, 
because they had nowhere to run to. It is my impression that national self-con-
sciousness was not particularly strong among the Bosnian Muslims before the 
1  The Bosnian Serb leader.
  When the war started Bosnia Herzegovina did not have an army. It had a police force and a 
territorial defence (TO), which was a kind of decentralised Home Guard. Bosnia Herzegovina 
experienced a weapons embargo, and even though it was not totally effective, it strongly re-
duced the Bosnians’ possibilities for arming themselves. When Armija BiH was established, it 
received some support from Islamic countries, but despite this many observers were surprised 
and impressed by the fact that Armija BiH managed to some degree to hold out against two 
rather mighty armies.
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war, that it probably grew throughout the war, and that it has now has faded. At 
no time, though, has Bosnian Muslim nationalism been strong, deeply inter-
nalised and influential (see also Maček 2000a).
Emir fought in the war. Once during an interview he showed me some 
pictures of himself and a friend in uniform, smiling, both holding machine-
guns up in the air. Emir’s mother felt embarrassed and did not want me to see 
the pictures; Emir, on the other hand, was proud of what he and his comrades 
had done in the war, but his pride was not related to a Bosnian nation:
We did not fight for any ideas at all. We did not try to create some kind of state 
or country; we just did it in order to survive. I fought at the front with my 
weapon just to prevent them from coming and taking my mother. So that they 
wouldn’t kill her or the children who were with her. There were no ideas in 
my head at that time, because I was hungry and thirsty and without anything. 
There were people who only had ten bullets in their guns, and they fought 
against tanks in that way. And in that situation you do not think about creat-
ing a state…We barely survived, we did not have any adopted country, as they 
[Croats and Serbs] had. They closed all the outlets, from both sides. We had 
no food, we were barefoot and naked.
Another informat, Suljeman, felt that the war created a Muslim consciousness. 
He once said: “Before the war we were Bosnians, today we are Muslims,” but he 
also thought that this was only half of the story. Survival was the other half.
TK: What about during the war, were the Bosniaks more nationalist than today?
Suljeman: Yes they were, that’s normal. And it was not without reason. It was an 
attack. You asked yourself, what is going on? You did not believe that a war 
could come. A lot of people could not understand what was really happening. 
What the real cause was. But everybody understood it afterwards. Some un-
derstood it sooner, some later. It was an attack on the Bosnian Muslims. A lot 
of people went into battle just to defend themselves, and when they defended 
themselves, they also defended Bosnia Herzegovina. Some did not do it con-
sciously; they just followed a stream that went forward [a nationalist stream]. 
But common for all is that they were just defending their own lives.
During the war the Muslims of Herzegovina were pressed from two sides: the 
Croatian forces from the west and the Serbian forces to the east. They could, 
therefore, not escape either to Sarajevo or to Croatia and then further on. Many 
of my informants saw this as a major tactical mistake on behalf of the Croats 
and Serbs. The Muslims would have escaped if only they had been given the 
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opportunity. In this sense, they felt they became Bosnians not by choice, but 
by chance. They were not primarily fighting for Bosnia, but because they had 
nowhere to run. The Muslims, whose backs were against the wall, had a differ-
ent and greater motivation to fight than did conscripts in the Serbian army. The 
Muslim men defended not only their own lives: they knew that their wives and 
children were totally dependent on them. If the men had surrendered to the 
Croatian and Serbian forces, they would also have given up on their families 
behind the lines. According to many people I talked to, this is the reason that 
the Muslims held out in places like the Mostar area. Nationalism might have 
played a role, but not being able to escape was also a factor in turning the Mus-
lims into Bosnians. 
Bosnia has no appeal 
Even today the image of Bosnia does not function as a meta-narrative that can 
bestow meaning on my informants’ sufferings, traumas and material losses. 
People are simply not proud of their country and do not identify with it. They 
are fed up with the corrupt and worthless politicians; the educational system 
functions badly and does not qualify people for jobs, only private connections 
do; the unemployment rate is disastrous; people do not get their paycheck or 
pensions on time; the division between rich and poor has increased strikingly; 
there is no future for the children, and so on and so forth. People also feel that 
Bosnia Herzegovina has lost prestige internationally. As Senida said, making a 
sad joke, “Today for us Albania is the West.” Albania is acknowledged by all to 
be by far the most backward country in Europe. In this context of despair one 
can understand the following disillusioned statement from a Bosnian worker 
in the Danish Refugee Council in Mostar: “Nobody won the war. After the 
Dayton agreement, the weapons were silent and peace broke out.” The follow-
ing two statements reflect this common feeling of disillusionment and identity 
confusion among my informants.
Fahrudin: My roots are here, and Bosnia Herzegovina is my native country. The 
Serbs say that their language is their fatherland, and the Croats say the same 
and then I ask myself: ‘who am I?’ I am only a fact. I am neither a Serb nor a 
Croat and I do not want to be one. I want to stay what I am now. It must be 
difficult for you to understand, it is an unclear situation and it is also difficult 
for me. I was born here, grew up here, and attended school here, but it is not 
that clear to me. And you will stay some months and of course it is difficult 
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for you to understand. The café in front of us is Croatian. But those further 
below are Bosniak property, but the Croats moved in during the war, and now 
they do not want to give them back to their owners. 
Muhamed’s mother: I am not an orthodox Muslim. Once in a while I go to the 
mosque, but I have never been a ‘big Muslim’ [Veliki Muslimani, a strong be-
liever and nationalist-minded Muslim] and I am not today. I respect my own 
faith and I respect others’ faith. They had a plan for annihilating the Muslims, 
they wanted nothing else but to exterminate us from the map of the world. 
Both sides, both the Serbs and the Croats wanted to annihilate the Muslims. 
They wanted for one of them to have one part and the other the other part 
of former Yugoslavia, and for Bosnia to stop existing; no more. That’s how it 
should be. By coincidence and maybe because God helped and also some of 
the European countries, this plan failed. Our soldiers tried to defend us, and 
then came the UN soldiers and these forces separated the three military forces 
in Bosnia, and now we have our situation.
If one compares these statements to statements made by the ordinary Croats in 
post-war Croatia interviewed by Stef Jansen (2000b), the differences are strik-
ing. For Jansen’s informants, nothing was ‘coincidental’ (cf. Muhamed’s mother 
above). For them Croatia as a symbol of identity made total sense of the war 
and the present miserable social situation as well as private losses. ‘We have 
Croatia!’ as they explained to Jansen, an expression directly borrowed from 
official nationalist rhetoric.4 In Stolac a statement like ‘We have Bosnia’ would 
not work. Some informants sometimes pointed out that the Muslims as a group 
became much more homogeneous during the war. Such unity, however, must 
be related to the fact that the Muslims knew who they were primarily because 
they had been attacked as Muslims – or as I heard it expressed sometimes, ‘only 
because of our names.’ They knew whom they fought against, but today many 
  He was right, it was difficult for me to understand. In the quotation, however, the ‘it’, which 
he refers to, is not defined and it did not link up to my question. I think this ‘it’ relates to the 
identity confusion I am alluding to.
4  One should be aware that such use of official nationalist symbolism does not automatically 
mean a total marriage of national ideology and the individual mind, but rather what Jansen 
(200) calls ‘the pragmatics of conformism’. Furthermore, not everybody interpreted the death 
of family members (even though they had fallen in war) in an atmosphere of national ideology. 
Rithman-Auguštin (1995) found, through an analysis of death notices in Croatian newspapers 
in 1991-92, that along with a ‘heroic’ discourse adopting the language of national ideology, 
another kind of non-nationalistic mourning existed. In these other kinds of obituaries “many 
families did not even mention that the deceased was a combatant. They have been just lament-
ing the immense loss” (ibid. 5).
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are uncertain about what they are fighting for. I will now give some examples to 
show how Bosnia Herzegovina does not have any special appeal as a national 
symbol.
I
I did not encounter public display of nationalist symbols among the Stolac Mus-
lims. Part of the reason for such a ‘lack’ is probably the fact that the Muslims 
have returned to their town as a minority, and have been afraid of the Croats, at 
least initially. But I encountered no nationalist symbols in private homes either. 
People are simply not proud of Bosnia Herzegovina. Although they consider its 
existence legitimate, it does not function as an icon of identification.
II
There is an opposition between people from Herzegovina and Sarajevo, which I 
think the war amplified. My informants felt that the Muslims of Sarajevo ‘sold’ 
their fellow countrymen in the war for strategic reasons. For instance, Nihad 
told me that a Bosnian general north of Mostar could have moved south and 
liberated Stolac just before the signing of the peace treaty between the Muslims 
and the Croats (in 1994). But the Muslim politicians in Sarajevo held him back. 
Nihad saw this decision as a political decision, not military strategy: “They 
thought that we were all going to die, so they left us to our own fate.” Or as 
Omer once said:
The only politician who drew attention to the fact that the Muslims were in 
prison camps in Herzegovina was Haris Silajdžić. SDA believed in the unity 
between the Muslims and the Croats, they believed it the whole time. But they 
did not know how we [Muslims in Herzegovina] were doing. They knew, but 
they kept quiet. Because they were only concerned about Sarajevo. There was 
a deal where our [Muslim] politicians from Sarajevo said ‘If only you give us 
arms so we can defend Sarajevo, then you can keep Herzegovina.’ They [the 
Croats] would definitely have occupied Mostar, if the road to Sarajevo had 
not been closed. We did not have any chance to leave Mostar, and that’s why 
I stayed in Mostar and defended my family. We had nowhere to go, and that’s 
why they could not take Mostar.
  According to Glenny (199: 22), people in Sarajevo were dependent on weapons supplies 
coming across Croatian territory and Izetbegović did negotiate with the Croatian president 
Franjo Tuđman.
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Sarajevo, therefore does not work for the Muslims of Stolac as an icon for im-
agining a Bosnian nation. 
III
According to a survey conducted in Bosnia Herzegovina in 2000 (UNDP 
2000), the weak national feeling I found among my informants in Stolac was 
part of a broader phenomenon. 1,000 young people (ages 14 to 30) of different 
ethnicities were interviewed. Though the report states that as many as 5 % of 
the Bosniaks feel greatly or moderately attached to Bosnia Herzegovina (p. 93), 
family/friends, habit and local attachment account for 50 % of the respondents’ 
incentive for continuing to live in Bosnia Herzegovina, whereas patriotism only 
amounts to 10 % (p. 92). Taken as a whole, the survey makes for rather disil-
lusioning reading. 2 % of all the young people in Bosnia Herzegovina would 
leave the country if they were given the opportunity. The three most important 
reasons for such a wish are low standard of living (42 %), no prospects of the 
country (19 %), and unemployment (1 %). In sum, the report tells of a young 
generation which has lost confidence in the future.
IV
The Stolac Muslims’ feelings about the future often swung between disillusion-
ment and hope. This quotation expresses the disillusioned perspective:
Huma: He [her husband] was a soldier, I was a nurse and was working all the time 
at the hospital with wounded soldiers. People came into the hospital without 
legs, arms, totally destroyed people with psychic traumas. I gave birth to a 
child, and then another. We have yet another boy, but he is not here now. He is 
three years old. Everything is a big trauma. We stayed here the whole time as 
domoljubi [those who love their country]. We hoped things would be better. 
Now our country does not make sense [bez veze]. No law. Anarchy, anarchy, 
criminals. It is like the things we only saw in the movies before.
Then she talked about immigrating with their children to the USA, due to their 
hopeless economic situation.
Huma: We do not believe a great happiness is waiting for us. We will leave because 
of our children, so things can be better for them. And if we have the chance 
to earn some money, we will come back to Bosnia someday. We will not stay 
there forever. We are going in order to create a better life.
Friend (who is also planning to emigrate): I will leave because I have 
had enough of those idiots. I have had enough of Serbs, Croats and most of 
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all Muslims. Something went wrong with my pretty, fine perspective on the 
Bosniaks. One is disappointed. And how could I not be disappointed. It is a 
catastrophe. My best years came to nothing.
In Stolac many talked about emigrating, and while I was there three families left 
the country to seek asylum before they even knew whether their applications 
had been turned down or not. 
V
In the light of people’s disappointment with their country and their politicians, 
it is not surprising that everyone with whom I discussed the topic wanted Bos-
nia Herzegovina to become a protectorate. They felt that foreign powers needed 
to take over Bosnia Herzegovina in order to save the country. At present the 
OHR is formally the highest authority in Bosnia Herzegovina, but the institu-
tion has neither the power nor the desire to control the country with an iron 
hand. In general, the hope of the OHR is that democracy can develop among 
Bosnians themselves. The Muslims of Stolac were not particularly optimistic. 
As Dino said “The only times there has been peace in the country have been 
when foreign powers controlled and ruled Bosnia Herzegovina: the Turks, the 
Austro-Hungarians, and also Tito because he was a strict and hard leader.” Seen 
in this light it is understandable that some of my informants feared the with-
drawal of the international personnel, as such a withdrawal could lead Bosnia 
Herzegovina back into war. 
VI
A last example of my informants’ lack of identification with Bosnia Herzegovina 
was their attitude towards the army. Though people were proud of Armija BiH 
and believed that their army could defend them, I never traced any romantic 
feelings regarding compulsory conscription. In the Croat Muslim Federation 
there is officially a joint Croat-Muslim army, but in reality it was totally segre-
gated. Two of my informants were to do their military service when I was in 
Stolac, and neither they nor the people with whom I discussed the matter had 
any national-romantic feelings about military service. They felt it was stupid 
and a waste of time that young people were forced to serve nine months in the 
army. A professional army would be better. 
001_316_post-war.indd   225 14/04/08   22:05:00
Denne side er købt på www.ebog.dk og er omfattet af lov om ophavsret. Uanset evt. aftale med Copy-Dan er det ikke tilladt at kopiere eller
indscanne siden til undervisningsbrug eller erhvervsmæssig brug.
22	 post-war identification
Religious identity
Religiosity today
Pre-war religious observance among the Muslims of Bosnia Herzegovina was 
rather low (see Chapter 9). Only 3 % claimed to be religious (Bougarel 1995: 
0), and devout religiosity existed mainly among the intellectual urban elite. In 
everyday life, Islam was mainly used in order to construct a Muslim identity as 
opposed to non-Muslim groups (Croats or Serbs). During the war, religion be-
came politicised and served as a vehicle for expressing a separate Muslim iden-
tity. Mojzes (199: 92-9) reports that Muslim fighting units increasingly turned 
into purely Islamic units defending a Muslim nationalist ideology and not the 
multi-religious society that the Bosnian government officially defended. Vrcan 
(199: 123) writes that the Muslim community vacillated between defending 
the idea of a Bosnian Muslim state based on Islamic culture on the one hand, 
and defending an independent and multi-religious, multiethnic Bosnia Herze-
govina on the other hand. But as the war proceeded, there was a marked shift 
in the direction of a growing resistance to multi-religiosity. In her detailed eth-
nography of the siege of Sarajevo, Maček (2000a) also describes how religion 
increasingly came to signal difference between the ethnic groups rather than 
the groups’ common background and experience. The war made people more 
religious, but a great portion of pragmatism continued to exist. For example, 
many Muslims found Catholic ancestors in their family in order to be eligible 
for humanitarian aid from Caritas, an organisation run by Catholics. The Mus-
lims also wanted to keep their special Bosnian interpretation and practice of Is-
lam. The presence, therefore, of people from foreign Islamic countries – either 
wanting to help or doing missionary work – in fact provoked the Sarajevans. 
Maček (2000a: 212) concludes: “To be a Muslim in Sarajevo one did not need to 
believe that there was no God but God and that Mohammed was his Prophet, 
but one did need to remember that faith, and reconsider what it meant for one’s 
everyday life.” In short, then, religion played an increasing role in peoples’ lives 
because of the pressure they experienced; but at the same time people tried to 
keep hold of the pre-war pragmatic and tolerant attitude towards religion.
So what has happened since the end of the war? My findings suggest that 
today religiosity has found a level more or less equal to the pre-war situation 
and does not play a major role in people’s everyday practices of identification. 
For some, religious activity and ideals are important, but for most people be-
ing a good Muslim means to behave decently and does not relate to religious 
  On the background of research conducted after the war, Maček concludes the same for the 
Muslims of Sarajevo (Maček 2000a: 19, and personal communication), see also Bougarel 
(2001).
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practices; for some Islam is simply unimportant. Therefore, for Stolac Muslims 
religious identity does not fully define what it means to be a Muslim. Several 
of my informants told me about how they were more religious during the war 
than today, they prayed more often and celebrated Ramadan more strictly. This 
they considered normal, due to the immense psychological pressure they en-
dured, and consequently there was nothing strange about the decline of re-
ligious observance when the war stopped. Often people lamented the loss of 
the wartime sense of community and social interaction, but the issue was not 
religion but rather društvo (approximately: social intermingling). It was my im-
pression that only a few of my informants were particularly religious. Once I 
said to Nihad that in Denmark people go to church three times in their lives: 
baptism, marriage and burial. He laughed and said that in Bosnia it was simi-
lar. I was obviously not wholly correct about Danish religiosity, and Nihad not 
about Bosnian, but to judge by my informants’ practices and lack of talk about 
Islam, it seems that they had a rather pragmatic relation to their faith, as the 
following examples show.
I
Following the Koran one should neither drink alcohol nor eat pork. My in-
formants did not eat pork, but the reason given was that it was repulsive. The 
majority had a relaxed attitude to alcohol. I do not recall being in a Muslim 
home where I was not offered loza (grape brandy) and often it was homemade. 
Homemade wine was also highly esteemed. This is not to say that people drank 
a lot, but that drinking was just not an issue. 
II
Only a few people regularly attended the mosque (or what was left of it), the 
same number of people as before the war, I was told. At the Friday service there 
were about five to seven young people, the remaining twenty to twenty-five 
persons being over sixty. And I never observed people praying during the day 
or in the evening.
  A Bosnian refugee I interviewed in Denmark recalled a situation in which a Dane asked her 
why she did not eat pork, and she answered: ‘I don’t know, I don’t like it.’ But he kept asking: 
‘But why do you not eat it?’ And for lack of a better answer she asked him ‘Why do you not eat 
cats?’ I think my informants could have offered a similar practical and non-religious explana-
tion to such a question.
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III
During the war language had become politicised and more Turkish words and 
expressions had entered the Muslims’ language. Greetings had increasingly be-
come symbols of nationality. It is my impression that this has changed again for 
the Muslims of Stolac. Possibly the use of religious greetings has increased from 
the pre-war level, but I heard them only rarely. Sometimes people would say 
selam alejkum (peace for all), and the reply would be alejkum selam; but mostly 
people said such secular and religiously neutral greetings as dobra dan, šta ima, 
kako si/ste, šta radi to each other.
IV
Before the war the children who attended mekteb (Koran school) would some-
times, if they had old-fashioned teachers, have to learn to recite the Koran in 
Arabic. Nijaz’s wife Ljiljana knows some of the Koran in Arabic, but she does 
not get much credit for that. As Nijaz said to her once: “Well it doesn’t matter, 
God understands all languages, why then should we pray in Arabic?” 
V
The last example of my informants’ pragmatic relationship to their faith refers 
to Ramadan [Ramazan], which took place in November and December 2000, 
when I was doing fieldwork. Ramadan is the main event in the Muslim ritual 
calendar. It occurs in the ninth month of the Muslim year, and is observed as 
a month of fasting during which Muslims abstain from eating, drinking and 
sexual intercourse between sunrise and sunset. As a codified ritual in Islam, it 
is an individual statement of one’s personal commitment and it could easily be 
used as a way to identify and collectively emphasise Muslim identity. But not 
many people in Stolac observed the fast. Some did so on some days, while oth-
ers ate and drank less in the period. Often only one or two in a family would 
be fasting or partly fasting. Actually, it was not a big issue. On a number of 
occasions I heard people making jokes about those who fasted. Once when 
Mensur’s mother talked about waking up before sunrise to have something to 
drink, her husband laughingly replied “this is definitely not for me”, and later 
when she told me that smoking is not allowed during Ramadan, her husband 
said, “Well, then Ramadan is good for something.” Their daughter-in-law was 
a smoker. Muhamed was also fasting, and his friends once said to me while we 
were having coffee together (with the exception of Muhamed): “He is not al-
lowed to eat, or even drink coffee, he cannot smoke, or even drink water, and 
he is not allowed to make love to his wife for a whole month”, and then they all 
started laughing. Those who fasted or partly fasted focused mainly on practical 
aspects: how it is easier to fast in the wintertime as the days are shorter, how to 
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wake up at four o’clock in the morning to have a morning coffee, how drinking 
a little water is allowed if one needs to take pills, and so on. Or they said that 
they did it because it was a nice tradition. Two of my informants who observed 
the fast gave more ideological explanations for observing the ritual. They fo-
cused on how it made one feel good, how one could handle things more easily, 
how one got energy after a couple of days, and how it helped one to be a better 
human being. Irrespective of their attitude towards the fast, everybody looked 
forward to the Bajram (ramazanski bajram), when the fast was over and people 
visited each other and had cakes (especially baklava), juice and coffee. 
Dissociation from religious dogmatism
These examples are not meant to illustrate that Islam does not have a place 
in people’s lives. Many people saw themselves as believers and respected their 
God. Being a believer, however, was about being a decent human being, be-
having properly, taking care of one’s family and fellow man and so on. It was 
not about knowing the Koran, praying, fasting, attending the mosque, greet-
ing people in the right way and so on. In fact, I often heard people dissociate 
themselves from more dogmatic religious manifestations. Instead, they wanted 
to stick to what they regarded as the typical Bosnian way of practising religion. 
Ljubica was what one could regard as a normal believer, to the extent that such 
a concept makes sense. She believed a little, fasted a little during Ramadan, and 
she knew the Koran a little:
The Muslims here in Herzegovina were not particularly devout. Maybe it is 
different north of Sarajevo. The Serbs aren’t devout either, but the Croats go to 
church every Sunday. During the war, then we were more religious, we were 
scared. Before the war I never saw anyone with a veil, but during the war there 
were quite a few donations from Saudi Arabia and Iraq, and they brought the 
custom with them. But it is not autochthonous [authentic]. The Muslims here 
are different. It seems as though everybody today is afraid of Islam, but our 
Islam is different from the Arabic countries, we are not particularly devout.
In Sarajevo, Maček (2000a) observed a similar attitude. People distinguished 
between ‘real Muslims’ and ‘April Muslims’; the latter being the ones who dis-
covered their religiosity at the beginning of the war (April 1992). People re-
spected the ‘real Muslims’, but often the newly awakened Muslims were looked 
on with contempt. Throughout the war and afterwards, religious symbols had 
been manipulated, religious differences reinforced, and many people had been 
killed or had to flee in the name of religion. Today many of the Muslims in 
Stolac are tired of politicians’ nationalistic-religious rhetoric. As I have already 
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shown, the Croats use nationalistic and religious symbols in abundance. This is 
what Muhamed’s mother said:
When one enters the hospital [run by Croats] there is a huge picture of 
Tuđman, and below it says ‘Tuđman is my president.’ And there is a big cross 
with Jesus on it, and you should not do such a thing in a public place. When 
you enter a hospital in eastern Mostar [the Muslim part of Mostar] the only 
thing you can find on the walls are children’s drawings, you do not see a cross 
or crescent and stars. It is all right if you wear a cross on yourself, that is your 
right, because it is something that is your own. And you have the right to 
wear it. But it is not all right if you place it somewhere where it doesn’t belong. 
Jesus Christ, I salute him, but he should not be in the places where he doesn’t 
belong. His right place is in the Church and they shouldn’t play with him.
People not only disapprove of the misuse of religious symbols by others. Their 
‘own’ religious symbols and practices are also rejected if viewed as too dog-
matic. I shall give some examples.
I
One day while shopping in a local shop in Stolac where people sometimes hang 
around, a man wanted to teach me a Muslim greeting. Another of the men 
present said, “No, you can’t teach him that, that’s a religious expression you 
know, that’s not a good thing.” I found it a little strange, since the man who 
protested was one of the more devout people I knew. But he automatically dis-
sociated himself from what he sensed could be interpreted as a religious/na-
tionalistic statement. This is not to say that he did not appreciate such religious 
statements, but rather that he wanted to show that he did not find them ap-
propriate. I experienced a similar situation one evening during a private visit. 
One of those present used an old Turkish word (I cannot recall the word), and 
another man jokingly said that he should not be teaching me such words, as I 
would then think they were Muslim fundamentalists. Behind the joke I think 
he was also concerned with the picture I got of them as Muslims. He did not 
want me to see them as particularly devout.
II
One evening Nihad and I were talking about what it meant to be a Muslim, 
and he light-heartedly said: “We are Muslims, we don’t eat pork, but we drink 
a lot of loza [grape brandy]. During the war we received some dates in the 
aid packages from Saudi Arabia and we used them for making rakija [spirits]. 
We did not have food, but we had cigarettes and rakija, we needed something 
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to soothe the nerves.” Besides being funny, the story also communicated how 
Bosnian Muslims are not very religious, at least not as religious as ‘those from 
Saudi Arabia’.
III
Another example of my informants’ rejection of a dogmatic interpretation of 
Islam relates to how those who showed off their religion too much were not 
well respected, such as women who wore veils or mujahedins who stayed on in 
the country after the war. One evening I did an interview in a home where one 
of the women present was a firm believer and not allowed to touch men other 
than her husband. I was therefore instructed by the informant I conducted the 
interview with not to offer her my hand on entering. I was only to say dobro 
veče (good evening). After the interview, I told some people about the woman 
who would not shake hands and one of the men commented “well, she would 
probably do it if you had a DM100 note in your hand”, and another man replied, 
“You would probably only need DM10.”
IV
The last example relates to the rebuilding of mosques throughout Bosnia Herze-
govina. One might assume that such rebuilding was popular, as the destruction 
of the many mosques during the war was a symbol of the destruction of the 
Bosnian Muslim people. Reconstruction of mosques could be seen as rebuild-
ing dignity and Muslim identity signalling ‘we have not given up.’ The Muslims 
of Stolac, however, simply found such rebuilding to be a total waste of money. 
The Muslims in Stolac I talked to all agreed that they did not want the rebuild-
ing of the mosques, they wanted investments. While I was in Stolac there were 
plans to rebuild the mosque in the centre of town. Talking to Emir about the 
matter, I said that I thought it was a good idea. Rebuilding the mosque would 
be a statement saying that the Muslims also have the right to live in Stolac. 
Emir, however, did not agree. He definitely preferred jobs and factories to a 
symbolic manifestation saying ‘we have returned.’ 
One could have assumed that national and religious identity would have been 
used by my informants to define Muslim identity, considering the all-perva-
siveness of powerful ethnoreligious nationalist politics prior to and through-
out the war. In addition, Muslim identity has been extremely important, as the 
killings and expulsion of the Muslims solely referred to ethnic identity. The 
  The mosque has now been reconstructed.
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Muslims of Stolac strongly felt themselves to be Muslims, and to be a Mus-
lim in Bosnia Herzegovina refers both to the practice of Islam and to national 
identity (narod). In spite of all these factors, however, religion and national 
identification only played a minor role in my informants’ identifications; these 
two aspects could not alone fill up the ‘container’ called Muslimness. People 
did not identify much with their country, neither during the war when they 
mainly fought for survival and not for a state, nor when I did fieldwork when 
the positive symbolic value of Bosnia Herzegovina was slight. Religion was 
more important: I only met a few people who declared themselves to be athe-
ists. Their religious identity, however, had not colonised more of their identity 
as Muslims than it had done before the war; on the contrary, it seemed that 
people distanced themselves from a radical and dogmatically religious Islam. 
In the remainder of Part III, I shall analyse how the Muslims of Stolac defined 
themselves as Muslims, considering the fact that national and religious identi-
ties are but a part of the overall Muslim identification.
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Chapter 12
Localistic identifications
During and after the war, Jugo-nostalgija was a label used by nationalists to tag 
people they considered critical of the nationalist vision. The label, however, 
was soon taken over by those targeted by it. According to Jansen (2000a), jugo-
nostalgic displays of the past and the imagination of Yugoslavia as a common 
cultural space where everyone lived well were used as critical commentary on 
the present. First, because the story of the good times in Yugoslavia was a story 
of remembering, in opposition to the nationalistic regimes’ amnesia and break 
with the past. Second, by conceptualising a shared space (the Yugoslavian past) 
it became possible to “access a common ground where a host of different de-
sires might meet and be articulated into a potential dynamic of change” (ibid. 
21). Reconstruction of the past, in other words, had the potential to enable a 
political vision of a better future. Similarly, Velikonja (2002) has shown how 
jugo-nostalgija in Slovenia has become a vehicle for a critique of the present 
regime’s uncritical embrace of a Western-style future. In Stolac people talked 
a lot about the past. Sometimes, like Jansen’s informants, they explicitly talked 
about Yugoslavia and the cultural space connected with it. More often, they 
talked about Stolac, or the ‘Stolac spirit’ as they sometimes called it, but even so 
some of the same dynamics analysed by Jansen existed. My informants’ strong 
local patriotism focusing on Stolac as a centre of open-mindedness, a meeting 
point for different cultures and ethnic groups, and a unique and beautifull town 
provides a source of identification and resistance to the nationalist vision, and 
is thus part of the counterdiscourse. At times, though, it also serves as a critique 
of the Croats, who are considered blameworthy. 
The Stolac spirit
Three aspects characterised people’s talk about the Stolac spirit, and all hoped 
this spirit would return.
Coexistence
The ideal of coexistence was of central importance to the Muslims of Stolac, 
and was often associated with a typical Stolac mentality: people from Stolac 
are simply seen as predisposed to co-exist, and multiculturalism runs in the 
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‘cultural genes’ of the people. My informants saw Stolac as a crossroads for dif-
ferent cultures, and stressed that all newcomers have been welcomed. People 
mentioned the Jewish grave just outside town, which commemorates the Rabbi 
Mosha Danon from Sarajevo, who died on his way to Jerusalem and was buried 
here in 130. Or they refer to an ornament on one of the world-famous Stećaks 
(medieval Bosnian tombstones) at the Necropolis Radimlja two kilometres out-
side town. This headstone is decorated with the figure of a standing man whose 
hand is lifted upwards at the elbow and whose palm is open, greeting the spec-
tators. This gesture is read by the Stolac Muslims as meaning that all strangers 
are welcome. Salko expressed his idea of local inter-ethnic coexistence in Stolac 
in the following way:
Our wish is that people would return. We want the Stolac spirit to return. 
And that spirit is the citizens who lived here before the war bošnjaki, i serbi, 
i hrvati.1 And those coming from outside [strani], the best thing would be if 
they left.
An interview I did with a Croat woman shows that this idea of a Stolac spirit 
was not reserved for Muslims. It is for everybody to identify with. 
 
When I returned to Stolac three years ago, I met a Muslim, and I inquired 
about all my neighbours, and then we talked for a while, and when we split 
up I said: ‘Greet everyone who drank from our river.’ It doesn’t matter if they 
are Serbs, Croats or Muslims. Because everyone is the same and has the same 
problems. Compared to other cities where people built big houses, in Stolac 
they built small houses, but the heart was big. The neighbours are tolerant 
towards us, and we towards them. If you do not want to live in this way, you 
shouldn’t come back to Stolac. If I only wanted to live with Serbs or Croats 
I would never have returned. We have to live together and not beside each 
other. Because if we live beside each other, we can live here for 1,000 years 
without talking to each other. When I stayed in Zagreb, nobody greeted or 
talked to each other. It is better to live together. It is beautiful. That’s the way 
I was raised.
1  The reason why I write this in the source language is that I often heard precisely this expression: 
‘Bosnjaks, and Serbs and Croats’. It seemed to be a deeply felt and engraved turn of phrase.
  He refers to Croats from central Bosnia.
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The beauty and economic strength of Stolac 
The second element of the Stolac spirit relates to the feeling of unity with the 
beauty of the town. Pictures of pre-war Stolac show that it was a very beauti-
ful and architectonically harmonious town. On a number of occasions I was 
reminded that before the war Stolac was a candidate for UNESCO’s list of cit-
ies worthy of preservation. People proudly told me about the four picturesque 
mosques, Stara Tepa (the big town market built in old Ottoman style), Begovi-
na, the old watermills, the Hotel Bregava (a newly constructed but architec-
tonically well-integrated building), all the cafés, the shops and so forth. Today 
everything is mined or burned. They told me about the lovely Mediterranean 
climate. They talked about the River Bregava, which runs through the town, 
where one can swim and fish and which provides water for the gardens situated 
on its banks. They described all the fruits they could grow: “In the summer fruit 
is so plentiful you don’t have to go hungry, we have kiwi, peaches, apricots, figs, 
apples, grapes, pomegranate, plum,” as Mensur’s mother said. And they told me 
about all the industries and factories in town, which employed a lot of people 
and exported goods to the whole of Yugoslavia and abroad. In short, they were/
had been very proud of their town. 
The reason why I write ‘were/had been’ is that people often had ambiva-
lent feelings about their town. Visual memories from before the war, pictures 
from pre-war Stolac, present images, dreams – they all merged together. Some 
said they could not remember what the town looked like before the war; others 
said they could not drive through the town without seeing the ‘real’ Stolac in 
their mind’s eye. Everybody felt the town had become ugly, but nonetheless I 
was asked – often in the expectant way one normally asks visitors to one’s town 
– how I liked the town, and it was obvious that the appropriate and polite an-
swer would be ‘It is very nice.’ I just could not say it, because Stolac was ruined, 
dirty and ugly. And when I said that, people sometimes became quiet for a while 
and then said, “Yes, that’s right.” Despite such contradictory feelings, Stolac was 
generally constructed in people’s minds as a beautifull and unique town. When 
people were in a realistic mood, their Stolac did not exist any more; instead 
they saw an ugly town dominated by Croats. But when they talked about Stolac 
in a more insubstantial but still physical manner, it was as though the old ‘real’ 
Stolac rose from the dust, and people were again full of pride for their town. 
They considered it the best place on earth. In this way the beauty of the town 
coalesced with the spirit of coexistence, and together these visions functioned 
as a symbolic cultural space or an idea with which one could identify. 
Mehmed was a member of the SDA, and as such supported a more explicit 
Bosnian Muslim national identity. His statement below, however, regards local 
and not national identity.
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We Stočani [citizens of Stolac] wish, even though I will not live long enough 
to see, but my daughter will live long enough to see Stolac become Stolac 
again: the old town that you have seen in pictures. We Stočani want such a 
town again. Life here is unique compared to the whole rest of Bosnia. Stolac as 
Stolac with its own way of life, and all Stočani want it to be so again.
Mehmed’s wife: And those people from Kakanj [Croats from central Bosnia], they 
just have to go back to where they came from.
Mehmed: Everyone should have the opportunity to go back to their own homes, 
and one’s property should be one’s own again. And those people from Kakanj, 
if they don’t want to go back, nobody says they can’t stay, but they have to live 
in their own houses, not in mine. My house was given to me by my father, and 
I will not let someone else live in my house. It is mine and it is my life. For me 
Stolac is the most beautiful town in the whole world, although it’s destroyed. 
And the same goes for Bregava [the city river].
Raha was a woman who loved her town. In this excerpt from an interview, 
she is talking about Stara Tepa, the pre-war market in Stolac. There was wide-
spread agreement about such a market’s potential for facilitating interethnic 
interaction. A special aspect of this quote is the way the speaker mixes past and 
present tense, which reflects people’s ambiguous feelings for their town.
It’s expensive in the shops and the market is much cheaper, and therefore we 
want one. And we called it Tepa. The things one can buy there are handmade 
by the people producing them, and there is no tax, that’s why it’s cheaper. 
The only thing they must pay for is the stand. Every week people came from 
all over, and one could buy meat and the quality is the best in the whole of 
Herzegovina. We have a flower in Herzegovina, and when the goats eat it the 
quality [of the meat] is the best. And the honey is the best and most expensive 
due to this flower [zanovijet].
Besides being a source of identification, picturing pre-war Stolac was also a cri-
tique of the Croats who demolished the old Ottoman-inspired town and domi-
nate it today, and who were trying to create a new Catholic and modern Stolac. 
Stolac was destroyed after the fighting with the Serbs in 1992-93. When the Mus-
lim men had been expelled and only women and children were left, the mosques 
were razed, and the old houses, private libraries and priceless cultural artefacts 
were burned. And when the Muslims started to return in 199, ordinary Mus-
lim houses were mined and burned. The meaning of the violence was clear: to 
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extinguish everything reminiscent of the Muslims/Ottomans/Turks – and later 
to prevent the return of the Muslims. Physical traces of the past were removed 
or destroyed, and the town was to be constructed in a new image. Flags were 
raised, the street names changed, and a bust was erected in front of the school 
where the old Partisan memorial had been. An even more grotesque denial of 
the town’s past appeared, so I was told, on TV. Following the expulsion, only very 
few Muslims remained in Stolac, all women in mixed marriages. One Muslim 
family did stay, though, as members of the family had saved a Catholic bishop 
from the Partisans during the Second World War. The man in the family was 
forced to confirm on television that there had never been any mosques in Stolac, 
which naturally was very odd for the Stolac Muslims to watch or hear about. The 
Muslims’ active remembering of pre-war Stolac is therefore not only a matter of 
nostalgia and identification, but also a resistance to the Croats’ destruction of 
the old Stolac and their vision of a new town. For this reason, even talking about 
the past and pre-war Stolac is a strongly political act. 
Sometimes the criticism of the Croats is more explicit. People say that the 
Croats do not love the town, or that they do not have any real attachment to it. 
If they did, they would not have treated it the way they did. Broken bricks, piec-
es of glass, ruined houses used as dumps, car wrecks in the river or in gardens, 
old faded graffiti: this is what characterises Stolac. And the Croats responsible 
for most of this mess, and who have lived in it since the war, have done noth-
ing to clean it up. As Suljeman said: “They want a dump rather than cultural 
monuments”, implying that the Croats do not deserve the town. Ibro and his 
wife expressed this criticism very directly during an interview.
Ibro: When I returned last year, I went out to see to the river, but the river was wild. 
You couldn’t see the water because the shores were polluted. We used to clean 
the river every year, every spring, so the river would be clean, because it is the 
mirror of the town.
Wife: None of the young people will do it now, and we elderly, we can’t. I am not a 
pessimist; I hope it will be good again. Come back to Stolac in five years and 
see how it is. A lot of young people are returning, but you can’t live here if you 
don’t love this town. When you live in your own town, you take care of it and 
love it, and I can see that it hasn’t been taken care of during the war. And this 
is because the ones who lived here during the war, they did not love it, they did 
not take care of it. They threw old cars in Bregava. In the river lived fish, snakes 
and frogs, and now there is nothing. There were many water mills on the river. 
Everything is destroyed, but it will be again [the town will be beautiful again].
  See: http://www.haverford.edu/relg/sells/stolac/stolacrab.htm
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The homemade and local
The last element in Stolac Muslims’ local patriotism has to do with the value 
attached to everything domaci (homemade/local), in particular local food. Peo-
ple would proudly let me know that the bread, the cheese, the yogurt, the juice, 
the loza (grape brandy) they served me were all domaci. Homemade food from 
the Stolac area was by definition better quality and preferable. People told me 
how the local food products were produced without chemicals or fertilizers, 
which in turn made the domaci clean (čisto). Some emphasised that their cows 
did not have mad cow disease, as they moved freely around in the mountains; 
others told me that eggs from the chicken farms smelled so strange. Of spe-
cial importance was the pomegranate [šipak], which grows in abundance. It is 
tasty and full of vitamin C. I was kindly given several bottles of šipak juice, and 
when I went home to Denmark I was asked to take šipak juice to people’s rela-
tives there. The positive connotations of everything homemade affected other 
kinds of classifications. In Chapter , we saw how people said that they did not 
have problems with Croats from Stolac, labelling them ‘naši domaći Hrvati’: 
our hometown Croats.
The struggle for local identity
There are only a few visible markers of Muslim identity in Stolac: the Croats 
dominate the public space, and the Muslims do little to change this. Many are 
probably afraid of the reactions that visible demonstrations could provoke (see 
e.g. Mahmutcehalic 2001), but more importantly this attitude is in line with the 
Muslims’ self-perception. The Muslims identify themselves by the fact that they 
do not use the same methods and rhetoric as the nationalists. Waving a flag or 
drawing nationalistic graffiti simply would not be respected. The few physical 
markers of identity I did encounter are rather part of the Muslims’ localistic 
identifications.
I
Before the war, a modest local historical pamphlet was published in Stolac with 
illustrated articles on the history, archaeology and architecture of the area. 
After the war and the total destruction of the Stolac heritage, these booklets 
suddenly gained new importance. In 199, some prominent people from Stolac 
initiated the reprinting of these booklets, along with a section with comparative 
photographs of Stolac then and now, in the format of a book (Slovo Gorčina 
199). The book was evidence of a time and a town which no longer existed. The 
articles, which hardly anyone read before the war, now became an important 
source of identity for people living in Stolac, since the book helped them to 
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mentally (re)construct the picture of beautiful pre-war Stolac that the Croats 
had destroyed and now deny ever existed. Without these publications, the eth-
nic and cultural cleansing of Stolac would have been total. The free distribution 
of the book to the citizens of Stolac was intended to help them remember their 
town. However, the book was probably also meant as a kind of propaganda, 
to play a part in the imagination of the ‘real’ Stolac, as it was not particularly 
attractive for people to return in 199-9 due to such problems as violence, 
threats and unemployment. In this sense, the political motive behind the book’s 
publication was to help motivate people to return, so that Stolac could again 
become Muslim. 
II
Another source of local identity was the River Bregava, which runs through 
town. People often talked about the river and would sometimes say, ‘at least we 
have Bregava.’ I think that the Bregava functioned as a central component in the 
Muslims’ identification with Stolac and the Stolac spirit. Here is a small excerpt 
from my notebook written after a conversation with Anvere:
[S]he was laughing a little at the name Sanpero, the name of the restaurant 
where the cultural centre had been before. She also said that before [the war] 
there had been a gallery next to Café Galerija, where artists from Stolac exhib-
ited. She then told me that it was so strange to realise that all this is destroyed 
and gone. The town really had soul before, a spirit: ‘now they have destroyed 
everything, the mosques, Begovina…Bregava is the only thing which they 
haven’t destroyed.’ When she said this, I realised why people talked about 
Bregava so much; maybe they had done so before, but now it was of extra 
importance, because it was the only thing people have left. It was like a symbol 
saying ‘We have not given up.’ The Bregava is what was left of the real Stolac. 
Or as Enver replied when I asked him if the River Bregava is the spirit of 
Stolac, ‘Yes, it is the only thing left that is ours.’
One of the Muslim cafés in Stolac is called Café Benat. The name refers to the 
place in town where the river is most scenic. And the name was not chosen 
arbitrarily; rather it is part of the appropriation of the symbolic/physical space 
of Stolac.
III
Another Muslim café in Stolac, Café Galerija, marked a more contested strug-
gle to regain a territorial marker. The café, located in the centre of town op-
posite three Croatian cafés, was popular. The owners of the place spent a lot 
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of energy on making it a cosy and pleasant place to be. It had big panorama 
windows so that one could overlook the centre, outdoor tables, flowers on the 
tables, and beautiful black and white drawings of pre-war Stolac on the walls, 
drawings which were part of the mental (re)construction of pre-war Stolac. 
The café had been destroyed twice by Croats. I think that the Muslim café in 
the centre of town was seen as a provocation by the Croats, and as a symbolic 
invasion of territory. Accepting the café would be tantamount to accepting the 
presence of the Muslims in Stolac. It should also be taken into account that 
Muslim houses were also repeatedly mined or burned (especially in 199-9) in 
order to frighten the Muslims and prevent them from returning. On both occa-
sions the café was reopened. For the Muslims the re-openings were a symbol of 
the integration of the town and the possible coexistence of the ethnic groups in 
Stolac rather than a sign of antagonism. Some said that Croats also patronised 
the café. Although, I never met any. I suppose that people wanted them to come 
to Café Galerija, thereby legitimising it and doing their part in (re)constructing 
the Stolac spirit. Recall also (Chapter 11) the night at Café Galerija where one of 
the Muslims provoked the Croats on the other side of the road. He repeatedly 
shouted, “Why don’t you come and sit with us”, meaning something like why 
do you not want to help reconstruct the Stolac spirit. This is an excerpt from 
an interview with Alija, one of the owners of Café Galerija. He hoped the café 
could play a part in reintegrating people in Stolac, seeing it as a fight for the 
town and the Stolac spirit of coexistence.
TK: Has the café also been a fight for your country?
Alija: What happened during the war was a fight for the country4. But the thing 
about the café was a fight for this town, and everybody who comes to the café 
understands it in that way.
TK: Do you think the Croats will come to the café in the future?
Alija: Yes. Listen, the good Croats already come, so do the Serbs. When they are 
in town, they naturally go down to Galerija…I hope the café can play a part 
in integrating people living here in Stolac…You have been at the cafe, what 
is your experience, do you think people enjoy themselves, is there a good 
atmosphere?
4  He says drzava, opstina, naroda right after each other, so it is difficult to translate.
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IV
Alija also played a central role on two other occasions when a fight for the 
physical/symbolic space of Stolac was going on. First, he initiated a tidying-
up of one of the haremi (Muslim graveyards) in town. Before the war the 
scouts normally did this, as well as cleaning the river. Since the expulsion of 
the Muslims, however, the harem had been left unattended. Grass, trees and 
bushes had grown wild. One day a group of people, among them Alija, made a 
poster asking everybody to come and spend a day cleaning the place. Around 
0 people, mostly men of all ages, turned up. The atmosphere was great and 
everybody seemed to enjoy the work, especially because they were finally able 
to do something, accomplish something, take up some space in Stolac, saying 
indirectly: this is also our town. Everybody was working hard, cutting, sawing, 
weeding and raking, and there were a lot of bonfires. Suddenly a big beautiful 
tree caught fire. Edin, however, just laughed and said “save nature.” Then he and 
another person started making fires next to trees in other places. I said: “Isn’t it 
a pity to do so?” “No!” Edin replied, ”So many shells have fallen here, the place 
needs to be cleaned up.” People laughed and kept working, and I do not think 
Edin was alone in thinking that the best thing would be if one could burn it all 
down, like a symbolic purification. The harem was already defiled and had lost 
some of its sacredness. Nijaz’s father showed me his father’s grave, a big marble 
slab with an engraving of a picture of his father. He pointed at the holes in the 
slab (approximately ten holes, each the size of a small coin) made by the shells, 
and said nothing. I think the anarchistic cleaning and burning gave the harem 
some of its value back.
V
The last example of the physical/symbolic recapturing of Stolac and the con-
current construction of the Stolac spirit is rather tragic. Alija again played a 
central role, but this time in a sad and involuntary way. One morning the tel-
ephone rang and my landlady answered it. She did not really say anything. She 
just sighed and then said ”Oh no!” Alija’s younger brother had died. A couple 
of days before he and some friends had driven off the road. Perhaps the road 
had been icy. He died in a hospital in Sarajevo. After hanging up my landlady 
said: “Imagine, surviving the war and then he dies now, it is a tragedy, it is life!” 
Her husband did not say anything. Tears just ran down his cheeks. The follow-
ing day the funeral (dženaza) was held. A lot of people attended the ceremony 
at the only functioning mosque in town, actually a reconstructed room in a 
demolished mosque, and afterwards everybody walked through town down 
to the harem. I think 500-00 people were present. It was quite a sight when 
everybody walked in procession through the town, all these people through 
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the narrow streets. More importantly, though, it was the first time since the 
war that people had walked through town at a đenaza, which was customary. 
I do not think it was meant as a provocation. Rather it was a way of saying ‘we 
also live here’, ‘we have the right to be here.’ Furthermore, this manifestation 
was in accord with the deceased’s spirit. He was known as a lively person who 
always held his head high. I was told that at the beginning of the Muslims’ 
return to Stolac everybody had been afraid of going to the centre, but Alija’s 
brother walked gaily: he was always whistling. Talking about the đenaza with 
people in the days that followed, I was reminded on several occasions that: ‘The 
Croat shops were closed when we passed’, and ‘The Croats didn’t play music [in 
the cafés] when the procession passed through town’, and ‘Croats attended the 
funeral and put flowers on the grave’ and ‘In the car on the day of the accident 
were also two Croats and two from mixed marriages.’ I think for many Muslims 
the đenaza was special. First of all it was tragic, but it was also a day when the 
Muslims took up space in town and the Croats accepted it, which they showed 
by closing the shops, turning off the music, and attending the funeral. All of 
these actions were interpreted as signs of respect. As Emir said: ”We cannot 
forget all the time we have lived together, and neither can they.” In short, the 
đenaza played a part in the Muslims’ construction of the Stolac spirit.
These five examples are some of the few visible attempts at redefining the physi-
cal/symbolic space of Stolac that I encountered. In addition there are all the 
minor daily acts, which are primarily about creating an everyday world, but 
which nonetheless also relate to the creation of the Stolac spirit. It is difficult to 
establish a dividing line between the everyday construction of small life-worlds 
and the more visible conquests of local physical/symbolic space. For instance, 
there were families who kept the road outside their house and garden extremely 
clean by sweeping it every day, even though the house next to them lay in ruins 
with a huge pile of litter in front. Are they just fastidious people trying to keep 
some dignity in an ugly and ruined town? Or is it possible to see such acts as ef-
forts to clean up (parts of) Stolac in order to create a contrast to the state of total 
decay in which the Croats have left the town? I think that both alternatives are 
  On the Internet, one also finds Stolac homepages. These are important statements of identity, 
but were not really relevant for the Muslims of Stolac. Firstly, only a few people in Bosnia 
Herzegovina had access to the Internet, and secondly, the pages consisted of hardly anything 
but expressions of opinion from people living outside Stolac, and many also outside Bosnia 
Herzegovina. Furthermore, the tone and the statements on the homepages were much more 
antagonistic and fierce and the criticism of the Croats more explicit than is the case in Stolac. 
Again one finds that nationalism is often stronger in exile, perhaps because people in exile do 
not have to live with the consequences of their own actions. This observation is supported by 
the research project I did in Denmark among Bosnian refugees (see Introduction).
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true. And what about such gestures as returning to a demolished house, recon-
structing buildings, insisting on being positive about the future for the sake of 
the children, opening shops, baking cakes for a birthday party, tidying op the 
street, planting flowers, tilling the soil, paying visits – all these actions attempt 
to recreate and normalise life, which also relates to creating the Stolac spirit. 
The chapter has analysed my informants’ identification with the town, mainly 
the ‘Stolac spirit’, important for the Muslims’ work of working out their new 
position in town. The Stolac spirit is about the creation of a physical/symbolic 
space – that is, spaces existing in reality like Bregava, Galerija, the mosques 
– and a cultural space, which is more a (re)construction of ideals and the aes-
thetics of the town with which one can identify. The creation of a cultural space 
is simultaneously a struggle for physical space, and the struggle for physical 
space is also an attempt to reconstruct Stolac as a cultural place and thereby as 
a source of identification. The Stolac spirit probably existed before the war, but 
has gained new significance. The Muslims returned to a town from which they 
were expelled, their houses were ruined and/or looted, everything Muslim was 
destroyed and the Croats now controlled all public administration and build-
ings. So it was no longer certain what being a Stočani meant. Hence, just to talk 
about the beauty of the town, the excellent climate, or the native and tolerant 
soul of Stolac, to open a café, stroll through the streets, use the River Bregava, 
produce and praise homemade food, identify naši domaći Hrvati and so on, 
now have some degree of political significance. The Stolac spirit is a source of 
identification, but it is also a sort of political manifestation saying we (also) 
have the right to live here. However, it is important to distinguish such a local 
identification from a nationalistic or religious one. Localistic identification and 
the evocation of the Stolac spirit is not about being Muslim, but about being a 
Muslim citizen of Stolac. The Stolac spirit redirects focus from a nationalistic 
identification towards a local one, and is thus part of my informants’ counter-
discourse.
  During and after the war many housewives did not bake cakes, as cakes symbolise joy and 
celebration.
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Chapter 13
Ideal of tolerance and coexistence
The Muslims of Stolac subcribed to an ideal of tolerance and wish for coexist-
ence with the other ethnic groups. Often this ideal was expressed through peo-
ple’s talk about the past, focusing on how everybody lived peacefully together 
and how ethnicity did not matter. People always talk about the past from a 
particular perspective, and talking about the past also exposes the present. I 
therefore have no hesitations about grouping people’s illuminations of the past 
together with statements about the present, and viewing both as part of an ideal 
of tolerance and coexistence. 
I analyse my informants’ use of the past and the connected ideal of toler-
ance and coexistence in three different ways. First, people’s nostalgic relation-
ship to the past was used as a way of comprehending the war, or more precisely 
of creating a space uncontaminated by the war. Second, talking about the past 
was also a political commentary on the present. Third, and most important, 
my informants were rather conscious of the ideal of tolerance and coexistence 
when it was used in a self-reflexive manner to identify Muslimness and criticise 
ethnic Others, the Croats in particular. The fusion of the past, tolerance and 
coexistence thus became a source of identification defining Muslim identity. In 
all three instances, my informants’ use of the past and their ideal of tolerance 
and coexistence became a way of criticising the intolerant nationalist vision of 
ethnic segregation, thus forming part of the Muslims’ counterdiscourse. 
The trouble-free past: a space uncontaminated by the war
Sometimes people, mostly the elderly, regarded the past as a trouble-free, har-
monious and pleasant time, from which all problems and sorrows had been 
weeded out. Such a sentimental relationship to the past can be seen as a kind 
of escapism (Chase and Shaw 199), brought about by an escessively dominant 
present. However, creating/remembering a harmonious past is also a way of 
coping with actual problems and overwhelming memories. For the majority of 
the Muslims of Stolac, their experiences from the war were so terrible that they 
were not able to talk about them (see Chapter 2). Instead they tried to forget 
or develop mechanisms for handling the violent memories. The creation of an 
undamaged and uncontaminated past was such a mechanism. It became an 
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ocean to dive into, a place where the nightmarish present was sealed, set apart 
from the war and its tragic consequences. Sometimes people also projected the 
past into the present, and lived for a moment in the belief that soon everything 
would be as before. In this way memories of the past offered an alternative to 
the depressing future and the sad memories from the war.
Once I was watching sports on television together with Enver and Alen. 
Then their mother Ljubica came home and after a while she said: “Come on, 
change the channel, you are always watching sports.” Enver shifted to a some-
what nostalgic TV programme; such programmes were broadcast once in a 
while. A singer known from before the war was singing with a picture of old 
Sarajevo in the background. After that there was poetic scenery from the park 
where the River Bosna has its source (Vrelo Bosne): children playing, flowers, 
slowly running water, a swan swaying idyllically in the light breeze. Everything 
was from before the war. “Oh, this is lovely, it’s so beautiful” Ljubica comment-
ed to herself. The programme certainly did have a nice atmosphere. It was as if 
I could feel Ljubica’s longing for this peace and quiet, this beauty and balance, 
where children play untroubled, the time before the world was out of joint, the 
non-chaotic state. Am I interpreting too much? I do not know, but my inter-
pretation has to be related to Ljubica’s other expressions. She was often very 
despondent, resigned and tired: “The war Nicolas, you cannot imagine what it 
has changed, before we lived so well, now …”
Though nostalgic use of the past was mostly reserved for the elderly, who 
had memories from before the war, and for whom it was not a sign of weakness 
to dwell on the past and the sad fate of the Muslims, young people could also 
enter this mode. Here is an example from an interview with a woman in her late 
20s. She had been talking about the war crimes of the Croats and how it would 
be possible to live with the Croats again when her objective account slid into a 
kind of world beyond:
Lamira: But before the war it was so beautiful in Stolac. We had poetry evenings 
at the Stecći [a place with a huge collection of medieval tombstones outside 
town] where poets from all over came and read poetry out loud. Then there 
was Bregava, it was so beautiful in the summer. We bathed, and the boys who 
had – you know boys’ bicycles they have such a crossbar – the boys who had 
such a crossbar, they could give their girlfriend a ride. My boyfriend had such a 
bicycle, and I could sit on it when he drove us down to Bregava. There was about 
three kilometres to walk, so it was nice. We also did theatre in the school, and 
we made a small newspaper that we sold, and the profit went to the ‘children’s 
embassy’ in Sarajevo. I was also a Girl Scout, and we went on a lot of lovely ex-
cursions. We went to cafés and acted like real ladies, sitting and having coffee.
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Photographs were also used as an entrance to this nostalgic world. People often 
showed me pictures of their family, their schoolmates, their friends etc. from 
birthday parties, excursions, holidays etc. On several occasions only the first 
pair of pictures was shown to me before memories took over and people faded 
into another world. Such a creation of a nostalgic past did not work out for all. 
Thinking about how everything had been became too intense. In such cases 
the past was not an ocean to dive in to, but a direct road to the traumatised 
memories from the war. Once when I was visiting Džanana I noticed the book 
Slovo Gorčina (see above), which is filled with beautiful colour photos of Stolac 
from before the war. I fetched it, looked in it and asked Džanana if she could 
remember the old Stolac. She said she would rather not. Her daughter then 
looked at the pictures, and after a while Džanana looked as well, but she had to 
stop. She excused herself with tears in her eyes, explaining that it was too sad 
to look at the pictures.
The past as a political comment on the present
The nostalgic use of the past served other functions than sealing off violent 
memories. When people told me about how the three ethnic groups lived to-
gether harmoniously before the war, they were also expressing that it is possible 
to live that way again. Evoking the past in this way was a political comment on 
the present, resisting the nationalist ideology. Though people were disillusioned 
and did not believe that things would be as they were before, the construction 
of a harmonicous past keeps reminding people that things could be different. 
As Mila, an elderly woman, expressed it:
I want things to be as they were before the war. I had a good time. And I have 
lived what I needed to live. I was well off and I think that everybody [all ethnic 
groups] was well off, if they were to tell the truth. We had work, we built our 
houses, we lived well together. My husband and I had a job where both Croats 
and Muslims worked. Believe it or not, we had both Serbs and Croats com-
ing to our house, they visited us at festivals and we visited them. I want these 
times to come back…Deep down in my soul I love all three nations [nacije]. 
I pray to my God that the time that was will come back. I could sleep on the 
asphalt, in the middle of the road, because I was not afraid of anybody. That’s 
how we lived. The place you fell asleep was where you slept. Nobody hit you 
or frightened you.
I will not offer further examples. Analysing people’s use of the past as a political 
comment on the present could fill a whole book. This section is intended only 
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as a reminder of the complexity attached to my informants’ use of the past and 
their ideal of tolerance and coexistence. 
Tolerance and coexistence as sources of identity 
In the rest of the chapter, I will show how the Muslims of Stolac resist the na-
tionalist ideology of ethnic separation by identifying themselves as a tolerant 
people wishing to coexist. Again, the past is drawn upon, but contrary to the 
more nostalgic use of the past, memories generate a conscious identification, in 
which the past is not just the ‘good old days’, but rather represents ideals syn-
onymous with Muslimness. These ideals of tolerance and coexistence make up 
the second part of my informants’ counterdiscursive identifications. 
I see some ethical challenges here. The war killed hundreds of thousands 
of people. The nationalist and prejudiced policies which continue even today 
have destroyed the lives of even more. Bosnia Herzegovina is a country filled 
with distrust, despair, and corrupt politicians living off the hate they can create 
between the ethnic groups. What is needed is a great portion of tolerance and 
a will to coexist and rebuild society together. To a certain extent this attitude 
exists among the ordinary Muslims of Stolac. But in this chapter I will be im-
plicitly devaluing this attitude due to a necessary analytical distance, necessary 
because the ideal of tolerance plays such a great part in the Muslims’ conscious 
self-identification. Talking to employees in various international organisations 
present in Bosnia Herzegovina I sometimes encountered a cynical approach 
in which the tolerant attitude of the Bosnian Muslims was seen as more or 
less hypocritical. The following example about the use of the school in Stolac 
reveals such an attitude, as well as introducing a discussion, running through 
the rest of the chapter, of the actual content and reality of the ideal of tolerance 
and coexistence among my informants. 
The school in Stolac 
When the Muslims started to return to Stolac in 199, they were not allowed by 
the Croats to use the school, and therefore had to use an improvised, reduced 
‘house school.’ The mothers accompanied their children to school, waited for 
them and accompanied them back, because they were afraid the children would 
be attacked by local Croats trying to frighten them. As more Muslims returned, 
the problem of the lack of school facilities grew. Before the war the school had 
had 1,340 pupils, but after the war only 4-500 Croatian children attended it. Not 
allowing the Muslims to use the school facilities was an act of sheer discrimina-
tion. Carina, an English employee in the OHR who had Stolac as her field of 
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responsibility, once told me about the negotiations which ultimately led to an 
opening of the school for the Muslim children. 
Carina had been very personally engaged in the attempt to facilitate the 
Muslims’ return to the school facilities. Initially there had been many political 
tugs-of-war with the HDZ, and the changing mayors of Stolac (all members of 
the HDZ) had argued that ‘house schools’ were common in Bosnia Herzegovi-
na, so why all the fuss, and why not in Stolac? But after some intricate negotia-
tions, in which Carina invested a lot of time and all her political skill as well 
as putting her prestige at stake, the reintegration of the school was accepted at 
last. So she was happy the day when all kinds of prominent people, including 
some high up in the OHR, went to Stolac to officially celebrate the reunion. The 
following day the more concrete aspects of the deal were to have been agreed 
on, but then the Bosniaks1 suddenly wanted much more than was realistic. The 
problem was that though the deal was in place, there were no exact references 
to what the Bosniaks should get. At this point in the story, Carina added that 
though the Croats are hard to negotiate with, the Bosniaks are definitely no 
better than they should be. They wanted half of the school and they wanted a 
separate entrance. Carina said to them: “Now you are pressing too hard. You 
only have eighty-five pupils, so you cannot get everything you demand and 
you can forget the thing about the separate entrance. We are about to make a 
good deal so do not destroy it.” And the mayor (Croat) was becomming furi-
ous. Alone with him Carina said: “You have to stick to it. They will not get their 
demands, but you have to hold out.” And to the Bosniaks she said: “You have 
twenty minutes to sign, otherwise there will be no deal, and we can skip it all 
and everything else in the future. And the thing with the two entrances you can 
forget about, one of the reasons why the OHR intervened was that this could 
be a project of reconciliation.” Carina knew that the Bosniaks who were present 
did not have the final say, so she told them to call X (someone higher up in the 
hierarchy) and tell him that it was now or never. Then they signed and they all 
went together to the school. Here the Bosniaks started again: “We want these 
particular rooms. They have to be painted …” The mayor was ready to jump 
out of his skin. The Bosniaks were so disrespectful, Carina said. They pointed 
to things in the school and said: “We want this and this.” When finally the deal 
was settled and they came out of the school, one of the Bosniaks pointed at 
Carina and commented: “We are not satisfied!” Despite the importance of this 
agreement – it was the first of its kind in Bosnia Herzegovina – there were no 
thanks, Carina told me. 
1  She used the term Bosniak and not Muslim.
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The autumn of 2000, then, was the first time after the war that Muslims and 
Croats sent their children to the same school. While I was in Stolac, the Muslims 
had four classrooms and the Croats had sixteen. Because there were too many 
Muslim children to fit in so few classrooms, they had to use the school in shifts, 
from  am to 12 noon and from 1 pm to 5 pm. Furthermore, only the Croats were 
allowed to use the huge gym. The secondary school was only for Croats as well; 
starting in th grade Muslim children had to go to Mostar by bus every day.
Carina’s experiences call the Muslims’ tolerance and will to co-exist into 
question. Why were they not satisfied? Why were they not grateful? If they were 
as tolerant as they claimed, they would have signed the deal without comments. 
I have two answers. First, when analysing the ideal of tolerance and coexist-
ence, I am not, as Carina did, referring solely to the political scene. On the 
everyday level things are different simply because they are less conscious and 
deliberate, as I will elaborate below. Second, Carina’s story does actually touch 
on the content of the Muslims’ tolerance to some extent, but to understand 
this better we also have to listen to the other side of the story. That is, how the 
Muslims of Stolac saw the school. For them, the school was very problematic. 
Their main experience in relation to the school was one of discrimination. They 
were often indignant about the situation of the Muslim children: ‘Why is it that 
we only have four rooms when we have as many kids as they do?’ ‘Why can’t 
our kids use the gym?’ ‘Why can only Croatian kids go to secondary school in 
Stolac?’ ‘What happened to all the equipment?’ And so on. Furthermore, many 
of my informants attended school in Stolac, and have recollections from that 
time. People also told me that their parents helped build the school after the 
Second World War. Some have traumatic memories from the time it was used 
as a barrack during the recent war, as well as being the place where Muslim 
women were searched and robbed before the expulsion. And people also told 
me that the school was renovated in 199 with help from the state. As one said: 
“Izetbegovic [the former president of Bosnia Herzegovina] helped pay for the 
renovation of the school and still we only have four rooms.” In short, for them 
there was no reason to be grateful. When looked at from the perspective of 
the political sphere where Carina works, the reintegration of the school was 
an important success for the OHR. Looked at from the point of view of the 
Muslims who live in Stolac, the deal was merely a continuation of the Croatian 
discrimination in Stolac. 
All my informants with whom I spoke about the school wanted it to be 
integrated so that Croat, Muslim and Serbian children could attend school to-
gether. They saw the school as an important place for the creation of a future 
without ethnic discrimination, and a lack of integration in the school as the 
major hindrance to the reunion of Stolac. 
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Muhamed: Imagine that in one part of the school we have the Bosniak children 
and in the other the Croat children, and that’s idiocy. For instance in the sec-
ond class, if anyone asked my daughter if she is Muslim she would say ‘Yes I 
am’, but she would not know what it means. She doesn’t know. And it would be 
the same if you asked the question to a little Croat. In fact they do not know 
what it means. The stupid parents tell their children ‘You are Croat or Muslim 
and you are not allowed to play with the others.’ And time passes and the chil-
dren who are raised in that way become encapsulated [zatvoren]. The Indians 
are much better than them [the parents]. That’s how it is. The teachers who 
work at the school, if they go to their class and say ‘Hello, you are Muslims and 
you shouldn’t play with the Croats or be together with them’, then the children 
will be like that.
The Muslim teachers in Stolac I talked to all wanted the instruction of the eth-
nic groups to be integrated. They were aware that history, music and Croatian/
Bosnian/Serbian language had to be taught separately, but English, biology, ge-
ography, physical education and other such neutral subjects should be taught 
jointly. As Mehmed, a teacher who had also taught at the school before the war, 
answered when I asked him if the Croat and Muslim teachers talk together:
There are no official contacts, because they don’t want them. I wish there 
would be, so that the kids could be together and attend the same classes. So 
that the English teachers can teach both Croats and Muslims, that they can 
have maths and physics together, and the subjects common to all they should 
be taught together, with respect for the subjects that are national. I also teach 
gym, and the Croatian children who are free for the day come to the schoo-
lyard where I teach and they ask if they can join, and I say it is OK. Maybe 
some fall in love during such meetings. Children think in a different manner. 
They are not bad. But the parents do not allow them to play with the Muslims. 
And that’s the problem.
On the one hand, then, the Muslims talked about ethnic coexistence in the 
school, while on the other hand they appeared to be backward-looking, un-
grateful and discontented in Carina’s story. Both attitudes are relevant when 
describing my informants’ identification with an ideal of tolerance and coexist-
ence. As Džanana, once said, in a way synthesising the two different attitudes: “I 
  People frequently used evolutionary schemes when evaluating behaviour. Indians are normally 
placed at the bottom of the scheme, but here Muhamed places the nationalist-minded parents 
even lower. See also Chapter 13.
001_316_post-war.indd   251 14/04/08   22:05:05
Denne side er købt på www.ebog.dk og er omfattet af lov om ophavsret. Uanset evt. aftale med Copy-Dan er det ikke tilladt at kopiere eller
indscanne siden til undervisningsbrug eller erhvervsmæssig brug.
252	 post-war identification
can live together with anybody, as long as the situation is just.” For the Muslims, 
tolerance is not the same as compliance (Carina’s interpretation). Neither is it 
confrontation. There is a rather large and murky middle ground between the 
two poles of compliance and confrontation. In the rest of the chapter, I will try 
to clarify this middle ground and thus the Muslim understanding of tolerance. 
I will focus on how tolerance and a wish for coexistence featured in everyday 
life among the Muslims of Stolac. I have arranged the sections around some of 
the themes which people persistently evoked when talking about the past and 
about the Muslims’ tolerant character.
Differences were an advantage
When talking about the past, my informants often stressed that cultural diversi-
ty enriched everyday life: people learned from each other, had more festivals in 
which to participate, and a large social network. Ethnicity mattered, not in rela-
tion to a larger political nationalistic framework, but in relation to everyday ha-
bitual practices of identification (see Chapter 10). Today people mourn the loss 
of these differences, or rather the loss of their respectful and habitual handling. 
The war both highlighted and created ethnic differences, but it also changed 
the positive connotations related to these differences and instead promoted an 
ideology in which ethnic dissimilarity was seen as a hindrance to interaction 
and a threat to cultural survival. Therefore, talking about ethnic differences in 
a positive manner was a means to resist the rhetoric of ethnic separation that 
nationalistic politics communicated in Stolac. And for the Muslims it was a way 
to identify themselves by saying, ‘We have no problems interacting with the dif-
ferent ethnic groups; we are a tolerant people.’ Take Emir, who reports how the 
Muslims’ tolerant attitude during the war was turned against them:
  Džanana’s story below is an example of a story about respectful and tolerant interaction among 
the three ethnic groups:
“Our whole family was mixed. It didn’t matter if one was Serb, Croat or Muslim; every-
body was good enough. When my oldest brother was going to be married, he came with his 
bride, and her name was Olga, and I knew her from before. We used to go down to Videvo 
Polje, and there she saw me with my son. ‘Well you know who I am’. ‘Yes, you are going to 
marry my brother’. When my brother came, he said to me: ‘Go to our father and tell him that I 
will be coming with my bride. How is he going to react when he hears that?’ I went home and 
told him, and my father said: ‘Why are you asking me? If he loves her, so do I. If he can sleep 
with her, I can dine with her’. My sister-in-law says that she can never think of my parents 
without starting to cry. She also says that they received her well and weren’t too religious, and 
that it did not bother them at all that she was Serb. And my uncle, he married a Croat woman. 
We took good care of each other. And one of my uncle’s daughters married a Serb and they 
lived in Serbia. And another one married one from Montenegro…Now I can’t remember them 
all. Everything was mixed in our family.”
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In school I had Serbian and Croat friends, and for instance on Bayram, I in-
vited my Serbian and Croat friends home, and at Christmas time, on 25th [of 
December] and th January, the Muslims were invited to their homes to roll 
eggs, but you could not do that today; it is unthinkable. Before the war the 
other cultures were an advantage for us: if there were only Muslims everybody 
would know one another, but with other religious communities we learned 
from each other – it was enrichment. Differences did exist, but it was a dif-
ference that enriched us. But with the war the differences became our disad-
vantages. We were conscious about being different before the war, but it was 
a difference that enriched us. With the war this difference was turned against 
us [exploited by nationalist politics].
Suljeman answered in a similar manner when I asked him how people had per-
ceived these differences before the war – were they seen as positive?
Yes of course. It is an advantage; differences are an advantage. Life is richer, 
people are also richer with these differences, but now the Serbs and Croats try 
to throw these differences out, it just has to be the same [ethnic homogeneity]. 
They have destroyed the good things about Bosnia Herzegovina. Before the 
war Bosnia Herzegovina was much more beautiful and the relations [between 
the ethnic groups] were much better. Now the relations have suffered.
As Suljeman, Emir and the most of my informants saw it, difference, respect 
and tolerance were three inseparable issues. However, even if the Croats opened 
up for interaction tomorrow, I think many Muslims would find interaction dif-
ficult. More to the point, then, the Muslims (want to) perceive themselves as 
tolerant and ready to resume interethnic relations, whereas they maintain that 
other ethnic groups do not hold the same ideal. Recollecting and stating that 
differences were/are no hindrance to interaction, therefore, is also an act of 
identification.
Nationality did not matter
People also said that before the war everybody lived together and had a good 
time, and no one cared about ethnicity. At first glance this would seem to con-
tradict the views expressed above, but in fact they are rather similar. When my 
informants said they were not aware of ethnic affiliation before, it is probably 
not true: they knew which religious community people came from, but this is 
not the point. What they were expressing is that they did not care. This is in 
keeping with the official ideology of the Yugoslav regime (Brotherhood and 
Unity), which tried to make ethnicity a thing of the past, and to many of the 
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Bosnian generations from after the Second World War a pan-ethnic Yugoslav 
identity was important. Mustafa, a man of about thirty-five, depicted the days 
before the war as joyful, a time when ethnicity was unimportant. I think this 
memory was important to him, enabling him to imagine a better future and 
reminding him of what he is, of his values, as he now lives in a totally different 
context.
TK: Do you remember what life was like before the war?
Mustafa: Let me tell you one thing: everybody had their life. We had work – I 
began building my house before the war. I also started with my business and 
I was about to open a coffee bar. Things were going well for me. I had a good 
group of friends. You are born here in Stolac, grow up together and have the 
friends until you get married, and I married before the war. We had a circle 
of friends. And that’s enough…You have a job, family, some everyday obliga-
tions; it was a normal life. You knew where to go in the evenings, and that 
you would meet your friends at that place. Then the war came and turned 
everything upside down. Now I can find some of my friends all the way from 
Canada to Australia. And not only Bosniaks, also Serbs and Croats. I had a big 
circle of friends. There were between ten and twenty of us in that circle. Before 
the war it did not matter if you were Serb, Muslim or Croat. You did not know 
what people were, you were not weighed by it…When I got married, my best 
man was Croat, and at my son’s first birthday his godfather was Serb. Now 
they live in Canada. That’s how it was.
Mustafa’s statement entails a contradiction. One the one hand he said, “You did 
not know what people were.” On the other hand, he told me – in line with the 
tradition of respectful interaction between the different ethnic groups – about 
the deliberate choice of a Croat and a Serb to be best man and godfather, re-
spectively. This contradiction, however, does make sense. Firstly, claiming to 
be unaware of the ethnic identity of one’s friends simply expresses indifference. 
Secondly, after the war the habitual pre-war pattern of tolerant and respectful 
inter-ethnic interactions has been objectified and constructed by many Mus-
lims as conscious knowledge, relevant in identifying present Muslim identity. 
This should become more evident in the following examples.
I was once shown a photo from a school excursion of five pupils sitting on 
a war monument, and the person who showed it to me commented: “This guy 
he is Serb, he now lives in Beograd”, and “She is Croat, she was one of my best 
friends.” Another photo I was shown was from a party, everybody seemed to be 
in high spirits, cheering at the photographer, and the comment: “Look he is a 
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Serb, we were best friends,” and “We were all together, Serbs, Croats and Mus-
lims; nobody cared.” Mostly when people showed me photos they explicitly told 
me about the nationality of the ones depicted. Besides mourning times past, 
such commentaries also expressed the spirit of interethnic tolerance which to-
day forms part of the Muslims’ self-identification. 
People sometimes told me they had Croat friends, mingled with Croats, 
and went to Croatian cafés and shops and vice versa. Sometimes this was not 
quite correct. It was as if people wanted to assure me and themselves that they 
still upheld the ideal of tolerance and inter-ethnic interaction. When I first met 
him, Safet told me that he had several Croat friends and acquaintances. But 
some months later, when I asked him if he knew some Croats I could interview, 
he said that he did not really know any. And once when I invited Mensur, who 
had told me that he frequented the Croatian cafés, for a cup of coffee as we 
were standing outside a Croatian coffee bar, he said “Yes, but then we will go to 
Galerija,” which was the nearest Muslim café, even though he was in something 
of a hurry. I do not think people were lying as such, but more central for my 
argument, the point is that it was important for people to state that they were 
tolerant and to identify with the ideal of coexistence, even though in practice 
this was rather difficult. 
Alija, the owner of the Muslim Café Galerija, who wanted the café to be 
a symbol of (Muslim) tolerance, once proudly told me how six Catholic nuns 
from Dubrovnik (Croatia) had entered the café and had some cakes. Obviously, 
they did not know it was a Muslim café. Besides being a funny story (I also 
heard it from other people), it also demonstrated for people that ethnic toler-
ance still exists or is at least possible. In the telling of the story the local Muslims 
and the nuns were somehow made conspirators, excluding the obdurate Croats 
who were left behind in their antiquated politics of separation.
A last example of how the ideal of tolerance and coexistence is first ob-
jectified and then related to Muslim identity relates to inter-ethnic marriages 
(mješovit brak). Such marriages were often highlighted as a symbol of unprob-
lematic interethnic coexistence. I do not have the figures for the frequency of 
interethnic marriage in Stolac before the war. When I compare the ones I know 
of with the high number people sometimes referred to, I think that there is 
a discrepancy. Again, one could say that people were only telling about the 
‘many’ interethnic marriages in order to construct a past that never existed. 
What is more interesting, however, is what people want to communicate in 
constructing such an idyllic past. Interethnic marriage was a symbol of coexist-
ence, so by saying that Stolac was one of the cities in Bosnia Herzegovina with 
the highest rates of interethnic marriage, one also states that: ‘We were able to 
live together and even marry each other’, or ‘Tolerance is what characterises the 
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true inhabitants of Stolac’, or ‘If we were able to live together before, why not 
now.’ On several occasions I heard the story of the three sons (Muslims) from 
Begovina: one married a Catholic from the Czech Republic, the second a Serb, 
and the third a Muslim. Besides resembling a fairytale, this and other evoca-
tions of the powerful symbol of interethnic marriage form part of the ideal of 
tolerance and coexistence which the Muslims construct and identify with. At 
the same time they say that the Croats and the Serbs were the ones who broke 
the ‘promise of marriage’ which the ethnic groups had made.
I will end this section with a quote from an interview with Zahida, who 
wanted to pass on to her children the same ideals of tolerance she herself was 
brought up with, knowing that they are neither unambiguous nor easy to adopt 
in the present situation. On several occasions her children communicated a 
more antagonistic attitude towards the other ethnic groups than she found 
suitable. She struggled to believe in and identify herself with the ideal of toler-
ance:
I was born after the Second World War and I have felt the consequences of 
the Second World War. My parents told me what had happened and I lived 
together with the Serbs up there [the village where she originated from]. And 
then Tito came to power and we lived well together and we helped each other 
when we worked in the fields. And therefore I think that we elderly people 
are able to live together again. But Amira [her daughter] was only nine years 
old, and the only thing she knew was how to play, and somebody came and 
interrupted that game. Until that moment she did not know she was Muslim, 
but she does know now. We did not teach our children that they were Mus-
lims and that the others were Croats or Serbs. It was as if you erased these 
differences. And now the children have difficulties understanding why these 
things were done to them. They could not see any reason for it, they do not 
understand. The young have a much harder time understanding why it hap-
pened than the old.
Her statement puts the ideal of tolerance I have touched on into perspective, 
when she indicates that the older people have somehow been through it all 
before. The young were raised to consider ethnicity unimportant, whereas the 
older people had to push the memories from the Second World War into the 
background. The older people, while upholding an ideal of tolerance and coex-
istence, also knew how ethnicity suddenly could be made important. 
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Criticism of the Croats – identification of the Muslims
In talking about past inter-ethnic interaction or present tolerance, sometimes 
the Muslims blame the other ethnic groups – especially the Croats – for aban-
doning these ideals. This blame and the implicit identification of oneself as tol-
erant is part of the same logic. Below is an excerpt from an interview with a 
schoolteacher and one of her colleagues. She lived outside Stolac in an area 
with many Croats. She hoped for a better future but was rather despondent. 
Interaction with the Croats was rare in that area, and at the small school where 
she taught, the Croat children left when the Muslims arrived. Croat nationalist 
symbols in and at the school communicated ethnic separation and indicated 
for her the Croats’ lack of willingness to intermingle.
Colleague: In the previous state in Yugoslavia, we went in for brotherhood and 
unity
Teacher: The worst thing is that those times were the best in my life. In former Yu-
goslavia ordinary people, the workers, had their rights, I think that everybody 
was better off in comparison to now.
Colleague: Except the criminals.
Teacher: Yes, of course, those mafia people. Before one could travel, for instance to 
Belgrade. We made trips together, everywhere. Nobody stopped you on the 
street. You could sleep in the car, or in the middle of the road, and nobody 
would touch you. Those were untroubled times. You can’t describe the differ-
ence compared to today. Terrible, terrible!
TK: Did you know who was Muslim or Serb or Croat before the war?
Teacher: Yes, I did, but there were no differences; it did not matter. In the street in 
Stolac where I lived, there lived Serbs, Croats and Muslims. You received the 
flats from the factory where you worked and nobody asked about who the 
neighbours were – if you were Serb, Croat or Muslim. There were also mixed 
marriages. And nobody felt it mattered. We were all as one. My first neighbour 
was Croat, and my sisters and I looked after their children. We were close. Not 
a day went by without visiting each other. We talked about everything. We 
knew each other’s problems. Today she [the Croat neighbour] doesn’t even 
bother to visit my parents, or even to talk to them. Our window is next to their 
terrace; you can jump from our apartment to their flat. It is senseless when 
you realise all these things. You have to hope but it is difficult.
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The teacher was criticising the Croats for not living up to the ideal of respectful 
interethnic interaction, which she implicitly claimed was still current among 
the Muslims. Other examples touch more explicitly on the issue of identifi-
cation. People said, for instance, that “Muslims read Serbian or Croatian lit-
erature but they do not read ours”, or “We read Cyrillic letters but they do not 
learn our alphabet”, or “We listen to their music, but they do not listen to ours.”4 
Comparisons of this sort meant that ‘our’ tolerance in fact exists as a function 
of ‘their’ intolerance. Whether the intention was to criticise them (Croats and 
Serbs and the whole nationalistic project) or define what it is to be Muslim is 
hard to tell. It is probably both. 
One evening while I was visiting Muhamed, we were watching a music 
programme on TV.
Muhamed: This is a Serbian programme, and my children like these songs. They 
know them all by heart. They are all Serbs and I don’t mind.
Wife: And I do not forbid them to watch these programmes.
Samir: But with them it is not like that. Šerif Konjević and Safet Isović, who are 
Muslim folk singers, they do not listen to them. They [the Croats] are their 
own enemies [dušman, that they do not want to be together].
A last example of how tolerance, by criticising what is seen as the nationalist 
attitude of the Croats, is used as a way of identification comes from an inter-
view in which two of my informants were discussing traditions of cooking and 
school politics. Before the war everybody in Yugoslavia learned Serbo-Croatian 
and everybody learned to read and write in both the Cyrillic and Roman al-
phabets. Since the war, language has become an important element of cultural 
identification. Serbs only use Cyrillic, and Croats only use Roman letters. Mus-
lims use Latin letters, but also learn Cyrillic.
Nijaz: The Muslims and the Croats have common traditions, but there are also 
some differences. For instance, regarding what is permissible and forbidden 
to eat and drink. Our faith tells that we may not eat pork or drink alcohol. 
Islam forbids it, but it is not forbidden for the Croats. Wine is the blood of Je-
sus Christ. And the traditional cakes [Baklava] we talked about, we got them 
from the Turks and now they are part of traditional Bosnian cooking, and 
the Croats have their traditional cooking. And these traditional differences 
4  In Café Galerija they often played Western as well as ‘Yugoslav’ music. Often I heard tapes with 
Serbian pop and rock singers, as I was told: ‘As long as the music is good, we play it’.
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were used in the political life. These differences between the traditions were 
respected before the war, but not during the war. A people which can write 
two alphabets and a people which has three religious communities, I consider 
to be a rich people. We learned both alphabets and our Bosnian pupils learn 
them also today, even if it is said that the Cyrillic is Serbian.
Amira: It is a good thing. If you go to Belgrade for example, you can read every-
thing and find your way, and if you want to read some of the books in Cyrillic 
you can do that.
Nijaz: The Croatian children do not read Cyrillic, but we read both.
Coexistence is our fate
People sometimes said that it was the fate of the inhabitants of Bosnia Herze-
govina to live together. For the Muslims of Stolac it was absurd to discuss eth-
nic separation, and for them coexistence was an obvious reality: the people of 
Bosnia Herzegovina have to live together. Such talk of inescapable coexistence 
makes sense when related to the Muslims’ general political situation in Bosnia 
Herzegovina, especially during the war. For the Bosnian Serbs and the Bos-
nian Croats, visions of a greater Serbia/Croatia were in the air, whereas for 
the Muslims visions of a greater (Muslim) Bosnia never really crystallised (as 
discussed in Chapter 9). One might say that the Muslims defended what they 
had (a multiethnic Bosnia Herzegovina), whereas the other two groups fought 
for something more (including the elimination of multiethnic Bosnia Herze-
govina). Coexistence was hence an important political card for the Bosnian 
Muslims. The policy pursued by the Muslims rested on the other ethnic groups, 
whereas the Croats’ and the Serbs’ political visions excluded the Muslims. 
The political rhetoric of the Muslim politicians with their insistence on a 
multiethnic Bosnia was reflected in many of my informants’ statements. They 
never talked about a pure Muslim Bosnia Herzegovina, or a Stolac only for 
Muslims. Instead, they stressed that the three ethnic groups belonged together, 
and that they simply had to learn to coexist again. “Stories of people’s own lives 
melt into the general themes of a collective narrative” as Malkki writes (1995: 
5). Furthermore, as the Muslims also held the position of minority returnees 
in Stolac, arguments of coexistence can also be seen as legitimising their return 
and their re-assimilation into the Stolac community. In short, my informants’ 
ideal of tolerance and coexistence is connected to political life and it is impos-
sible to fully separate the one from the other. A first example of how coexistence 
is perceived as a matter of fate comes from a talk I had one day with Nijaz.
TK: Did you have Croat friends before the war?
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Nijaz: Yes, lots. One of them pointed the gun at me when we were forced into the 
truck. He was a good friend and he stood there pointing the gun at me.
TK: Don’t people feel hatred afterwards? Today don’t you feel hatred towards the 
Croats?
Nijaz: You can’t have that. We Muslims only have Bosnia. The Croats have Croatia, 
and the Serbs Serbia. We have to live together, and the children have to get on 
together, so hatred is of no use.
In his utterance Nijaz implicitly defines Muslim character as tolerant, but it 
is a tolerance which is entwined in the Muslims’ political situation in Bosnia 
Herzegovina. Salko, a prominent member of the local SDA, expressed the re-
lationship between a Muslim ideal of coexistence and coexistence as fate very 
clearly:
Something very terrible happened to us. 200,000 were killed. Most of them 
were Bosniaks. We have to tell our children what happened, we have to say 
that they have to be very careful, so that the same will not happen to them. We 
must never forget. Those who did this, it was totally individual, and the war 
criminals have to face justice and go to jail. You can’t say that a whole nation 
is bad, because it is totally individual. Our fate is to live together. When you 
listen to the tape again, you will hear that I never said that we should be seg-
regated. We have been living together for many years, why should we not be 
able to do so again? People have to live together, but at the same time we have 
to be aware that we do not again come to experience the ugly things that hap-
pened. I believe that Bosnia has a future even though many are ready to divide 
Bosnia. And this vision of dividing Bosnia [between Serbia and Croatia] will 
exist for ever […] but I hope it will never be fulfilled. Bosnia will survive and 
will always be three different peoples. The war created the ethnic division, but 
it was the war that created it [implying that it was not something ordinary 
people wanted]. The majority of the Serbian population will never come back 
to Croatia, and many of the Bosnian Croats will buy these Serbian properties 
and move to Croatia. Let us be realistic – if I were a Croat, and Croatia were 
so close, I would move to Croatia. But even if I were to move to another place 
in the world, Denmark for example, I would always be Bosniak, even if I were 
to go to Croatia I would be Bosniak. We Bosniaks have no alternative than to 
stay here. It is my fate to die here. Also before the war, when my schoolmates 
were going to study, the majority of the Stolac Croats went to Zagreb and the 
Serbs to Belgrade. And the ones who had the opportunity to work in Belgrade 
or Zagreb, they would never come back. Well, that’s how it is. But the most 
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important is that we give some hope to the people who do return. If a Serb 
has the will to return [to Stolac] he should be given the chance to do so [only 
few Serbs return]. I think that the majority of the Serbs will never return, but I 
wish that all would come back. It is only the old people who return – they will 
die in a couple of years, and then I think the children will sell [their houses]. 
Some [Serbs] are already selling their houses now, it is, it is…If we had an-
other native country as the Croats have, then we might also move. But we only 
have Bosnia and that’s why we are here.
This is the articulate statement of a politician. A plainer one comes from Os-
man, who though he described himself as an ordinary person with only little 
schooling, nevertheless communicates more or less the same ideal of tolerance 
and coexistence. As a Muslim, Osman both believes in it and has no other im-
aginable options (coexistence as fate).
My family and I really want the past to come back [prošlo vrijeme], and that 
people should be unified again, united. And if it is not going to be so, I cannot 
imagine that we can have a good future. If our school, factories and hospitals 
stay as they are [divided] you can’t expect things to be better. Especially in a 
shared town, where three different nations live, like in Stolac […] Nobody 
can say on behalf of others how many want a real peace and union in this 
town. I can only say what I think. I think we should live together again and be 
together again and create a better future for our kids, a boga mi [he reveals his 
own scepticism towards his own hopes]. The problem is that our children are 
divided, and while they are divided you can’t expect things to become better. 
When the children play together and the Croats say balija and the Muslims 
say ustaše [both are ethnic insults] I can’t see how it can be better. Maybe the 
solution is that the children should be together in school and get to know each 
other, and when they grow up they will behave as they learned in school.
The merging of tolerance and Muslim identity
In this chapter I have analysed a further aspect of my informants’ self-identifi-
cation. The first was the localistic identification, the second relates to an ideal 
of tolerance and coexistence. The war has forced people to reflect on pre-war 
practices in order to make some sense of it all. Ethnic difference, including the 
way this difference was nurtured, articulated and created before, has become 
objectified and part of the Muslims’ conscious identification. The Muslims call 
this tolerance; I call it the ideal of tolerance. In short, practices of interaction 
(such as the ‘familiarisation of difference’ described in Chapter 10) have become 
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22	 post-war identification
ideals of identification. The tolerant and respectful way characterising the dif-
ferent ethnic groups’ interaction before the war is now increasingly seen by the 
Muslims as a specific Muslim quality, partly because the other ethnic groups 
are seen as having abandoned the respectful pre-war attitude. But persistently 
highlighting the trouble-free and joyful interaction among ethnic groups in 
the past, and stressing the possibility of resuming this interaction in the fu-
ture, is also a way to handle the traumatic experiences from the war, and more 
importantly a way of rejecting the nationalistic rhetoric and practice of ethnic 
exclusiveness. The ideal of tolerance and coexistence is thus an important part 
of the Muslims’ counterdiscourse. Though the Muslims’ ideals of tolerance and 
coexistence are intertwined in this mix of political life, identification, nostalgia, 
visions of a future and resistance, this does not mean that these ideals are not 
deeply felt. Feelings are not something you can isolate from the rest of the social 
world: instead they are connected.
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Chapter 14
The Balkans – Europe
We are European Muslims. That is our destiny. We want to be Muslims and 
Europeans. I personally feel most comfortable when I say that I am a Euro-
pean Muslim, because that’s what I am. When I go to the East, I am disturbed 
by some things there, some things disturb me also when I go to the West. I feel 
best here, in Bosnia. Probably because it is East and West, and the good that 
exists on both sides. (Izetbegovic, former President of Bosnia Herzegovina, 
199 from an SDA meeting, quoted in Maček 2000a: 213).
If we have to fight, well then we will fight. But I hope they are not going to be 
crazy enough to fight with us. For if we don’t know how to work and produce 
that well, at least we will know how to fight well. (Slobodan Milošović, former 
President of Serbia, 1991, quoted in Cohen 1993: 223).
The next identification relevant for the Stolac Muslims’ attempt to identify 
themselves and comprehend the war relates to a pair of geographical sym-
bols: the Balkans vs. Europe/the West.1 This is a conflicting discursive field in 
which my informants were entangled. Rather than taking solid and consistent 
positions, they had to make their identifications in the middle of an existing 
quandary. Sometimes Europe was decadent and cold, at other times it was the 
future and the civilised. Sometimes the Balkans was authentic and honest, at 
other times it was violent and crude, and sometimes it was associated with an 
unavoidable destructive force. Whereas the ideals of tolerance and coexistence 
and, as I show in the next chapter, the victim identity relate directly to what 
my informants see as characteristics of Muslims in Bosnia Herzegovina, and 
localistic identifications relate to being a Muslim in Stolac, identifications with 
the Balkans or Europe are more general. The Others are not so much the ethnic 
Others (Croats and Serbs), as European Others. Entering this space of identity, 
people are more focused on defining what it is to be a Balkan Muslim than a 
Muslim. My informants’ uses of the Balkans-Europe dichotomy thereby evades 
nationalist thinking and forms part of the Muslims’ counterdiscourse. 
1  Both the West and Europe are in play. Europe, however, is the label most commonly used by 
my informants.
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24	 post-war identification
I start by looking at the cultural construction of the Balkans-Europe di-
chotomy, and then move on to focus on how it is used among the Muslims of 
Stolac and forms part of their counterdiscourse.
The discursive construction of the Balkans – Europe
From without 
In his polemic of the geographical metaphor ‘the Oriental’, Edward Said (195) 
showed how this concept is much more than a designation of an area; it is rath-
er a Western cultural construction of the ‘Other.’ Whereas the Orient as a place 
has changed, its status as Other has remained more or less intact. The same 
seems to hold true of the Balkans. Most people probably have an idea of what 
the Balkan mentality is, but few know exactly where the Balkans start or stop. 
Inspired by the debate about Orientalism, the Bulgarian-American his-
torian Todorova (1994) has analysed how the Western construction and image 
of the Balkans came into being. She argues that the Balkans as a distinct geo-
graphical area with specific cultural traits was not discovered/invented before 
the end of the 1th century, mainly through European travel literature, which 
became very popular at that time. The Balkans was increasingly associated with 
the traditional, the non-civilised, tribalism (political underdevelopment), and 
the rural and uneducated. During the Balkan wars and World War I, a further 
ingredient was added to this mixture: violence. In fact violence has been a leit-
motiv of the idea of the Balkans ever since. After World War II a new demon, 
communism, was grafted onto the image of the Balkans (see also Bakic-Hayden 
1992: 3-4). And during the recent war in former Yugoslavia the image of the 
Balkans came full circle, since Western observers have explained the war as if 
not unavoidable then at the very least typical evidence of the Balkan mentality. 
For example, in an article in The New York Review of Books from 1993 George 
Keennan explains the war by referring to the Balkan wars of 1913. On both oc-
casions the conflict was inevitable because of the Balkan mentality:
  I am restricting myself to outlining the discursive construct of the Balkan-Europe dichotomy, 
but I am aware that the creation and maintenance of this opposition also relates to tangible 
economic interests. As Allcock (2000) argues, the Balkans stand in a ‘semi-peripheral’ rela-
tionship to a capitalist world system, and if the Balkans have come to signify conflict and 
fragmentation: “This is because the region has been the arena in which the larger conflicts of 
European powers have been concentrated and, to some extent, conducted by proxy” (ibid. 24; 
see also Schierup 1991).
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Eighty years have now passed since the Carnegie commissioners paid their 
visit to that region. And this writer knows of no evidence that the ability of the 
Balkan peoples to interact peaceably with one another is any greater now than 
it was those eighty years ago. (1993: ).
In a recent book with the telling title Balkan Ghosts, Robert Kaplan continues 
the Western essentialisation of a presumed Balkan mentality, which he identi-
fies with everything violent. A quotation from the book gives an impression of 
his views. 
Twentieth-century history came from the Balkans. Here men have been iso-
lated by poverty and ethnic rivalry, dooming them to hate. Here politics has 
been reduced to a level of near anarchy that from time to time in history has 
flowed up the Danube into central Europe. 
Nazism, for instance, can claim Balkan origins. Among the flophouses 
of Vienna, a breeding ground of ethnic resentments close to the southern 
Slavic world, Hitler learned how to hate so infectiously. (Kaplan 1993: xxiii).
Considering such stigmatising denunciation of the Balkan people, one can un-
derstand Todorova’s opinion:
The Balkans have been ill served by discovery and invention. Balkanism and 
its subject are imprisoned in a field of discourse in which ‘the Balkans’ is 
paired in opposition to the ‘West’ and ‘Europe’, while ‘Balkanism’ is the dark 
other of ‘Western civilization.’
In fact the people of the Balkans have been even worse off than those caught in 
the discourse of ‘Orientalism’, she continues:
When the Balkans were part of the scatter pattern of invective aimed at the 
east and ‘Orientalism’ was the other necessary for the self-essentializing ‘West’ 
and ‘Europe’, there existed the prospect of their rediscovery in a positive fash-
ion. With the rediscovery of the east and orientalism as independent semantic 
values, the Balkans are left in Europe’s thrall, anti-civilization, alter ego, the 
dark side within. (1994: 42).
  The Carnegie Commission was charged with the task of giving the West a clear and reliable 
picture of what was going on in the affected area.
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A minor and rather innocent example of how the people of the Balkans have 
had a hard time escaping the discourse that partly created them is seen in the 
shifting European perception of coffee. At first traveller reports from the mid-
1th century from the Balkans depicted the Turkish drink called coffee as a dark, 
disgusting drink which was ‘hell-like.’ Later, when the drink became popular in 
Europe, possible chains of positive associations between the Balkans and Eu-
rope were cut by referring to the motive behind the intake of coffee. In Europe 
the drink was valued for its energy-creating effect, whereas the Balkan people 
were seen as drinking it only for pleasure. That is, they did not in a rational 
way use the drink’s stimulating potential, rather coffee drinking was just seen 
a part of a general Balkan mindset: relaxation, laziness and unproductiveness 
(Božidar 2001).
From within
Besides being a part of the self-construction of the West, since its invention ‘the 
Balkans’ has also been used politically by people inhabiting the area. Even back 
in early twentieth century some of the first famous scholars from respectively 
Serbia (Jovan Cvijić 15-192) and Croatia (Dinko Tomašić 1902-195) contrib-
uted to and used the Balkan discourse. Cvijić for his part embraced and posi-
tively valorised the characteristics stigmatised in the West. The ‘Dinaric type’ 
(one of four basic types he operated with) was seen as a lively, intelligent and 
sensitive type growing very enthusiastic or angry without much effort, and he 
praised its military qualities, opposing the virtues of this type to the decadent 
and degenerating urban population. Tomašić, on the other hand, distanced 
himself from the qualities of the Dinaric type, opposing them with a demo-
cratic mentality which he claimed existed mainly in northern Croatia, while 
the more violent and uncivilised types lived in the Dinaric mountains, which 
were populated mainly by Serbs and Montenegrins (Kaser 199; Bougarel 1999; 
Ritman-Auguštin 1995). Despite differences in sympathies, both scholars used 
the mentalities they studied politically and tended to ‘ethnicise’ features of the 
Balkan discourse (Bougarel 1999: 11).4
Basic-Hayden (1992, 1995) has analysed what she calls a symbolic geogra-
phy in Yugoslav politics, a geography which forms a hierarchy in which Europe 
and the Balkans, West and East are valorised in terms of religion. This sym-
bolic geography is an opposition which can be used on all levels of society, with 
primitive and conservative values increasing the further ‘East’ you go (‘nesting 
orientalism’ she also calls it (1995)). Islam is generally less favourably viewed 
4  Both writers have recently had a renaissance because they so easily entered into (post-)Yugo-
slav nationalistic polemic and politics.
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than Orthodox Christianity, whereas in the West the Protestant tradition is 
generally jugded more positively than Catholicism. This symbolic geographical 
opposition was and is part of the Yugoslav and Ex-Yugoslav everyday life, with 
Slovenia being seen as the more civilised, educated, developed and Western 
country, and going south and south-east the pictures changed proportionally.
In the recent conflict images of civilisation and Europe versus barbaric, 
violent and Balkan-like were used abundantly. Croatian and Slovenian politi-
cians engaged the Balkan discourse in their attempts to legitimise their seces-
sion from Yugoslavia. As a result, the Orthodox Christian tradition and the 
Serbs were depicted as authoritarian, patriarchal, power-hungry and aggres-
sive, whereas the Croats and the Slovenes were depicted as embracing democ-
racy and Western values (Bougarel 1999; Bakic-Hayden and Hayden 1992; Bak-
ic-Hayden 1995; Ritman-Auguštin 1995; Zarkov 1995). As an article by the HDZ 
stated, seeing its victory in the elections of 1990 as the ultimate step in:
the inclusion [of Croatia] in the states of central Europe, the region to which it 
has always belonged, except for the recent past when balkanisms and the for-
cibly self-proclaimed national representatives have constantly subordinated 
the Croatian state territory to an Asiatic form of government, while the justi-
fied anger and protests of certain Croatians have been qualified as terrorism 
and even fascism. (Quoted in Bakic-Hayden and Hayden 1992: 9).
And during the Muslim-Croat confrontation in 1993 a Croatian general warned 
that it was necessary to:
Distinguish the essentially different mental makeup and value system of the 
writer of the Islamic declaration [an allusion to Bosnian President Alija Izet-
begovic] and his followers from those of European-oriented Christians, even 
if the latter are on the margins of civilization [an allusion to Orthodox Chris-
tian Serbs]. (Bakic-Hayden 1995: 929).
The symbolic geography has also been reversed. Internalising and positively 
valorising a Balkan identity, which at the outset is negatively assessed, can be 
traced from Cvijeć´s analysis (see above) up until the recent war. Based on eth-
  Consider this joke told to me by a Bosnian: A Slovene, a Croat and a Bosnian had an audience 
with God. The Slovene asked God: “When will we reach European standard?” “In ten years’ 
time” God answered, then the Slovene cried. Next, it was the Croat’s turn. Standing in front of 
God, he asked: “When will we reach European standard?” “In fifty years’ time” God answered, 
and the Croat cried. Finally, it was the Bosnian’s turn, and he asked: “God, when will we reach 
the European standard?” Then God cried. 
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2	 post-war identification
nographic fieldwork in Novi Sad in Vojvodina, van de Port (199) has shown 
how the local Serb population is caught between two discourses. By day they 
try to be civilised city people (fine ljudi), or as van de Port calls them, a ‘Bal-
kan Bourgeoisie’, embracing what they see as European values and distancing 
themselves from the brutal and uncivilised Balkan mentality. But at night they 
frequent gypsy bars, singing and drinking and living out another identity: the 
emotional, violent and primitive, but at the same time authentic and genuine 
Serbian Balkan identity. The internalisation of this ‘Balkan identity’ is, as van 
de Port sees it, partly due to a European refusal to accept the Serbs as civilised 
Westerners, but also due to continued experiences with the devastating forces 
of war. 
Consequently, the discursive construct the Balkans-Europe – like kultura-
nekultura (see Chapter ) – offers a dichotomy which can be used to evaluate 
behaviour in almost all situations, in which the context determines the use and 
not so much one’s geographical position.
Balkan identifications in Stolac 
Everyday Balkanism 
When the category ‘Balkan’ was used by my informants in everyday life to 
evaluate and categorise behaviour and attitudes, it often bore negative connota-
tions, being associated with such qualities as laziness, callousness, disrespect 
and violence, and with things being unstructured, complicated, corrupt and 
unpleasant.
I
One morning after Nijaz and I had taken a stroll through town, we went to 
the café, where we sat down to talk. All of a sudden the music started to play. 
It was loud rock music, much too loud for the small speakers, which distorted 
the sound and made conversation almost impossible. “Typically Balkan”, Nijaz 
said. On our way home we passed the school and the gym. “Do you play bas-
ketball?” I asked, pointing at the gym. “No!” Nijaz answered: “The sports hall 
is only for Croats, but it is about to change, I think it will change in a couple 
of months, but it takes time, if it had been in Denmark [read Europe] it would 
have been fixed at once, but here it takes time; Balkan mentality!”
II
A couple of times I taught in the school in Stolac. Once one of the boys was 
sitting with his feet on the table when the teacher and I entered the room. The 
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teacher told him to take them down, and after the lesson he excused the ‘Balkan 
attitude’ the boy had displayed.
III
Nusret, Suljeman and I were talking one day about taking a short trip to Croatia. 
But Suljeman said that he could not go because he did not have a passport. 
“Typically Balkan” Nusret commented: “He doesn’t care, he will have to stay 
here, he never manages to organise such things.”
 
IV
One evening I was sitting with Mensur and his family watching a Croat film 
on a Croat TV channel. The film was about a Croat living in Germany who 
pretended to be dead so his wife could obtain his pension. He therefore had to 
be transported to Croatia in a coffin by an undertaker. The film then showed all 
the crazy and stupid entanglements this led to, all the not very clever solutions 
sought, and several instances of random violence. Several times during the film 
Mensur commented: “Balkan, Balkan. And they [the Croats] say they are a part 
of Europe, they are as Balkan as we are.”
Balkan, something in the air
In everyday conversation ‘Balkan’, then, is used as a negative adjective. But ‘Bal-
kan’ is also used in a more profound way to explain and comprehend the war 
and the post-war violent and complicated situation. ‘Balkan’ becomes associ-
ated with violence, rudeness and brutality, with madness, insanity and death. 
On several occasions I heard people saying in a despairing manner that down 
here (in the Balkans) people did not care about things or humans. 
I
One evening I was eating frog drumsticks and drinking homemade white wine 
with my landlords. One of their sons had been down to Bregava to catch the 
frogs. I told him that in Denmark frogs are protected, at least some species. My 
landlady then replied: ”They are not protected here, here [in the Balkans] noth-
ing is protected, neither animals nor humans.” She then laughed a sad laugh-
ter. 
II
People also said that this war was a typical Balkan war because of the many 
dead, the viciousness, and the insanity.
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Dino: This war could never have occurred in Europe. It is a typical Balkan war. It’s 
insanity and savagery – we have to try to get rid of it, this Balkan-ness, but it 
is a part of us. 
III
Once Asim expressed something similar down by the River Bregava. He started 
to tell me about the destruction of the town by the Croats in a desperate manner, 
but ended up ascribing the devastation to a Balkan mentality, which he himself 
found that he could not escape. In this way, ethnic denunciation was replaced by 
Balkan identification. This is how I remembered his words subsequently: 
They have destroyed everything, grenades, bombs, mines…Boom! Look at 
the house over there [in ruins], why? Ugh! Fascists! Ruined everything. Be-
fore the war we had everything, we had a good life together. I was director of a 
big company, I had three TVs in my apartment and a piano, everything. Look 
at me now. Now I am walking with an old iron that is broken [which he wants 
his brother to repair]. Look at my clothes, Ugh! When they came to get us 
[when they were expelled], we couldn’t even take a plastic bag with us.
Why, why should they destroy everything? The Balkan mentality, it 
is not good, Balkan people are not good. This couldn’t happen in Europe, 
France, England. This is Balkan mentality; it is Mediterranean. We are not 
normal. During the war here in Bosnia 300,000 people died and 300,000 peo-
ple were wounded, and everybody has been damaged psychologically. Why? 
Europe didn’t do anything; it is only because of America that it didn’t get even 
worse. Europe was sleeping. They didn’t do anything. They did not care. If 
they had intervened, it wouldn’t have looked like this, destroyed houses. They 
should go to The Hague, all the criminals. 10,000 of them. They could build a 
whole town there [he is laughing].
Today there is nothing here in Bosnia; the industry is destroyed. The 
machines are destroyed by grenades, rusted away, or they are obsolete, and 
the market – before we could sell to all of Yugoslavia, now…And today every-
thing is with computers, and we have no computers. Computers, internet. We 
have nothing. Before everything was good, can you imagine?
IV
Connected to this idea of a specific Balkan mentality, people seemed to think 
that foreigners could not understand what is going on in Bosnia Herzegovina. 
Perhaps people from the Balkans do not understand it intellectually either, but 
nevertheless, as they see it, the war has become part of an implicit shared expe-
rience, as this part of a conversation shows:
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Miho: How can one kill a little child? Imagine, in Mostar many children were 
killed, how can you explain it? People must be sick in their heads. How can 
they come and set houses on fire, steal windows, doors, everything? It is hard 
for a Westerner to understand.
TK: But isn’t it hard to understand for you as well?
Miho: Yes it is. But in our country we often have war.
It is this kind of knowledge van de Port calls implicit social knowledge, that is, 
knowledge gained through experiences of successive generations, often impos-
sible to articulate (van de Port 199: 100). Personally I doubt the significance of 
such a cultural logic. Many of my informants did not have prior experiences 
of war. Rather I believe that the Balkan metaphor is employed to make some 
kind of sense of the madness, with one element in this Balkan discourse being 
that people in the Balkans are used to recurrent insane violence – in short they 
know it by heart. In a similar vein, I occasionally heard people say that every 25 
years or 30 years there is war, or that: “We build up everything – houses, family, 
economy – and then we destroy it all.” 
One might have expected that the Muslims of Stolac would have associated 
the other ethnic groups with this Balkan mentality, and used the label as an 
ethnic condemnation in disguise. But they seldom did. The war was typically 
Balkan, rather than being typical of specific ethnic groups. It is my impression 
that people perceived ‘the Balkan mentality’ as an independent force operating 
in the Balkan areas that makes people act insanely. People do not positively 
embrace this violent and destructive Balkan mentality, but they do not feel they 
can evade it either. The Balkan mentality is an unavoidable aspect of living in 
the Balkans. People sometimes describe themselves as crazy Balkan people, but 
they are not the subjects that act: it is the Balkan mentality and its irreversibility 
that are acting through them. As one of my informants said when talking about 
this mentality: “Maybe it is something in the air, or maybe in the cigarettes, 
maybe they put marijuana in the cigarettes here in Bosnia.” The wild and cha-
otic Balkan mentality is thus enclosed in the middle of culture, but at the same 
time it is not part of the ordinary. It has its own secret life and its own dynamic, 
so the normal and ordered world can be upheld. The war’s incomprehensibil-
ity is not set apart or isolated outside culture, it is encapsulated inside culture. 
Such an identification with a Balkan mentality on behalf of all groups in Bosnia 
Herzegovina (the Balkans) forms part of the Muslims’ counterdiscourse, as it 
makes ethnically based condemnations irrelevant.
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Balkan, the authentic
Besides its everyday use and its status as an unavoidable mad mentality, ‘Bal-
kan’ also occasionally has positive connotations. When compared to European 
mentality it sometimes represents the authentic, warm, real, impulsive and un-
pretentious, whereas Europe represents the decadent, commercial, false and 
cold. I have heard people say that it was only after the war, with the presence 
of the international community, that drugs and prostitution entered Bosnia in 
earnest; that Westerners are often very patronising and condescending; that 
the kind of democracy that, for example, America defends only pretends to be 
democracy, and so on.
The owner of a local shop where I often did some shopping or just came 
to talk clearly saw me as representing Europe, and he often wanted to com-
pare life in Bosnia Herzegovina with life in Denmark/Europe. He wanted me 
to taste his pršut, a kind of air-dried meat. I told him it tasted delicious and he 
replied: “Our cows have plenty of space, they live naturally, they don’t grow fast 
and never become bigger than 250 kilos, but the meat is the best, they do not 
have any diseases [he referred to mad cow disease, which was a big theme in 
Europe], as your cows have. You only have industry, right? We don’t, but our 
quality is better.” Or he wanted to talk about how we treat the elderly in Europe. 
“In Bosnia the family sticks together and people take care of their parents, in 
Denmark you send the old to a nursing home. I have heard that people in Den-
mark spend more time on their pets than they do on their parents.” And he 
was not alone in making such comparisons. Many people loved to engage the 
well-known stereotypes that oppose cold (Northern) Europe and the warm and 
hospitable Balkans. 
The following is an excerpt from an interview with a couple in their mid-
thirties and two of their friends. Stereotypes here are free range ignited by my 
presence as a European, showing how Europe is a central ‘Other’ in my inform-
ants’ self-understanding. 
Huma: Yes, our mentality is different compared to your Scandinavian mentality. 
We are warm people. We are hearty. We are hospitable. We will give every-
thing.
Friend: For instance today you say you like sarma (a dish) and tomorrow we’ll in-
vite you for sarma. And they [people from Europe] say we are crazy.
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Huma: We don’t arrange our visits.
Nedžad: When you have arrived at someone’s house you are welcome.
Friend: We would never show that we did not want you to come. We are happy that 
you came, because Nedžad is our friend and you came with him. It doesn’t 
matter who he brings, we would treat him as a friend.
Nedžad: A friend’s friend is also a friend.
Huma: This is not how it is like for you. I do not like that, but such things await 
me in America [she is planning to emigrate]. We like having company, going 
out, spending some money if we have any; if we don’t, we are happy anyway. 
We are not together because of the money. If our neighbour is sick it would 
be unimaginable not to go over with cakes and some juice. Where you come 
from you can live 30 years next to your neighbour without knowing him. We 
also like sijaset [to have and make fun]. Then we say all kind of things, true 
and false.
Friend: We like to interfere in each other’s lives.
Huma: We are also different when it comes to marriage, it is impossible [to imag-
ine] for us to get divorced so much as you do in Europe.
On other occasions people told me that they were more impulsive than Europe-
ans, or that they had more time, not being so stressed, or that they were more 
emotional. In short, people embraced the positive stereotypes which are also 
connected to a Balkan mentality.
 
Embracing Balkan insanity
Balkan identity is complex and contradictory. It is both a violent and destruc-
tive force, and an authentic and creative attitude. And sometimes people em-
brace the contradictions and adopt the wild and chaotic madness because it 
also represents something real, that is non-European. This aspect of Balkan 
identification I mainly (but not solely) found among the younger male popula-
tion. I will start with two excerpts from my diary:
He [Nusret] tells me that: ‘People in the West look at us and think we are crazy, 
they all think we are crazy’, and he says something like: ‘Our mentality is dif-
ferent’, He does not directly refer to a Balkan mentality, but it is something 
like it. This thing where you at one at the same time hate your culture, the 
Balkan-like, which is the chaotic, crazy, violence, war, the incomprehensible, 
and if not love it then identify with it. It is like saying: ‘I am crazy, insane and I 
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am proud of it.’ Like when we hear this powerful and crazy yell from down the 
road and you think some kind of catastrophe has happened, and I ask what it 
was, and he replies: ‘Nothing, it is normal here.’ And then they laugh a strange 
laughter, but also one that is meant to tell me [as a European]: ‘This is how we 
are, we are wild and we are proud of it.’ It is this embrace of the otherness they 
are perfectly aware that a Westerner sees in them. As when Edin says: ‘People 
from the West look at us and say we are crazy, abnormal, but here everything 
is abnormal, that’s why I feel normal.’
[At the Café Galerija] Edin rose and danced a little; those at the table next to 
us did the same, and they sang. I said something like I had never felt unsafe 
in Bosnia, and Suljeman replied: ‘That’s how the Balkans are, here you can do 
what you want, you can sing, shout, dance, but nothing ever happens. Never. 
We never have fights in a place like this. Never.’ We talked a great deal about 
the Balkans, or rather Safet did. He identifies with ‘Balkan.’ For him ‘Balkan’ 
is something crazy, beautiful, insane, real, authentic; he often uses the words 
‘authentic Balkan.’ He is Balkan, or as he said when Edin was dancing with his 
hands raised above his head – this was after he had stubbed out the cigarette 
on his tongue – ‘He is a Balkan boy.’ ‘Balkan’ is the thing that explains the 
insanity in his life; it explains the war, that nothing works, his fear, his dis-
like, everything. ‘Balkan’ explains without having to be explained itself. As he 
clearly said himself: ‘Balkan is Balkan, you cannot explain it.’ […] 
When we were talking about music he [Safet] said: ‘This music you do 
not find other places, it is real Balkan music’. He said the same thing about 
the Bosnian cafes. ‘Like we are acting right now, you only find this in Bosnia. 
People are happy, they are crazy. You can shout in here (he shouts), you can 
enter without clothes, you can do what you want, nobody would ever harm 
you, we never have fights. We are a peaceful people and then suddenly war 
comes, it comes every 20-30 years and then we run totally amok (he beat his 
fists against each other in a very telling manner) aaaahhh! 30 years of peace, 
without the slightest violence, everybody lives well together and then comes 
total war, everybody runs amok. It is Balkan, it is crazy.’ He laughs, but the 
laughter passes into a cheerless and despairing attitude. We listen to more 
music, and some novakomponovana narodna muzika [new-composed folk 
music] is played; he does not like it. The authentic is important. Balkan is war 
and chaos, and it is beautiful and sentimental. I say that it is crazy and beauti-
ful at the same time. He totally agrees.
A final example comes from an interview with a young man called Edin, and 
it depicts, among other thing the tension which is so characteristic in people’s 
001_316_post-war.indd   274 14/04/08   22:05:11
Denne side er købt på www.ebog.dk og er omfattet af lov om ophavsret. Uanset evt. aftale med Copy-Dan er det ikke tilladt at kopiere eller
indscanne siden til undervisningsbrug eller erhvervsmæssig brug.
	 the balkans – europe 25
identification with everything ‘Balkan.’ Edin seeks both the Balkan wildness 
and the European orderliness. But he cannot have both.
TK: How is the Balkan mentality different?
Edin: I don’t know…Germany, Denmark, there is law and order. But here in the 
Balkans there is nothing. Here everybody can do as they please. People, like 
you coming from Denmark, think: wow what kind of animals live here. It 
has always been like that, before the war, in the war and after the war. It will 
always be like that. It will never change. There is a difference. You can see it. 
For instance yesterday you and I drank beer, and in Denmark when you drink 
beer, you talk, smoke, you are calm, normal, nothing special. But here when 
you drink beer wow! Hajde! [meaning something like: come on! Yeah!] do 
you understand? It is Balkan. Aaaaaarg! [shouting]. You know what I mean.
TK: Feelings?
Edin: Feelings are different. Here you feel strong, very strong. If I came to Den-
mark and had done like that: hajde! People would have said what kind of idiot, 
a fool, then the police come and drive you to the hospital.
TK: And that is positive [the feelings in the Balkans], you think?
Edin: Yes.
TK: But does ‘Balkan’ also have negative dimensions?
Nijaz: Negative? Yes, many. I tell you again, there is no law and order, you can do 
what you like. Here there is no law. There are a lot of drugs, a lot of mafia […] 
But it was not good before the war either. With Tito the Balkan mentality was 
the same, aj gotovo! [meaning something like: to hell with everything!] If only 
we had good law and order, everything would be fine. Everything is for sale: 
here you make counterfeit money, if you do that you will have inflation, like 
in Russia. In Germany there is no counterfeiting, everything works, comput-
ers control everything. If we had another kind of law and order it would be 
perfect here; people would be different.
Balkan, then, is negative and positive, and also unavoidable. It is the opposite of 
the European mentality – sometimes better, sometimes worse. It is destructive 
and creative, and it is used to understand the war, violence and destruction. The 
question of wheter to be or not to be (or rather how to be) Balkan is not some-
thing one normally relates to Muslim ethnoreligious identity. For the Muslims 
of Stolac, however, it was a central question, which they answered in contradic-
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tory ways. Furthermore, the central elements in the Western discourse on the 
Balkans, such as violence, passion, emotion and so on, were also the ones that 
entered into the examples just given. One thing, though, uniting my inform-
ants’ different use of Balkan mentality is the absence of a linkage with ethnicity. 
This kind of linkage was made extensively throughout the war on the political 
level, as previously discussed, so one might also have expected that my inform-
ants would have associated negative aspects of the Balkan mentality with the 
Croats or Serbs, and positives characteristics solely with Muslim mentality. 
This, however, was only seldom the case. When entering the Balkans-Europe 
dichotomy, my informants entered a higher level of identification at wich the 
sparring partners were European Others, not ethnic Others, and the madness 
of the area related not to one ethnic group, but to the whole populace. The 
contradictory Balkan identifications, therefore, form yet another part of the 
Muslims’ counterdiscourse.
European identifications in Stolac
Opposite the Balkans is Europe. And Europe is contradictory just as the Balkan 
picture is. The Muslims of Stolac had three ways of comparing and identifying 
themselves with Europe: as lagging behind, as being like, and/or as being better 
– not by being Balkan but by being more European than Europeans.
Lagging behind Europe
Many of my informants associated Europe with peace, prosperity and orderli-
ness, and believed it could offer a better life. ‘Towards Europe’, as an election 
poster stated it in the general election in November 2000. Europe was a dream, 
and for many an unattainable one. Bosnia Herzegovina was seen as lagging 
behind materially and technologically, as well as in regard to the legal system 
and societal development.
I
I remember once Rasim showed me some pictures, one of which was of his 
family during the war. Its quality was bad. The background was a wall with graf-
fiti on it. His children, who looked sad, were wearing ragged clothes, and every-
thing seemed to be run down. Another picture was taken inside an apartment, 
in front of an empty peeling wall; one of the boys was sitting on an old mat-
tress full of holes. That is all. Right next to these pictures in the album was one 
taken by his sister, who lived in Germany. The home was pretty and the quality 
of the picture was good. The children were well dressed and well groomed, 
pictures were hanging on the wall, and there was nice furniture and china on 
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the table. Everybody looked healthy and lively. Rasim’s comment was: “It’s the 
same, right? Totally the same; can’t you see it?” He laughed a little, I know he 
dreamt of being able to give his children and himself such a future. In fact, he 
emigrated with his family to Sweden two months later.
II
On many mornings my landlady’s child watched the British children’s pro-
gramme Teletubbies. Besides the small puppets, there were scenes with children 
from the UK and Germany playing in nice kindergartens, beautiful private 
houses, tidy streets etc. Often I heard the boy’s mother sighing in the back-
ground. I guess she was wishing and dreaming for, and perhaps also recall-
ing such material surroundings and orderly conditions. Watching such a pro-
gramme in Stolac, where so much was destroyed and people’s living standard 
so low, seemed more or less surreal. Compare this to the time Mensur and I 
stopped to buy petrol at a garage. It was a new one: everything worked and the 
place was clean. After filling the car Mensur said that this was a good garage, 
orderly and fine, like in the West.
III
The Muslims of Stolac very clearly operate with an evolutionist paradigm, eval-
uating countries and cultures on a time scale, as the following utterance by 
Munir shows.
 
The situation we have now is one Western Europe experienced a couple of 
hundred years ago. Western Europe has experienced nationalist fights from 
the time of the French Revolution. And now we have it, after 150 years we have 
it. In Western Europe they are throwing out the borders, but here we create 
more borders than existed in the whole of Europe.
The idea that Bosnia Herzegovina is placed on a lower evolutionary stage than 
Europe also runs as a theme in many of the jokes people tell about themselves. 
Bosnians are here characterised as being simple, unsophisticated and primitive. 
I referred to one above about the Slovene, Croat and Bosnian talking to God. 
Another one goes like this. 
A Bosnian man had taken his grandmother [Balkan] to Scandinavia [Eu-
rope]. The man stopped at a cash dispenser and got out of the car to withdraw 
some money. The old lady saw how he just went to the cash dispenser and got a 
lot of money. When he returned she asked him to see the money. She counted it 
and said: “Why did you only take so little, why did you not take some more?” 
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The next joke was told to me by a young woman. When I asked her if such 
a thing as a Balkan mentality existed, she answered by telling three jokes and 
ended by saying that she was so fed up with this lousy, criminal Bosnian men-
tality: “Mujo has moved to USA, to an apartment where everything is electric 
[symbol of Europe/the West]. Suljo comes to visit him. At one point he has to 
go to the toilet, but he cannot get it to work with all those buttons and electri-
cal installations. At night when the others are asleep he therefore gets up and 
tries to find a bucket, but does not find any. So he takes a plant and all the soil 
out of its pot and shits in the pot and puts the soil and the plant back in place. 
The day after he tells Suljo that he is going home; the place is not for him. After 
he returns about three weeks pass, and he receives a telegram from Mujo that 
says: “Tell us where you have shit, we have moved three times, but the place still 
smells of shit.” 
At the same time as the jokes depict Bosnians as ‘below’ Europe, they 
also to some extent embrace the primitiveness associated with the Balkans (as 
described above). It is as though the primary characters are saying: “We are 
lagging behind the whole world, but we don’t care.” This is the case in this joke, 
which many people probably know with other characters: A Dane, a Swede and 
a Bosnian were in a sauna. The Dane talks proudly about his tiny cellphone, 
which one can hardly see. The Swede then says that he has had a cellphone 
operated into one of his teeth; he just has to chew to make a call. The Bosnian 
waits a little, then he presses and shits, and says: “Aha! I just received a fax.” It 
is as if people in the jokes degrade themselves with ill-concealed satisfaction: 
“When the world once is destroyed with a big crash, Bosnia will survive for 
another 100 years (as they lag 100 years behind).”
We are Europeans, normal people
On other occasions when Muslims compared the Balkans with the charged 
symbol of Europe, they did not depict themselves as lagging behind, but rather 
as being no different. They stressed that it was the other peoples in Europe 
who deemed them to be underdeveloped and abnormal. As Mensur once said, 
“The Bosnian Muslims are the most intelligent and most educated Muslims in 
the world, probably because we are from Europe.” Sometimes I was confronted 
  Mujo (Muhamed) and Suljo (Suljeman) are recurrent characters in many jokes, they are arche-
typical Bosnians associated with primitiveness and a Balkan mentality.
  For instance, this one: It was during the war, there were a lot of snipers in Sarajevo, Suljo runs 
into the street and suddenly a sniper fires and shoots off one of his ears. He takes cover. Mujo 
says: “Oh! Your ear is shot off, what are you going to do.” “Fuck the ear,” Suljo replies “I had a 
cigarette behind the ear.” Se also Maček’s (2000a: 0-3) interpretation of some of the Mujo and 
Suljo jokes in relation to everyday life under siege in Sarajevo.
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with the view – contrary to the Balkan explanation – that the war could have 
occurred anywhere, that Europe also has a bloody history, or that it was all due 
to international as well as national politics, a view with which people resisted 
attempts at linking up the war with a typical Balkan mentality. 
Mensur often, when talking about aspects of Bosnian culture, used the 
expression: “it is the same as in the West”, as if to convince me that the societies 
and mentalities were the same, and that he (they) were not Balkan. Once, for 
instance, he told me how male chauvinistic people were before: “If the wife was 
sick they would go to the doctor, but it was the man who would be riding. To-
day it is not like that, now both the man and the woman help, like in Europe.” 
In the following quote from an interview with Muhamed several different 
identifications are at play. He calls himself a European, a Balkan man, and also 
just normal/ordinary. And though he sees the standard in Bosnia Herzegovina 
today as lagging behind that of many other countries, he does not perceive the 
culture or mentality to be second rate.
Muhamed: In Denmark everybody thinks that we fight, as if we were some kind 
of tribe in Africa, as if there were a civil war. We are not. What did people say 
when you were about to travel down here? That you would be robbed, killed, 
that it was dangerous?
TK: Yes.
Muhamed: Yes I know, I know the propaganda in the West, but we are ordinary 
people. Maybe you should arrange for a tourist bus to come down here, then 
people could have a look, and we could tell about the war…
The majority of the Bosniaks who live abroad, who I talk to say that the 
Danes think that this war was like a tribal war [plemenski rat], like Indians. 
People in the West see us as a tribal people [domorodac]. But we are not. We 
are a normal people, a European people. I speak a little English, but we have 
people who speak good English and German. For instance the Bosnian chil-
dren in the Danish schools, they are very clever, our children. They have a 
broad perspective, so it is, but you have to show it [people in the West do not 
know]. People in the West are afraid to invest their money here, because we 
are a risk area. […] 
We are not Iranians. I do not wish for Bosnia Herzegovina to be an Is-
lamic country, I do not need it. I am not a man of the East. I am a man of the 
Balkans. Neither am I a man of the West, but I want my children to have the 
same life as Westerners have and it shall be here. […] 
Well, I’ve never been in Denmark. Our houses may not look like Danish 
houses; maybe you have bigger living rooms in Denmark. Maybe you have 
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a fireplace in the house. There is a difference between you and us, but if you 
travel to Albania, the Albanians they have it much harder than us, and it is the 
same in Bulgaria and Rumania. […] Before the war when we were in Yugosla-
via, those people from the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Albania, and the other 
countries from the Eastern block, in comparison to them we were the West. 
When Poles came to Yugoslavia, four of them would sit and share one beer, 
they would have four glasses. And when we travelled to Poland with KM200 
[€100], we were like a host [gazda]. But now, it is totally opposite. For instance 
the Czechs and Hungarians have it much better than us. The only republic 
from the former Yugoslavia that is progressing is Slovenia. Serbia, Macedonia 
– it is a catastrophe. 
For Muhamed Europe or the West are persistently used as sparring partners, 
and it is clear that he has no respect for the condescending attitude of Europe-
ans. Bosnians are Europeans too.
We are more European than you
The last aspect of the comparison between the Balkans and Europe is when 
people stated that Bosnians are in fact better than Europeans, not because they 
are more authentic, emotional and hospitable, as was the case when the Balkan 
discourse was embraced and the Otherness internalised, but because they are 
more European. The main arguments employed to support this identification 
relate to education and general knowledge. 
Nusret’s father, for instance, clearly placed Bosnia Herzegovina at the top 
of Europe. He was a well-read man and was part of an intellectual group in 
Stolac which does not exist any more because, as he said, the majority of the 
intellectuals have left the country. He often talked about the high intellectual 
level of former Yugoslavia: “We had one of the best school systems in Europe, 
philosophy, architecture, mathematics. Plato, Aristotle, everything”, and he told 
me that the West does not reckon the people in the Balkans as capable of any-
thing. One day he told me about a Spanish SFOR soldier who used to come and 
visit him: “I asked if he knew [he mentioned a Spanish writer whose name I did 
not catch]; he didn’t, so I had to teach him Spanish literature.” He also talked 
about civilisation, that a culture has to settle. He said that civilisation has exist-
ed in Bosnia and in Yugoslavia for many years, which may be regarded as a tree 
  The first time we met he excused himself for not having read Kierkegaard, and on his table I 
have for instance seen: The Will to Power and Madness and Civilisation in Cyrillic, a biography 
about Freud as well as his Interpretation of Dreams, a book about German grammar and a book 
about Horcheimer and Adorno.
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with close rings, while American culture is of the same quality as a tree grow-
ing very fast. He speaks Russian and taught himself German from a tape. One 
day he told me about the superiority of the letter c in the Bosnian language: “In 
German you need three letters to create the same sound: sch.”
The following quote is from an interview with Amela, a young school-
teacher. It shows how Europe can be used as the basis for an evaluation of the 
perceived superiority of Bosnian culture, educational system and civilisation.
TK: Why did you return from Germany?
Amela: I returned because I couldn’t [stand] be[ing] there any more. I had a good 
education. When I came [to Germany] they treated us as the lowest class. You 
could only get the jobs the Germans did not want themselves. […] There, 
nobody respects you. They don’t respect our educational system, even though 
our school system had a greater capacity than the German, or that of other 
European countries. That’s our problem. We learn a lot in the school and 
many people go to the university, but in Europe it doesn’t count. They think 
we’re on a lower level. For instance when I was in primary school I read at 
least 200 books. We had to, it was a must. Whereas in the European schools 
the children read two books in ten years. […] 
I couldn’t get another job in Germany and then I cleaned for a German. 
I spoke to her in English, because I couldn’t speak German. She asked me 
where I had learned English, because she didn’t know anything about us. She 
couldn’t understand that we were capable of doing anything. She gave me a 
vacuum cleaner and showed me how to turn it on. She also had a vase, which 
was antique and she explained that the vase was valuable, as if I did not know. 
She didn’t think that I knew anything because I came from some country at 
war. […]
If we had the same conditions as one has in the European countries, if I 
had good conditions, if I had a good salary, I would battle to learn even more. 
They [Europeans] stagnate. They stop with only minimal education. They are 
content with what they have got, but for us it is not like that. We fight to take 
yet another step forward, while they remain with what they have got. For 
instance, our men in Germany who worked building houses – Germans were 
foremen, and if some tool was lacking they would go to a shop to buy it, while 
our people would always improvise something to replace the missing tool. 
Why buy it? The Germans said it was the Balkan system, that is, improvising. 
We like improvising. If we don’t have a table we would not go to a store to buy 
a new one, we would try to make something. We can fix things with fewer 
resources. We improvise everything in life. I don’t know where we learned it 
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from, maybe from the old system [in Yugoslavia]. Germans work with one 
thing in one way. For us it is not like that. […] 
Nobody respects us because they don’t know how much we are capable 
of. When we started at the university a professor from USA came to teach 
us. We were scared because we thought we were going to read thick books in 
English, and then he brought some thin books. Like books for children. His 
way of teaching was so simple. Our school is difficult and we laughed when we 
saw the books he brought with him. Their students learn from those books. 
That is to say, it’s much easier to study there. After a while it was decided that 
he should not teach any more, and then another one came and he brought 
some thick books. […]
My son is in first grade. In the West when you are in the first grade you 
play with your friends; my son is taught simple equations in mathematics. He 
has to write whole sentences without errors. He has to. I believe it is different 
for you. 
Reading the quotation, a ‘Westerner’ cannot help being a little provoked or 
amused. Naturally, Amela’s thinking relates to Yugoslav and post-Yugoslav 
pedagogical traditions of knowledge and teaching. But other things are also 
at stake. Amela felt like a European, but did not feel that she (and the Bosnian 
people in general) were accepted as such. This is why she employed these occa-
sionally dubious arguments. In as much as these arguments were justifications 
for herself and her culture and a criticism of Europe and European civilisation/
education, they were expressions of the dilemma inherent in the discourse of 
the Balkans-Europe.
In their attempt to define their identity as Muslims, my informants drew on 
the discursive construction ‘the Balkans versus Europe’, which during the war 
became even more relevant due to extensive use of the metaphors the Balkans 
and Europe by almost everyone involved: ex-Yugoslav politicians trying to le-
gitimise succession; Western politicians, journalists and academics trying to 
‘Balkanise’ the war and thereby legitimise non-interference; and civilians try-
ing to grasp the madness by encapsulating the violence, seeing it as the result 
of some kind of unavoidable Balkan mentality. The Muslims’ dilemma of being 
(n)either Balkan (n)or European was a central aspect in everyday processes of 
identification, and the Muslims of Stolac employed the opposition in different 
and rather incongruous ways. Often the same persons made different state-
ments depending on the situation or the topic discussed. However, the differ-
ent Balkans-Europe identifications avoided ethnic connotations, as they were 
placed beyond ethnicity by my informants, on a higher level of comparison. 
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To be a Muslim of Stolac means to continually place oneself somewhere in the 
discursive tension of the Balkans-Europe dichotomy, and by so doing ethnic 
affiliation becomes less relevant. As this, moreover, opposes the way the Bal-
kans-Europe discourse was employed in other spheres of society, I see it as part 
of the Muslims’ counterdisourse.
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Chapter 15
The role of the victim
In contrast to the previous identifications I have discussed, the Muslims’ identi-
fication of themselves as victims – victims of both Serbian and Croatian aggres-
sion and the cynical politics of the West – functioned as an explicit criticism of 
the Croat/Serbian Other. The role of the victim explicitly set the Muslims apart 
and reinforced the nationalistic rhetoric of exclusiveness and ethnic separation. 
The Stolac Muslims’ recurrent talk about themselves as victims of the war was a 
mutual confirmation of their own fate and their communality as Muslims. The 
establishment of the victim’s role was a way of representing identity and an at-
tempt to come to terms with the unmaking of the world. In short, the statement 
‘we are victims’ became an answer to the questions the Muslim population of 
Stolac was continually faced with: who are we (as a group), why did these things 
happen to us, what does it mean to be Muslim, how can one make sense of the 
ruined world? 
The role of the victim is linked to national political rhetoric. Though not 
well documented, it seems that Muslims as a group were promoted as victims 
in Bosnian politics by Muslim politicians throughout the war in order to gain 
international sympathy and to legitimise the preservation of an ethnically het-
erogeneous Bosnia Herzegovina (Velikonja 2003; Bougarel 199: 10-109). For 
instance, when we look at the terrible rapes committed during the war, it ap-
pears that the raped Muslim women only became important politically when 
they disappeared as individuals and were transformed into a symbol of the 
raped nation (Meznaric 1994; Morokvasic 199; Olujic 199). As Olujic (199: 
45) writes, “The rapes of individual women were microcosms of the larger inva-
sions of territory.” 
The role of the victim in Stolac is, however also ambivalent and contradic-
tory. By identifying with a role as victims, one also remembers the atrocities, 
thereby poisoning the present with hate: the recalcitrance of the tragedy, as 
Das and Kleinman call it (2001: 14-1). Facilitating inter-ethnic interaction and 
a comparatively normal life demands forgetting, especially in Bosnia Herze-
govina, where no public processes of reconciliation by remembering have been 
set in motion. Again I am faced with an ethical problem. My analytical focus 
centres solely on how my informants use their actual fate as victims as a source 
of identification and a way of comprehending their unmade world. Implicitly, 
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such an analytical position questions the Muslims’ actual status in the war. On 
the other hand, stating that the Muslims are victims would not explain why 
and how they themselves stress this matter, or what identity is sought by such 
a strategy. Even though they are victims, they did not have to focus on it, and 
when they do there are many ways of constructing oneself as the injured party.1 
My informants’ accounts were variations of the same story again and again: 
“We didn’t start the war, we did not commit any atrocities, we did not burn 
down any churches, we showed our true nature in the war, no Muslims stand 
charged in The Hague, we are still victims”. Hereby the role of the victim com-
municates central values relevant for the Muslims of Stolac, especially their 
righteousness as Muslims. What is more, identifying with the role of the victim 
is also a way – more or less the only one – of making a more direct criticism of 
the ethnic Others. 
The conspiracy
One aspect of the role of the victim concerns the Muslims as victims of con-
spiracy. Almost everybody I talked to recalled how the war came as a surprise 
(see Chapter 2), and they explained this by saying that it was all a conspiracy 
and that they were betrayed. People believed in Yugoslavia, in Brotherhood 
and Unity (bratstvo i jedinststvo), in their army JNA (Yugoslav People’s Army), 
and later when the war had started they believed that they and the Croats were 
facing the same enemy – the Serbs. But when the war started, the Muslims 
realised that the Serbs had been planning it for a long time, and the Croats had 
intended to go against the Muslims even when the two groups were still allied 
in 1992-93. 
I
Nihad often talked about the deceit he, his family and the Muslims had experi-
enced; a feeling which was probably amplified by the fact that he, like all other 
adult men in Stolac, had not been able to defend himself and his family when 
he was arrested (see Prologue). Some observers of Balkan culture say that the 
ability to defend and revenge one’s kin is very central in these areas (Boem 194; 
Bax 2000b). I do not know if such attitudes are more pronounced here than 
1  A victim role is probably a universal role (Buruma 1995), but its actual manifestation and 
function is culture specific and linked to the social situations in which it is articulated. The 
Palestinians, for instance, construct a victim role which is used as a way of gaining individual 
merit, part of an initiation rite, and there are degrees of victimhood, as seen in the practice of 
acknowledging martyrdom (Ladekjær 2002).
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elsewhere. Rather, I believe that frustration is a universal feeling when you are 
under pressure and without options for acting (Jackson 2002). This at least was 
Nihad’s situation, and probably the reason why the deceit was felt so deeply. Let 
me add that when the male Muslim population was released from the prison 
camps many went to the Mostar area, where they were met with a contemptu-
ous attitude from the local Muslims and accusations of not having defended 
themselves against the Croats (or the Serbs for that matter when they occupied 
Stolac in 1992). So for the second time many Stolac Muslims were placed in the 
front line in military operations (the first time was when they fought together 
with the Croats). At least this was what people told me.
Nihad: The Croats had planned it all far in advance. Before the war, in 1991-92 they 
had already begun printing their own birth certificates. It was all planned. The 
Serbs and Croats had a deal. The Serbs were to get the territory to Neretva [the 
great river running through Herzegovina and also Mostar], and the Croats 
the territory from Neretva. What about us then? We were supposed to end 
up in the river.
Wife: Nihad, he didn’t think there would be a war; he just worked all the time. He 
thought that as long as he worked nothing would happen. At that time, in 
1991, he helped a friend build a house in Dubrave. Then a Croatian friend of 
ours came by and asked, ‘Why are you working, Nihad; the war will still come 
and destroy everything.’
Nihad: I was standing there by the road working, and he passed and asked, ‘Ni-
had why are you working; the war will soon come and everything will be 
destroyed.’ I didn’t take any notice of him; he has always been a little nervous. 
It was all planned. The Croats, they stabbed us in the back.
II
Omer expressed the feeling of betrayal by the Croats and the theory of the con-
spiracy between the Serbs and the Croats in this way:
Omer: When the war started between Muslims and Croats in Konjic [central Bos-
nia], the Croats from Konjic were driven on trucks through Serbian territory 
to Stolac. And in return the Croats drove food to the Serbs in the same ve-
hicles. The Serbs also received gasoline and diesel in return for allowing the 
Croats to drive through their territory. It was in 1993. All the time during the 
  See Glenny (199: 19) for an explanation of the deal between the HVO and the Serbs.
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war a part of Konjic was under Croatian control. They were surrounded by 
Muslims on the one side and Serbs on the other. And if they were not on good 
terms with the Serbs they could not receive supplies from their base, and they 
would have been in the same situation as we were in Mostar.
TK: When did you know that the Croats would expel you?
Omer: When they expelled us. Maybe you suspected it a little earlier, but you didn’t 
really believe it. When we were arrested, all the Muslims were in a row, and we 
all had to put our guns on the ground […]…It was like cheating.
People also felt that the West let them down by not intervening soon enough, 
by not allowing the Muslims to arm themselves (due to the weapons embargo), 
and by pretending not to know what was going on in Bosnia Herzegovina (es-
pecially the existence of the Croat prison camps). They felt as though they were 
part of a political game that they were unable to see through: old alliances, ter-
ritory, military access to the sea, international politics, arms deals and so on. 
On the other hand, people stressed that it was the West that finally ended the 
war and ensured peace. People are grateful, yet they still ask themselves why the 
West did not intervene long before, thereby saving thousands of lives. 
Salko: It took a long time to explain to the Europeans that it wasn’t a civil war but 
an aggression, that they [Serbs and Croats] would exterminate [unište] the 
Muslims. But the West gave the go-ahead to the Croats and the Serbs to ex-
terminate us. You can still read some of these thinkers in the newspapers, for 
example Robert Owen, he still thinks in that way. I have read a letter that John 
Major wrote to Douglas Hurd, which says that that Bosnian Muslims should 
be exterminated. And of course the Muslim countries entered the conflict, 
Saudi-Arabia and Iran, and they are economically very strong countries, and 
it became a fight against America.
Stolac Muslims, then, have a feeling of being betrayed by everyone and only 
having oneself to turn to. At the same time people kept on expecting the inter-
national community to sort out their present problems. It was as though they 
felt that the West ‘owed them’ for having let them down in the war.
Another aspect of the role of the victim is that when talking about the 
betrayal, people represent themselves as credulous and naive. They ask them-
selves why they did not see things coming, why they believed the Croats, and 
  See for instance Cigar (1995) regarding how Lord Owen considered it to be a civil war.
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why they did not make military preparations. But at the same time this naiveté 
is also read as evidence of the Muslims’ trustworthiness and decency. Consider 
here what Muhamed’s mother once said:
In the beginning it was the Serbs [who started the conflict] and then they per-
suaded the Croats to do the same. Tuđman and Milošović were in Karadjor-
djevo, where they were planning how to divide the country. Then Milošović 
said to Tuđman: ‘You can have your country to Neretva, you can have half of 
Bosnia Herzegovina and then I want half of Bosnia Herzegovina, then we’ll 
make a deal and then we will kill all the Muslims.’ We Muslims did not know 
anything about the deal at that moment. We are decent people and want a 
good relationship with everybody. There is one word very characteristic of 
us Muslims and that is merhametli [roughly: to be helpful]; we are not bad 
people. We cannot all be brothers and sisters, but we have to be good friends, 
we have to understand each other, take care of each other and be together, 
communicate. And if I do not have anything today and you do, you should 
help me, and tomorrow if you do not have anything I’ll help you. 
One of my informants once said that “Some think we were too merhametli dur-
ing the war and that’s why all this happened; we were too tolerant.” In the quote 
Muhamed’s mother clearly communicated the feeling of deceit, and the sense 
that the Muslims were victims, and with a starting point in this fate she moves 
towards a definition of Muslimness: a deceived, naive, but decent people.4 
A final element of people’s talk about the betrayal is their lack of trust 
in the Croats: they can live together, but will not trust each other again. And 
many felt an obligation to tell their children the truth, so the war will not repeat 
itself. When we discussed the curriculum in the school, Amira, a schoolteacher, 
made the following remarks:
You have to realise our problem. It was the Muslims who suffered most in 
the war. In the school where I work we are forced to have a joint school pro-
gramme. They [the OHR’s educational section] threw everything Muslim out 
of the books. But it is only Muslims who live up to the plan that Petrich [Wolf-
4  During Muhamed’s mother’s talk about proper behaviour and Muslim identity, Muhamed and 
his friend (both around 35 years of age) were talking about prices in the shops. They probably 
agreed with her, but had heard it all before, and more importantly the elaboration of the victim 
role is mostly done by the older generation. For the young there is not much prestige or future 
in pursuing the role of victim.
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gang Petrich; OHR] wants. In the Croatian schools they teach their children 
the way they want.
I cannot teach my child to forget it all. My mother never taught me 
about the things that happened before [Second World War], and that’s why 
these things happened to us. If we were a little stronger and if we did not 
believe in everything they say…The worst thing is that we believed them. We 
paid the highest price because we believed them. We shall never forget. If we 
forget, it will happen again. They raise their children to become the great-
est Croats or the greatest Serbs, and things will remain the same until they 
change their education.
Criticism and decency – mosques and churches 
The different elements in the role of the victim (we were deceived by every-
body; we were naive but decent; we are not like them/we will never trust them 
fully again) all fit together, and by referring to one you refer to them all. One 
can enter the role of the victim through any one of them, and often one does 
not have to say a lot in order to implicitly refer to a much broader framework. 
By saying, for instance, “We did not destroy any churches” or “We did not com-
mit any war crimes”, people were also implicitly talking about such issues as 
physical violence, the looting of houses, the present political violence of the 
Croats, the insufficient support from the West, and so on, as these assertions 
belong to the same cluster. Below are examples of such assertions, which taken 
together constitute additional parts of the Muslims’ role of the victim.
We were not guilty 
The Muslims definitely saw themselves as victims who had been robbed of eve-
rything: material goods, their past, their present, political influence, and so on. 
They saw the war as an aggression, an attempted nationalistic genocide, for 
which they had no responsibility themselves. They did not feel they had any-
thing to be ashamed of. And they felt neither ashamed nor embarrassed about 
the pre-war years, when they trusted the other ethnic groups and lived peace-
fully and well together. What they wanted was for the Croats (and the Serbs) 
to face their misdeeds, because, as the Muslims saw it, they were the ones who 
rightfully should feel embarrassed. 
Fahrudin was one of the first Muslims to return to Stolac after the war. He 
believed in the future, or at least he wanted to. But he also had his souvenirs 
from the war, as he called them. All his front teeth are artificial: a Croat from 
Stolac smashed his real teeth out with a rifle butt during the expulsion.
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TK: Is it difficult to live together again?
Fahrudin: It is not that difficult to live with them, but it is difficult [for them] to 
face the truth. On a political level Croatia hasn’t apologised for what they 
did against the Muslims in Herzegovina, and the same goes for Serbia. And 
the people in Croatia have to say to themselves that they have done wrong. I 
didn’t kill anybody; I didn’t do anything bad to other people. I can look them 
in the eyes [pogledaj ga u oči]. But there are people here in Stolac who can’t. I 
didn’t burn down any houses, and I didn’t mine any churches. And on a gen-
eral level Amija BiH didn’t do things like that. Those who say that we can’t live 
together are chauvinists and nationalists. If we could live together for 50 years, 
why can’t we then continue?
We did not destroy any churches
I often heard the statement: “We did not destroy any churches.” The destruc-
tion of cultural artefacts, especially religious buildings, was a very widespread 
practice during the war. Stolac’s four mosques were destroyed. Altogether an 
estimated 1,000-1,500 mosques were destroyed during the war in Bosnia Herze-
govina (about two-fifths of them all) (Velikonja 2003). The destruction of the 
mosques became a symbol of the destruction of the Muslim people. At the 
same time, according to my informants the Muslims did not destroy churches, 
and if they did it was a matter of individual cases and not part of a war strategy 
of ethnic and cultural cleansing. By dissociating themselves from the practices 
of the others, the Muslims at one and the same time were able to demonise and 
criticise the ethnic Other and stress their own decency and tolerance, as this 
excerpt from an interview with Salko shows:
We have shown in this war that we are not like them. We haven’t killed as they 
have killed. We haven’t razed churches. Once when I was in Sarajevo during 
the war, I heard the bell from the cathedral and the Catholic church. And I 
have to say that it made me shiver. In the centre of Sarajevo there is a Catholic 
church, and in my hometown there isn’t one mosque. And that’s the way we 
Bosniaks are – we do not want to be like them.
The next example comes from an interview with Muhamed, talking about the 
moral support Armija BiH had. 
Muhamed: Let me tell you about Armija BiH. For instance if we two got into in a 
car and drove to Mostar, to Jablanica, drove to Konjic, Sarajevo, or to any town 
which was under Armija’s control – in all these towns, you will find churches, 
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everywhere. We did not touch the churches. There was no destructions of 
churches. None. But here in Stolac you can’t find a single mosque. I lived in 
Konjic during the war, and when there were clashes between HVO and Arm-
ija, policemen from Konjic guarded the church. And do you know why they 
did that? They were afraid that some Croats would set the church on fire.
Friend: That is the truth.
Muhamed: There were Franciscans, and there were nuns there all the time, and 
that is the army you asked about [Armija BiH].
Friend: For instance in Bugojno the Croats themselves threw bombs at the Catho-
lic church to show that the Bosniaks did it [give them the blame].
Muhamed: All mosques were destroyed during the war, and that’s why they wanted 
to show that the Muslims did the same to their churches. […]
Friend: In comparison to what they did to us, we were the best.
Muhamed: For instance I lived in Stolac. And I knew what the Croats did in Stolac 
and then I went to Konjic, where there lived Croats, but I never considered 
at all doing anything bad against them. What kind of person would I be if I 
did?
During the war the Muslims did not commit the same number of atrocities as 
the Serbs and Croats did. These differences are used by the Muslims of Stolac as 
a way of identifying themselves as well as labelling the others. 
During the war, Blagaj was the outermost isthmus of the Muslim-control-
led area, and the place to which many of the Muslim women and children from 
Stolac were expelled in 1993. The mosques in the area were all destroyed (some 
have been rebuilt since), and at least one Serbian church was hit by Croatian 
fire. When I visited Blagaj the Catholic church in town was still standing. It had 
not been touched, not even by graffiti, and this in an area totally under Muslim 
dominance. I think that part of the answer is that for the Muslims, the church 
was and still is a visible symbol of the Muslim mindset: they can point to the 
church and say “We are not like them.”
We did not commit any war crimes
The Muslims considered that they showed their true nature during the war by 
not ‘talking’ the same language as the other two ethnic groups, that is destruc-
tion, looting, and killing of civilians. People felt innocent and were astonished 
by the violence in the war: “How can anyone kill innocent children and wom-
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en?” “We didn’t commit any war crimes,” “We showed our nature by not being 
inhuman.” 
Once I asked Emir why the Croats behaved so cruelly towards the Mus-
lims in the prison camps. He answered: “I don’t know, if I knew I would be like 
them.” A central strategy was to turn the wrongdoers’ actions back on them-
selves. The misdeeds affected the Muslims, but they spoke about their perpetra-
tors. At the same time, the contours of Muslim mentality were delineated.
My informants did not believe that the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia in The Hague could bring any justice or redress, as it 
was regarded as working too slowly and not charging the big shots (Milošović 
was not on trial when I was doing fieldwork). But in establishing themselves 
as victims and identifying Muslimness, the tribunal had a place. On several 
occasions I heard people saying something like: “All war criminals should be 
sent to the Hague, but notice that only two Muslims stand accused: the rest are 
Serbs and Croats.” For the Muslims The Hague became a symbol of their role 
as victims, and the injustice they had experienced. The following excerpt from 
an interview with Omer is an example of how the others’ misdeeds, one’s own 
decent behaviour and one’s status as a victim are all used as ways of identifying 
Muslim mentality.
Omer: I was up at Treskavica [a mountain near Sarajevo] and it was during the war 
between the Serbs and the Muslims. And if some of our soldiers found some 
of the enemy soldiers wounded, they didn’t kill them, but brought them to 
our hospital [sanitet]. Once they brought me a wounded Serbian soldier, but 
he was dead when he came to the sanitet. And even though they found him 
five hours’ walk away from the sanitet, they brought him to me, because they 
hoped that I could help him. But all our soldiers who fell into their hands were 
killed. On both sides [both Croatian and Serbian]. Every single soldier they 
caught was killed.
Friend: Our soldiers respected the Geneva Convention; if you find a wounded sol-
dier you should exchange him.
Omer: Once three Serbian soldiers were caught during battle; they were brought to 
Mostar and later exchanged. But in Srebenica they have killed 10,000 people.
We want to move on
One last part of my informants’ construction of their role as victims centres 
around how they want to rebuild a peaceful and democratic future in contrast 
to the other ethnic groups. Implicitly, one senses that the Muslims feel that it is 
not possible to suppress their decency and righteousness. Mustafa had a small 
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business producing articles for all three ethnic groups. The business was built 
on savings made during the time he was in exile. He wanted to move ahead, 
forget about the war and ethnicity and create a future, and this was naturally 
important if his business was to succeed.
Mustafa: It is true that the Croats have stolen from me. You can’t say when a cus-
tomer comes, ‘You are Croat, I don’t want to make anything for you’, and the 
same goes if he is Serb. If you did that it would be stupidity. If you looked at 
things that way nobody would be able to do anything. There would be no 
commerce, nothing. We would each be in our trench. Life goes on.
Generational lopsidedness
By identifying themselves as victims, the Muslims at one and the same time 
criticised the ethnic Other (mostly Croat) and set themselves apart as decent, 
honest and naive people. By entering the role of the victim, my informants 
stereotyped the other ethnic groups, as well as setting themselves apart as a sin-
gle ethnic group. This identification works counter to the other Muslim iden-
tifications I have outlined. Whereas the ‘Others’ in the previous identifications 
have been for instance European, the nationalists, or those coming from central 
Bosnia, the Otherness related to the role of the victim is the general mentality 
of the different ethnoreligious groups. The role of the victim, however had a 
generational lopsidedness. 
The young wanted to forget as much as possible, both about the war and 
the past. They did not want to live on the nostalgic memories of the older gen-
eration. The young had had enough of this talk about the past and this self-
victimisation; they wanted to get on with their lives. They wanted a future, and 
they wanted to listen to music, buy a car, and watch sport on television. They 
did not oppose the role of victim, but on the other hand they did not find it of 
special use in their lives. It gave no status. The ideal of tolerance and coexist-
ence was more relevant, not as a kind of nostalgic clinging to the past, but more 
as a way to get out of ‘all this’ and start afresh. The localistic identification was 
  One day when I was talking with my landlady about my trip back home to Denmark, I said 
that taxis were very expensive in Sarajevo, but were the only way to get from the hotel to the 
airport. My landlady replied: “Why don’t you just take the bus to the bus terminal and from 
there it’s only a 250-300-metre walk. Everything is destroyed there, but just follow the road, 
because there are mines, so don’t go off the road.” Her son, who had overheard our conversa-
tion, interrupted and said: “There are no mines, mother.” And she replied: “Yes there are. A lot 
of things were destroyed during the war; the frontline was there, there are mines.” And her son 
said, a little resignedly: “Mother there is no war any more, the war is over!”
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often central for the young, but again more as a territorial marker than a recol-
lecting of the ‘beautiful old Stolac.’ 
The old were often poor and many had poor health. Old people with chil-
dren and/or grandchildren abroad suffered from a huge sense of absence, but 
could at least be pleased that their children or grandchildren often had bet-
ter opportunities in foreign countries. In general, however, the old had had 
their lives. Remembering the old times may be painful, but the old were able 
to construct a parallel world which could supplement the real one. The victim 
identity, the ideal of tolerance and coexistence, and especially the Stolac spirit 
were of central importance in their practices of identification. 
The middle-aged were caught in between: they were despairing, despond-
ent and bitter. In particular, the sad future of their children tortured them, and 
their own inability to offer them the conditions for a good life. The middle-aged 
often entered a discourse of problems. From the young people’s point of view 
the old were too nostalgic and the middle-aged too depressed by problems. The 
middle-aged definitely saw themselves as victims not only during the war but 
also after. I think many wanted to break out of this persistent focus on and talk 
about problems, but they were rarely able to do so. 
Common to all is the dilemma of forgetting versus remembering. The 
creation of a possible future demanded that the war be put behind you, but fear 
of repetition and the sense of justice demanded that the offences be retold and 
remembered. The young, though, were more concerned about forgetting (it 
all), whereas the middle-aged wanted to remember; their whole life had been 
destroyed. They could not live with oblivion.
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Summary of Part III
In comparison to the two other national groups (Serbs and Croats), the re-
ligious nationalism of the Bosnian Muslims came rather late. Nevertheless, 
throughout the war it soon came to dominate Bosnian Muslim politics. And 
though the Muslim religious nationalism was definitely more ambiguous than 
were Serbian and Croatian nationalism, because it adhered to an idea of both 
ethnic coexistence and ethnic exclusion, it definitely had its say in putting eth-
nic identity to the forefront. Before the war Muslim ethnic identity was mainly 
embedded in everyday life: respectful modes of interethnic interaction existed 
which familiarised differences, and ethnic identity made up only one iden-
tity among others. The war-related violence, especially the practice of ethnic 
cleansing, and the nationalist discourse in the public realm, changed this. By 
fully objectifying ethnicity, making it the absolutely most important identity, 
the Muslims’ awareness of themselves as constituting a separate ethnic group 
became enormously heightened. One might then expect that national and reli-
gious adherence would have constituted the major part of the Muslims present 
identification of themselves as a group. As I have shown in Part III, this was not 
the case. 
National identifications were more or less non-existent, and the Mus-
lims’ religiosity had presumably found a level relatively equal to the pre-war 
period. My findings show that instead of national and religious attachments, 
my informants were attached to what they call a Stolac spirit, characterised by 
a strong local patriotism. This identification excluded the Croats who had de-
stroyed this spirit, and it was used to carve out a physical space for the Muslims, 
but it did not exclude the ethnic Other as such. Rather a spirit of ethnic inter-
dependence was highlighted. On a more general level, the Muslims of Stolac 
upheld an ideal of tolerance and coexistence. The wilful remembering of past 
respectful interethnic coexistence made up a central part of this ideal, and I 
concluded, on the background of Chapter 10, that former practices of interac-
tion had become ideals of identification. That is, the tolerant and respectful way 
the different ethnic groups interacted before the war is increasingly seen by the 
Muslims today as a specific Muslim quality. Nevertheless, this ideal completely 
contradicts the nationalist ideology of ethnic exclusion and must be seen as part 
of the Muslims’ counterdiscourse. The Muslims’ use of the pair of geographical 
concepts the Balkans-Europe was inconsistent and many-sided. Sometimes my 
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informants saw themselves as no different from other Europeans; at other times 
they embraced an endemic, authentic Balkan mentality. These identifications, 
however, all surpassed ethnicity; it was Europe and not the other ethnic groups 
which made up the Other. This in itself makes this identification part of the 
counterdiscourse, and it is increased by the fact that the discursive construct 
the Balkans-Europe was highly ethnicified by all sides throughout the war. 
The Muslims’ use of ‘the role of the victim’ was the only identification 
I encountered in Stolac which seriously stands in opposition to the Muslims’ 
counterdiscourse and where something resembling a Bosnian Muslim national 
character was constructed. By persistently identifying themselves as victims, 
the Muslims perpetuated ethnic tensions and problematised coexistence. Per-
haps a role as victims has a universal character. What, however, characterised 
my informants’ identification with the role of the victim was the way the Oth-
ers’ atrocities became proof of the Muslims’ righteousness. Seeing oneself as a 
victim, however, also has its limitations. For many, especially the young, such 
an identification carries little prestige and is rejected, whereas for the middle-
aged and the old it was an identification they could not escape from. This gen-
erational dilemma reflected a broader predicament seen in other post-war so-
cieties: a dilemma of forgetting versus remembering, or one could say between 
facilitating future coexistence versus a feeling of justice. 
To sum up, the Muslims of Stolac answered the question which the un-
made world has produced – who are we, since this was done to us? – mainly by 
engaging non-ethnic identifications, some of which have links back to pre-war 
inter-ethnic life. And these identifications can therefore be understood as part 
of their counterdiscourse.
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Conclusion
In my analysis I have presented three concepts central to understanding post-
war life among the Stolac Muslims: remaking, identification, and counterdis-
course. In short, I have looked at patterns of identification, which make up a 
central element in the process of remaking. I have analysed these identifications 
resisting the nationalist paradigm in central ways, a resistance I call counterdis-
course. Let me summarise the main argument of the book.
Inspired by contemporary anthropological studies of the experience of 
war and violence, I have stated that a major proportion of my informants’ eve-
ryday lives have been unmade by the war and post-war violence. I have focused 
on people’s experiences of how the very foundation of existence has been ques-
tioned; how the stories and values governing normal social life have been dam-
aged; how the loss of epistemological frameworks has made communicating 
about the traumatic experiences difficult; and how Stolac is pervaded by a feel-
ing of loss, which continues (though in a diminished way) the world’s unmak-
ing. This unmaking had forced my informants to question central categories 
of human experience in fundamental ways in order to remake their shattered 
world. One of these categories relates to identity: the identity of oneself and of 
the Other. For my informants this has meant answering two fundamental ques-
tions: Who are they, the ones who did this to us? And: Who are we, since this was 
done to us? In the study I have analysed the way in which my informants have 
answered these questions.
In particular, I have discussed the role of nationalist discourse in my in-
formants’ remaking of their world, as one might expect that the nationalism 
which had infected the whole area would have been the central constituent 
in the remaking of my informants’ lives – or in the work of Elaine Scarry, the 
Truth which has alleviated the pain. However, this has not been the case. This 
avoidance of the massive nationalist pressure I have termed counterdiscourse. 
Theoretically, this counterdiscourse has several characteristics. First, it only 
exists when viewed against (counter-) the nationalist discourse. As such it is 
not an independent feature; it only manifests itself in resisting the nationalist 
discourse’s search for hegemony, for instance by offering alternative non-na-
tionalist contexts for explaining and identifying. Second, such anti-nationalist 
identifications rest upon already existing cultural categories and social identi-
ties, as well as drawing upon experiences from pre-war habitual inter-ethnic in-
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teraction. The cultural part of this counterdiscourse is therefore not necessarily 
new, but the context in which it is employed is new. Former categories and ways 
of interacting obtain new values in this process. For example, I have shown how 
a local-patriotic framework (‘the Stolac spirit’) could be used to express values 
of ethnic coexistence. Similarly, the cultural category of the ‘non-cultured’ has 
been used to explain the war and the destruction of Stolac without resorting 
to ethnicity, just as former respectful inter-ethnic patterns of interaction have 
become objectified as part of the Muslims’ identification with an ideal of toler-
ance and coexistence. Third, I maintain that the value of the counterdiscourse 
should not be evaluated in terms of authenticity. Instead of seeing my inform-
ants’ conflicting values and contrasting practices in terms of real and false, I 
analyse them as evidence of the coexistence of contested discourses – in Stolac, 
a nationalist discourse and its counterdiscourse. Throughout the study, I have 
pointed out such tensions, repeatedly stressing that they are a characteristic of 
post-war life in Stolac. People both resist the nationalist framework and use it 
when remaking their world. 
In Chapter 4 and Chapter 9, I have given a historical account of the emer-
gence of nationalism in Yugoslavia generally, and in Bosnia Herzegovina more 
specifically. A discourse of nationalism spread throughout former Yugoslavia, 
leaving hardly any area of life unaffected; a nationalism which, when linked up 
with the violent practices of the war, had ethnic cleansing as its aim and method. 
According to this antagonist nationalism, the different ethnic groups could no 
longer live together. Bosnian Muslim nationalism, came late, but managed for 
the first time in the history of Bosnia Herzegovina to link territory and national 
identity with religion (Islam). Only from around 1991 did it make sense for 
the Muslims of Bosnia Herzegovina to envision an independent Muslim terri-
tory of Bosnia built upon Islam. In the ambivalent political strategies of leading 
Bosnian Muslim politicians, such national-religious exclusiveness became one 
of the war strategies. The other aim was continued inter-ethnic coexistence. I 
have also shown how this Bosnian nationalism, this new version of Muslim-
ness, collided with pre-war habitual practices of inter-ethnic identification and 
interaction. From being a domain of loose moral imperatives, religion became 
much more closely connected to a more fundamentalist reading of Islam. Eth-
nic Otherness, which before the war had been embedded in everyday prac-
tices, became dissociated from its context and represented in new, rigid and 
politicised religious categories. Ethnic identity changed from being one facet of 
identity among others to being the most defining one. Finally, respectful modes 
of inter-ethnic interactions were destroyed. 
Therefore, if one considers the following four aspects: the rise of nation-
alistic thinking on the political level in former Yugoslavia as well as in Bosnia 
001_316_post-war.indd   300 14/04/08   22:05:16
Denne side er købt på www.ebog.dk og er omfattet af lov om ophavsret. Uanset evt. aftale med Copy-Dan er det ikke tilladt at kopiere eller
indscanne siden til undervisningsbrug eller erhvervsmæssig brug.
Herzegovina; the violent practices of ethnic cleansing throughout the war; the 
ethnic division of the public space in Stolac (institutionally as well as symboli-
cally, see Prologue); and the unmaking of my informants everyday world, then 
one can understand that many of my informants’ identifications of both them-
selves and the Other must be seen as resistance to the nationalist picture of 
the world. I have outlined various ways in which my informants practised this 
resistance or counterdiscourse. 
First, they did it by recontextualising the narratives of destruction, which I 
also called non-ethnic condemnation. That is, when accounting for the war and 
the present sad situation, my informants often refrained from using the ethnic 
Other as an explanatory framework. Instead, possible non-ethnic Others were 
presented such as politika and the immoral world of politics, a category which 
was constructed as an autonomous force accounting for ungraspable aspects of 
the unmade world. The category of decent people (pošteni ljudi) was used to de-
liberately categorise acquaintances of other ethnic affiliation as decent people, 
thereby legitimising and facilitating interethnic interaction. The category of the 
non-cultured (nekultura) – clearly connected to pre-war social and cultural 
changes, mainly urbanisation and education – was also used to explain the war 
by reference to non-ethnic Others; instead allusions were made to the uncivi-
lised and the rural. And finally, the notion of the Balkan Other has been used 
to account for a destructive and violent force existing inside Bosnian culture, a 
force which is only occasionally linked up with a particular ethnicity.
Second, even though ethnic labels were sometimes employed to account 
for the world’s unmaking and the present sad situation, such labels were com-
plex and situational, and a different moral value was attached to each ethnic 
category. This complexity marks a second way of practising the counterdis-
course. I have shown how my informants operated with dissimilar kinds of 
Croats: Croats from central Bosnia, from the countryside, from Stolac, from 
Croatia, good Croats, and so on. When my informants did criticise the Croats 
in general, this was mostly done in a context with reference to violence and 
discrimination.
A third counterdiscursive practice relates to more deliberate and obvi-
ous anti-nationalist demonstrations. The outright criticism of nationalist politi-
cians, including ‘one’s own’, was an example. Another was my informants’ dis-
sociation from the newly constructed Bosnian Muslim national identity. I have 
termed this the national identity that failed. People told me how they fought 
for survival, not for Bosnia. In general the state of Bosnia Herzegovina had no 
appeal. In the same way, my informants distanced themselves from religious 
fundamentalism. They considered themselves to be believers; but in line with 
	 conclusion 301
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pre-war religiosity, being a good Muslim meant adhering to an everyday moral 
code of conduct, not visible religious displays.
A fourth way in which my informants contributed to the counterdis-
course was by identifying with values of ethnic tolerance and coexistence, in to-
tal contrast to the exclusive, antagonist nationalist discourse. The Stolac spirit 
(part of the localistic identifications) centred on the positive aspects of the co-
existence between the three ethnic groups – Croats, Serbs and Muslims. And 
pre-war embedded practices of respectful and tolerant inter-ethnic interaction 
have become objectified ideals of identification for the Muslims. Ethnic toler-
ance is seen as a primarily Muslim quality, as the other groups have abandoned 
that ideal. Nevertheless, stressing and identifying an ideal of tolerance and 
highlighting the trouble-free and joyful interaction among ethnic groups in 
the past, as well as pointing to the possibility of future interethnic coexistence, 
works counter to the nationalist discourse.
Finally, I have argued that for the most part my informants identify them-
selves in non-antagonist and non-exclusive ways. In fact some of their identifi-
cations are able to encompass members of the other ethnic groups, as is the case 
with aspects of the localistic identifications, in which one’s status as ‘real Stolac 
citizen’ is more important than one’s ethnic affiliation. As with the Balkans-
Europe identification, the different positions in this geographical symbolism 
referred not to ethnicity but to being Bosnian. The role of the victim, however, 
was a more exclusive Muslim identification, setting the different ethnic groups 
apart. On the other hand, it primarily existed among the older generation, as 
did a general preoccupation with the past, especially the idea of the good old 
days.
Before the war ethnic identity in Bosnia Herzegovina was only one iden-
tity among others, and ethnic differences were embedded in everyday prac-
tices. Today ethnic difference is all there is. The Muslims of Stolac are fully 
aware that as Muslims they constitute a totally separate group, and that ethnic 
identity is by far the most important form of identity in present-day Bosnia 
Herzegovina. In that regard the nationalist project has succeeded. Such a crys-
tallisation and explication of identity fits in well with the structurally inspired 
anthropology of war and violence, which theorises that the function of violence 
is to create unambiguous identities. However, my study has shown that for the 
Muslims of Stolac, the creation of unambiguous ethnic identities is only half 
the story. Looking at my informants’ everyday identifications, one sees a move 
in the opposite direction as well. It is a move which blurs as well as breaking 
down ethnic differences, makes ethnic labelling complex, and in fact creates 
resemblances: in sum, it resists the importance of ethnic identification. But as 
I have also argued, such a move (or counterdiscourse) is not a fully conscious 
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or deliberate strategy. The resistance to the antagonist nationalist discourse and 
the prevalence of exclusive ethnic thinking should be seen not as deliberate 
or ideological tolerance, but as a necessity, as my informants have to live with 
the ethnic Other as well as with the consequences of their own actions. Ethnic 
hatred is a luxury they cannot afford.
	 conclusion 303
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